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Throughout this thesis, I assume consumption is an unstoppable economic force that 
limits policy intervention even when the level of consumption is destructive to the 
environment. A result is that traditional policy interventions – caps, trading schemes, and 
many taxes and subsidies directly on polluting outcomes are too costly to implement in 
terms of political, social, or measured economic costs. However, I also assume that a 
limited regulator still seeks to reduce the environmental fallout. I then study some policy 
options that fit within the consumer’s limited expectations of regulatory reach. 
Deciding to use limited policy interventions is not intended to replace other efforts. I 
explore part of what could be a joint effort and emphasise perhaps short-term, stopgap 
responses to opposition. This is proposed because not all environmental problems can wait 
for justice or the environmental Kuznets curve to turn in their favour. Once we are free 
from trying to devise ways to implement first-best environmental policies, various 
alternatives emerge. 
First, I explore environmental regulation when some pollutant is necessary. Necessity 
restricts policy to determining where it must occur, and the analysis becomes one of 
whether clustering or dispersion of an activity leads to less total damages. A revision to 
current regulatory approaches results. I then discuss improving recycling, a necessity to 
transition to a circular economy model. I find there is an optimal division of effort between 
producers and recyclers and propose an incentive structure to improve product design for 
recyclability. I then review how U.S. coal power plants use technology to reduce sulphur 
dioxide emissions. The objective is to derive lessons for the next great energy transition. 
Finally, I include a foray into economic growth, inequality, and their measurement in two 
chapters on the premise that there is a link between the fate of the environment and ours.  
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Introduction – Non-Cooperative Environmental Policy More 
Broadly Defined 
I repurpose the term Non-cooperative, or Nash Environmental Policy (NEP) 
to describe a decision-making framework in the same genre as second-best 
and satisficing environmental policy approaches.1 I define it to use in 
devising and evaluating alternatives when standard environmental policies 
encounter insurmountable public or industry opposition. I then outline the 
five chapters of this thesis – three which apply NEP approaches to 
challenging environmental problems, and two focusing on inequality in 
economic growth on the basis that their combination can result in the 
overexploitation of natural resources. 
This research explores applications of a concept I unoriginally refer to as Non-
cooperative Environmental Policy (NEP), but also Nash Environmental Policy in deference 
to Nash’s contribution to our understanding of equilibria without coordination (Nash, 
1950). The term itself has been in previous use, but I claim not to its appropriate potential. 
In Haupt (2006), Hattori (2010), and no doubt a few others, it refers to non-cooperative 
games played in international environmental agreements or explains why contributions to 
environmental endeavours do not add up to commitments as in Ulph (1992) and Barrett 
(1994). If Non-cooperative games meant only one or two sorts of application as such, Nash 
would hardly be a household name. In reply to what I suggest is NEP’s premature 
designation, I non-cooperatively, unilaterally co-opt it to describe a variety of 
circumstances – to return it to a general concept. In doing so, I suggest the prior use of 
“non-cooperative environmental policy” are instead applications of non-cooperative games 
to understanding international accords. 
To the matter at hand, informally a NEP approach is an environmental policy that does 
not need further buy-in from consumers, firms, and other interested parties. It is already 
accounted for, or “baked-into” expectations. That is, an expectation on consumption, 𝐸[𝐶] 
already accounts for some policy intervention. This intervention is likely limited, and 
perhaps there is an expectation of no change in near-term consumption resulting from it. 
Consumers and firms move first as they create the need for environmental policy in the first 
 
1
 (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956; Simon, 1956)  
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place in an overwhelming majority of cases. The choice by a regulator between a NEP 
approach and a cooperative environmental policy (CEP) – where we expect consumers to 
cooperate by changing their actions – then follows.2 I justify exploring NEP more formally, 
though briefly, in the next section as it is the foundational ideology and motivation 
underlying much of this thesis. 
However, I must note that it is not the purpose of this thesis to contribute to the literature 
on non-cooperative games. The purpose is instead to convey the underlying philosophy for 
exploring the research presented in this thesis. More generally, it is also a sort of advocacy 
for pursuing environmental policies that are sometimes limited in scope but move a 
conservation agenda forward despite public resistance or indifference. The non-cooperative 
games literature itself is quite vast and crowded. Google Scholar presently notes Nash’s 
original work as having been cited approximately 12,400 times (July 2021). There is also 
a vast supply of textbooks of varying degrees of depth and complexity and many popular 
offerings on the subject. In comparison to many texts, the following discussion is simple. 
The scope is simply to provide the minimum structure necessary to convey the NEP concept 
in relation to CEP alternatives. So, nearly any text including non-cooperatives games 
material should be sufficient background, if any background is necessary at all.3 
I.1 A Formal Definition of NEP 
Assume some expectation over consumption. Define the private goods share of 
consumption through the classic construct of equilibrium – restate 𝑆𝑖,𝑡(𝑷) = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡(𝑷) as 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 (𝐷𝑖,𝑡(𝑷)) = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡(𝑷), or conversely so, for some abstract general supply, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡, and 
demand, 𝐷𝑖,𝑡, responsive to prices, P, impacting good i in period t. For any realisation 
(equilibrium) of price, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, there is a corresponding quantity 𝑄𝑖,𝑡(?̂?𝑖,𝑡). Shorthanded, this is 
some level of consumption and production in the economy where for private goods denote 
it 𝐶𝑖,𝑡. Then for any policy proposal, expectations over future private consumption are 𝐸[𝑪] 
where C is the set of consumption flows of private goods over perhaps many periods of 
accounting. 𝐸[𝑪] forms from current beliefs and information – what the individual and 
society expect over their planning horizon, T. Finally, I consider the expectation of the 
 
2
 Whether they explicitly consider NEP alternatives or not. 
3
 Several popular and sufficient examples are Aumann (2019); Dinar, Albiac, and Sánchez-Soriano (2008); Dixit and Nalebuff 
(2008); Gibbons (1992); Hanley and Folmer (1998); Harsanyi (1977); Luce and Raiffa (1957); McCarty and Meirowitz (2007); Mouline 




median voter and assume political representation votes to fit their interests – a dubious but 
common simplification with a fairly long history (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957). For this 
discussion, treat as if the median voter’s realisation is sufficient and known, 𝐸[𝑪] = ?̃?.4 A 




represent expected public goods consumption as a 
1
𝑁
 share of the public benefit of public 
policies among N consumers – also a dubious but useful and I think sufficient assumption. 
A payoff matrix is illustrative in completing the picture of one definition of a NEP and 
when it is preferable. Assume the median consumer plans to consume either ?̃? or alternative 
stream ?̃?, where they prefer ?̃? when they do not account for public goods consumption. A 
regulator can attempt to implement either NEP or CEP alternatives. However, if the median 
consumer and voter does not believe they will sufficiently benefit from a CEP, it will not 
be implemented. Besides political opposition, repeated challenges through the legal system 
over an extensive period of time may come in reply to an opposed CEP approach.  
Take payoffs to consumers, and similarly profits to firms, to be a utility derived from a 
consumption combination of private and public goods as 𝑈 (?̃?,
Φ
𝑁
). Like in the distinction 
of ?̃? versus ?̃?, here Φ is the public benefit from a policy that does not challenge the 
preferred private consumption plan – the provision of a NEP. Alternatively, let 𝜙 be the 
public benefit to a CEP and a resulting 
ϕ
𝑁
 expected share. However, because the CEP is 
dependent on coordination, it may either succeed, S, or fail, F. The latter means the 
regulator pursues the policy at some cost but ultimately cannot implement it due to 
opposition. If we assume policy either is or is not implemented, the normal form pay-out 
matrix (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) can condense to the 2 × 2 form in Figure 1 
after some manipulation. 
To analyse when NEP is the best action given public expectations, constraints on the 
parameters in Figure 1 are necessary. Assume public benefits follow 𝜙𝑆 ≥ Φ ≥ 𝜙𝐹 , 𝜙𝐹 <






) would only result 
for policies where the median consumer believes the public goods pay-out is “substantial” 
– that their share of the pay-out is larger than their private consumption loss. Because CEP 
pay-outs 𝜙𝑆, 𝜙𝐹  are dependent on the median consumer’s choice, a dimension in Figure 1 
is missing. The strictly dominated set where the consumer chooses ?̃? but rejects 𝜙 (chooses 
 
4
 So, I am not addressing matters of expectations versus realizations nor gain/loss specifications. 
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𝜙𝐹) is not shown. Also consider NEP and CEP instead of NEP or CEP. When the 
policymaker can implement CEP, I assume a NEP is no longer needed – CEP “solves” the 
environmental problem.5 So, I drop row “NEP & CEP” as well as row “No Action.” From 




) > 𝑈 (?̃?,
𝜙𝐹
𝑁
). The exception is the case when cooperative environmental policy 
is warranted – when the parties represented by the median consumer are sufficiently 
rewarded – or expect to be – due to cooperation. Examples of when this exception results 
in choosing action set {𝐶𝐸𝑃, ?̃?} are the Montreal Protocol and America’s Acid Rain 
Program. 
  Median Consumer 






r NEP Φ,   𝑈 (?̃?,
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𝑁




CEP 𝜙𝐹 ,   𝑈 (?̃?,
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FIGURE 1 NON-COOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE POLICY MATRIX 
Notes: Median consumer (and their political representative executes) chooses a consumption plan ?̃? or ?̃? where ?̃? > ?̃?, 
and Regulator – representing wider public interests in what ought to occur – chooses to pursue either a non-cooperative 
environmental policy (NEP) with total public payoff Φ or cooperative environmental policy (CEP) with total public 
payoff 𝜙𝑆 when successful and 𝜙𝐹 when it fails. Payoff assumptions include 𝜙𝑆 ≥ Φ ≥ 𝜙𝐹  because the median consumer 
and voter does not support policy implementation unless they are personally better off from doing so and Φ = Φ𝑆 ≈ Φ𝐹  
implying NEP does not, or hardly, impacts consumption level. 𝑈 (?̃?,
𝜙𝑆
𝑁
) > 𝑈 (?̃?,
𝜙𝐹
𝑁
) is the exception where consumers 
believe the public goods pay-out is so substantial that their individual share of it is larger than their private consumption 
loss under a CEP policy. The Nash equilibrium is otherwise action set {𝑁𝐸𝑃, 𝐶}. Non-cooperative environmental policy 
is the best response to consumption expectations unless they expect the cooperative public benefit to be significant for 
the median consumer and voter. 
 
I.1.1 Discussion of NEP Versus CEP 
Naturally not everyone wins with a NEP or CEP policy. Producers and firms dependent 
on dichlorodifluoromethane did not benefit from CEP policies in the Montreal Protocol, 
while overwhelmingly nations and consumers benefitted (Barrett, 2003). Nevertheless, it 
was a monumental task which took over a decade of discovery, followed by several 
amendments to what was and remains a win-win outcome for nearly all parties. What if an 
 
5
 Similarly, I leave open how many NEP or CEP to implement.  We could conceptually search over many mixed and pure baskets of 
NEP and CEP options. 
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environmental issue is so urgent that a decade or more of delay is unacceptable? What if 
we cannot ever reach a cooperative agreement because the preceding exception condition 
cannot be met?  
The democratic, short-run feasible optimal regulatory decision is to choose NEP resulting 
in non-cooperative social and private payoffs (Φ,   𝑈 (𝑪,
Φ
𝑁
)). Further, the regulator may 
not even be in a position to consider the cooperative outcome. Because consumption actions 
overwhelmingly and causally precede environmental problems, a credible commitment to 
C may have already occurred.6 The game matrix in Figure 1 is then degenerate to the left 
column. If the regulator chooses to go against the odds and pursue CEP, the likely outcome 
is failure to implement it as in, for instance, America’s Clean Power Plan and Waters of the 
United States (WOTUS) extension of the Clean Water Act (Kendall and Harder, 2015; U.S. 
Congress, 2015; Glicksman, 2017; Holden, 2017).7 The regulator should consider NEP 
alternatives. 
The argument that NEP’s are sometimes preferable is not to say that CEP’s are not worth 
pursuing. By the condition 𝜙𝑆 ≥ Φ ≥ 𝜙𝐹, when the median consumer personally benefits 
from pursuing the cooperative policy, CEP is promising and preferable. In the long run, we 
might also change public perceptions through the discovery and dissemination of 
information. That is, change the public’s utility function.8 An environmental amenity may 
also become sufficiently scarce that the marginal benefit to conservation outweighs the 
personal benefit of consumption. With more regulatory discretion and favourable courts, 
implementing CEP’s may also protect the rights of future generations. So, NEP’s and 
CEP’s need not be mutually exclusive approaches either – one perspective is that a NEP 
preserves the environmental option value until the majority of society decides to support a 
CEP. 
The NEP approach is an alternative for thinking about environmental policy. It presumes, 
foremost, limitations on the state’s power – that the state acts within the public’s 
expectations over its power. It assumes strict limitations on what the policymaker or 
regulator may attempt to implement as regulation. For instance, regardless of what the 
regulator may want to do, they must not exceedingly hinder consumption. But at the same 
 
6
 Consumers and producers might choose C as a natural combined Stackelberg leader because they must cause an environmental 
problem before we are even aware that there is one to address. 
7
 At the time of this dissertation. 
8
 Maniates and Meyer (2010) note the difficulty (even impossibility) of getting consumers to sacrifice for environmental conservation, 
and then present extensive debates on how to change consumer preferences to encourage sacrifice anyway. 
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time, the regulator remains interested and mandated to address environmental problems. 
Among the constraints, it may be that no limitations are acceptable on the quantity of 
emissions as imposed through taxes and standards and the like. We would almost certainly 
preserve the environment if all our needs are already met. Realistically, we should assume 
that consumption occurs at an environmental cost, and with an ever-growing population, 
this will increase. So instead of exploring ways a policymaker can tell people what they 
cannot do, a NEP exploration is one of what a policymaker can do after they project that 
consumption needs are being addressed but not necessarily met. These are policies perhaps 
enacted in the short run that do not intend to change the quantity of production and 
consumption much, and as a result, limits the probability that policies are decided by the 
courts because the likely plaintiffs – consumers and producers – are not unduly harmed. 
Exploring NEP is not always graceful. But taking the NEP perspective unlocks 
alternative policy instruments because the regulator is no longer preoccupied with proving 
CEP worthiness. I leave the cost-benefit analysis of CEP’s to the many practitioners who 
will no doubt remain devoted to it – CEP has a purity that is lacking in some NEP 
applications. However, the need to address many urgent environmental problems is more 
critical than ideological victory. Impasses in addressing global climate change, biodiversity 
loss, and the global proliferation of microplastics all seem to suggest that society needs 
NEP approaches. I present some NEP-adherent alternative policy approaches to address 
such issues in this thesis. 
I.2 Thesis Overview 
Having outlined the NEP ideology, I now outline the content of this thesis and where I 
deviate from NEP. In the three chapters of Part I, I derive NEP-sort of responses to three 
pressing environmental problems. I then deviate in the two chapters of Part II and explore 
economic growth and inequality. I decided to write Part II because addressing 
environmental problems without addressing poverty which leads to environmental 
exploitation is akin to treating the symptoms of an illness but not the illness itself.  
I.2.1 Part I: Applying a NEP Perspective 
In the first chapter, I assume some domestic, polluting production must occur. Two 
applications are the storage of nuclear wastes – even if going cleanly forward, our nuclear 
legacy remains, and the central collection of household wastes – a nearly ubiquitous policy 
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choice that has only become so in recent decades.9 How can we handle this environmental 
problem when taxes, tariffs and related measures are not always applicable? A model of 
when to aggregate and disperse an environmental activity is useful. I find and 
econometrically explore a few applications of aggregation and dispersion policies in action.  
In the second chapter, I switch to improving recycling rather than limiting production. I 
identify the issue of material heterogeneity within products as a remaining constraint to 
greater recycling rates. I use a product space to explore the issues involved and derive an 
efficient recycling policy given the quantity of production that occurs. The framework 
results in the optimal division of the burden to recycle versus innovate between recyclers 
and producers. This is certainly not the only issue hindering higher recycling rates, but it is 
one where a leap forward in innovation appears to be needed. 
In the third chapter, I then explore the result of abatement technology decisions on the 
sulphur content of coal consumed in the U.S. energy sector. In such circumstances, we are 
constrained by the need to supply substantial levels of energy from existing sources while 
also reducing emissions levels. I outline how ambient air sulphur dioxide levels diverge 
from the sulphur content of fuels entering power plants due to installation of abatement 
technologies that capture the sulphur content. I empirically test for the scale and incentives 
involved in the relevant low sulphur coal versus abatement technology and high sulphur 
coal purchase decisions. This leads to a simple model of the purchaser’s decision process 
and further empirical tests to validate the model. I then conclude with estimates of the scale 
of abatement costs involved for use in designing indirect policy incentives. While the 
chapter is constrained to reviewing the sulphur dioxide problem, hopefully lessons can be 
drawn that are applicable to other environmental problems. 
While each subject area has received research interest, it is the non-cooperative 
perspective that I think is important and leads to new redresses. NEP originates from a view 
of the world I do not like, of unguided and unhindered consumption. However, I think this 
perspective better represents that scarcity still abounds and a variety of human needs are 
unmet. The result is an approach to addressing at least three environmental problems while 
explicitly trying to avoid worsening scarcity in the process. 
 
9
 Stated in terms of consumption, the population wants greater consumption of safety and clean surroundings 
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I.2.2 Part II: Inequality Trends in Economic Growth 
Reducing the impact of human consumption on the environment might be undertaken 
more effectively by addressing root causes of overexploitation rather than treating the 
symptoms alone. We might observe, absurdly, that some industries (e.g. coal and oil power 
plants, garbage incinerators) even cause damages at rates that are several times the value 
added to society when environmental impacts are included (Muller, Mendelsohn, and 
Nordhaus, 2011). Chapters 1-3 treat exploitation by advising policy to limit the damages 
caused in the pursuit of consumption. But what about the factors driving the sort of 
consumption we pursue? Our behaviour is the result of complex processes resulting in the 
trade-offs we make. So, one must address the underlying causes of overexploitation, of why 
we might make short-sighted consumption decisions to the detriment of the environment. 
Toward that end, Kuznets (1955) hypothesises what has become known as the Kuznets 
curve – a relationship of first rising and then falling economic inequality with per-capita 
income. The generally inverted-U shape of the Kuznets curve has since found application 
to the environment. Grossman and Krueger (1991) popularise the notion as a relation 
between environmental degradation and income – destruction increasing with economic 
development and then declining. While receiving heavy criticism (Deininger and Squire, 
1998; Stern, 2004), it has intuitive appeal. One interpretation is that not only does inequality 
drive growth, perhaps through differential savings rates as in Chapter 5, but the 
environment also drives growth through transformation into capital (Dasgupta, 2021; 
Groom and Turk, 2021). A tension then develops in economic growth and development 
because the natural environment becomes divorced from daily life as we consume it away, 
but then becomes something we wish to have more of in our lives. Yet for a worker, we 
cannot conserve for tomorrow unless today’s needs are met first. So, perhaps the most 
significant contribution to make to preserving the environment is to ensure that we can 
meet consumption needs. At the level of the worker that must choose between, say, illegal 
logging and conservation, it means ensuring a sufficient and fair share of the returns to 
economic development reach them. Studies of the environment, growth, and inequality are 
then inexorably linked. 
In Chapter 4, I present a new way to estimate the inequality preferences implied by 
national economic growth statistics. Inequality preference estimates provide a point of 
comparison – it allows a policymaker to assess whether the distribution of gains from the 
aggregate production process match social preferences. It also allows us to assess the extent 
to which economic volatility impacts the distribution of gains and losses. I also extend the 
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framework to measuring inequality trends between social groups in society. In Chapter 5, 
Mean-Spirited Growth with co-authors Dr Ben Groom and Dr Eli Fenichel, we explore 
economic growth and societal preferences over inequality further. A more complex model 
of the economic process suggests how social preferences over inequality result in different 
economic structures. We propose some statistics to accompany gross domestic product per-
capita which highlight when society’s distribution of economic growth fits or diverges from 
social preferences. The hope is that by aiding the design of macroeconomic policy that fits 
preferences – preferably during both economic booms and busts – the impact of growth on 
the environment will be lessened, or at least fit social preferences which seem to turn in 
favour of conservation after sufficient economic development. 
I.2.3 A Note on Thesis Format 
I have presented a concept that can be explored in many ways because it is an implication 
of a core principle of economics – the existence and pervasiveness of scarcity. As much of 
our field exists to explore and address scarcity, avenues for research abound. However, 
“write three and let it be” is standard advice to those preparing a dissertation. I almost abide 
by this and emphasise three interesting but perhaps controversial applications in 
environmental economics: the burning of fossil fuels, nuclear storage, and the processing 
of consumer wastes. For readability, I sometimes reserve equations, model formalities, and 
contextual references for presentation as notes, footnotes, and exposition in the appendices. 
While this attempt at simplification is perhaps less common in a dissertation, the end goal 
is generally publication of each chapter, in whole or in part, in a preferably interdisciplinary 
journal. The approach also follows recommendations by Fawcett and Higginson (2012) and 
Higginson and Fawcett (2016) on equation density and citation rates, and Sen’s (1970) 
stylistic experiment. I do try to integrate formal material where communication necessitates 
it but otherwise prefer the approach of debating the topics at hand. 
Finally, I quote the original, 1895 LSE Prospectus to suggest this research is particularly 
fitting to pursue through the London School of Economics and Political Science:10 
“The special aim of the School will be, from the first, the study and 
investigation of the concrete facts of industrial life and the actual working 
of economic and political relations as they exist or have existed, in the 
United Kingdom and in foreign countries.” 
 
10
 underline emphasis added, source: http://www.lse.ac.uk/about-lse/our-history 
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I now begin in earnest with the subject of siting polluting activities that are necessary to 
society. It is a subject of both modern and historical relevance whose exploration may pay 
dividends as new technologies become cost-effective, transportation infrastructure 
modernises, and we attempt to address pressing environmental problems such as 








Part I: Applying A NEP Perspective   
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1. A Consideration of Clustering and Dispersion as 
Abatement Strategies for Localised Pollutants 
Clustering and dispersion of local-scale polluting activities may decrease 
aggregate – the sum of all local – damages and increase social welfare. I 
first review five areas of the literature that relate to clustering, dispersion, 
and local-scale regulation. I then apply structure to the organisation decision 
that is distinctly applicable to local-scale problems and discuss damage 
functional assumptions where clustering versus dispersion is preferable. 
While practical matters of production might bound application, the 
framework suggests untapped efficiencies in environmental regulation likely 
abound as well as unpaid recompense due for accepting damages as a 
service. I present a few empirical examples. I also note applications where 
some expectation of damages is the relevant datum such as in the storage of 
nuclear waste. A key takeaway is that the property right to the agenda – 
whether we decide first the organisation of polluting activities or quantity of 
emissions – impacts the level of pollution and welfare. 
Keywords: Environmental policy, industrial organisation, clustering, agglomeration, 
dispersion, local, damages, abatement, nuclear, waste, agriculture, prostitution, 
homelessness, terrorism. 





At present, substantial attention in the press and across the sciences focusses on global-
scale concerns such as climate change (see an extensive literature survey on global climate 
change in Dobes, Jotzo, and Stern, 2014; and discussion of Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) media coverage in O'Neill, Williams, Kurz, Wiersma, and 
Boykoff, 2015). However, many pollutants, and subsequently policy problems, are local in 
nature. The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) – another United Nations-backed agency of more than 550 environmental 
scientists – makes such a case (IPBES, 2018). They argue that destruction of biodiversity 
– often a local-scale concern – is at least as dangerous as climate change.11 While global 
climate change captures headlines, these local concerns not only worsen, but are in sum an 
existential threat to world order. In reply, this paper contributes a discussion on the 
conceptual siting of polluting activities that do not individually have a global impact, yet 
cumulatively pose a global threat. 
To be clear, I explore clustering and dispersion – the zoning of polluting activities – to 
mitigate environmental damages at N-localities from N-externality generating processes. I 
focus on local pollutants which are those that inflict damages on a limited, i.e., generally a 
sub-global scale. A local emphasis usually entails discussing emissions and damages at a 
site, community, ecosystem, or watershed scale. While each issue is small, the combined 
effect from many sites on social welfare is potentially large. Yet despite the small scale of 
each local issue, intractable issues inhibit effective policy responses. Regulatory and 
emission activities at some site i are generally treated as irrelevant to those at other sites j. 
This disconnect factors into both the determination of optimal emissions and whether 
consumers care about the issue. The empowerment of policymakers and regulators may 
also be at a higher administrative level – say regionally or nationally – such that the 
concerns of a small subset of the population at local sites are crowded out. Even if 
policymakers develop a coordinated policy response, perverse incentives result in 
opposition to successful implementation. Among these, firms have a strong incentive to 




 The extent of biodiversity loss does perennially catch the interest of the popular press, for instance Briggs (2020) and IPBES 
popular press coverage in Watts (2018). 
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There are several reasons why the traditional environmental policy framework fails to 
address localised pollutants. Three should be enough to make the case for this research. 
First, the benefits of production at some site accrue to many members of society offsite due 
to intensive modern production methods. Meanwhile, a few residents experience the 
associated damages, perhaps intensively. Rather than a setting for a Coasian solution, the 
scale of modern production, administrative level of regulation, and rational indifference of 
consumers leaves the problem unsolved. Second, within localities, it is reasonable to expect 
that there is a level of damages that totally destroys an ecosystem. The local destruction 
possibility contrasts with a global public good, such as the atmosphere, where it is likely 
impossible for mankind to destroy it entirely. I then introduce the possibility of full site 
degradation into models of damages. The result is that the policymaker may end up 
choosing how many sites are sacrificed to meet society’s needs while preserving others. 
Third, implementing punitive or restrictive regulation at the scale where local damages 
occur is difficult. The imposition of restrictions at some site i invites the transfer of 
production to other sites j – leakage through relocation. Depending on the scale of what 
“local” implies, this transfer may be to the next municipality or waterway, and the result is 
emissions leakage without meaningful increases in transportation and other variable 
relocation-related costs for the polluter. 
I begin by outlining a key policy result. I then show more carefully that damage 
functional form impacts whether polluting industries cause more harm when congregated 
or dispersed, even for some fixed total output. An implication is that whether environmental 
scientists discover the correct representation of damages – an important topic (see for 
instance the discussion in Paul et al., 2020), and whether policymakers use it in crafting 
regulation, impacts not just the scale, but the sign of policy effectiveness. I compare the 
resulting impact on total social damages under different industry organisational 
assumptions. I often assume out of convenience that the default case is a uniform dispersal 
of some necessary activity across available sites, and then compare damages to those under 
a concentration of polluting activities with special attention to the role of the total site 
degradation possibility. 
I initially take the level of total emissions as a necessity to meet society’s needs, given 
their technology level. One way to think about this is to discuss a future where society 
abates all but the most complex emissions to protect public health. Those that remain are 
then a necessity, and if nothing else, are the remnants of past production such as nuclear 
waste that takes thousands of years to become safe (Besnard et al. 2019; U.S. NRC, 2002). 
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There are less extreme ways to defend the framework, but this assures long-term relevance. 
I then introduce abatement costs into the model and show why the standard marginal 
abatement cost-marginal damage (MAC-MD) framework is ineffective in addressing N-
locality, N-externality generating activity problems. The analysis leads to a revised 
emissions tax, fee, or penalty system to incentivise congregating to less sites or one site 
when called for. In doing so, I demonstrate the importance of controlling the environmental 
agenda. Some generally intuitive examples and empirics then suggest that firms and 
individuals respond to reorganisation incentives. Finally, I suggest the combined threat of 
localised pollutants should be taken as a call to action to develop a more complete policy 
framework. Some of the implications of this exercise may be surprising given the simple 
nature of the model introduced. 
This research draws on several areas of the literature and so an expansive literature 
review is in order. So, before delving into the local scale damages model I review the 
relevant literature in five parts – on the impact of non-convexities on economic theory, the 
land sparing versus land sharing debate, zoning and dispersion policies, damage functional 
forms, and the policy literature on jointly regulating emissions based on damages and 
abatement costs. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The primary contribution of this paper is to redefine the local damages function to include 
a 100-per cent damages possibility. A second contribution is to define the local 
environment relative to other environments in a region and note the policy implications that 
result. Several areas of the literature are relevant to these simple additions. I first review 
the economic discussion on the implications of non-convexities in functional forms on 
economic theory. This has been a matter of occasional debate for the last century. I then 
review the hotly debated subject of land sharing versus sparing in regard to environmental 
protection. Often this debate is focussed on agriculture versus rural conservation, but it 
certainly does not need to be so constrained. Third, I survey the literature on zoning and 
dispersion of polluting activities for pollution control. Then, I briefly review the literature 
on damage functional forms. This extends beyond the economics field and briefly makes 
note of some comparatively exotic formulations. However, only a few generally 
representative functional forms are needed to make the points in this paper. Finally, I briefly 
review the policy-focussed environmental literature on damages and abatement costs 
pertaining to jointly regulating separated sites. This is the sort of regulatory problem that 
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this paper is primarily intended to support. As these five segments of the literature are all 
relevant to the subject at hand, there is some overlap between them. I start with the non-
convexities debate. 
1.2.1 Impact of Non-Convexities on Economic Theory Literature 
Economists have been quite concerned with non-convexities in our functional 
representations for both consumers and firms for some time. Pigou (1920) recognized the 
issues that non-convexities would cause in finding optimal solutions. Hotelling (1935) and 
Samuelson (1950) briefly discuss the issue and that it leads to situations where the observer 
would be unable to tell whether a firm has reached an optimal solution at all. They viewed 
it as something to basically avoid in economic models. Koopmans (1957) then discusses 
the implications of ignoring nonconvexities and that the economics profession needs to 
develop more realistic models including those with non-convex functional forms.  
Substantial advancements in addressing non-convexities then occurred in the 1959 
through 1969 debate on the matter which resulted in what seemed to be a satisfactory 
conclusion for mainstream economists. Farrell (1959) notes that in the real world, 
indifference maps and productions functions will likely often not be entirely convex. After 
discussing when non-convexities would lead to problems, Farrell then shows that in many 
cases – including some with corner solutions – that non-convex representations do not 
impact the optimal solution. This led to a substantial debate, highlighted by a set of 
correspondence in 1961. Bator (1961), Farrell (1961), Koopmans (1961), and Rothenberg 
(1961) hotly debate how practical Farrell (1959)’s examples of non-convexities are, among 
other criticisms, but in general Farrell’s points stand. 
The debate on non-convexities in standard economic models then gets basically avoided 
altogether through a convenient observation – that non-convex preferences have a convex 
hull which will approximate them well when finding optima in competitive markets with a 
large number of participants. Starr (1969) gets substantial recognition for discussing the 
validity of such quasi-equilibrium as the Shapley-Folkman theorem in reference to 
correspondence with Folkman and the contributions of Shapley and Shubik (1966) on 
approximating, quasi-equilibrium. However, Rothenberg (1960) also discusses the 
approximating convexity of sums of non-convex sets, and Aumann (1964, 1966) explores 
the same result under stricter assumptions. Further, Diewert (1982) traces the idea to Wold 
(1943) as a restatement of taking the convex hull of non-convex preferences, which in turn 
is a much older and more general mathematical concept. Regardless of origin, the result 
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satisfied many mainstream economists, for example Arrow (1969), and the debate pretty 
much ends with this convenient though not always applicable solution. Despite the issues 
of the convexity assumption, it is incredibly convenient. So, one approach is to rely heavily 
on it anyway and just note that non-convexities violate it as in, for example Montgomery 
(1972) as did Arrow (1969) on setting up markets for pollution control licenses. But by 
then the wider debate on nonconvexities in the environmental subfield is underway. 
As is well known, one of the fields where the large N participant requirement is less often 
met is environmental economics where we must explicitly consider market thinness. In the 
case of local-scale damages as in this paper, N is often one or close to it. So, the issue of 
nonconvexities in our functional forms warrants still further discussion. Starrett (1972) gets 
substantial attention in the environmental economics literature for raising the debate. The 
issues that Starrett raises have also been raised in different settings by Baumol (1964) and 
Portes (1970). But what distinguishes Starrett (1972) is showing that tax-based approaches, 
and under some conditions artificial markets, can still work in the presence of non-
convexities. 
To summarise Starrett (1972), externalities can be the cause of non-convexities in 
production functions which may then cause the classical conditions for optimality not to be 
satisfied. Further, this can cause there to be no stable equilibria in generally thin markets 
such as for pollution licenses. This depends on whether production and pollution occur on 
a nonconvex segment of the production-pollution curve. Pollution-driven nonconvexities 
can also make setting the optimal tax rate difficult. Starrett notes that if we still try to find 
optimality by, say, raising an environmental tax iteratively, we may just arrive at a local, 
non-global optimum and not even know that we have done so. By addressing the externality 
problem then, the policymaker may cause a serious private problem for the firm and a 
headache for the regulator.  
Adding to Starrett (1972), Starrett (1973) discusses the issue in more game theoretic 
terms. In short, when externalities or other sources cause nonconvexities, there may be no 
core – stable game theoretic equilibria – in markets and/or we may not be able to distinguish 
local maxima from global maxima at all. Laffont (1978) continues this line of thought and 
shows that decentralization of control, like artificial markets, is not likely to lead to Pareto 
efficient outcomes when nonconvexities result from negative externalities. So then, they 




Slater (1975) also makes the argument that our MAC-MD framework is only effective in 
finding interior optimality in the special case of downward sloping MAC curves and 
upward sloping MD curves. Further, Slater notes that many externalities may be best 
represented by MD functional forms that are not upward sloping or convex, particularly if 
the externality is the aggregate of several qualities impacting the polluttee. This is clearly 
true, but interestingly in the local-damages case there may be a non-zero optimal level of 
pollution and production in the aggregated case even when in the disaggregated case, say, 
represented by a downward sloping MD function, suggests zero pollution is optimal at each 
site. Then, a locality condition provides a justification for otherwise irrational types of 
production. 
Burrows (1986) then takes a different perspective on externality-driven nonconvexities 
and instead asks how important these nonconvexities are – unlikely special cases or likely 
to be common? Burrows explores producer-producer models where one firm’s externality 
impacts other firm’s output. Even with nonconvexities in the form of a shutdown decision, 
they still find merit in regulation in many hypotheticals – that the value in regulating often 
exceeds deadweight losses of doing so imprecisely. Burrows then explores the implications 
of when many firms, with nonconvex MD functions, are aggregated. In short, the result is 
not unlike that of quasi-equilibrium in the mainstream economic literature – that we can be 
reasonably accurate in regulating the aggregate. Burrows also suggests the ability to 
regulate in the aggregate even in cases where the interior of the MD function is nonconvex. 
So, while regulating a firm would lead to substantial inefficiencies with imprecise 
regulation (in producer-producer cases), setting an aggregate for an industry polluting a 
commons in a way that can be described as globally convex is still possible. In the local-
scale case, we must however be quite concerned about interior solutions and nonconvexities 
as we cannot rely on the aggregate at a local site to lead to quasi-equilibria. We can, 
however, with sufficient production still rely on the equilibrium at an aggregating site. But 
then, the issue remains of setting a tax correctly at non-aggregate sites, versus the at least 
approximately accurate aggregate AAD-based tax to be discussed. But this is not a new 
problem, rather an existing one that perhaps impacts many studies.  
The matter of nonconvexities continues to find some interest in the field. Particularly 
relevant to this discussion, Helfand and Rubin (1994), notes that nonconvexities of the form 
of decreasing marginal damages – as in the case for clustering in this paper – suggest a role 
for policy that attempts to cluster a damaging activity into smaller areas. They identify that 
a standard Pigouvian tax will not necessarily have the desired effect of concentrating 
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pollutants, but they do not note the alternative I show in this paper because they do not 
consider the explicitly local damages functional form of this paper either which is necessary 
to do so.  
In the end, it seems that non-convexities are not the theory/optimality destroyer that they 
were first suggested to be. A century of thought on the matter has certainly made progress. 
Of most interest here, the aggregating tax proposed later in this paper bypasses some of 
Starrett’s issues. I now continue the literature review by outlining the land sparing versus 
land sharing debate that is a particularly hot topic at the moment in the fields of 
environmental economics and sustainability. 
1.2.2 Land Sparing Versus Sharing Literature 
For many environmental problems, such as those involving water and air pollution, the 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis (an adaptation of Kuznets, 1955) suggests that 
society can grow its way out of environmental problems. That is, first environmental quality 
decreases with economic development, but crucially quality then increases with sufficient 
development. One premise is that once a society’s population is sufficiently well off, they 
can afford to substitute away from polluting means and pay directly or indirectly for a 
healthier environment. Powerful entities with a focus on development such as the World 
Bank have advocated for such an approach, for example in Beckerman (1992).  
Unfortunately, not all environmental problems fit with the environmental Kuznets 
hypothesis and rather may be exacerbated by higher incomes. One of these is that higher 
incomes tend to lead to higher food consumption. So, with globally improving incomes, 
food demand has surged in recent decades leading to vast expansions in agriculture at the 
expense of the natural environment. This has resulted in one of the most intense and 
important debates in the field of conservation – whether to spare or share space between 
human activities and the natural environment, particularly in terms of agriculture versus 
land conservation for species habitat. This is the land sparing versus land sharing (LSP-
LSH) debate. One particularly promising way that the local damages specification I note 
can contribute to the environmental field is through informing some cases of the LSP-LSH 
debate. 
Waggoner (1996) might be credited with starting the LSP-LSH debate when they asked 
how much land we can spare for nature in the pursuit of feeding a global population of ten 
billion. But Green, Cornell, Scharlemann, and Balmford (2005) really set off the current 
debate. At the time, conservationists reportedly favoured LSH, while agricultural producers 
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and development-focussed entities favoured LSP. Green, Cornell, Scharlemann, and 
Balmford outlined the two positions. Importantly they also show, quite approachably, when 
sparing or sharing would result in greater total yields and species population sizes based on 
concavity and convexity assumptions about agricultural yields in response to density 
changes – in other words in response to losses due to field-level conservation. 
Fischer et al. (2008) expand on Green and colleagues by taking a case studies approach 
to explaining the differences between LSP and LSH approaches and outcomes resulting in 
a set of recommendations for when either policy is preferable. Matson and Vitousek (2006) 
and others also ask whether increased agricultural intensification will result in more land 
sparing. Their conclusion is essentially that policies to encourage intensification must be 
part of a larger LSP framework. Ewers, Scharlemann, Balmford, and Green (2009) further 
support this point empirically by observing that increases in staple crop yields only weakly 
increase conservation. As another angle on this debate, Chappell and LaValle (2011) ask 
whether agricultural production and biodiversity conservation are compatible, or whether 
it is strictly a matter of trading one for the other. We now know, as Chappell and LaValle 
suggest, that the ecosystem services received from preserving nature include positive 
values to agriculture when properly structured. Fischer et al. (2014) suggest integrating 
such values into LSP-LSH decision models, among the lessons learned during the 
preceding decade of debate. 
Some suggest that in recent years the LSP-LSH debate has leaned in favour of land 
sparing policies, but the debate itself is far from over (Pearce, 2018). Goulart, Carvalho-
Ribeiro, and Soares-Filho (2016) note at least 800 references to the LSP-LSH debate in the 
literature by 2016 and this has continued to grow. One reason for the interest is no doubt 
that billions of dollars are at stake when we discuss policies impacting agriculture at a 
national or global scale. But also, no single LSP-LSH policy can be one-size fits all. Phalan 
(2018) observes that there are several factors involved and that where a researcher’s 
conclusions on the debate fall can quite often depend on their assumptions. They then see 
sparing as much land as possible – LSP – as the safest option. That is, policies encouraging 
highly intensive agricultural production on the least areas possible given all the 
uncertainties involved are preferred. Goulart, Carvalho-Ribeiro, and Soares-Filho (2016) 
also note the diverse set of factors involved. But they instead focus on the array of 
possibilities and assumptions about animal species – including concavity or convexity of 
damage functional forms – rather than focussing on agricultural production assumptions as 
in Phalan (2018). The result is that Goulart, Carvalho-Ribeiro, and Soares-Filho instead 
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advocate for sharing – LSH – as their default agriculture-conservation policy. Yet Crespin 
and Simonetti (2019) suggest that the role of human-nature conflict is underrepresented in 
the literature. Their point is essentially that LSH is not likely to be an effective policy unless 
we research and include policies to mitigate conflict between land users and species in the 
natural environment.   
Others suggest that no single approach, nor one conceived in a partial equilibrium 
vacuum, can be sufficient. Kremen (2015) reviews several quantitative studies of LSP-
LSH, then advocates for a mixed solution. That is, suggesting modest land sparing be paired 
with modest land sharing in surrounding areas. Kremen also suggests the land in 
agricultural or other production be managed labour intensively rather than by using sources 
of capital without regard to cost. Finch et al. (2019), Finch, Green, Massimino, Peach, and 
Balmford (2020), and Finch et al. (2021) make Kremen’s recommendations more 
actionable and recommend a three-tiered landscape of full conservation, high yield farming, 
and mixed lower yield semi-natural plots. They find in the specific cases of a few bird 
species that this maximises the summed benefits to wildlife and agricultural production. 
Basically, they find that land sparing maximises benefits across a number of indicators as 
long as some lower yielding land is planned around or between conservation plots. Salles, 
Teillard, Tichit, and Zanella (2017) focus instead on cost, specifically integrating markets, 
into the LSP-LSH debate at the forefront. They argue that land sparing, from an 
“economist’s perspective” as they claim, is likely to lead to higher demand and more 
pressure against conservation. That is, higher yields leading to higher profits, leading to 
more interesting in expanding agricultural production.12 The bigger point that these authors 
make is that the policymaker must consider and plan for human behaviour – policies must 
align incentives, which is hardly new but a critical point. This is increasingly emphasised 
in later research, such as Jiren, Dorresteijn, Schultner, and Fischer (2018) where careful 
consideration of the “social-ecological context” – ecological and institutional factors – is 
found necessary for effective policy. We might include, or even emphasise, getting the 
prices involved right, which the local-scale model I explore attempts to do. 
Of course, LSP-LSH is part of a larger debate on zoning policies which in turn impacts 
several factors including environmental justice. Campbell, Kim, and Eckerd (2014) model 
 
12
 Salles, Teillard, Tichit, and Zanella (2017) are also concerned as others have been that the spatial arrangement of sparing will lead 
to decreased efficiency of conservation areas due to issues such as pesticide drift. However, I would argue that if the species of interest 
is prone to pesticide damages, then a conservation area where pesticide drift can occur was not a conservation area after all  and should 
not be treated as such nor rewards given to producers based on it. Balmford, Green, Onial, Phalan, and Balmford (2019), however, find 
that even with such imperfections, land sparing often still outperforms sharing in terms of species conservation. 
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the zoning of polluting activities in terms of the impact of environmental justice in terms 
of unequal health impacts on minority segments of a population. They find that proactive 
zoning – in terms of restricting polluting activity locations before the damage can be done 
– improves environmental justice measures. In comparison, reactive zoning – restricting 
where people can live after the damage from an activity has been done – first reduces 
environmental justice measures and then trends toward equivalent in the long-run. So, there 
are likely costs to getting it wrong and, as in most policy, to changes in policy. 
Substantially missing in the debate is the local damages function I outline in this paper, 
and importantly, the related concept of ‘regional’ in relation to local sites. The local-
damages framework allows the setting of conservation prices – taxation for land sharing 
approaches versus alternative payments for land sharing plots.13 Regional instead informs 
on how maximally far apart conservation plots can be. This may be the limitation of travel 
distance of the species of interest and when biodiversity corridors are instead necessary for 
species. In general, the result is a framework supporting the implementation of land sparing 
approaches while offering alternative prices for land sharing if agricultural producers so 
choose. The subject of land use in the modern era is naturally closely tied to zoning. So, 
the next section briefly reviews the use of zoning and recent developments in zoning policy 
to mitigate the impacts of pollution. 
1.2.3 Zoning and Dispersion Literature 
Pollution control was perhaps one of the first purposes of urban zoning. In antiquity, 
polluting and particularly odorous activities necessary to a city’s survival would generally 
take place outside the city’s walls. Then, as the walled system of protection fell out of 
fashion, polluting activities continued to be indirectly assigned to districts. Arendt (1958) 
notes that, until the industrial revolution, manufacturing tended to be a home-based 
business and so polluting activities tended to occur in areas of cities zoned for particular 
occupations or the social groups more often engaged in a particular occupation. Talen 
(2012) notes that following the industrial revolution, city planners began to zone for 
polluting industries to mitigate the rampant destruction of the city environment and human 
health that occurred with mass industrialisation. While zoning and pollution control have 
perhaps been linked since beginning of urban living, the prevalence and intensity of zoning 
 
13
 Setting aside the matter of leakage which is beyond this paper. However, Finch et al. (2019), Finch, Green, Massimino, Peach, 
and Balmford (2020), and Finch et al. (2021) address it as a practical matter by also noting the necessity of semi-conservation areas 
around conservation plots. 
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experienced today really developed within the last century. Yet for much of zoning’s 
history as today, the objective has remained the same –isolate a particular activity or set of 
activities from the population. That is, in effect, to aggregate polluters somewhere else. 
Holland, Hasegawa, Taylor, and Kauper (1960) discuss how the legal framework for 
restricting the location of heavy polluters was still in its infancy through the 1950’s. 
Kurtzweg (1973) notes that by the 1970’s, with the U.S. EPA established in 1970, that 
research on safe pollution levels and spatial planning was starting to substantially increase. 
Like Kurtzweg, other early works such as Dajani, Jett, and Vesilind (1977) were occupied 
with spatially arranging pollution sources such that some safe emission ceiling was not 
exceeded. With perhaps a bit of path dependence, research and policy on spatial planning 
for pollution basically continues to primarily zone polluting activities separate from 
residential and other uses as single-use zones. Generally, the number and size of zones, if 
not taken as exogenous, is then a function of transportation costs. 
White and Wittman (1982) instead consider under what conditions it is better for polluters 
to be established in the same areas as pollutees and instead purchase abatement 
technologies rather than relocate. To operationalise relocation, they consider “double 
pollution taxes” on both polluters and pollutees such that both parties have incentives to 
invest and relocate socially efficiently. They then expect that, in the long-run, polluters will 
tend to agglomerate and that the tax on pollutees overcomes incentives to basically live 
conveniently near work.  
Head, Reis, and Swenson (1995) is an example of another line of research that emerged 
in this period. They study the incentives for firms to agglomerate even without pollution 
taxes being applied. Hochman and Rausser (1990, 1999) then model whether zoning is 
needed at all and how many zones are optimal based on a dispersion function that is either 
concave or convex as well as travel costs and alternative land use values. The dispersion 
function models how pollution from an industry is transmitted, with a convex function 
suggesting that pollution levels drop off rapidly with distance and subsequently implying 
that an aggregated, larger zoned area of polluting industry is less damaging (minimise the 
border between a polluting zone and surrounding areas). Rather than a Pigouvian tax, 
Hochman and Rausser arrive at a tax equal to the total land damages in the grid of a polluter 
to then use in balancing land use for polluting activities against other rent generating ones 
such as residential uses. 
So, we can observe that zoning need not be strictly by command-and-control type 
approaches. A multisite approach to zoning and pollution with a bit of free will preservation 
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is to identify the optimal level of tax applicable to each pollutant at each location and apply 
it such that industry organises efficiently. This is in, for example, Tomasi and Weise (1994) 
and is sort of zoning by taxation. (They also find that a system of Pigouvian taxes may be 
insufficient for reasons like those discussed by Hochman and Rausser). One can also take 
the location of polluting activities as exogenous and effectively permanent, then apply a 
tax as in Goetz and Zilberman (2000). Either approach as well as outright zoning by 
ordinance may be appropriate and sometimes sufficient under different circumstances. 
Taking location as given is, for instance, perhaps the most realistic assumption when 
dealing with agricultural production. In comparison, not assuming that location is fixed 
may be more appropriate when regulating housing developments or the location of industry 
with modest relocation costs.  
As noted, Head, Reis, and Swenson (1995), Puga (2010), and certainly in others there are 
incentives for firms to aggregate without state intervention. These include information 
sharing/learning, development of a robust labour pool, and reductions in operating and 
logistic costs. Locations may also have natural advantages – known as a “first nature 
advantage” – that lead to agglomeration (going back to at least Marshall, 1890). One 
example is the build-up of (polluting) shipping activities in an area due to the construction 
of a port in a natural harbour. But since firms do not always aggregate, one must assume 
that what are known as “centrifugal” forces must also operate on industry. Particularly 
appropriate for the topic at hand, van Marrewijkm (2005) outlines that local-scale pollution 
from industry itself or collocating ones may make aggregation undesirable. It then stands 
that intervention may be in order when the aspects of a pollutant suggest that aggregating 
would be socially optimal while a centrifugal force has been naturally dominant.  
Lange and Quaas (2007) further explore the centrifugal effect of pollution on industry 
location by adding transportation and human capital considerations. Of more novelty, 
increasing human capital reduces the number of workers that would be exposed to pollution 
for a given level of output, and subsequently offsets the effects of pollution on organisation. 
Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas (2013) presents a model where the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces on industry can result in aggregation, particularly around natural 
advantages, but also dispersion of activities with increasing regulation. Kyriakopoulou and 
Xepapadeas (2017) then explore the competing forces on industry location further while 
adding in labour location incentives. Related to White and Wittman (1982), they find that 
both a tax on polluters which is site-specific, and a subsidy targeting labour which is also 
site-specific is necessary to reach optimal allocation in their model. Both approaches would 
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seem to require a more substantial regulatory burden than most policymakers prefer to 
undertake.  
Arnott, Hochman, and Rausser (2008), like many of their predecessors, explore the role 
of transportation costs. They note that as transportation costs increase, the incentive to 
aggregate or zone industry away from residences decreases compared to residential-
industry integration – perhaps with additional regulatory and abatement costs – and the 
impact on rents and prices is explored. A corrective tax of the form in Hochman and 
Rausser (1990, 1999) based on the total damages to a parcel from a polluting activity is 
then noted as bringing about an efficient spatial allocation. These and other research on the 
role of transportation costs have led to interesting innovations in the idea of optimal 
taxation versus outright zoning. However, my research sidesteps transportation costs to 
take a different perspective and instead assumes they are negligible in comparison to other 
costs involved in production and pollution. A limited interpretation is that the present paper 
constrains itself to particularly local – very small – environmental problems. However, the 
empirical applications to follow suggest that the former, more general description of 
transportation costs being minor compared to other considerations is more accurate.  
I next present a short literature review on damage functional forms before discussing the 
joint regulation of polluting activities at separate sites. In zoning as well as the LSP-LSH 
debate, knowledge of the functional form of damages is often necessary to know whether 
policy to aggregate or disperse an activity is more socially desirable. 
1.2.4 Functional Form Literature 
A brief review of damage functional forms is outlined here. It precedes the discussion of 
the four generally representative ones that will be emphasised later in the paper. I have 
already noted that the concentrating possibility is suggested in Helfand and Rubin (1994). 
The issue of uncertainty over damage functional form currently weighs heavily in 
environmental discussions. Metcalf and Stock (2017), for instance, emphasise the 
seriousness of this uncertainty in estimating the social cost of carbon with any confidence, 
and Kopp et al. (2012) suggests functional form impacts the results of many studies. Some 
discussions of damage form in environmental economics are in the context of global-scale 
concerns. But others such as Paul et al. (2020) and Dasgupta and Mäler (2003) undertake 
studies of functional form within the context of biodiversity and ecology. Functional form 
also finds extensive discussion in toxicology and, more recently, legal literatures. I find the 
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toxicology literature to be a good place from which to initiate a discussion of functional 
forms. 
Toxicology has a long history of discovering and debating damage functional forms at 
the levels of individuals and populations. These usually take the form of dose-responses – 
the biological response in terms or mortality, cancerous tumour growth, etc. to levels of 
some exposure (dosage). An extensive discussion of such functional forms can be found in 
Eaton and Gilbert (2008). They include discussions of concave and convex biological 
examples such as derived from Lassiter, Barone Jr., Moser, and Padilla (1999) (concave), 
and Dobo et al. (2011) (convex), but also more complex relationships such as the logistic 
S-shaped dose-response. An S-shaped form can be observed in many studies. A simple and, 
for many, relatable example is on the dose-response to wine consumption in Gilbert (2012), 
and a more environmentally relevant application in mining silica exposure in Utembe, 
Faustman, Matatiele, and Gulumian (2015). Nash and Revesz (2001) equivalently discuss 
concave and convex damage functional forms in the context of local and regional tradable 
permit schemes – that the optimal distribution depends on damage functional form. 
Calabrese and Baldwin (2003) discuss the ramifications of hormesis in toxicology – that 
small doses of some substances are beneficial – which is equivalently that negative 
marginal damages initially result from some polluting process.14 Wiener (2004) discusses 
linear, convex (discussed as supralinear), concave (sublinear), and also hormetic functional 
forms in the context of emissions trading schemes. The ramifications of the hormetic 
functional possibility has been further debated recently, for instance in whether polluters 
should emit more nitrogen oxides in urban settings to reduce ozone (see comment by Fraas 
and Lutter (2012) and reply by Muller and Mendelsohn (2012a)). 
There are, however, many potential complications to modelling dose-responses or 
exposure-damages relationships well. Goodson et al. (2015) discusses that synergistic 
effects – interactions between different carcinogens in their case – may increase total 
damages. Clewell, Thompson, and Clewell (2019) find modelling complications in that 
there can be many “thresholds” for mutation and toxicities leading to cancers – points of 
sudden change in the response to carcinogen dosage. Another possibility is a relationship 
that is not hormetic but has a minimum threshold before any measurable response is 
observed. Waddell (2004) emphasises that there is a time aspect to response levels and 
when subjects are tested. In Waddell’s case, the results of extrapolation from low-dose to 
 
14
 The existence of hormesis has long been conjectured in folk medicine as well as folk environmentalism. For instance, exposure to 
small doses of allergens to address allergies, and the existence of species that thrive following limited oil spills. 
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high-dose effects depends on when dissection of their subject rats occur. Faustman and 
Omenn (2012) discuss that such uncertainties make the process of toxicological risk 
assessments extremely difficult, and by extension, so too other risk assessments. 
Controversially, the U.S. Environmental Potection Agency’s response to uncertainty has 
been to assume linear dose-response relationships as the baseline until evidence suggests 
otherwise (EPA, 2005) (Abt, Rodricks, Levy, Zeise, and Burke (2010) discuss a decision 
process to move away from the EPA’s linear assumption). One can also find several dose-
response relationships not fitting the aforementioned cases, Sunstein (2010) discusses a few 
of these. 
A couple notes remain to be made on the environmental justice component and possibility 
of corner solutions despite concave functional forms. An important discussion on 
functional form is emerging in the legal and environmental justice literature. Rowell (2012) 
sets off the debate by discussing how functional form and the allocation of exposure has 
extensive ramifications on environmental justice and the existence of potential Pareto 
improvements through distribution. This has immediate parallels in the joint regulation of 
separate sites as in, say, Muller and Mendelsohn (2009), Fowlie and Muller (2019), and 
this paper. It has also been noted in the literature that the MAC-MD framework can fail to 
arrive at an interior solution even without nonconvexities or international trade. Winrich 
(1982) outlines that if a damage function is instead sufficiently concave, any optimal 
planning will be confronted with a corner solution – an all or nothing optimal policy. We 
are again in need of alternative policy tools as in this paper to address production with 
externalities. I next discuss the literature around damages and abatement cost-based joint 
regulation. 
1.2.5 Damage and Abatement Cost Policy Literature 
Preceding a discussion of jointly regulating polluted sites, it is perhaps informative to 
connect the subject to the international trade literature on specialisation. This is useful 
because people – or at least firms and political establishments – have repeatedly shown 
themselves to be willing to specialise in a polluting activity, raising the quantity of pollution 
produced locally, when their incentives sufficiently support such a course of action. Dean 
(1992), Azhar and Elliott (2007), Copeland (2000), Copeland and Taylor (1994), and 
Copeland and Taylor (1999) each show in the context of international trade that just such 
aggregation – in the form of spatially separating incompatible industries – can and does 
occur internationally. Generally, the resulting division is specialisation of the cleaner 
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industry in a more financially advanced economy while a less fiscally advanced one 
specialises in polluting industries that are polluting. This certainly should not be surprising 
as it is a natural extension of Smithian, Ricardian, and other discussions on the division of 
labour and resources. Benarroch and Thille (2001) counters that transboundary pollution 
would muddle the picture – that specialisation/clustering of polluting activities does not 
work when substantial transboundary leakage is present. This is fitting with the conditions 
put on local damages in this paper where leakage is excluded or insignificant. However, 
Unteroberdoerster (2001) also suggests that specific assumptions about the form and who 
is impacted by transboundary pollution matter and the result of specialisation may hold. 
One reason that the literature on international specialization is first noted in this section 
is that the literature on damage functions was in general quite focused on the transboundary 
pollution problem for a while (Sturm, 2003) leading to a bit of path dependence in 
discussing local scale-type environmental problems. One result is that the line of literature 
on transboundary spillovers – leakage – suffers from a lack of key characteristics of the 
local damages functional form outlined in this paper. So, the ability to aggregate to a single 
site is not, unfortunately, even within the purview of many papers outside of a gains from 
specialisation argument. In the preceding literature review on the LSP-LSH debate, the 
costs of either approach are often discussed at a farm level and sometimes summed over a 
landscape, fictional or literal. Here I will note some of the literature on instead jointly 
regulating something akin to a landscape. But it is perhaps first useful to again digress and 
note why we need a policy at all. 
Silva and Caplan (1997), Boadway Song, and Tremblay (2013), Ogawa and Wildasin 
(2009), and Arbex, Behringer, and Trudeau (2017) suggest that decentralised planning can 
be at least as efficient as central control over environmental matters. However, Fell and 
Kaffine (2014) instead suggest that such results are heavily assumption driven, and rather 
that centralised planning is necessary for efficiency. But perhaps more important in either 
case, Coase (1960) outlines stringent conditions for an environmental problem, even a local 
one, to find redress without state intervention. Baumol and Oates (1988) also note that even 
when parties can reach an agreement, the “solution” is sometimes to shift an externality 
onto other groups not involved in the negotiations. The containment requirement of this 
paper’s framework – no leakage from sites – makes it distinct from, say, a state “black-
spot” policy as discussed in Siebert (2008). In a black-spot policy, the state balances 
summed damage savings against, say, international opposition and replies, and a total 
damage possibility is not assumed or discussed. However, there are parallels in the decision 
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process. Cases of redress without state intervention exist of course. Ostrom (1990) 
chronicles hundreds of cases where successful management of the commons occurs without 
an exogenous power involved. Ostrom’s metanalysis notes several factors that are common 
to successful cases. Summing them up: it is arduous work, requires close and frequent 
interaction between all parties, and generally expensive monitoring. Parties cannot solve 
many environmental problems independently as they often fail the Coase conditions for an 
agreement to be possible – particularly low transaction costs – or do not exemplify the 
Ostrom factors that make one probable. It is then likely, if an environmental problem is to 
be addressed at all, that a central power intervenes to coordinate intervention across local 
sites.  
Fortunately, many environmental problems have convenient non-Coasian, non-Ostrom 
analytical interpretations and solutions. Generally, these begin by defining the 
environmental problem in terms of an externality, which is hardly a new idea. Adam Smith 
in 1776 gives an example of a positive externality (from education) at a time when the 
world’s resources still seemed limitless (Smith, 1994 edition), and Marquis de Condorcet 
in the same year provides examples of a few negative externalities (Sandmo, 2015) albeit 
somewhat arbitrarily deciding who was wronged (from factory pollution). Pigou (1920) 
generally receives credit for formalising the idea of the externality, particularly negative 
ones. Pigou’s concept received a lot of criticism on various technical grounds in the first 
decades, for example by Buchanan (1962). However, operationalising Pigou’s ideas on 
optimal standards and taxes by Baumol and Oates (1971), and defence of Pigou in Baumol 
(1972), muted criticism and modernised policymaking on environmental externalities. 
The most recognisable and intuitive framework for many environmental problems 
summarises Baumol and Oates’ general equilibrium model, where the user contrasts 
environmental damages against abatement costs. The shortest review is that policymakers 
seek to minimise the sum of abatement costs, 𝐴𝐶(𝑥), and damages, 𝐷(𝑥), as deterministic, 
separable, and continuous functions of emissions, x, as 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥} 𝐴𝐶(𝑥) + 𝐷(𝑥).
15 The 
unconstrained optimality condition for an interior solution – where neither “cost” 






. We often write this as marginal 
abatement costs, 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥), versus marginal damages, 𝑀𝐷(𝑥), as the point where 
𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥) = 𝑀𝐷(𝑥). Likely the most familiar version of the MAC-MD framework 
incorporates externalities into Samuelson’s (1954) pooled public good. But this is usually 
 
15
 So, expressed as additive rather than compounding interactions occurring. 
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depicted as a 1 × 1 space of one polluter creating one environment problem and hardly 
descriptive of many environmental problems or society-wide regulatory environments. 
The more general situation is to assess N polluters and M receivers of damages. Muller 
and Mendelsohn (2009) provide a heterogeneous, non-local 𝑁 ×𝑀 application of several 
polluter’s emissions inflicting overlapping damages at many sites in a way that modern 
computing has only recently allowed researchers to quantify. The difficulty of relating 
damages to specific sources in the setting of Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) – of an 
overlapping “mixing commons” – is a sticking point for some, for example Fraas and Lutter 
(2012). But this uncertainty is addressed in reply by Muller and Mendelsohn (2012a) as 
well as by Muller (2011). The general impact of differential damages are then explored 
further in Hsiang, Oliva, and Walker (2019), as well as the redress framework advocated 
for extensively in Muller and Mendelsohn (2012b). Fowlie and Muller (2019) explore 
further optimal regulation in such a mixing commons. They find damages-based, 
differentiated tax policies are first-best – essentially the preceding separate-optimal 
regulatory framework – as they are not exploring a regulatory problem addressing damages 
of the local form. In fact, no application addresses jointly regulating 𝑁 ×𝑀 disjoint, local-
scale polluter-environment pairs where full site destruction is possible. As implicit in 
Muller and Mendelsohn (2009), the “polluter” at a site represents the summed pollution of 
perhaps many polluters at the site. Within such a site, the standard framework of allocating 
among several polluters applies here too. The joint regulatory framework is instead another 
layer that sets the total of site level emissions, to then be allocated within the site. We might 
visualize the current application as a diagonal 𝑁 ×𝑀 matrix where 𝑁 = 𝑀. Regulation of 
these disjoint and local sites, whether jointly or separately, has significant implications for 
both optimality and implementation of environmental regulation. 
Having now reviewed five relevant areas of the literature, I proceed with a basic model 
of local scale environmental damages. The next section outlines the perhaps modest 
adjustment to damages functional form that is needed to represent local-scale problems and 
environments more accurately. It is a simple contribution with significant implications for 
how we optimally regulate many pollutants as well as social problems. 
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1.2 A General Model of Local Pollution Damages 
It turns out that under certain conditions, it is always better from an environmental 
perspective to aggregate some types of activities. To arrive at the relevant conditions, I use 
a simple framework for thinking about local environmental damages. Let a per-site damage 
relation, 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖), be defined piecewise as 
(1) 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = {
𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖),         0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 100
100,             𝑥𝑖 > 100         
, 
such that 
𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖): {𝑥𝑖𝜖ℝ|0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ +∞} → {𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)𝜖ℝ|0 ≤ 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≤ 100}, 
and assume scaling 
𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖 = 0) = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖 = 100) = 100 
 
where I discuss 𝑥𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) in percentages unless it is more convenient to use other terms. 
There is no reason not to consider more complex mappings, save for clarity. Scaling the 
input and output to percentages defines exposure 𝑥𝑖 by result 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) such that exposure, or 
a dose, of 𝑥𝑖 = 0-per cent causes 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 0-per cent degradation of the environment in 
question. Similarly, a dose of 𝑥𝑖 = 100-per cent is a threshold where 100-per cent of the 
environmental value of a site or system is lost. That is, polluters inflict 100-per cent of 
possible damages. The damage specification also allows exposure beyond full degradation. 
In between the zero and 100-per cent extremum, 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖) specifies the rate of change or 
transition in damages from exposure and is sometimes critical to finding when aggregation 
or dispersion of a polluting activity is in the public’s interest. The transition and extremum 
cases also suggest when some value is figuratively left on the table when aggregation and 
dispersion possibilities are ignored. An example emphasises the analytical value of the 
framework. Suppose we deposit a meter of refuse atop some natural environment. 
Afterwards, several more meters of rubbish deposited cannot further damage the extinct 
ecosystem buried below. However, choosing to deposit more rubbish at the site avoids 
damages at other sites that could have been used for dumping too.  As in the refuse example, 
suppose the local site is contained – or at least is intended to be – such that a no-leakage 
condition is included in this analysis. 
We must also have definitions for the terms “local” and “regional”. I define “local” 
endogenous to the damage specification and the related term “regional” to cost. Local is 
the scale where an activity can conceivably result in 100-per cent damages. This definition 
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is pragmatic to features of the polluting activity and pollutant rather than as a geographic 
feature. The concept of regional complements local by placing a limit on site 
substitutability. It is the scale where we can discuss selection among alternative sites over 
a long enough time horizon – the long run – as costless. In an industrial setting, say the 
siting of a replacement powerplant, regional may cover several hundred square kilometres 
and thought of as a costless move because, by the end of a power plant’s service life, related 
infrastructure likely must also be renewed. Regional might be a city, neighbourhood, or 
even a city park or similarly small setting. However, it might also be a nation or even global 
– I note examples of both extremes in the appendix. Throughout this paper, I then discuss 
choosing among local sites as though it is costless, but this is a simplification. The concept 
region is the financial bound where the costless movement among local sites within it is 
not a misleading approximation. 
1.2.1 The Accounting of Damages Across Isolated Local Sites 
The sum of pollution damages across N locations is ∑ 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  from a total of 𝑋 =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  polluting activity. Whether the aggregate is subadditive, additive, or superadditive 
has implications for interior, joint-optimality. However, if 𝑋 ≥ 100 is possible for any one 
site, then it is sufficient to render at least one of 𝑁 sites valueless in supplying 
environmental amenities. It then follows that the joint-optimal outcome is sometimes a 
corner solution – the novel contribution of the preceding conceptual framework. 
I first discuss industry organisation nonparametrically, perhaps unnecessarily so, to put 
minimal structure on the problem. To be explicit, we can expand the sum of damages as 
𝐷𝑁(𝑥𝑁) + 𝐷𝑁−1(𝑥𝑁−1) + ∑ 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁−2
𝑖=1  where the ordering of 𝑥𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑁 is arbitrary if 
sites are symmetric. With site and exposure symmetry can be assumed, 𝐷(?̅?) = 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) =





𝑖=1  at any sites 𝑖, 𝑗. We can then specify a comparison of incomplete 
clustering as 𝐷(𝑀?̅?) + (𝑁 −𝑀)𝐷(?̅?) ⋛ 𝑁𝐷(?̅?) where 𝑀 sites of activity consolidate. In 
the case where only two sites engage in the polluting activity, the useful simplification is 
to compare 𝐷(𝑥1 + 𝑥2) ⋛ 𝐷(𝑥1) + 𝐷(𝑥2) for pollution levels 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. The two-site case 
clearly highlights that if the relation 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is a twice differentiable and well-behaved 
function, concavity or convexity over the domain of exposure informs whether greater or 
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lesser marginal damages occur.16 We can appeal to Jensen’s (1906) inequality for support 
on this matter. The framework applies to clustering and dispersion benefits in all manner 
of organisational structures. I focus on the value of clustering to one site versus the 
dispersion to many equally of all polluting activities. That is, comparing the effect of 
industrial structure 𝐷(𝑁?̅?) to 𝑁𝐷(?̅?) for clarity. 
At the risk of spoiling the experience, I label three general, damages-based formulations 
as the cases for clustering, dispersion, and indifference. These depend on whether 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖) is 
convex, concave, or linear, respectively. I also discuss the more pragmatic logistical 
damage form. The latter finds frequent application in integrated assessment modelling, 
natural sciences, and medicine as descriptive of a biological or ecosystem dose-response to 
some exposure. While I refer to it as the biological case, it is sometimes formally the 
convex-concave case. The next section outlines the form of Equation (1) under each of the 
four functional forms of 𝑑(𝑥), a brief note on other alternatives, and the implications for 
damage avoidance-based policies. 
1.3 Representations of Local Damages and Joint-Optimal Implications 
Having outlined the key characteristic of the local-scale damage function and damage 
accounting across local sites, I now emphasise four general damage functional forms. As 
the literature review notes, these are not exhaustive but chosen to cover a range of 
applicability and convey intuition. The critical point in choosing among or diverging from 
these is to fit the circumstances under study.  
1.3.1 Four Basic Local Environmental Damage Relations 
In practice, the difficulty of discovering a representative functional form may be more 
severe in the study of localised pollutants where funding is limited. However, researchers 
may also have specific, informative site knowledge, and increased sensitivity to pollution 
may provide useful variation.17 To aid selection, I explore the policy implications of 
selecting among four basic, generally representative functional forms. These may be further 
 
16
 Another representation of whether it is better to aggregate or disperse occurs by defining 𝑥′′ > ?̅?𝑖 > 𝑥′ and 𝑥
′′ − ?̅?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 − 𝑥′ 
including the case when 𝑥′ = 0 such that total polluting activity, 𝑋 is unchanged. Compare fully symmetric 𝑁𝐷(?̅?) to 𝐷𝑁(𝑥′′) +
𝐷𝑁−1(𝑥′) + (𝑁 − 2)𝐷(?̅?). Let the state represented by equal sharing of the pollution load be 𝔻(𝑋) and the alternative be 𝔻(𝑋)′. If 
𝔻(𝑋)′ > 𝔻(𝑋), concentration increases total damages. Assuming welfare is strictly decreasing in damages, thus reduces welfare, and 
suggests mandating dispersion as a welfare increasing policy. If 𝔻(𝑋)′ = 𝔻(𝑋), marginal changes in damages are either constant or 
symmetrically increasing and decreasing such that society prefers neither structure over the other at level X. Alternatively, if 𝔻(𝑋)′ <
𝔻(𝑋), concentration decreases total damages and increases total welfare suggesting clustering as a method of damage abatement. 
17
 Siebert (1975) makes a similar argument in that regional regulators may be more attentive to a population’s issues than federal 
ones (and that regional regulation may be inefficient because they do not account for changes in emissions outside their domains). 
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extended with caution to site-specific needs, and the literature informs on the variety of 
alterations available. This study, however, is unique in modelling localised pollution 
damages in a way that allows for total loss. 
I begin with similarities. Each representation fits the piecewise damage relation of 
Equation (1), sharing the implication that beyond 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖 = 100) = 100 the marginal 
damage from additional exposure is zero. This is equivalently known as a “ceiling effect” 
in pharmacology. The implication has a powerful impact on the analysis: In a closed system 
– one that does not allow spillovers to other environments – the sum of site damages is 
always subadditive at a sufficient production scale. It follows that transferring in polluting 
activities from other sites results in society-level welfare improvements. A policy of 
clustering may still be undesirable to implement without compensation to those it impacts 
on equity grounds. However, we may observe it in real policy preferences. For instance, 
activities resulting in a high degree of toxicity or danger tend to occur at highly aggregated 
sites. Munitions dumps, nuclear waste disposal sites, and municipal dumps all tend to be 
large and serve many customers outside the immediate area. They also tend to find use 
solely for their primary purpose as though they hold no environmental or other use- and 
non-use-value.  
But not all environmental problems are of sufficient scale to result in corner joint-
optimality. To analyse interior cases, I continue to assume that any two sites in comparison 
are symmetrical unless stated otherwise. In real site comparisons, users must consider 
different population levels, sensitivities, etc. at every site. But without site and pollutant 
specifics, it is not useful to focus on asymmetries at this point. I take each 𝑑𝑖(𝑥𝑖) as a twice 
differentiable function to discuss them in simple language and manipulate easily. I also 
only discuss exposure and damages as environmental “bads” and that the least damages 
outcome is an unexposed environment. However, the framework extends to, say, a 
development context. Four basic cases follow under these assumptions. 
The case for dispersion: The first case is of increasing marginal damages. Dispensing 
with site notation, from initial exposure, 𝑥, a unit increase results in a greater magnitude of 
damages than from preceding units. I present this case in the marginal form in Figure 2, 
top-left. One burden in its use is that the policymaker must rationalise why each additional 
unit is progressively worse. Another is the mathematical discontinuity at 100-per cent 
exposure. In a biological case, justification is on the basis that full extinction suddenly 
occurs. But then, one must defend why full extinction does not occur at a lesser dose when 
the population is unsustainable. Case for dispersion sites are superadditive in damages, 
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𝐷(𝑁𝑥) > 𝑁𝐷(𝑥) when 𝑋 = 𝑁𝑥 < 100, and any division of 𝑋 other than equally among 
the largest number of sites available results in more damages (Note 1). 
 
Note 1 – Applying Jensen’s Inequality 
Theorem: if 𝑑(𝑥) is convex in 𝑥, total damages are minimised by dispersion. Likewise, if 𝑑(𝑥) is 
concave in 𝑥, total damages are minimised by clustering. Proof: This is immediate from the 
definitions of convexity, concavity, and Jensen’s (1906) inequality. In the case for dispersion, 
Jensen’s inequality is generally stated for two sites, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, and production share 𝜆 ≤ 1 as the 
inequality 𝐷(𝜆𝑥1 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥2) > 𝜆𝐷(𝑥1) + (1 − 𝜆)𝐷(𝑥2) while 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 < 100. This would be 
conversely stated for a case for clustering. A proof on why aggregation is preferable beyond 100-
per cent damages is also immediate: 0 < 0 +  for any positive value . 
 
The case for clustering: The second case is characterised by an opposite effect – 
decreasing marginal damages. Each additional unit of exposure results in a smaller increase 
in total damages than from the prior unit. One application is when subsets of a population 
show greater resilience than others. I present this case in the marginal form in Figure 2, 
top-right. It suggests that the first increment of exposure is more damaging than any 
subsequent exposure – an assertion the scientist or policymaker must carefully consider. In 
this case, sites are subadditive in damages – minimisation of total damages always occurs 
through moving the activity to the least number of sites possible for any X.18 This may 
make a case for clustering pollutant easier to regulate as there is not an interior-versus-
corner optimal policy dichotomy. 
 
18
 The feasibility of production in toxic environments has changed in the era of automation. Aggregation to higher levels of pollution 





FIGURE 2 GENERAL REPRESENTATIONS OF MARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
Notes: Four general marginal damage functional forms meeting the conditions of Equation (1). I include plots of their total damage 
forms and production origins in appendix A1.1 Damage Functional Forms. 
(top-left) The case for dispersion: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) > 0.  
(top-right) The case for clustering: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) < 0.  
(bottom-left) The local indifference case: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) = 0 
(bottom-right) The biological (logistic) case: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) ≥ 0 𝑜𝑛 𝑥 ≤ 50 and 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) ≤ 0 𝑜𝑛 𝑥 > 50 
 
The case for indifference: Constant marginal damages characterise the third case as in 
Figure 2, bottom-left panel. Any unit change in exposure results in an identical change in 
marginal damages up to the discontinuity at 𝑥 = 100. This case may be appealing on the 
grounds of simplicity, but the practitioner should justify the discontinuity. As a practical 
matter, kinks and discontinuities may be more straw men than substantive critiques – a 
functional form with many kinks and discontinuities can best represent complex 
environments. See, for instance, Mendelsohn and Schlesinger (1999) or Win, Zin, 
Kawasaki, and San (2018) where damages from environmental events are divided into 
component damage relations. These, in turn, may sum to an unsmooth combined functional 
form. The essential point is to undertake careful contemplation (Pindyck, 2017). In the case 
for indifference, dispersal and clustering are irrelevant up to the point where total damages 



























for indifference can then be grouped with clustering as it is never an inferior strategy to do 
so. 
The biological case: Finally, I present a more involved case of both increasing and 
decreasing marginal damages, depending on the level of exposure, in marginal form in 
Figure 2, bottom-right. The logistical form (see appendix A1.1 Damage Functional Forms 
for context) has origins in the biological and medical sciences where populations have a 
degree of diversity.19 The level of diversity is the essential justification – the practitioner 
believes some members of the population to be substantially affected by a pollutant, while 
others are resilient. At an ecosystem scale, some forms of life, e.g. amphibians, 
brachiopods, and insects, may be harmed by small doses of a waterborne pollutant (Kerby, 
Richards-Hrdlicka, Storfer, and Skelly, 2010) while extraordinary doses are necessary to 
denude the landscape. The generic form of this case does not contain discontinuities to 
justify but does have an inflexion point in the aggregate form which I plot at 𝑥 = 50. This 
level is discussed in the biological and medical literature as 𝐿𝐷50 – the “lethal dose” 
resulting in a 50-per cent mortality rate – an important standard in comparisons. A 
drawback is that the biological case requires a higher threshold of institutional knowledge 
to regulate well as up to the inflexion point dispersion is preferred, then clustering is 
preferable.20 
We might also consider the implications of lower threshold and hormetic damage 
functional forms. If the number of sites is not constrained, a regulator might prefer an 
arrangement that allows each site to operate below the lower threshold. In the hormetic 
case, this can be further improved upon by operating each site at the damage minimum – 
the point where negative damages are maximised. Within the context of weighing the 
benefits of damage reductions against abatement costs, however, lower threshold and 
hormetic additions are likely unimportant. Rather, the optimal allocation weighs these 
aspects of the damage function against the costs of abatement. 
In total, the four basic cases condense to two optimal arrangements – either clustering or 
dispersion, and it is always preferable to encourage clustering with sufficient total 
emissions. Limitations to these choices exist. In the introductory example, clustering in 
agriculture may reduce some damage, yet the necessity of dispersing over vast tracts of 
 
19
 Verhulst devised the logistic form in 1838 to describe asymptotic population growth in response to Malthusianism (Bacaër, 2011; 
Verhulst, 1838). But it might also be traced to Gompertz’ (1825) work describing human mortality rates. In both cases, their general 
forms have been widely adopted in the biological and medical sciences. 
20
 There is also a special case where symmetric transfers around 𝐿𝐷50 can results in the case for indifference if the slope of the 
marginal damage function is comparable around the point and a balanced number of sites transfer pollution. 
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land is often necessary for production. Even so, I have demonstrated that this framework is 
still applicable in the planning of, say, agricultural drainage to waterways. Reorganisation 
to reduce damages may also be a matter that polluters can seek remuneration for as a 
service. Alternatively, a community willing or forced to accept an aggregated or dispersed 
polluting activity may have an additional basis for payments beyond redress. The scale of 
such payments may be large and pivotal during policy development. Next, before exploring 
optimality, I discuss how the framework should change when based on expectations of 
damages rather than certainty. 
1.3.2 Decision Making Using Expectations: Nuclear Sites and Disasters 
Many environmental decisions must be made based on an expectation of exposure rather 
than stocks and flows of pollution. That is, the population accepts exposure with some 
probability, while expecting many sites to incur zero damage. They – the public, site 
managers, and policymakers – may approve activities that can result in devastating 
damages because the probability of exposure is small. Nuclear power production and fuel 
disposal are cases that immediately come to mind. 
Say some exposure 𝑥𝑖 occurs at site i with probability 𝑝𝑖, zero exposure with probability 
1 − 𝑝𝑖, and the probability of exposure increases in the scale of the activity. The expectation 
of exposure 𝐸[𝑥𝑖] > 0 and resulting damages 𝐷𝑖(𝐸[𝑥𝑖]) are the relevant ex-ante decision 
datum.21 Such binary risk occurs in using a substance sufficiently toxic that any release 
renders an environment undesirable for further activity. That is, 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖 > 0) = 100 and any 
additional exposure results in zero marginal damages. Binary states need not be the only 
application and non-use value may complicate matters. For instance, there are reports of 
abundant wildlife, including endangered species, within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone and 
Korean and Cyprus demilitarised zones (Mycio, 2005; Billock, 2018; and Constantinou, 
Hadjimichael, and Eftychiou, 2020, respectively). But for the purpose at hand, I find binary 
states and use value analysis sufficient. 
Before exposure, the calculus of site selection up to this point holds. However, once 
exposure occurs at a site 𝑖, the decision simplifies. When exposure 𝑥𝑖 occurs, we still have 
𝑥𝑗 = 0 occurring at all other sites and these other sites continue to operate in the world of 
 
21
 This paper does not address damages-dependent utility functions which are assumed to be decreasing in damages, ceteris paribus. 
However, note that a utility function has an expected utility form if and only if (iff) it is linear, in this case iff 𝑈(𝑝𝑖𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)0) =
𝑝𝑖𝑈(𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑝𝑖)𝑈(0) which we might assume simplifies here to iff 𝑈(𝑝𝑖𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)) = 𝑝𝑖𝑈(𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖)). So, whether we use the 
expected utility form need not be determined by the damage functional form. 
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expectations. For pollutants with lengthy rates of decay and high clean-up costs, the 
exposure level at site 𝑖 may now be a permanent feature. Policymakers and operators face 
the decision to shut down the exposed site, transferring the potentially polluting activity 
elsewhere, or allowing continued use by perhaps using greater automation or protective 
measures. The consumer needs that have been driving production (including that of safety) 
and total polluting activity have not changed, and thus demand related to 𝑋 does not decline. 
If operations are transferred, other sites shoulder additional production and risk burdens 
resulting in 𝐸[𝑥~𝑖
′ ] > 𝐸[𝑥~𝑖] for post-disaster dispersal 𝑥~𝑖
′ . Alternatively, operations 
continue at site i, and in addition to realisation 𝑥𝑖, an expectation of further exposure 
remains. Then 𝑥𝑖 + 𝐸[𝑥𝑖] is the relevant decision datum at site i. Figure 3 illustrates 
continued operation using the biological case fitting with a nuclear accident or 
exceptionally toxic, nondegradable chemical spill. Let the region fall within the dispersion 
doctrine range of the biological case at the initial scale of production. After exposure 
𝑥𝑖,then 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝐸[𝑥𝑖]) = 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝐸[𝑋]) = 100 and the region transitions to the 
clustering doctrine minimising total damages. Using site i as an accumulator for the risky 
activity preserves all other sites in the region. One finds an example of this in the use of the 
Chernobyl Exclusion Zone for the storage of low and medium risk waste from other 
Ukrainian nuclear power plants (Laraia, 2019). We might more generally consider any 
nuclear production or waste site that is then expanded for waste storage. 
 
 
FIGURE 3 EXPECTATION OF ADDITIONAL EXPOSURE 
Notes: Additional activity at an already damaged site might fall in the range of decreasing or zero marginal damages. An 
activity that originally warrants dispersal at the scale of production and risk in the region, may now warrant clustering at the 
damaged site. 
 
𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖 +𝐸[𝑥𝑖])
= 𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖 + 𝐸[𝑋]) = 100 
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Having set the bounds of the sort of damage functional forms used in this paper’s 
analysis, I now proceed with a discussion of policy development. I also discuss issues 
related to whether a policy that is otherwise designed to achieve optimality will actually 
lead to improvements for society and the environment. 
1.4 Local-Scale Environmental Policy Development 
One application of this paper’s framework is that there is a necessary pollutant that we 
cannot abate through technology or curtailment and instead decide to mitigate damages 
through industrial organisation. Other situations place a policymaker in similar 
circumstances. Policy development generally begins after some regulator asserts authority 
over the production quantity of pollution. Earlier supra-local environmental problems, for 
instance, sulphur dioxide emissions from power plants, have resulted in state and national 
regulatory scales. This geographic and political separation from the local scale constrains 
local governments to find options, given the level of pollution exogenously allowed. One 
option in the spirt of non-cooperative environmental policy is to use zoning, which often 
remains a local concern save for national infrastructure. Zoning is increasingly used to work 
around the issue of federal- and state-level environmental regulators not sufficiently 
addressing local-scale problems (Nolon, 2002). But local zoning can also be used poorly – 
to set exceptionally strict local environmental regulations because the local community and 
regulator only bears part of the cost when they set a higher than efficient standard. This 
results in states tending to overregulate versus federal standards or cap and trade systems 
(Williams, 2012). To be discussed, this may exacerbate underachievement of 
environmental goals in the aggregate due to leakage of polluting production beyond the 
locally regulated bounds. 
So, the discussion of local-scale environmental regulation proceeds by noting a 
substantial constraint on policy success that I think is underappreciated. The role of the 
agenda – which components of a comprehensive environmental policy are decided first – 
puts the feasibility of the results to follow in context. Reaching an optimal solution by 
jointly regulating across local environments then follows as well as a section highlighting 
some other issues to keep in mind during policy development.   
1.4.1 The Role of the Agenda in the MAC-MD Regulatory Framework 
The most troubling aspect of regulating N-environments is that control of the agenda – 
whether N or 𝑥𝑖’s are chosen first (with 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  in mind) impacts total emissions and 
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damages. It is particularly troubling because the default – choosing 𝑥𝑖 separately, or de 
facto separately, has the potential to result in larger N and more pollution. 
Consider N emitters or groups across N sites. Discussing the optimal N under different 
damage assumptions has been the fundamental problem up to this point where X is 
exogenous and then N is endogenously determined to minimise total damages. That 
approach assumes that we have a necessity X, and then choose optimally 𝑁 = 𝑁∗ from 
some workable interval, 𝑁𝑎 ≤ 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁𝑑 where 𝑁𝑎 is a regional clustering result – perhaps 
to one site, and 𝑁𝑑 a large dispersion. 
Now, in the MAC-MD framework say we choose N first then each 𝑥∗ optimally. The 
symmetric sites simplification aids discussion, else choose N and then X by choosing 𝑥𝑖 for 







)] and 𝑥∗ =
𝑋
𝑁
= ?̅?; equivalently solving 𝑀𝐴𝐶(?̅?) = 𝑀𝐷(?̅?), or more generally 
𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖) for all i in 1:N. This separate, local sites interior problem contrasts 
with the pooled public good equivalent of Samuelson (1954): 𝑀𝐴𝐶(?̅?) = 𝑁[𝑀𝐷(?̅?)].22 
The separate-optimal result is good news in that it matches the traditional framework of 
environmental economics – the optimal emissions in each environment is decided 
independently of other environments if the regulator must solve the local sites problem 
separately. For example, the optimal abatement of agricultural runoff in Iowa is 
independent of that in Idaho.23 But what if the level of X is a necessity and cannot be met 
by the separate optimal condition at N sites – that 𝑁𝑥∗ is greater or lesser than a necessity 
level of pollution X? 
Solving the interior solution jointly given necessity X – and assuming all units of 
polluting activity can relocate in the long run – requires a different framework. First, 
suppose the number of sites as well as the total quantity of emissions are fixed, the objective 
and relevant constraint are min
{𝑥𝑖,…,𝑥𝑁}
∑ (𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐷(𝑥𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1  subject to 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  which in 
the symmetric case results in optimality conditions 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) +𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑗) +
𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑗) for all 𝑖, 𝑗 in 1:N (Note 2). This is equivalent to the separate-optimal framework 
when firms and sites are symmetric and the scale of X is exactly such that 𝑀𝐴𝐶(?̅?) =
𝑀𝐷(?̅?) can be satisfied at each site. These conditions seem unlikely to be met in many 
 
22
 This is specifically the symmetric polluter solution which is sufficient for this comparison. The purpose of this research is  not to 
address the Samuelson problem which has a solution of setting the sum of individual marginal benefits equal to the margina l cost of 
providing a public good.  In this case, marginal benefits are in terms of damage reductions and marginal cost in terms of abatement costs. 
23
 To be clear, they do not share a watershed. They also have different growing conditions and so for many crops are not substitutable 
and may serve different markets. 
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cases. When the joint-optimal objective allows selecting all 𝑥𝑖’s and the number of sites in 
𝑁𝑎 ≤ 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁𝑑, then 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖) can be satisfied only if 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
∗𝑁
𝑖=1  can be 
satisfied in the bounds of 𝑁𝑎 ≤ 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁𝑑. So, in either case – when optimally selecting 𝑥𝑖’s, 
or both 𝑥𝑖’s and N, it is entirely possible that the joint-optimal interior solution is different 
from the separate-optimal solution and is a second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) 
outcome.24 
 
Note 2 – Solution to the Joint Regulation of Local Sites 
The symmetric as well as asymmetric case optimums can conceptually be solved by the Lagrangian 
method. Suppose for two sites 𝑖, 𝑗 there is an interior optimal solution. Then, 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) +𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖) −
𝜆𝑥𝑖 = 0, 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑗) +𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑗) − 𝜆𝑥𝑗 = 0, and ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 −𝑋 = 0 with shadow price, 𝜆. Let 𝑇𝑖 =






 subject to ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑋. With symmetry, 𝑇𝑖 =





𝑋 for 𝑁 sites, here 
𝑋
2









) 𝑋, so site shares are based on their contribution to the total environmental cost 
across all sites. 
 
Another issue arises when the regulator decides 𝑥𝑖’s but does not fix either N or X. 
Assume 𝑥𝑖’s are first set optimally at the site level. Under some conditions for the polluter 
such as a superadditive MAC function, (𝑁 + 1)𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥∗) < 𝑁 ∗ 𝑀𝐴𝐶 (
𝑁+1
𝑁
𝑥∗) can occur 
if we restrict firms to 𝑥∗ locally.25 That is, an incentive can exist for polluters to expand to 
other locales rather than invest in abatement, and we observe leakage by expansion. Total 
emissions increase and possibly total damages depending on the functional form. The 
implication is that whoever owns the property right to the agenda – whether 𝑥𝑖’s or N are 
decided first, controls the total level of pollution, damages, and abatement. There is then a 
perhaps substantial incentive for industry to prefer the status quo form of regulation – 
choosing 𝑥𝑖’s and equivalent methods without regard to N, given current regulatory 
methods. 
Unfortunately, choosing 𝑥𝑖’s first also lays the groundwork for the result that it is optimal 
to cluster all activities to one site and pollute without limit. The limiting result of the 
incentive to disperse to avoid regulation is that 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑑, followed by polluters operating 
 
24
 That is, when we cannot separate-optimal choose 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗ for all 𝑖 in 1:N, we can still joint-optimal solve 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖) =
𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑗) + 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑗) for all 𝑖, 𝑗 in 1:N. 
25
 At least if 
𝑁+1
𝑁
𝑥∗ ≤ 𝑋. 
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subject to regulation limiting production to 𝑥 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥0, 𝑥
∗} for unregulated level 𝑥0. Since 
𝑁𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥0, 𝑥
∗} ≥ 𝑁𝑥∗, else the regulation was not binding to begin with, the region may 
be closer to the clustered solution being more efficient. I next discuss the difference 
between separate- and joint-optimal regulation when the agenda – and the general 
regulatory environment underpinning it – is appropriate. 
1.4.2 Achieving Optimality 
As in the preceding sections, suppose there are N potential sites for some polluting 
activity and polluters of an inconsequential number group themselves at these sites such 
that we can also refer to them as N polluters. Let the marginal abatement cost function at 
site i, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖), be well behaved, downward sloping, and defined for all values of 
pollution, 𝑥𝑖, and alternatively abatement. In this initial discussion, let the marginal 
damages function, 𝑀𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖), first increase in a well-behaved manner. However, as this 
paper models a local-scale environment, assume beyond some level of damage that 
pollution destroys the local environment in the sense that all environmental value is lost. 
That is, 𝑀𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 0 for all values of 𝑥𝑖 beyond the point of destruction. 
The separate-optimal solution: Suppose we regulate each site separate-optimally. A 
conventional approach is to set a Pigouvian tax, 𝜏𝑖
𝑃, or an equivalent quantity of emissions 
limit, 𝑥𝑖
𝑃 at each site, i, in 1:N. Assume 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≈ 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) and 𝑀𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≈ 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖). 
That is, each site is sufficiently comparable. Then, Figure 4 where 𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) =  𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖), 
𝑥𝑖 ≤ 100, and Figure 5, left side, represent the interior optimal solution for a case for 
dispersion marginal damage form and a typical marginal abatement cost curve which is 
also assumed symmetric for all sites (the general result holds for each functional form). The 
result holds whether we regulate optimally by 𝑥𝑖
𝑃, 𝜏𝑖
𝑃, or measures of damages at the 
optimum, 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖
𝑃) or 𝐷(𝑥𝑖
𝑃).26 The separate-optimal solution follows the classic 
framework introduced to many by Baumol and Oates (1988) to solve Samuelson’s (1954) 
public goods problem.  
The joint-optimal solution: The local-scale, total damages possibility results in an 
alternative, joint-optimal solution. Sometimes this remains an interior solution at all sites 
equal to separate-optimality. But sometimes the sum of all damages and abatement costs is 
 
26
 Muller and Mendelsohn (2009) advocate for regulation based on 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖
∗) by, say, weighting trades in a cap-and-trade system 
based on the damages caused by each source rather than emissions. The solution to follow might be considered a hybrid 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖
∗) and 
𝐷(𝑥𝑖
∗) approach – suggesting site-level regulation by 𝑀𝐷(𝑥𝑖
∗) (equivalent to regulation by 𝑥∗ or 𝜏∗ in a contained local environment) 
but regulating by total damages (actually by the mean) in the clustered alternative to follow. 
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less if all production occurs at one site – a corner joint-optimal solution. Suppose rather 
than the interior outcome occurring N times – at N sites, we ask that all polluters move to 
one location, site a selected from the set 1:N. Site a’s aggregation is represented by line 
𝑁 ∗𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) in Figure 4 as well as the right panel of Figure 5. Quantity of emissions at a 
are 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑁?̅?. Critically, beyond some point where a’s environmental value is 
lost, any additional unit of emissions results in zero additional damages. Meanwhile, the 
N-1 sites not used receive zero damages. 
So, let’s say the policymaker weighs the total cost of dispersed abatement and damages 
across symmetric sites and firms as 𝑁[𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖) + 𝐷(𝑥𝑖)], against a clustered alternative of 
𝑁[𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑖)] + 𝐷(𝑁𝑥𝑖). These are the sum of the private costs of abatement – their horizontal 
summation – plus the damages to either N sites or a single site (𝑁𝑎 = 1 for simplicity). 
With small increases in N (where each site is polluted at the optimal level), the interior 
solution remains optimal for all sites. However, with sufficiently large N, the optimal 
outcome is achieved by shutting down N-1 sites and allowing polluters to operate 
unconstrained at one site where 𝑋 is emitted.  
 
 
FIGURE 4 OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS IN THE CASE FOR DISPERSION 
Notes: With symmetric firms and sites, selecting simultaneously N and site emission 
levels 𝑥𝑖 optimally results in emissions 𝑥𝑖
∗ at each site and 𝑁𝑥𝑖
∗ total emissions. Once 
𝑁𝑥𝑖
∗ ≥ 100 for any single site and thus 𝐷(𝑁𝑥𝑖
∗) = 100 at that site, any additional 
clustering is unaccompanied by additional damages. With N sufficiently large, a single-
site alternative with unabated emissions reduces total damages relative to emitting 
separately at N sites. 
 
A mechanism to operationalise separate- versus joint-optimal regulation is presented 
next. The regulatory framework incentivises polluters to voluntarily choose the most 
efficient of the preceding industry geographic structures. 
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A separate- and joint-optimal compatible incentive structure: An issue is that, when 
using standard regulatory instruments of setting level 𝑥𝑖
𝑃 or Pigouvian tax 𝜏𝑖
𝑃 at several 
sites, clustering to one site is never desirable for polluters. However, setting the per-unit 
emissions penalty, or price, equal to average aggregate damages at a site a, 𝐴𝐴𝐷(𝑋) =
𝑇𝐷(𝑋)
𝑋
, corrects the incentive when total emissions are sufficient. For any additional unit of 
emissions where the resulting marginal damages are zero, the price producers pay for 
emissions, 𝐴𝐴𝐷(𝑋), decreases. When X is sufficiently large, paying 𝐴𝐴𝐷(𝑋) is cheaper 
versus paying separate-optimal emission penalties, taxes, or other abatement costs.27 As 
𝐴𝐴𝐷(𝑋) declines with increasing emissions, each polluter’s joint-optimal level of 
emissions are also higher, at 𝑥𝑎
𝐴 > 𝑥𝑖
𝑃, and presumably, more welfare increasing units of 
consumer products and services result. We need not be precise about offering one sort of 




𝐴 as in Figure 
5, polluters can determine amongst themselves the preferable organisation, at least in an 
organised and informed industry. 
 
 
FIGURE 5 THE POLLUTER’S DECISION WITH A CLUSTERING INCENTIVE 
Notes: The left pane identifies the individually regulated, interior optimal site result, 𝑥𝑖
𝑃 emissions, from minimising the total cost of 
damages plus abatement. The optimal Pigouvian tax is then 𝜏𝑖
𝑃. In the right pane, when jointly regulating sites, a different optimal 
decision may result. If total exposure from congregating all polluters to one location eliminates all environmental value at the site, any 
additional exposure results in zero marginal damages. Setting a tax, 𝜏𝑎
𝐴, equal to the average damages in aggregation encourages firms 
to move all production to the site when it is beneficial to do so. All other sites taken out of production experience zero exposure and 
damages and total damages across all sites decreases. Setting the tax or standard by average damages rather than emissions achieves the 
result, while each firm i increases emissions to 𝑥𝑎




 As previously noted, differences in transportation, crowding, and other operating costs – frictions – must clearly be considered in 






















We might refer to this policy approach as an AAD-Pigouvian choice framework or other 
connotation which indicates that choice remains between Pigouvian-based regulation as 
several sites versus average damages-based regulation at an aggregator site. To summarise 
the outcome, when jointly regulating local-scale environmental problems of the form 
outlined in this paper (e.g. with trivial leakage), the optimal tax policy may diverge from 
the Pigouvian recommendation. Offering firms a choice between a tax set by marginal 
principles versus a tax set according to an equal share of aggregate damages results in firms 
choosing as in Equation (2). Such a tax offers an incentive for firms to move toward the 
joint-optimal result. Importantly, the policy prescription is robust to the damage functional 
forms highlighted. 




One cannot propose an alternative policy route, however small in difference from existing 
frameworks, without considering the secondary effects it might have. In the next section I 
briefly note some issues that may arise. They warrant particularly careful consideration 
when an AAD-Pigouvian choice framework is under consideration. 
1.4.3 Some Reasons for Caution 
Applying this paper’s analytical framework warrants caution so I address a few potential 
issues here. For one, different damage relations may exist within an ecosystem as in 
Mendelsohn and Schlesinger (1999) and Win et al. (2018), and almost certainly differ 
between sites. Even a difference in population affects how damages are disbursed. 
Differences in environmental value are evident in our behaviour as well – we are far more 
likely to tolerate crowds to visit a renowned site such as Yellowstone National Park and 
still benefit from it, than visit several available empty fields. We cannot then uninformedly 
choose between sites. Yet decades, or even centuries of intensive production have provided 
many devastated sites to choose from anyway, so we need not choose Yellowstone nor 
some farmer’s field for many destructive uses. 
The siting of polluting activities also has a considerable environmental justice component 
as there is a long history of siting polluting activities in or near poor communities. See a 
general overview in Mitchell (2011), discussion of social justice and zoning in Wilson, 
Hutson, and Mujahid (2008), examples of inequalities by different pollution types (waste, 
air, risk such as flooding, and landscape quality) in Walker (2012), and cases of struggles 
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against environmental injustice in Adamson, Evans, and Stein (2002). But to ignore this 
framework in favour of opposing any polluting activity across all possible sites ignores the 
value that siting implies. The value of siting – of damage savings elsewhere with clustering 
or dispersion – informs whether compensation beyond repayment for damages at a use-site 
is warranted. These valuations might provide substantial benefit to impacted communities 
and knowing of their existence results in bargaining leverage which contributes to 
environmental justice. 
I have also mostly ignored the well-developed literature on incentives in a repeated game 
framework and the role of reputations (for instance in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) or 
several other texts). The justification is simple: If a nation’s environmental regulatory 
authorities at any scale are unable to prevent unabashed dumping, then they are likely 
unable to regulate the organisation of industry too. The most significant concern is that 
without any empowered regulatory authority, there is an incentive to pre-emptively damage 
a site entirely such that zero abatement remains optimal if regulation should later come into 
effect. Allowing destroyed sites at the time of regulatory enactment to become pollution 
havens incentivises pre-emptive behaviours that few advocating for intervention would 
prefer. 
Finally, this analysis relies on the idea that the local pollutant in question does not leak – 
that we can maintain whatever polluting activity’s emissions within the locality. When we 
store nuclear waste or even household waste in a landfill, containment is the objective in 
mind. But in applying this framework, we must consider whether containment is the case, 
as the intent is not to support unabashed dumping that would permeate the natural 
environment. The intention of this framework is quite the opposite – to carefully choose 
sites and contain dangerous and perhaps resilient pollutants well, even forever as in the case 
of fissile waste.  
Having noted a few concerns – certainly not an exhaustive list of cautions to keep in mind 
with any potentially corrective policy – some numerical and empirical support follows. 
These are far from exhaustive, and the applicability of this paper’s modest adjustment to 
the damages functional form need not be constricted to environmental regulation. 
1.5 Empirical and Numerical Support 
In this section I outline four cases of local form damage relations in action – two 
numerical and two empirical. I reserve a few more diverse applications for appendix A1.2 
Siting Framework Applied Beyond the Environment. There are certainly many cases where 
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industrial reorganisation results in reduced total damages but detecting and isolating causal 
relationships can be difficult. Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY)-driven policies also happen 
to occasionally be correct, but otherwise cloud the search for evidence.28 There have also 
been “hot-spot”, or “black-spot” policies where the objective is not containment, but to 
allow an industry’s emissions to leak beyond the regulator’s domain and the public’s 
capacity to care (Siebert, 2008) – these clearly violate the requirements of this paper’s 
model. When this paper’s framework is appropriate, however, it also appears easier to 
identify a clustering change because it is easier to identify the appearance of a significant 
source of pollution. Even without a change in regulation, consumers might also prefer a 
specific polluting activity be clustered or dispersed such that public pressure without a 
discrete change in identifiable policy is sufficient. In other cases, such as the first 
agricultural example, historical usage inhibits change. 
Note that I test for policy responsiveness rather than measuring the scale of the benefits 
that result from reorganisation. In each case, the objective is to suggest that “polluters” 
generally respond to reorganisation incentives. The matter of particular damages as well as 
abatement cost values beyond those in the hypothetical numerical examples are a matter 
for when policy using this framework is deliberately applied by a regulator. The assessment 
of damages avoided and resulting welfare benefits may also be incalculable in many cases. 
Rather, I suppose the changes were implemented because policymakers or the public 
minimally expected damages to be lower, revealing the existence of value but not 
quantifying the scale tied to clustering or dispersion. 
1.5.1 Numerical Application 1: Agricultural Runoff, Drainage, and Watersheds 
A numeric, albeit artificial, application illustrates the preceding arguments. Many sorts 
of pollution resulting from agricultural production might fit a case where aggregation or 
dispersion reduces total damages to the environment. But agriculture generally requires 
expansive space and does not aggregate well by many measures. Yet, agricultural runoff – 
a significant environmental problem – can be concentrated or dispersed in how it enters 
waterways by changing drainage systems, and an application emerges. For a history of 
agricultural drainage practices in the United States see USDA ERS (1987). The sort of 
guidance given to reduce runoff damages includes some farm-level changes, but also a lot 
 
28
 NIMBY responses are generally in reply to Locally Unwanted Land Uses (LULU)’s – local-scale environmental problems. A 
general critique of NIMBY campaigns, their frequent role in perpetuating environment injustice, and when NIMBY responses are instead 
justified can be found in Feldman and Turner (2010) and Feldman and Turner (2014). It is also worth considering whether NIMBY 
responses are a global movement as explored in Martinez-Alier, Temper, Bene, and Scheidel (2016).   
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of public works sort of corrections as in guidance from the USDA NRCS (2009) or more 
general international guidance in FAO (2017). One of the most visible forms of damages 
results from excess nitrogen-driven algae blooms in waterways (Biello, 2014). The total 
value of damages from agricultural runoff are substantial. In the U.S., these have been 
estimated at $157 billion/year (Sobota, Compton, McCrackin, and Singh, 2015), and at a 
similar scale in Europe (van Grinsven et al., 2013). The per-hectare damages inflicted often 
exceed the value of agricultural land uses at current production levels and prices. 
I present this application “in theory” then because a complication arises “in practice”. 
Agriculture is generally one of the first uses of land and tends to almost uniquely own a 
wide range of property rights by use, if not law. In the U.S., these rights have been 
formalised more recently to protect agricultural producer historical rights as they and 
residential users come into increasing conflict. These conflicts have lead to "Right-to-Farm 
Statutes" in all 50 states protecting agriculture from having to redress damages (see a 
catalogue of these statutes at the National Agricultural Law Center, 2019). There are case 
studies, however, of changing property rights as secularization of the countryside occurs. 
As an example, Munton (1995) documents a transition from employment to an 
environmental focus around a coal extraction-based community (but also local resistance). 
But overall, until recently little precedent existed for changing these rights. Agricultural 
producers almost undeniably owned a right to route drainage into waterways. When the 
public has objected to damages from agricultural runoff, it is rarely if ever a question of 
whether it should occur. Instead, it is sure to be framed as an argument about farmers using 
“too much” of some input that then washes away – pushing their property right too far – 
and lending implicit support to farmer’s rights. So instead of arguing whether we can limit 
agricultural runoff through some quantity restriction, let us consider whether a change to 
where that pollution enters waterways can improve welfare.  
Consider a hypothetical farming community of an initially 𝑖0 set of farms in a watershed 
where at first the total discharge of a persistent, polluting agricultural runoff into any 
segment j of the watershed amounts to at most 𝑋𝑗 = ∑𝑥𝑗 = ∑𝑥𝑖0,𝑗 ≤ 100. Also, let any 
runoff result in scaled, constant marginal damages 𝑀𝐷𝑗(𝑥𝑗| 𝑋𝑗 ≤ 100) = 1 and 
𝑀𝐷𝑗(𝑥𝑗| 𝑋𝑗 > 100) = 0. Suppose each farm emits 25 units of the persistent pollutant. 
Figure 6 presents an initially four-farm case, with farms 𝑖0 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑. Producers route 
drainage ditches (black arrows) to the closest tributary composed of segments (blue arrows) 
in the left panel, versus arbitrarily choosing to route all drainage to the right tributary in the 
right panel. I present the resulting damage values in black text. Regardless of organisation, 
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the same total damages to the watershed result at the initial scale of production. Then, 
consider the development of another plot in the watershed, e, also emitting 25 units such 
that set 𝑖1 = 𝑖0, 𝑒 and 𝑋𝑗 = ∑𝑥𝑖1 > 100 is possible if all 𝑖1 farm discharges flow through 
the same segment. I present the new segment damage values in red text for each routing 
assumption. Now, the aggregate routing in the right panel is preferable. The rightmost 
tributary becomes 100-per cent damaged in its final segment – in effect becomes a drainage 
canal. However, the left tributary experiences no damages in any segment – the tributary 




FIGURE 6 OPTIMAL AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE WITH DIFFERENT SCALES OF ACTIVITY  
Notes: Assume the pollutant in agricultural runoff results in constant marginal damages, does not degrade while in the 
watershed (is persistent), and the environmental value of any drainage canal (black arrows) is zero. Assume each farm 
emits 25 units of pollutant as runoff and each unit is normalised such that it causes one unit of damage (=1/100 th of 
total damage potential) to any tributary segment (blue arrows) that it passes through. The total damage in both scenarios 
is 150 (black numbers) without the inclusion of Farm e. With the inclusion of e, the left arrangement would incur 225 
total units of damage, but the right arrangement would only incur 200 units of damage (red numbers) because the 
segment * receives 𝐷∗(∑ 𝑥𝑗 = 125) = 100 units of damage when the total environmental value of this segment is lost. 
The least damages drainage plan is then to route the system as in the right-side clustered arrangement. 
 
The application need not apply to entire landscapes nor to situations where full damages 




1.5.2 Numerical Application 2: Several Small “Polluters” 
Assume a local damage function in discrete units based on a change in the number of 
individuals engaging in an activity that generates a negative externality locally. For 
tractability, let the discrete marginal damage function at a site i be a function of x number 
of individuals engaging in the activity as 
(3) 𝑀𝐷𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = {
2, 𝑥 = 1
1, 𝑥 > 1
 
 
where marginal damage values of 1 and 2 are for the purpose of illustration. 
As an example, the sites may be neighbourhoods within a city as the region. Damages 
may be in percentage decreases in property value or increases in waste or incidental crime 
when people engage in some activity. Consider a city where five individuals or firms 
engage in the activity at separate sites, then total damages to the city are ten. If instead, the 
city council implements a policy that draws the individuals to a single site, total damages 
are six. An implication is that a site or neighbourhood harmed by the policy might be 
entitled to more compensation than just for damages from the negative externality – also a 
payment for providing a public service by accepting the damages. The damage savings are 
more than sufficient to compensate the owners or other users of the aggregation site – a 





FIGURE 7 REGULATION OF SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITH NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
Notes: Assume a discrete damage function where the first individual to engage in the 
activity at any site 𝑖 = 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒 causes two units of damage and any additional 
participant inflicts one additional unit of damage at i. If five individuals engage in the 
activity at five separate sites, the total damages in the city (region) is ten units (the damage 
to each site is reported in black digits). If instead the activity occurs at one site, say e, total 
damages are six units (damages now reported in red digits). The damage savings at 𝑖 =
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 can more than compensate the owner of site e. 
 
1.5.3 Empirical Application 1: Household Waste 
The story of household waste is of changing consumption patterns and a move centralized 
collection over the last century. Household waste itself is a certainty, but centralised 
collection away from the home is an almost entirely new phenomenon. Nearly all 
centralised waste management began within the last seventy-five years and was almost 
unheard of more than a century ago. Early exceptions occur not from discontent with the 
level of accumulating matter, but because some waste retained market value. A particularly 
vivid and well-known example is of bone-pickers and rag-gatherers in 19th century London 
as documented by Mayhew (1861). Before centralised collection, household waste was 
almost certainly biodegradable – food and cooking waste and the occasional wood, glass, 
and pottery items beyond repair. From an intensive use of the author’s compost bin, I find 
a family’s annual accumulation of these sorts of refuse amounts to nothing that would still 
be considered waste in the end. In comparison, the amount of nonbiodegradable, or at least 
non-compostable waste a family now generates in a year is enormous. For instance, the 
waste generated by all economic, production, and household activities in the EU-28 in 2016 




To add rigour to the story, I use a regression kink (RK) design akin to Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell’s (1960) regression discontinuity (RD) approach. Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber 
(2010) discuss the RK identification strategy, Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber (2012) supply a 
theoretical basis, and Böckerman, Kanninen, and Suoniemi (2017) provide an example 
application. However, estimation and interpretation are intuitive when one is familiar with 
the RD approach: rather than a “jump”, we find a change in rate of change or slope. 
Identification comes from the adoption rate of something changing beyond the point of 
implementation of the policy of interest. In this application, I use the RK design to test 
whether the rate that waste removal services came into existence changes with a critical 
change in the nature of household waste generation.  
One proposition is that following the invention and widespread adoption of 
nonbiodegradable plastics, households using composting and household dumps 
encountered an intractable new problem. Rather than garbage exposure and a damage 
function that returns to around zero as waste decomposes, with each plastic item disposed 
of, the homeowner finds the quantity of garbage on hand increases. As still occurs in some 
developing areas, burning is an option. But doing so produces toxic smoke with 
uncomfortable and immediate effect on health and the relationship with one’s neighbours. 
Unlike any preceding household waste, plastic is not a problem that the homeowner can 
solve acceptably on site.  
To test the plastic hypothesis, I compare growth in plastic production to growth in refuse 
collection services across Europe. Geyer, Jambeck, and Law (2017) provide annual 
estimates of all plastic production globally since 1950, and I supplement with observations 
from Freinkel (2011) for 1939 and 1945 which is reproduced in appendix A1.3 Plastic 
Production Volume, 1939-2016.29 Following World War II, year-over-year plastic 
production increases and global production rapidly becomes measured in millions of metric 
tons instead of thousands of kilograms. New plastic types, quality, and production 
capacities developed during the war drive this growth (Freinkel, 2011). However, it is 
almost certainly also driven by the post-war desire for more production and consumption 
of every sort. 
For comparison data, the Orbis database on business activity provides dates of 
incorporation for every company in Europe including under the industry code for refuse 
 
29
 As a matter of general interest, of all the plastic ever produced it is estimated that 9-per cent has since been recycled, 12-per cent 
incinerated, and 79-per cent still exists in some form. 
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systems, SIC code 4953 (Bureau van Dijk, 2019a, 2019b).30 The data provides an estimate 
of the annual rate of change in the number of waste management firms. This may overstate 
the rate of change, however, as there is no data on when firms drop back out of the market.  
Yet the waste management sector is profitable and has instead undergone growth and 
consolidation. We may also note the near-universal prevalence of waste management 
services in Europe today – from covering nearly zero-per cent of households to around 99-
per cent of EU households in 75 years. Unlike post-World War I when plastics did not 
become a substantial share of household consumption, following World War II the number 
of new waste management firms rapidly increases. The “kink” in the rates of new waste 
management firms and plastic production volume are illustrated in Figure 8, and I reserve 
the formal econometric treatment for section 1.5.5 Regression Discontinuity and Kink 
Methodologies and Estimates alongside the formal estimates from the next application. A 
more extreme surge in waste management firm growth also occurs in the 1970’s to meet 
the rising demand for recycling. However, the interpretation of SIC 4953 data loses the 
interpretation of interest in the 1970’s as it becomes dominated by smaller recyclers – 
handlers of the same waste in a new, yet older way (Strasser, 1999). 
As one metric for the plastic production-waste trends, the correlation coefficient is near 
unity. However, we must expect the relationship between these activities to be more 
complicated because, at a minimum, producers must somehow transfer plastic products to 
the consumers that later throw them away. Figure 8 also illustrates the change in all formal 
sector business activity.31 In terms of estimating a causal effect, a problem arises because 
all business activity follows a similar trend – little growth preceding 1945, and dramatic 
growth thereafter.  
 
30
 Appendix A1.4 Description of SIC Code 4953: Refuse Systems includes a formal definition of what the SIC code includes as well 
as annual summary data. 
31
 Waste management data includes all SIC code 4953 enterprises, and all “other” firm activity is a random sample (~13,000 
observations with dates of incorporation) drawn from non-4953 coded enterprises in Orbis. Each data series is summed by the year in 




FIGURE 8 NEW WASTE AND OTHER FIRMS IN EUROPE AND GLOBAL PLASTIC PRODUCTION 
Notes: Black with solid circle markers: Number of new waste management firms annually (refuse collection, 
disposal, and recyclers) by year of incorporation which is scaled by the maximum value in the period of 161 new 
firms in 1968. 
Blue with hollow circle markers: Trend in new, non-waste management firm activity by year of incorporation – 
a random sample of several thousand observations representative of activity in the period, then scaled.  
Red with triangle markers: Global plastic production in millions of metric tons (MMT) scaled by the maximum 
value in the period of 35 MMT in 1970. While data availability continues after 1970, the business code 
representing waste management firms changes in nature as it then includes several thousand small recyclers. 
Unfortunately, the impact of plastic production versus all other production cannot be separated. The two sources 
are collinear as general firm activity is the mechanism for the transfer of plastics to consumers. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk, 2019a, 2019b), Geyer, Jambeck, and 
Law (2017) for plastic production data 1950-2015, and Freinkel (2011) for 1939 and 1945 estimates converted to 
Mmt from millions of pounds. 
 
So, we are left to wonder: Did waste collection become nearly universal in Europe 
because of non-degradable waste, because all sorts of consumption and waste increased, or 
because of an entirely separate change in lifestyle? Collinearity prevents separation of the 
impact of plastic production and general firm activity. One might construct an international 
panel, but both the manufacture of plastic products and waste disposal involves complex 
international supply chains. The result is a causal change beginning in 1945 in the sense 
that garbage must follow consumption and disposal. However, the exact cause of the 
change in garbage – plastic, lifestyle, or an overwhelming volume of all waste, cannot be 
isolated. The waste story is as compelling as econometrically intractable. Unfortunately, it 
is not the only application. I next explore U.S. nuclear power generation where a single 
exposure event changed the entire industry’s trajectory. 
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1.5.4 Empirical Application 2: Nuclear Power 
The evolution of views toward nuclear power production is a story of public discovery 
followed by backlash. The nuclear power sector in every so-endowed nation operates under 
a cloak of secrecy inherited from their origins in nuclear weapons programmes (Pearce, 
2019). The transference of secrecy should not be surprising as both fields draw from the 
same pool of technical talent. The nuclear power story presented here is one of public 
discovery – of experts assuring the public that nuclear energy is marvellous and safe, 
followed by public outcry when something goes wrong. In the United States, the event that 
changed the public’s perception was the Three-Mile Island incident (Pearce, 2019; Walker, 
2004). In terms of radioactive release, it was minor. But in terms of media coverage, public 
backlash, and demand for greater oversight, the incident was substantial. It halted the 
expansion of nuclear power production in the United States.  
The argument: Nuclear power producers enjoy a secrecy rent from lack of public 
awareness about the risks involved, or they are overconfident about their ability to control 
and contain a nuclear incident. The sector should operate aggregated to as few sites as 
possible because the risk of damages from an incident are enormous. For example, the 2011 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster clean-up cost is estimated to be between $75.7 billion 
(government estimate in 2006) and $660 billion (the Japan Center for Economic Research) 
(Hornyak, 2018). However, without the risk being public, or even frankly acknowledged 
within the industry, the sector operates dispersed (at 100 or so sites in the U.S. case). When 
the scale of the threat does become known through some event, the public demands a 
transition to as few sites as possible. The limit of this is movement to a single site that does 
not operate but instead stores the sector’s legacy. However, because of the substantial costs 
involved in both replacing nuclear capacity and decommissioning plants, as a practical 
matter the phase-out occurs over a long period. The compromise is to not build nuclear 
power plants except those nearly complete. The mechanics of enforcement are to make it 
cost-prohibitive in terms of supplying safety. The potential for nuclear power to disperse 
further is limited, and the natural phaseout of nuclear power occurs as plants retire, resulting 
in the eventual accumulation of waste to one or a few sites. 
To support the nuclear power story, Figure 9 presents the number of new nuclear power 
building permits issued since the beginning of nuclear power production.32 Until the Three 
Mile Island incident in 1979, the sector continued to expand, and regulators on average 
 
32
 Data included in appendix A1.5 Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permit Approvals, 1955-2018. 
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issue more building permits each year. The trend since 1979 is striking in both Figure 9 and 
the econometric RD and RK treatment in the next section – 1.5.5 Regression Discontinuity 
and Kink Methodologies and Estimates. We can observe that only recently have firms 
begun to consider expanding nuclear generation again and the only new construction 
licensed since 1979 – all in recent years – come with caveats.33 
 
 
FIGURE 9 NUCLEAR POWER CONSTRUCTION PERMITS ISSUED IN THE U.S. 
Notes: Number of nuclear power plant (generating unit) construction permits issued each year in the United States 
since the beginning of nuclear power generation. Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, no new 
building permit applications are completed for over three decades. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from the Energy Information Administration for years 1955-2011, 
and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission for years 2012-2018, (EIA, 2012; NRC, 2018). 
 
A nuclear accident provides a credible natural experiment – if it were expected, the plant 
operator would act to prevent it. But the weakness of the application is, perhaps, having to 
accept a narrative that a stoppage on nuclear expansion implies a preference for clustering. 
Unfortunately, other applications are also apparent. As previously noted, some additional 
applications are presented in appendix A1.2 Siting Framework Applied Beyond the 
Environment. These cover matters around radiation exposure, social problems, and 
international conflicts and terrorism. In the next section I outline a combined regression 
discontinuity and regression kink empirical methodology to put firm estimates to the 
 
33
 To incentive diversification, the firms involved have been allowed to pre-charge customers for the power plants such that they are 
risk-free for firms to build (Biello, 2012) 
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household waste and nuclear power examples. This framework is also used in the noted 
appendix and later chapters of this thesis. 
1.5.5 Regression Discontinuity and Kink Methodologies and Estimates 
Here I present the econometric methodology and estimates supporting the waste 
management and U.S. nuclear power examples. These rely on a combination of RD and 
RK methodologies. In the RD design the policy of interest leads to an often visually striking 
break in some time series of interest. Similarly, in the RK design some policy leads to a 
generally visible change in the rate of change of the variable of interest. The RK design is 
justified as a separate method from the RD design in, for instance, Card, Lee, Pei, and 
Weber (2012). However, the estimation strategy described by Angrist and Pischke (2009) 
is sufficiently flexible to estimate both sorts of effects. 
In the examples of this section, let 𝑌𝑖 be the outcome of interest in observation i. In the 
household waste example, 𝑌𝑖 is the number of new refuse firms in year i, and in the nuclear 
sites case it is the number of new nuclear reactor construction permits in each year. In each 
model, let 𝑥𝑖 be an adjusted month or year, as applicable, of form 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 − 𝑘) where 
time is in standard calendar form and k is the moment of some critical event. As the purpose 
of the model is to estimate the impact of an event or policy enacted at k, not the influence 
of primitives on Y, the functional form for estimation is simple: Let a function 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) 
approximate for the purpose at hand the true relation 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑋𝑖) which has a potentially 
large vector of determinants of demand, 𝑋𝑖. The event, or treatment at k fundamentally 
changes underlying demand such that we can apply a binary indicator of form 
(4) 𝐷𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑘
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 𝑘
 
 
and can write the conditional expectation of Y as  
(5) 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖] + ([𝑌1𝑖|𝑥𝑖] − [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖])𝐷𝑖. 
 
Let the functional form of the pre-treatment conditional expectation be  
(6) [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 
 
and post-treatment conditional expectation with both different slope and intercept be 
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(7) [𝑌1𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 
 
Then with 𝛼 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼0 and 𝛽 = 𝛽1 − 𝛽0, the functional form for estimation is 
(8) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑖 
 
The coefficient 𝛼 identifies any effect resulting in a discontinuity, and 𝛽 any change in 
the linear rate of change from k onward. A strict regression discontinuity design results in 
an estimate of 𝛼, and a strict regression kink design in an estimate of 𝛽. In Table 1, I report 
both RD and RK estimates for the empirical applications. 
In the waste management example, the rate of new firms increases from 0.07 per year 
until 1945, to 0.07+4.02 per year thereafter. Reducing the span of pre-1945 observations 
increases the 𝛽0 estimate but does not change the overall result. In the nuclear site example, 
the statistical story reverses as new building permits after the Three Mile Island accident 
drop to zero. Null hypotheses that 𝛼0 + 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽0+ 𝛽 = 0 cannot be rejected at any 
appropriate level of significance which confirms the obvious – zero new permits are issued 
in the 30-years following the 1979 event.  
In the nuclear sites example, we can take the Three-Mile Island accident as a truly 
random, uncorrelated treatment as the operators would avoid the incident otherwise. In the 
waste management example, individuals have no control over the timing of the introduction 
of new materials like plastic, when World War II will end and be followed by economic 
growth, or when a new disposable lifestyle takes hold in the rest of the populace. We might 
also be tempted to estimate a model using independent variables such as non-waste 
management firm growth and plastic production. However, general firm activity is the 
medium through which plastic producers transfer their goods to shoppers, and the two 
trends cannot be convincingly separated. One might also want to construct a panel of the 
EU 28 or a broader set of countries. But international supply chains in finished and 
intermediary goods as well as waste complicate the matter – the resulting measurement 
error would be prohibitive. A perhaps better methodology is to leave waste and plastic 




TABLE 1 — RK AND RD DESIGN ESTIMATES  
 Waste Management a 
(k=1945) 
Nuclear Construction b 
(k=1979) 
Date (actual – k) 0.07*** 0.65*** 
    (0.02) (0.11) 
RD: D=1(actual ≥ k) -5.94 -15.53*** 
    (6.15) (2.08) 
RK: Year*D 4.02*** -0.63*** 
    (0.65) (0.11) 
Constant 6.46*** 15.43*** 
  (0.94) (2.06) 
Observations 89 64 
R-squared 0.85 0.68 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 per 
cent level, ** Significant at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per 
cent level. 
a Dependent variable is the number of new waste management firms 
registered in Orbis in each year up to 1970 reported in Table 24 of appendix 
A1.4 Description of SIC Code 4953: Refuse Systems and Number of New 
Firms. After 1970, the nature of the SIC code changes to include substantial 
growth in recyclers rather than general waste management firms as required 
in this analysis. In summary, a change in the rate of waste management firm 
creation coincides with widespread plastic use but also general firm 
activity. 
b Dependent variable is the number of new construction permits issued for 
commercial nuclear reactors from 1955-2010 reported in Table 25 of 
appendix A1.5 Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permit Approvals, 1955-
2018. Both a kink and discontinuity follow the Three-Mile Island incident 
after which zero permits are taken to completion for three decades. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from Geyer, Jambeck, and Law 
(2017), Freinkel (2011), Orbis (Bureau van Dijk, 2019a, 2019b), U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (2012), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (2018). 
 
I am confident the examples I present do not exhaust applicability. Some applications 
occur around a premise that aggregation offers an advantage because total damages – or 
their potential with radiation and nuclear proliferation – are sufficient that total loss of a 
site’s entire value is possible. For others, the issue may best be described by the interior 
case for clustering. Others may be a combination of both – first an interior clustering case, 
and then total loss potential as is expected with non-biodegradable household waste. The 
breadth of these applications suggest that a wide range of other applications may also exist. 
For instance, a stroll along many urban streams in developing countries or beaches that are 
unfortunate enough to become accumulators of plastic waste suggest that even the most 
common effluents can destroy nature. I now conclude this study before considering an 
approach to improving the plastic waste issue in the next chapter. 
1.6 Conclusion 
I have argued that a model of local-scale environments should allow for total 
environmental degradation and that important implications then result. Regulation to 
cluster or disperse where damages occur might increase social welfare but applying this 
75 
 
sort of framework can have significant unintended consequences. I show that encouraging 
reorganisation need not require a heavy hand, but rather a change in the way regulation is 
applied. But without such regulation, polluters have an incentive to disperse to bypass local 
regulatory limits. A perverse incentive to degrade the environmental value of a site may 
also occur with regulation on the horizon, as once an environment is sufficiently damaged, 
its continued use has value as a pollution aggregator. Unfortunately, consumers, higher-
level policymakers, and regulators outside the local environment have little incentive to 
push for regulation of local-scale pollution. Retained local authority over zoning, however, 
may allow the NEP alternative of regulating industrial and human organisation through 
zoning.  
Despite various potential pitfalls, this framework expands the regulator and 
policymaker’s toolkit at a time when such alternatives are needed to address critical issues 
such as biodiversity loss. It also suggests that compensation to impacted communities 
should exceed the damages they experience when clustering leads to avoided damages 
elsewhere. This provides a much-needed framework for the discussion and measurement 
of appropriate compensation beyond damage redresses. This paper also describes the 
appropriate AAD-based penalty or tax when regulating local environmental concerns in a 
region jointly and how providing polluters a choice between Pigouvian- and AAD-based 
regulation can lead to joint-optimality in appropriate cases. 
I conclude with a prediction: As global transport costs fall, what we will consider local 
will become larger conceptual spaces.34 As discussed, the international trade literature has 
already noted specialisation in polluting versus clean production. This is closely linked to 
the concept of local environments because it isolates areas of the global from some of the 
harm caused by production in others. The limit of this is globe-spanning specialisation in 
an increasing number of polluting processes. A problem emerges, then, in that international 
specialisation will be opposed by occupants of areas where the rest of the world sends their 
pollution. We can begin to observe this issue in where the world sends plastic waste for 
processing. The frequency of the issue is sure to increase unless a framework for the 
appropriate international organisation of pollution handling is adopted, such as the AAD-
Pigouvian choice framework, and estimates of compensation to those adversely impacted 
are accurately made and compensation disbursed.  
 
34
 Driven by more efficient shipping, automation, and declining borrowing rates. Transportation costs have already declined by 90-
per cent in the last century and appear likely to continue to decline (Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). 
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2. A New Redesign Incentive to Improve Recyclability 
This paper outlines a new approach to improving the recyclability of 
products. By defining the optimal division of effort between producers – who 
can redesign products to be more cost-effective to recycle, and recyclers of 
consumer waste, methods of incentivisation become apparent. A tax and 
subsidy framework on the count of materials in products based on the optimal 
division of efforts may result in the full recycling of complex waste. The 
efficiency of this result and appropriate magnitude of the tax and subsidy are 
explored. As there is no precedent in the environmental sphere for the 
mechanism proposed, the discussion is chiefly theory-based. However, data 
on the complexity of common types of waste and the importance – and some 
values – tied to the purity of recovered waste are reported. 
Keywords: Environmental policy, recycling, sustainability, circular economy, waste 
purity, material recovery, industry, taxes, subsidies. 





Achieving a higher rate of consumer waste recycling has become an intractable problem 
in many countries. Of plastics – one of the most recyclable of all materials – only 9-per 
cent ever produced has been recycled (Geyer, Jambeck, and Law, 2017). Even within the 
regulated EU, less than one-third of plastics are recycled at present (European Parliament, 
2018). Much of the plastic not recycled reaches the oceans at substantial cost. Beaumont, 
et al. (2019) put the value of the decline in marine ecosystem services due to plastic 
pollution at between $500 billion and $2.5 trillion per year.  
There are many contributors to the cost of recycling. Nations with higher recycling rates 
such as Germany have extensive sorting and recycling systems. 35 On the demand side of 
production, firms may also choose new materials in production instead of recycled ones. 
Because of processing costs – exacerbated by sorting difficulties and the poor quality of 
mixed recycled materials, it can be preferable to use new materials (Brooks, Hays, and 
Milner, 2019). The combined effect is a generally challenging business environment for 
recyclers beyond a few choice materials. Difficult choices must be made, such as what to 
recycle or discard, and how much to invest in processing. A particularly costly aspect of 
processing waste is handling items made of many material types. Even if every material 
involved in a product is recyclable, unless the entire product is of the same material, 
recycling requires disassembly and sorting into separate streams at some cost. 
Alternatively, almost any materials used in a product – particularly packaging – has 
substitutes, albeit also at some cost.  
The purpose of this research is to contribute an additional approach to improving the 
recycling system through improving product recyclability. It generally falls within the 
concepts of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) – methods to ensure producers cover 
the costs of wastes related to their products, and Design for Environment (DfE) – efforts to 
incentivise the design of products for environmental friendliness throughout the product’s 
lifecycle. The main exploration of this paper is in finding and implementing an optimal 
division of effort between recyclers who disassemble and process wastes, and producers 
that can redesign a product to be more or less recyclable. With this in mind, I explore a 
mechanism that should result in improvements in product design in terms of recycling 
 
35
 Germany has a 67% recycling rate for households and higher rates for commercial, production, and construction (BMU, 2018). 
However, there has been criticism of what this rate entails – whether the inclusion of plastic burned for energy, which is the end result 
of about half of plastic waste, should count as recycling. Wecker (2018) notes that Germany’s recycling rate is based on waste collection, 
not the final processing and destination of waste. 
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efficiency. The incentive structure is intended to improve recyclability within products – 
changes in the composition or assembly of products (alternatively to improve the means of 
decomposition) – such that their whole is more recyclable. An alternative is to try to 
improve recyclability across products – changes in the entire stream of waste. This may, 
for instance, occur through efforts to standardise products and packaging. The purpose of 
this paper is to contribute to the former approach. It is a longstanding issue often noted in 
the recycling and waste literature review to follow. An approach to the latter is to instead 
increase the homogeneity of entire waste streams. This is discussed briefly in appendix 
A2.1 Improving Recyclability Through Standardisation Auctions. It is reserved for the 
appendix because it is an issue that has a perhaps more orthodox solution by today’s 
standards – a Vickrey style auction over the right to design an industry’s standard. In 
comparison, the within-product incentive structure in this paper is a bit less orthodox, 
though still likely recognisable to those familiar with the approaches of environmental 
economists. 
First, a real-world example helps illustrate the complexity of the issue addressed. At 
present, around 500 billion disposable plastic drinking bottles are produced and used 
globally per year (Laville and Taylor, 2017). Many are of polyethene (polyethylene) 
terephthalate (PET), which is easily recycled. Where available, deposit-return schemes 
have been effective in ensuring they often enter recycling streams rather than go to landfills 
or into the environment (United Nations Environment Programme, 2017). Note, these 
programmes remain the exception, and a small share of global PET bottles are recycled. 
Even of the bottles sent to recycling, we generally recycle only part of the packaging. Most 
bottles have a separate label often made of another material – generally polypropylene (PP) 
or laminated PET – and a lid usually made of high-density polyethene (HDPE) or PP. 
Recycling lids requires more effort than bottles because lids of different materials and 
colours (natural versus coloured at a minimum) must be separated for the resulting recycled 
bulk material to have a positive value. Unseparated lid material will be HDPE and PP, not 
HDPE or PP, and recycled material prices are sensitive to purity. Lids and labels attached 
to bottles are not desirable because they must be separated, requiring processes at some 
expense. While sorting methods involving separation by specific gravity in a liquid are 
sometimes employed, it is still common that manual sorting of plastic bottles and other 
waste be employed at substantial cost (RDC-Environment and Pira International, 2003; Bio 
Intelligence Service and European Commission, 2011). This is even more true for complex 
wastes such as electronics and electrical parts. 
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No policy such as different recycling rebates for bottles with versus without caps or labels 
attached exists. There have been external and rather heroic efforts to recycle bottle caps 
through volunteer initiatives, but these are short-lived due to the economies involved – the 
costs versus returns expected. For instance, with careful management, the programme “500 
Deckel für ein Leben ohne Kinderlähmung” (translation~ “500 Lids for a Life Without 
Polio”) financed substantial social benefit in the form of over 900,000 polio vaccinations 
through a collection of 450 million bottle caps (Deckel drauf e.V., 2019). Unfortunately, 
the effort ended recently when market prices for recyclable PP declined following the 
decline of new PP prices and a loss was feared. Unfortunately, when caps are not recycled, 
they become a source of ocean pollution harmful to wildlife (Boonstra and van Hest, 2017; 
Parker, 2019). 
Even for simple products, there is a great deal of complexity to the resulting recycling 
problem. In the plastic bottle example, we observe that products made of 100-per cent 
recyclable material are often not 100-per cent recycled. When requiring that firms make 
products recyclable the matter can be definitional. From the perspective of a cost-
minimising firm, requiring a plastic bottle and all related pieces – lid, label, and other 
attachments – to be 100-per cent recyclable is not equivalent to making the whole item 
cost-effective to wholly recycle. This issue is a symptom of misaligned incentives. One 
perspective on the underlying issue is that separate sorts of firms bear the alternative costs 
of product design versus recycling. In the bottle example, either a firm’s concern is 
producing bottles and the products they contain at least cost, or recycling bottles and related 
waste at least cost, not the least cost combination of producing and recycling. This is an 
issue that the EPR and DfE schools of thought sometimes seek to resolve. So, before 
presenting a framework to align production and recycling incentives and its efficiency, a 
literature review on waste and recycling is in order – particularly on EPR, DfE, and the 
concept of the circular economy (CE). 
2.2 Literature Review 
The literature on waste and recycling and the CE concept are based on familiar ground 
for economists. The underlying issue is scarcity, which is well known as a (or the) core 
principle of economics that we often trace to Malthus (1798). Scarcity, and in particular 
concerns that it will increase as resource reserves are consumed away, leads immediately 
to studies of sustainability, waste, and recycling. Champions of the sustainability 
movement often trace its origin to Boulding’s (1966) concept of a “spaceship earth” – a 
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transition from an effectively open set of economies to a globally closed and limited 
economy once sufficient population and consumption demand levels are reached. But 
Boulding himself acknowledges George (1879) as inspiration and source material, which 
clearly presents the same argument as Malthus did nearly eight decades earlier.  
From Boulding onward interest in waste, recycling, CE, and sustainability increases 
substantially. By the second half of the 1960’s the concept of a globally limited set of 
resources is taken quite seriously, and several works predict an impending end to 
civilization and/or global mass starvation and so continue Malthus’ tradition of failing to 
have predictive power. But by the end of the 1960’s, technological innovation was being 
advocated for by the public as part of the larger green movement, and industry interest in 
recycling and conserving materials began to increase. Some early examples marketing to 
corporate interest includes Fisk (1973) and Harmon (1977). Eventually, the movement led 
to substantial government interest, including the establishment of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency in 1970, and several other agencies became involved in researching and 
encouraging sustainability practices by the 1990’s (U.S. Congress OTA, 1992). These 
earlier efforts emphasised reducing total material in products, reducing production waste, 
and reducing the amounts of hazardous materials produced overall – the low hanging fruit 
of the subject. Concepts such as redesigning products for recyclability and disposal were 
also in development but did not carry the same financial incentives for firms that reducing 
materials provides at this early stage. One of the key pieces of terminology to emerge from 
this period is Design for the Environment (DfE) and concepts within DfE such as designing 
for environmental processing and manufacturing, packaging, disposal or reuse, and energy 
efficiency. 
Fiksel (1995, 1996) outlines several DfE strategies that have developed. These include 
reducing the number of distinct parts in products as well as using similar or compatible 
materials, but without consideration of the optimal improvement for firms to undertake. 
They also outline several recycling-relevant strategies such as designing for separability 
and simplifying component interfaces. These are some of the primary considerations of this 
paper. Here I put the concepts into an actionable economic framework and ask what the 
optimum number of material types is versus recycling effort and in effect make Fiksel’s 
recommendations actionable. 
One might suppose that consumer pressure through price would lead to DfE changes. 
That is, when consumers must pay for proper waste disposal, they will pressure firms to 
take DfE seriously. The use of charges for waste disposal, particularly at the residential 
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level, have also become standard in some areas in recent decades. This subject remains an 
area of substantial research. Most studies have found that households and other waste 
producers respond little to a price on waste disposal. EPA (1990) compared weight- and 
volume-based approaches early on and found households responsiveness to be highly 
inelastic.36 Similar values are reported across the studies noted in Choe and Fraser (1998). 
Bel and Gradus (2016) provide a meta-analysis of more recent studies and also find an 
inelastic response to the price of waste. Their value differs by location, but U.S. households, 
which produce a substantial amount of global waste, are particularly unresponsive to price 
changes on waste disposal.37  
As firms have often already capitalised on cost saving DfE approaches, and consumers 
are unlikely to pressure firms further (at least in the heavily polluting U.S.), more drastic 
interventions are perhaps in order. The desire for further recycling progress has led to the 
concept of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) – a set of strategies or initiatives to 
ensure producers consider the full cost of their products on the environment. These are 
often mandatory regulatory, sometimes price-based, approaches to force or encourage 
producers to internalise environmental costs. Sometimes this results in firms physically 
taking responsibility for waste products but need not be so direct. It is not entirely clear 
where or if there is a functional difference between many EPR-branded initiatives and 
preceding mandatory approaches. Regardless, several attempts at encouraging EPR have 
emerged in recent decades. 
Researchers often study policies to encourage EPR, DfE, and efficient waste processing 
and recycling at the producer level. Dinan (1993) studies the efficiency of taxes on new 
virgin materials versus a tax on material producers which is paired with a subsidy to 
recycled material users. They find the paired system more efficient. Palmer, Sigman, and 
Walls (1997) compare a paired deposit and refund system to advanced disposal fees and 
recycling subsidies and find the paired system again most efficient – least costly – in 
reaching a waste reduction goal. Palmer and Walls (1997) instead study recycled content 
standards but find that without a paired tax system it is difficult to reach an optimal level 
of recycling. They also find the information requirements of recycled content standards to 
be extreme as extensive information on each firm and product would be required. Choe and 
Fraser (1998) argue that kerbside charges, deposit-refund schemes, sales tax exemptions, 
 
36
 They found elasticities around -0.10, suggesting a ten-per cent increase in waste disposal costs reduces waste by around one-per 
cent. 
37
 They find an average elasticity of -0.339 from the 66 studies in their primary analysis which are generally in OECD countries. 
However, their mean coefficient from the U.S. studies is substantially smaller – close to zero. 
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and virgin material taxes may be difficult to implement in many cases. In particular, they 
are sceptical of how successful consumer-facing policies will be in ensuring high rates of 
recycling, alternatively preventing losses into the environment.  
As some policies are easier to implement than others, Fullerton and Wu (1998) prepare 
a general equilibrium model to compare several policy options, specifically those 
implemented on firms versus those implemented on consumers. They argue that it is more 
difficult to apply something like a tax and rebate system on 100-million consumers, so it is 
useful to find the equivalent level of some mechanism applied on substantially fewer 
supplying firms. Among the policies that are suggested as being a substitute for deposit-
refund schemes on consumers are, as in Palmer, Sigman, and Walls (1997), tax and subsidy 
systems on producers where the subsidy goes to whoever accepts the waste for recycling. 
Their rationale is that the most recyclable amongst existing packaging will be more widely 
adopted, as opposed to, say, Stillwell, Canty, Kopf, and Montrone (1991) which advocates 
for the redesign of packaging for recyclability. 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1999) note the rapid increase in both kerbside recycling 
programs as well as economist’s interest in writing about recycling, but that many policy 
ideas have received little interest from policymakers. They also note that a consensus is 
forming by the later 1990’s that some form of tax-subsidy combination is likely needed for 
many waste products to be recycled efficiently, but whether the policy is applied at the 
consumer “downstream”, or firm “upstream” level is still a matter of substantial debate. 
Palmer and Walls (1999) differentiate between the concepts and incentives in Extended 
Producer Responsibility (EPR) versus Extended Product Responsibility. The former places 
the onus on firms, rather than sharing the burden to recycle along the chain of ownership. 
The original focus on producer responsibility involved exploring physical take-back 
requirements, but Palmer and Walls expand it to include a wider set of policy options. They 
advocate specifically for combined tax-subsidy systems on producers to encourage DfE 
and reduce transaction costs compared to systems involving consumers or consumer-facing 
stores. Calcott and Walls (2000) also explore whether upstream instruments are needed 
versus when downstream-focussed policies send sufficient signals to producers to 
encourage DfE. They argue that in most settings, transaction costs would be too high at the 
consumer level to send accurate signals about recyclability back to firms. Rather, Calcott 
and Walls advocate that at least some firm-level pricing policy is needed to encourage DfE. 
Walls and Palmer (2001), like Fullerton and Wolverton (1997) and Calcott and Walls 
(2005), argue that multiple policy instruments may be needed when several types of 
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externalities result from the production and consumption of goods. In particular, Walls and 
Palmer’s argument is made in response to opinion at the time that the variety of responses 
to waste and recycling problems was too complex in the aggregate. They also argue that 
life-cycle assessments (LCA’s) on goods which became popular at the time – evaluating 
product energy and material consumption from production through consumption and 
disposal – were inadequate as they lacked measures of the marginal damages component 
from usage. Walls (2003) then reiterates the EPR concepts and argues that it should include 
a breadth of policies such as DfE, not just producer take-back programs. Walls also notes 
the inherit difficulties of EPR, but that when recycling markets are functioning poorly – 
when they do not meet policy objectives on their own or substantial illegal dumping 
remains – that EPR-type policies are possibly the best policy addition. Slemrod (2008) too 
argues that when avoidance and consumer dumping are possible, that applying taxes and 
other policies on fewer and more easily monitored entities such as firms can be more 
effective. 
Glachant (2004), as part of an OECD series on waste policy, also discusses policies to 
encourage the redesign of products to reduce waste. They explicitly view product 
characteristics as the result of an economic process – of price – so ensuring that the value 
of damages at the post-consumption stage are reflected back into the cost to firms of product 
design is important for DfE. Glachant also differentiates between policy requirements for 
DfE for nondurables – with rapid waste turnover – and durables – with long lifespans. They 
see the former as the realm of lightening and designing for simplicity, while the latter of 
reducing toxic materials and perhaps entirely redesigning products. They also note the 
problems of innovation – of the risks and costs inherit in revising a product’s design. 
Because of the risks of not recovering the costs from extensive research and redesign 
towards DfE, it is thought that the standard tax-subsidy programs on producers has limited 
potential. Walls (2006) finds that such programs – and EPR in general – have been effective 
in reducing the weight of products and quantity of packaging materials. However, they are 
doubtful that more extensive product redesign will occur without more focussed EPR 
policies. This is a purpose of my paper. Karlsson and Luttropp (2006) also discuss the 
difficulties of firms in pursuing DfE, but under the term EcoDesign. They suggest that such 
considerations must often occur at the earliest stages of product design, which then 
increases the costs – and incentives required – for product change. Wang, Chang, Chen, 
Zhong, and Fan (2014) also explore how subsidies provided to firms at different stages – 
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design, production, and post-consumption, result in fairly different incentives and 
subsequent producer responses. 
DEFRA (2011) argues that waste and recycling should have a clear goal of reaching 
efficient levels but that many policies in practice do not set efficiency-based goals. They 
also put values to different waste recovery methods in terms of tons of carbon dioxide 
released and show that the recycling method used can result in a substantially different 
environmental impact. Hennlock et al. (2014) discusses recycling policy types and 
effectiveness in the Nordic countries. While such nations have generally achieved higher 
recycling rates, Hennlock et al. outlines that these programmes have come up against 
familiar barriers including high administrative costs of programmes involving many 
participants, the difficulty of ensuring that wastes, particularly plastics, maintain a high 
enough purity level to be recycled into high value products, and low levels of coordination 
between producers and recyclers. Cimpan, Maul, Jansen, Pretz, and Wenzel (2015) 
evaluate the current state of material sorting and recycling technologies. They discuss that 
high purity requirements for recyclable wastes – typically in excess of 95-per cent – have 
led to substantial research and development and subsequently upscaling of recycling firms 
in recent years. It is not at all clear whether the scale of the necessary investments involved 
are efficient as the recycling sector is often symmetrically isolated from the production side 
of products. That is, there is insufficient information exchange on how much producers 
should simplify products versus how much recyclers should invest. Hennlock et al. (2014) 
and Cimpan, Maul, Jansen, Pretz, and Wenzel (2015) in particular have noted subjects that 
this paper’s framework seeks to address. 
Recently, the concept of the Circular Economy (CE) has gained in prominence. 
Ghisellini, Cialani, and Ulgiati (2016) provides an overview of its origins in the 1980’s, for 
example in Stahel and Reday-Mulvey (1981), but that substantial growth in its use begins 
in the 2000’s.38 In short, CE is said to include EPR, DfE, product LCA’s, and recycling 
innovations into a wider framework. CE is most known in simpler form as an advocacy 
framework for closed- or nearly closed-loop production and consumption processes. But 
this, and CE generally, entails a multipronged approach to environmental damages and 
scarcity – consumer and firm environmental awareness, advocating for cleaner and efficient 
production practices, extensive recycling and renewable energy development, and robust 
 
38
 Murray, Skene, and Haynes (2017), like scholars of prior works on recycling and waste management, also trace the origin of the 
CE movement to Boulding (1966). It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between efforts labelled as CE advocacy versus prior work. 
While some authors, such as Ghisellini, Cialani, and Ulgiati (2016) depict CE as a larger umbrella movement encompassing EPR and 
DfE, it is not clear that CE, other than as a popular and sometimes provocative term, is a new concept. 
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environmental policy development. CE policy advocates generally emphasise 
technological advancement, including higher recycling efficiency levels, while generally 
acknowledging that the appropriate incentives for firms must exist. Genovese, Acquaye, 
Figueroa, and Koh (2017) provides an example of this lattermost issue – that at this time 
many closed-loop production transitions would have positive environmental impacts but 
would be losing propositions for firms without some form of state intervention. Ghisellini, 
Cialani, and Ulgiati (2016) note as does Murray, Skene, and Haynes (2017) that CE is of 
particular interest in China as a top-down policy objective, and elsewhere as a grassroots 
movement. Others, such as Orset, Barret, and Lemaire (2017), find that consumers in their 
study area on average have a higher willingness to pay for environmentally friendly and 
recycled products. So, it seems that in some cases the issue of information asymmetry 
remains. 
Bocken, Pauw, Bakker and van der Grinten (2016) within the CE literature, like in the 
EPR and DfE literature, suggest the need for product redesign to improved recycling. But 
as with others, does not outline a sufficient incentive structure to encourage firms to do so. 
EEA (2017) focusses on specific issues related to product design incentives and their 
trends. Among these, a trend of increasingly complex product designs – and in particular 
more heterogeneous materials – which complicate recycling efforts. Kalmykova, 
Sadagopan, and Rosado (2018) also provide a guide to circular economy policy options 
which is decidedly lacking in voluntary, price-based incentives. So too, Savini (2019) 
advocates for transitioning to a circular economy but does not provide relevant guidance 
on incentivising a circular economy. Often, today’s policy recommendations for waste and 
recycling problems, such as marine plastic accumulation, are still those proposed three or 
so decades ago (Abbott and Sumaila, 2019). While there has certainly been progress on 
some environmental issues, waste and recycling remain a difficult issue where further 
improvements appear to be needed. 
Providing a new, targeted policy framework to reduce within-product material 
heterogeneity is the key objective of this paper. This is a variation on tax-subsidy schemes, 
but decidedly different in terms of design and implementation as well as limitations. It 
specifically seeks to improve recyclability by simplifying products while encouraging 
recycler-producer coordination. As shown, the issue it addresses – of material heterogeneity 
and complexity – has been noted in the literature since at least the 1990’s yet remains a 
hindrance to higher recycling rates across countries. Before presenting the core model of 
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this paper, I next provide some specific estimates on the costs and complexities involved 
in the recycling problem. 
2.3 Some Select Estimates of Waste Composition and the Importance of Purity in 
Preserving Value 
In this section I provide some estimates on the complexity of products, price sensitivity 
of recycled material to purity, and scale of prices and costs involved in recycling. The 
example products explored in this section are likely familiar to most consumers – they are 
the sorts of items that many of us use and dispose of daily. The products are also the source 
of a lot of waste we may find when exploring nature.  
An issue in addressing the recyclability problem is that often we must accept that 
knowledge of a firm’s marginal abatement cost schedule is private and guarded. Firms 
facing competition, taxation, or even subsidies have reason to guard this information. We 
can, however, derive some estimates using a revealed preference framework over recycling 
prices and activity for select products. I use a list of the ten or so most collected items along 
European coastlines (Ocean Conservancy, 2018). This list has a high degree of overlap with 
other beach clean-up studies such as European Commission (2017) and the consumer litter 
entries in Hardesty et al. (2017). I organise the list into eight items and expand the entries 
to include each item’s associated materials (i.e., if we recover a bottle cap, a bottle also 
existed). The Ocean Conservancy sample is not representative of consumer waste, but 
rather is biased toward wastes that float and do not rapidly disintegrate. These are the most 
common sorts of waste observed by the public in the environment. In Table 2, I provide the 
derived list with estimates of material quantities (?̅?), detailed usual composition, and 




TABLE 2—COMMON CONSUMER WASTES ON COASTLINES, THEIR COMPOSITION, AND FATE 
 Typical 𝑁 Typical composition Recycled? 
Cigarette butts 3a Residual tobacco, paper, and cellulose acetate filter No 
Food wrappers (ex. 
Crisp packets) 
3b Layered BOPP, LDPE, and durable ionomer resins No 
Plastic beverage 
bottles and caps/lids 
4-5 
Bottle: PET/PETE, HDPE, LDPE, PS other polymers 
Cap/lid: PP, HDPE, sometimes with a PE lining 




Plastic grocery or 
other bags 
1 HDPE, LDPE, LLDPE, or PET Sometimes 
Disposable cup and 
straws or stirrers 
3-4e 
Cup: paper with PE liner 
Lids: PS or PP 




Plastic take out/away 
containers (plus 








Foam take out/away 
containers (plus 
cutlery and carry bag) 
3 
Container: PS or EPS 
Cutlery: PP 




Glass beverage bottles 
and caps/lids 
4-5 
Bottle: Glass of various colours 
Caps/lids: steel or aluminium with a PE lining 




Notes: Reorganization of top ten list of consumer waste products collected from ocean coastlines internationally. The 
reorganisation includes pairing beverage bottles with lids and expanding to include complement waste (ex. including cutlery 
with plastic take out/away waste). In practice, whether items are accepted for recycling depends on local guidance and 
initiatives. Plastic acronyms used: Biaxially oriented polypropylene (BOPP), expanded polystyrene (EPS), ethylene-vinyl 
acetate (EVA), high-density polyethene (polyethylene) (HDPE), linear low-density polyethene (polyethylene) (LLDPE), low-
density polyethene (polyethylene) (LDPE), polyethene (polyethylene) (PE), polyethene (polyethylene) terephthalate 
(PET/PETE), polypropylene (PP), and polystyrene (PS). 
Sources: Top Ten list from Ocean Conservancy (2018) reorganized and expanded to include commonly associated waste and 
materials based on author estimates and other sources: a Terracycle (2019); b Trending Packaging (2016); c Margolis (2018). 
 
On average, the waste in Table 2 is composed of three materials that are generally 
separable without great difficulty. Exceptions to separability are multilayer food wrappers 
and labels which are matters of marketing and consumer appeal rather than out of necessity. 
That these products are separable, however, does not mean that separation and sorting by 
recyclers is optimal. A recent development at fast-food franchise Taco Bell suggests the 
feasibility of single material packaging as 95% of the firm’s new cups, lids, and straws are 
made of the same recyclable plastic (Danigelis, 2019). As in the bottle cap example, the 
difficulty is not always mechanical separability from other components, but lack of 
distinction such as between HDPE and PP plastic.39 The Plastic Bottle Cap Report 
(Boonstra and van Hest, 2017) notes a great variety of cap types discovered on North Sea 
beaches – 25 types with 80-per cent originating from drink bottles, and several colours – 
roughly 30-per cent white and 70-per cent in a rainbow of variety. This may be more variety 
than needed to hold a product and then be discarded.  
 
39
 HDPE/PP bottle caps float while PET bottles sink in water which influences both the prevalence of bottle cap discovery on beaches 
and is one method used to separate out caps from bottle material (though manual sorting is still common). 
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Analysis of recycling material prices emphasises the importance of material purity. Table 
3 reports average prices for some types and grades of recycled materials and associated 
costs in the U.K. The value of recycled materials sharply declines when not separated – 
when it is contaminated. The extreme comparison in Table 3 is where natural HDPE bottles 
fetch 30 times the price of mixed plastic bottles per tonne. Plastic film also transitions from 
having a positive market value to a disposal cost when more than 5-per cent contamination 
is present, highlighted in Figure 10. A high alternative cost of disposal (a minimum of 
£82/tonne) bounds recyclable waste prices in the U.K. resulting in, historically, a lucrative 
industry exporting recyclables of dubious quality to countries with less oversight (Arkin, 
2019).40 The primary destinations for this waste – China and then others recently cracked 
down on dubious recyclable material imports with global repercussions. This is done 
primarily by raising the purity rate required to import bulk plastic waste for recycling (Katz, 
2019; McNaughton and Nowakowski, 2019).41 The problem of poor recyclable waste 





 See also several case studies on the processing of recyclables abroad in Alexander and Reno (2012). 
41
 Liu, Adams, and Walker (2018), argue that regulations maintaining firm responsibility for recyclables sent abroad would improve 
purity rates. In practice, it seems often exceedingly difficult to hold firms accountable for waste once it has left the country of origin. 
They also argue that policies pushing technological transfers of waste technologies to developing countries would improve the situation 
– another policy that is difficult in practice with current intellectual property practices. 
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TABLE 3—PRICES OF RECYCLABLE MATERIALS IN THE U.K., 2018-2019 
 Price range (£ / tonne) 
Plastic bottles  
Clear and light blue PET 79-156 
Coloured PET 25-38 
HDPE natural 315-363 
HDPE mixed colour 93-114 
Mixed 11-58 
Plastic film  
PE Clear - Natural 263-296 
PE Printed 174-194 
Export 98:2 138-177 
Export 95:5 4-28 
Export 90:10 (27)-(2) 
Export 80:20 (76)-(55) 






MRF glass (28)-2 
Metal cans  
Aluminium 867-938 
Steel 113-129 
Alternative disposal  
Energy-from-waste site (82)-(109) 
Refuse-derived-fuel site (88)-(98) 
Landfill disposal and tax (104)-(116) 
Notes: Average range of prices at recyclers in the U.K. from January 2018 
through June 2019. In parentheses, red numbers indicate negative values 
– payments required for disposal. Prices include plastic recovery and 
export (PRN/PERN) value.42 When numbers are presented in the material 
types column, the first indicates per cent plastic and the second the per 
cent of contamination. 





 Package recovery notes (PRN) and package export recovery notes (PERN) certify that materials will be recycled into new products 
and exported to facilities meeting UK standards. Firms can sell PRN/PERN to companies with recycling obligations, for instance in 




FIGURE 10 RECYCLED POLYETHYLENE MARKET VALUE BY PURITY 
Notes: Based on mean monthly prices January 2018 through June 2019 for polyethene (polyethylene) (PE) plastic film used in packaging 
based on the level of contamination. Positive salvage value declines rapidly and becomes a discard price beyond 5-per cent 
contamination. Processing costs for the more contaminated film is bounded by an alternative waste disposal cost of on average ₤93/tonne. 
Source: Author calculations based on Letsrecycle.com (2019). 
 
The issue of waste pervasiveness in nature is becoming quite pressing yet deriving 
recycled materials of higher purity is costly. We can observe that when sufficient levels of 
purity are not met, the value of recyclables quickly becomes negatives. As this problem is 
resistant to existing methods of redress, new approaches are in order. Recycling requires 
preferably NEP-compatible policy options that are pragmatically applicable to when 
simplifying product composition and ease of decomposition by recyclers would improve 
recyclability. I next outline an instrument for when a policymaker wants to incentivize more 
recyclable product designs.  
2.4 Introducing the Per-Material Marginal Abatement Cost Decision 
I explore the benefits of a per-material tax on manufacturers to reduce the number of 
materials used in products and fund the decomposition and recycling of complex products 
through a subsidy. As a starting point, I present an abatement cost framework where for 
any nth component of an existing product, there are two costly options for improving whole-
product recyclability. Suppose we can rank the costliness of changes to the ?̅? components 
from highest to lowest abatement costs. At any change in the processing of the (discrete) 
number of materials in a product, a cost-minimising policy satisfies 




where each choice might include a complex set of changes representable as quantities and 
accompanying costs. An example is a producer switching from metal to plastic fasteners in 
a mostly plastic product. A fastener change impacts not only the per-piece cost of fasteners, 
but perhaps the number of fasteners needed, the structure of the surrounding material, 
assembly complexity and durability, and thus consumer satisfaction with the product. 
Alternatively, a cost comes with separating the metal and plastic components and recycling 
separately. For materials that are profitable to recycle anyway, the invisible hand gets to 
work on the matter. Frequently, however, recycled material prices are insufficient, and 
recyclable materials are discarded when attached to other waste (European Environment 
Agency, 2019).43 
Items entering the recycling stream are composed of one or several materials which may 
be separate parts or permanently combined such as laminates. For expositional purposes, 
suppose each part in a product entering the recycling process is somehow separable to be 
sorted into independent recycling streams. From an optimal recycling design perspective, 
two options exist to prepare any of 1: ?̅? pieces of a discarded item for eventual recycling. 
Either the producer can reduce the number of material types by making parts of the same 
materials – make it of 𝑁 < ?̅? materials – or improve disassembly (lower the cost) for 
recycling.  
Consider if both product design and recycling are by a single firm that is required to 
recycle. The objective function over the potential number of pieces in a product would 
extend Equation (9) as 




where summing over all 𝑛 = 1: ?̅? includes the possibility to create a recyclable product of 
one material, but also to make no change to the initial product and rather process it by 
disassembly and recycling only. We might also suppose there is an option of choosing 𝑛 =
0 materials and not make the product at all, or at least the part of it not consumed. This may 
be applicable to cases where the entire value of a product is exceeded by the cost of 
recycling it, or alternatively, the damages it imposes on the environment. This is generally 
 
43
 Particularly difficult are recyclables attached to or containing hazardous components which this framework can also address. 
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assumed to be an exception, however.  We might also find cases where packaging serves a 
purely aesthetic purpose for a target audience, e.g. placing a wrapper on a coconut. 
Solving Equation (10) as if a cost minimising firm internalises recycling and disposal 
costs results in an efficient recycling policy. This efficient result occurs as the firm would 
choose the least cost combination of product changes and recycling processes. However, 
firms are rarely involved in both production and recycling, and a coordination problem 
results.44 Producers design, manufacture, distribute, and sell a product to consumers who 
discard some or all of it. Other firms – recyclers – are in the business of recycling the 
disposed of items – processing the materials to sell for use again. Alternatively, waste may 
be sent out for incineration for energy, sent to landfills, or lost into the environment. 
Producers and recyclers face different incentives over product design. Producers, when not 
subject to the full cost of the environmental impact averted by an Equation (10) decision 
process, strictly choose the most profitable material and assembly style for each part of a 
product. The producer’s unregulated preference is the material variety of ?̅? types. 
Recyclers instead prefer a uniform and easily disassembled product, all else equal, and 
would no doubt prefer materials of a higher recycled value since producers are footing the 
material bill.  
Generally, one defines a marginal abatement cost curve over a group’s costs as −𝐶′(∙) 
on a differentiable cost function, 𝐶(∙). An assumption is that abatement only affects costs, 
not revenues, which perhaps unintentionally excludes revenue-generating aspects of 
abatement like public goodwill. Yet some firms use sustainability in product differentiation 
to great success, e.g. Patagonia, a brand whose business model and image emphasise 
controlling their environmental impact (Patagonia, 2018). Their business model suggests 
that revenues may increase when firms take responsibility for the recycling of the materials 
used in production, at least in specialty cases. I then derive the marginal abatement cost 
curve more appropriately over the entire profit function, −𝜋′(∙).45 In a recycling context, 
material choices affect both revenue and costs when material choices impact quality. For 
producers, choosing 𝑁 < ?̅? reduces profit and likely increases costs, as without regulation 
the firm chooses their profit maximising level of materials, ?̅?. For recyclers, 𝑁 < ?̅? 
decreases costs but has an ambiguous effect on revenue. Suppose producers initially make 
a product of X volume of ?̅? materials, but then change their material schedule to make it of 
 
44
 Exceptions occur when new inputs are too costly, scarce, and difficult to substitute away from to not recycle. A perhaps extreme 
example is the availability of frostbitten toes for garnishment in the sourtoe cocktail (NPR, 2017).  
45
 If it were necessary to use both cost and profit bases in this paper, I would differentiate between them as, say, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐶  and 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝜋. 
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𝑁 = ?̅? − 1 materials without a change in the total volume. Let ?̅? = 2 and a recycler’s 
initial revenue from recycling the product be 𝑃1𝑋1 + 𝑃2𝑋2 where 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 = 𝑋. After 
redesign, their revenue is 𝑃1𝑋. If 𝑃1 < 𝑃2, then the recycler’s revenue decreases. I set this 
pragmatic matter aside, however, and suppose producers act efficiently and choose higher 
cost materials only out of necessity. We might also suppose that, generally, recycled 
material prices relate to producer input prices. Then, 𝑃1 ≥ 𝑃2 for a recycler to keep the 
analysis tractable. 
While the number of material types in a recyclable product is distinctly discrete, it is 
useful to discuss it as though it is a continuous quality so that I can use the language and 
notation of differentiable functions. Let the profit function of a producer be 𝜋𝑃(𝑁,∙), of a 
recycler be 𝜋𝑅(𝑁,∙), and let the effect on cost be greater than the effect on revenue from a 
change in N. 𝜋𝑃(𝑁,∙) is weakly increasing in N and 𝜋𝑅(𝑁,∙) weakly decreasing. Define the 










Equation (11) is an extension of the standard definition of a marginal abatement cost 
curve in that it maps the impact of abatement decisions of the polluting firm on their own 
profitability. Equation (12) is more exotic as the recycler did not produce the polluting 
item. Rather, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅 maps the cost to avoid environmental damages by recycling once a 
product is made and discarded. It is not a marginal damage function either, rather the 
marginal cost of avoiding damages. But rather than plague the world with another acronym, 
I refer to it as a marginal abatement cost curve for the recycler. 
2.4.1 Encouraging Design-for-Recycling Through a Per-Material Tax 
As part of the EU Plastics Strategy, the European Commission identifies innovation as 
critical to reducing the quantity of plastic waste entering the environment (European 
Commission, 2018). This section outlines an efficient strategy to incentivise full recycling 
as well as product innovation toward that goal.  
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If an interior optimal solution exists in choosing between product change costs and 
recycling costs with a cost minimising objective, then 𝑁 = 𝑁∗ achieves an efficient 
outcome (Note 3) when 
(13) 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁). 
 
The efficient number of remaining material types in a product, 𝑁∗, is the number passed to 
recyclers which then requires 𝑁∗ −1 separating processes to fully recycle. The 
complement ?̅? − 𝑁∗ is the socially optimal reduction in material types by producers. 
Because it is optimal that producers reduce up to 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁
∗) and a recycler process 𝑁∗ 
materials, an optimal tax imposed on the producer on the number of materials used is 
𝜏𝑃
∗ (𝑁∗). Additionally, a subsidy to recyclers 𝑠𝑅
∗ (𝑁∗) would ensure profitability in processing 
materials composed of 𝑁∗. A standard at 𝑁∗, alternatively, an optimal tax without a subsidy 
may be insufficient because the profit incentive of a recycler is not ex ante guaranteed.  For 
an efficient interior solution, it must be that 𝜏𝑃
∗ (𝑁∗) = 𝑠𝑅
∗ (𝑁∗) as depicted in Figure 11. The 
dashed line highlights the combination of abatement costs that minimise the cost of full 
recycling. An efficient recycling support strategy incentivises this combination such that 
no component of the product is left without an associated incentive to recycle. 
 
Note 3 – Achieving the Efficient Outcome from a Zero Loss Objective 
As perhaps the simplest approach to finding the socially optimal level, define the problem in terms 
of competing abatement costs from the producer and recycler with an objective to minimize loss of 
residual waste value into the environment, min
{𝑁}
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) − 𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁). 
Then differentiating and setting the desired loss, alternatively waste value, to zero results in 
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) −𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) = 0. So, choose 𝑁 = 𝑁
∗ such that 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁). More complex 
objective functions can obviously be written, this one also serves as advocacy to address a 





FIGURE 11. OPTIMAL N AND DIVISION OF ABATEMENT EFFORT 
Notes: Marginal abatement cost curve of recycling 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) maps the damage avoidance costs once a product is made and sent to 
recycling. 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) is the cost of reducing the number of materials to make the product easier to recycle. The least-cost combination 
of 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) and 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) to redesign versus decompose and recycle a product is emphasised by the dashed line. An efficient damage 
avoidance strategy incentivises N* materials in a product. Taking the curves to zero would suggest the recycler might not recycle at all, 
or the producer not produce at all or produce something with no waste. 
 
Compared to optimal 𝜏𝑃
∗(𝑁∗) = 𝑠𝑅
∗(𝑁∗), a higher level of taxation and subsidies is 
inefficient, and a lower level is insufficient. 𝜏𝑃 = 𝑠𝑅 > 𝜏𝑃
∗ = 𝑠𝑅
∗  is inefficient because it 
incentivises overinvestment in abatement – producers seek to reduce, and recyclers to 
process some of the same components. It could, however, result in innovation through 
producer-recycler competition. In contrast, 𝜏𝑃 = 𝑠𝑅 < 𝜏𝑃
∗ = 𝑠𝑅
∗  leaves a gap where neither 
invests, and some material is discarded. We might also expect bounds on each MAC. For 
producers, there is an alternative of not producing at all, and for recyclers of not recycling 
at all. 
A different depiction results from a partially profitable recyclables stream. Figure 12 
outlines a case where components of a recycled product up to ?̂? are profitably separated 
and recycled in ?̂? − 1 processes. Even if producers, compelled by a tax, reduce the number 
of materials to 𝑁∗, a subcomponent 𝑁∗ − ?̂? is discarded without an offsetting subsidy 





FIGURE 12. OPTIMAL DIVISION OF ABATEMENT EFFORTS WITH PROFITABLE RECYCLING 
Notes: A slightly more realistic depiction of optimality – since recycling programmes already exist – notes that 𝑁 − 1 separating 
processes must be profitable. As an example, the processing of plastic polyethene (polyethylene) terephthalate (PET) bottles may be 
profitable while labels and caps are unwanted and discarded. 𝜏𝑃
∗ = 𝑠𝑅
∗  compels efficient producer and recycler behaviour, but the subsidy 
is only necessary over components 𝑁∗ − 𝑁. 
 
Firms can clearly redesign products – it is entirely within their right to do so. It is often 
an approach advocated for in EPR and DfE circles. In the next section I consider how the 
optimal tax and subsidy changes with product redesign. It explores how the tax and subsidy 
encourage redesign by producers to lower their tax obligation. This incentive also 
encourages producers to coordinate with recyclers – to seek their input on product design 
for recyclability. Unfortunately, I also outline that there is a cost involved in this process 
for the regulator – the cost of reassessing the optimal tax and subsidy following a products 
redesign. But surely in some cases this cost will be less than that of other EPR approaches. 
2.4.2 Innovation in the Efficient Programme 
A leader-follower relationship is inherent in the production and recycling of goods as a 
producer controls their composition.46 While the incentive for dynamic efficiency with 
environmental taxes is known, a second incentive to innovate occurs with a per-material 
recycling tax. Assume the profit function of a recycler is dependent on the design of the 
 
46
 This is aside from, perhaps, existing cases of producer-recycler coordination. But then, without a legal framework requiring 
producers to act on a recycler’s recommendations coordination is voluntary, and producers maintain a dominant position. 
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item and summarised in a parameter that indicates the ease of processing, 𝛿𝑃(∙).
47 The 
recycler profit function is then 𝜋𝑅(𝑁, 𝛿𝑃(∙)). Consider if, in each iteration of product 
design, the regulator recalculates the optimal tax. A producer has an incentive to confer 
with a recycler to make products easier to recycle because it reduces the tax burden on the 
producer. This change, however, also reduces the matching subsidy to recyclers.48 I refer 
to this as iterative efficiency as it occurs when producers make improvements in each new 
iteration of a product, followed by evaluation of the tax and subsidy policy. Taking the 
effect of 𝛿𝑃(∙) on a recycler as a scalar multiplier, I present the iterative efficiency incentive 
in Figure 13. With a decrease in processing difficulty, 𝛿𝑃(∙) decreases from 𝛿𝑃
1(∙) to 𝛿𝑃
2(∙). 
Savings to a producer are the shaded area resulting from iteratively reducing the tax level 
to match the efficient level and shifting the responsibility to recyclers from 𝑁1 to 𝑁2. While 
the efficient subsidy also decreases, because the amount of business for a recycler increases, 
the effect on recycler profitability depends on the producer and recycler marginal 




 The sub-P notation reminds which party – the producer – is in control of the parameter. 
48
   In the limit, a producer might make their product fully profitable to recycle. 
49
 We might also take interdependence further and suggest that recyclers impact producer profitability through the effect on material 




FIGURE 13. ITERATIVE EFFICIENCY INCENTIVE TO MAKE PRODUCTS MORE RECYCLABLE 
Notes: Dynamic efficiency leads to improvements within the producer’s marginal abatement cost function, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁), while iterative 
efficiency results in improvements in a recycler’s 𝛿𝑃𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) as new iterations of a product are made easier to recycle. I highlight 
iterative improvements which reduce both the tax on producers and the number of material reductions that are efficient for a producer to 
undertake. Recyclers, who act given a producer’s decisions, receive a lower subsidy per-material after programme re-evaluations. 
However, the number of materials a recycler processes increases, and the effect on the recycler’s profit as well as net revenue or cost of 
the programme tax and subsidy is ambiguous. 
 
In practice, I have been discussing what would be a micro-tax for many products. 
Consider the motivating example of plastic-packaged beverages which are generally 
composed of four or five materials. The optimal tax is likely to be in the few-cent range 
and possibly a fraction of a cent, since the entire packaging cost is at most a few cents per 
bottle (Economist, 2014). With sticky prices, this increase may not result in a consumer-
facing price change (see Note 4). Yet at a production scale of a half trillion bottles globally 
per year, the tax results in an incentive for firms and industry to seek innovation. Given the 
scale of the issue that this framework seeks to address, I next discuss a few complications 
that may arise in its use. Any policymaker using this approach almost certainly would not 




Note 4 – When Firm Behaviour is NEP-Consistent 
It has been suggested that I include a theory of firm behaviour that connects the chapter’s model to 
the NEP framework. Such a model follows; however, it is immediate from existing research. 
Suppose firms sell a differentiated product, the industry is defined by sufficient demand 
substitutability, and firms compete by setting prices. Hotelling, Salop, and Spence (1976), and Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) provide relevant frameworks. I include that output prices as well as input 
contracts are sufficiently sticky that a penalty must be paid to change prices, |𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1|. Let the 
initial period (𝑡 = 0) price for firm i be argmax
𝑝𝑖,0
𝜋𝑖,0(𝑝𝑖,0, 𝐸[𝒑𝑗≠𝑖,0]) given i's expectations of prices 
for all other firms, 𝐸[𝒑𝑗≠𝑖,0]. For all other periods, firm i sets price according to  
argmax
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
(𝜋𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐸[𝒑𝑗≠𝑖,𝑡]) − |𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1|). A NEP-compliant tax and subsidy works within the 
bounds where |𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≠ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1| ≥ 𝜋𝑖,𝑡(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , 𝐸[𝒑𝑗≠𝑖,𝑡], 𝜏𝑃
∗) − 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝐸[𝒑𝑗≠𝑖,𝑡−1]). Firms might 
still oppose a NEP-sized material tax on the grounds of reducing profitability but find it 
insufficiently burdensome to adjust prices and consumers are unaffected. 
 
2.4.3 Some Complications and Cautions 
Because of the variety of materials involved and the complexity of recycling processes, 
several complications may arise in implementing the outlined framework. We might divide 
the complications into modelling and implementation constraints, but the distinction hardly 
matters in practice. 
First, standard applications of the MAC-MD framework generally have the quality that 
all units of emissions can be assumed the same e.g., each ton of carbon dioxide emissions 
is uniform. When a unit of emissions is of uniform quality, the order of what unit of 
emissions is plotted against a unit of damages and abatement does not matter. But plotting 
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) against 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) warrants caution. Consider the ?̅?
th material in any of the 
preceding figures. The implicit assumption is that the change that is the least costly for a 
producer to make is also the costliest for a recycler. This assumption is almost certainly a 
special case. If using the producer’s marginal abatement cost curve as the base, the 
recycler’s marginal abatement cost curve may not be upward sloping, and thus, there may 
not be an intersection of the two curves and, therefore, no equalisation of the optimal tax 
and subsidy. The social objective in Equation (10) still holds, however, and so for any Nth 
material, either a product change or recycling processing is preferable.50 
 
50
 Or at least not less preferable in a tie. 
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Second, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) and 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) may not be feasible over all 𝑁. That is, some 
reductions in the material may not be possible for a producer, and some materials might 
not be separable and recyclable. For example, the composition of crisp packets is of many 
layers of plastic that cannot be separated by any practical means.51 In other cases, specific 
materials are necessary for one part of a product while infeasible in others (e.g., soft silicone 
seals in a necessarily rigid product). Additionally, as the nature of product materials is 
discrete, 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) might not exist. Equation (10) still holds, but the optimal 
tax and subsidy may not match. 
A concern in a standard MAC-MD framework is that 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) or 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅(𝑁) may be 
strictly higher. That is, it might always be cheaper for a recycler or producer to act. If it is 
always cheaper for recyclers to process up to ?̅?, collecting a producer tax can still finance 
recycling. But setting 𝜏𝑃
∗(𝑁∗) = 𝑠𝑅
∗(𝑁∗) – the interior-optimal policy – is not helpful. 
Instead, setting the tax to balance subsidisation in total is sufficient and still fosters 
innovation. Alternatively, if it is always cheaper for a producer to reduce material variety, 
zero matching subsidy would be paid out, but its availability might still incentivise 
innovation as a prize for developing more efficient recycling methods. 
Fourth, the materials that producers choose matter. An assumption has been that all 
materials are in some way recyclable or have a recyclable alternative, but surely there are 
exceptions. A less extreme perspective is that materials have different recycled value. Then, 
which materials producers choose to replace in a product impacts 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑃(𝑁) in more ways 
than ease of separability and processing. A producer might reduce the number of materials 
in a product, but by eliminating those with the highest recycling value. A product that was 
at least partially profitable to recycle becomes a loss without subsidies, and the policymaker 
has made recyclers dependent on public support rather than encouraging innovation. 
Different materials might also have different toxicities, lifespans, and environmental 
impacts (though we might expect a more toxic material e.g., fissile waste, to be more costly 
to recycle). For those items lost into the environment despite our best efforts, a reduction 
in material types could then increase or decrease environmental damages.52 Yet, making a 
 
51
 There have been efforts to recycle crisp packets that involve special collection and pelletisation of the plastic for generally lower 
grade uses. Smithers (2019) reports the low success rate of a crisp manufacturer’s collection program – roughly 0.01-per cent of the 
manufacturer’s current production volume is being recovered through their effort which includes thousands of collection points and a 
mail-in option.  
52
 Yet it is likely still preferable to have, say, a bottle made from plastic rather than glass which has a lower environmental impact 
after it is lost into the environment. Gray (2018) notes that a glass soft drink bottle costs about 1-cent more to make than a PET bottle, 
but due to its considerably heavier weight, a glass bottle results in substantially higher emissions during transportation (Gray, 2018). 
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product fully recyclable might increase the probability that users attempt to recycle it 
because they believe it will be recycled rather than partially discarded during processing. 
Fifth, dynamic and iterative efficiency requires monitoring. Just as firms have been 
accused of ineffectually, even cynically using carbon offsets (Song, 2019), whether a 
product has become more recyclable requires review. And as with carbon offset operations, 
recycling operations often occur in less regulated countries where oversight may be costly. 
However, checking whether a product has become more recyclable can occur at the 
production facility gate or in the market in consultation with experts. 
Sixth, dynamic efficiency and iterative efficiency are competing incentives. Producers 
may choose between pursuing dynamic efficiency – reductions in their abatement costs, 
and iterative efficiency – reducing recycler abatement costs and awaiting revaluation. An 
efficient, timely revaluation process improves the position of iterative efficiency. However, 
any combination of the two sorts of efficiency improvements are beneficial, and I assume 
producers will choose efficiently. 
Seventh, producers and recyclers might seek to freeride by pushing the matter onto 
households. Single versus multi-stream recycling is in effect a debate over whether the 
gains from pushing recyclable sorting onto consumers is sufficient since sorting at 
collection points is remains inevitable. I also note that most plastic bottle recycling 
programmes prefer that consumers only deposit the bottle. They communicate this 
preference through the design of rebate programmes that only pay for the bottle, not 
whether consumers return the cap for which no rebate price is offered. It is likely not 
socially negative to have consumers involved in the recycling process, but it is uncertain 
whether doing so results in a net benefit to society. 
Finally, I discuss the framework on a product scale. But this might only make sense if 
either a product so regulated is separable from others in the recycling stream or is applied 
to a sufficiently large variety of products. It might not be sufficiently beneficial if a 
programme improves the recyclability of some items, but in general waste remains too 





2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I discuss a regulatory framework to improve product recyclability. I 
assume, as the literature suggests, that composite waste items pose an obstacle to recycling 
because they are costly to separate. I then derive a framework of a paired tax and subsidy 
on the count of materials in items to ensure there is a profit incentive for waste to be entirely 
recycled. The concept is simple – when the incentives are set properly, either the recycler 
or producer accepts accountability for each component in a waste item. I then observe that 
there are practical obstacles to setting the paired tax-subsidy well, but trial and error are 
likely to be effective. I also outline the possibility of iterative efficiency – producers would 
have an incentive to coordinate with recyclers to design new versions of products that are 
more recyclable. I have not, however, addressed creating a mechanism that dynamically 
tracks and automatically adjusts to iteratively changing optimal tax and subsidy levels. 
There is no obvious way to create this. It would likely need to depend on a process that 
gathers and merges confidential production and recycling information and then uses it in a 
decision process to arrive at an optimal price without excessive state intervention. This is 
an avenue that requires further research.  
Unfortunately, when trying to address an issue as intractable as achieving exceptionally 
high consumer waste recycling rates, one policy approach is not sufficient to address all 
issues. In an appendix I outline how a Vickrey auction can be used to encourage greater 
waste stream homogeneity (A2.1 Improving Recyclability Through Standardisation 
Auctions). But we might also consider whether the vast array of plastics and other materials 
at our disposal are even necessary. For example, across a wide range of household products, 
the choice to use HDPE versus PP by producers appears random as these materials are 
perfect substitutes or nearly so. Among the seven most common plastics and dozens of less 
used ones, I speculate the benefit to differentiation is negligible in many applications. 
Committing to less plastic types across all industry and society could have value by 
increasing recycling efficiency and thus reducing waste. Like the two mechanisms I 
propose, it increases recyclability potential because it decreases the cost of recycling and 
increases the value of recycled materials by increasing their purity. Of course, firms 
producing products from the plastic to be eliminated would argue against the value of 
differentiation and may require compensation to adapt. To choose among plastics to phase 
out, we should compare the expected damages if materials are still lost into the 
environment, capacity for repeated recycling, and lifespan of the material when making 
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such far-reaching choices. Clearly there are several avenues for further research on 
recyclability. 
In this as in many proposals related to the environment, the issue of existing property 
rights almost certainly poses a substantial obstacle to implementation. Within many legal 
systems, firms would have the standing to oppose these schemes on the basis that the 
required changes dilute the value of intellectual property licenses granted to them. 
However, suppose the alternative is that the polluter must pay the full externality cost when 
they do not enter the scheme. That is, suppose they are offered the alternative of covering 
the full cost and responsibility of ensuring their product is recycled – the EPR approach, 
but also, critically, the cost when their defection interferes with the recycling of others. 
Firms may then choose their efficient solution – relinquish a license which is resulting in 
an increasingly concerning externality, or truly and fully internalise the externality. In 
either case, they address the underlying problem to society’s benefit. But being required to 
make such a choice, too, will almost certainly be opposed by powerful interested parties.  
Substantial progress is being made in recycling rates in some nations. Recycler processes 
have improved, and producers have, in some cases, become interested due to material cost 
savings and public image. However, most materials are not recycled and instead lost into 
the natural environment where they cause damages over decades that are difficult to 
measure but certainly exceptionally large. As society seeks to recycle a larger share of 
waste and move toward a circular economy organisation, more nuanced approaches are 





3. A Review of How U.S. Coal Power Plants Used Technology 
to Reduce Sulphur Dioxide Emissions – Lessons for the 
Next Energy Transition 
The objective of this paper is to advise current and future energy transition 
advocates on the workings of the last great transition to occur in the U.S. 
energy sector – a substantial reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions. This is 
not a new area of study, but one that I examine carefully for additional 
insights. I review how some U.S. coal power plants used technology to reduce 
sulphur dioxide emissions. To do so, I use historical coal and natural gas 
purchase decisions at power plants and find power plants with sulphur 
dioxide abatement technologies demand dirtier fuel. This results in a 
divergence in domestic demand by abatement technology which is robust to 
how the problem is approached. Along the way, I develop a couple new 
analytical methods, derive new fuel price demand elasticity estimates for the 
U.S. energy sector, and put prices on some of the incentives involved. 
Keywords: energy, power plants, almost perfect substitutes, inter-fuel substitution, 
dynamic linear logit, regression discontinuity, hedonic price model. 





This paper adds to the literature exploring reductions in sulphur dioxide emissions from 
coal power plants in the United States. As new energy transitions are underway – from coal 
and fossil fuel-based power altogether – it seems an appropriate time to take another look 
at the last great energy transition. The approach taken is to review the supply side of sulphur 
dioxide reductions – analysing fuel purchase decisions between high sulphur coal and 
cleaner alternatives – and how abatement technology decisions impact purchases. This 
generally occurs at the power plant level, but also sometimes within power plants and at 
the national, aggregate scale. I restrict the main analysis to the domestic market as this 
remains the highest binding level of regulatory reach. To achieve the objectives of the 
study, a substantial set of econometric techniques are developed and then implemented on 
a large and specifically developed dataset. However, in the end the objective is not 
historical reflection, but rather to develop lessons, frameworks, and tools for application in 
current and future energy transitions. 
Undertaking this study is obviously an exercise in searching for new insights along a 
well-trodden path. So, I first present a literature review focussed on aspects of the U.S. 
energy sector. This includes the history of efforts to address sulphur dioxide emissions – 
an alarming issue in its time, research on abatement technology and fuel selections, and 
relevant empirical techniques. I then visually present the scale of sulphur dioxide reductions 
nationally, followed by evidence that coal power plants with flue gas desulphurization 
(FGD)-type abatement technologies continue to consume higher sulphur coal while their 
non-FGD counterparts reduce the sulphur content of their coal purchases. I explore these 
competing trends in detail – at the power plant level, within power plants at the boiler level, 
and using causal inference techniques around the point of FGD installation within the 
available timeframe of data. The data itself is both new and old – including historical figures 
that have been well-explored, and newer, more diverse data resulting from more recent 
enhanced reporting requirements on power plants by the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Across the data, scope, and methodology employed in this paper the 
message is quite clear – power plants that use FGD systems then consume dirtier fuels more 
cleanly. This potentially leaves less dirty fuel available for other uses. 
I also explore whether power plants are switching coal sources or purchasing from the 
same mines which could indicate changing pre-treatment regimens. As noted, I find that 
the difference in sulphur content of incoming coal to power plants is substantially higher 
for FGD equipped power plants and that this change often occurs with FGD installation. 
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This generally results in power plants switching to a new set of higher sulphur coal 
suppliers. When power plants install FGD systems is also important, and it appears that 
firms do not necessarily jump into using such costly, new technologies following regulation 
as alternatives exist. Rather, implementation across the sector occurs gradually which is 
more fitting with the economic calculus of firms which are balancing several cost 
considerations.  
I then develop a simplified model of the power plant-level decision between low and high 
polluting input alternatives which are roughly perfect substitutes. The model begins with a 
regulation in place mandating emission reductions, then allows the availability of an 
abatement technology which enables cleaner consumption – less emissions – from dirty 
inputs. I develop and implement a new method to test the perfect substitutes hypothesis. I 
then modify existing methods to derive the national, net effect on energy sector fuel demand 
in the form of own- and cross-price elasticities separated by whether power plants used 
FGD systems. Another implication of the model is that there are at least four variable 
abatement costs relevant to FGD selection and usage. I then derive estimates of the price 
on the two types that are less studied in the literature. This puts prices on some of the 
incentives involved to inform what scale of intervention might be required to increase the 
speed of an energy transition while maintaining firm choice. 
The result of this research is an expansive but not exceedingly complex study. The focus 
is on the impact and incentives surrounding abatement technology decisions related to 
sulphur and coal demand in the U.S. energy sector. To maintain clarity, I sometimes 
intersperse the modest theory in this paper with the relevant empirics which attempt to 
derive clear support from a messy and complex sector.  
To retain control over the scope of the investigation, I have chosen a set of related 
questions to explore: Do firms in the U.S. energy sector that adopt abatement technologies 
demand dirtier fuels than those that do not? Does this decision only occur at the power plant 
level, or does it extend to boiler fuel choices when not all boilers at a power plant have 
FGD systems installed? With the installation of abatement technologies, does the sulphur 
content of fuel change at power plants? And are the source mines for a power plant 
somehow retained when an FGD system is installed? Resulting from abatement technology 
choice, do interfuel substitution elasticities differ for the shares of the market with and 
without abatement technology? Finally, what type and scale of variable abatement costs 
occur with FGD systems, and should we consider their manipulation to be realistic options 
107 
 
in support of domestic environmental objectives? I now proceed with a literature review to 
place this research in relation to the substantial body of work that precedes it. 
3.2 Literature Review 
This literature review covers some of the history and aspects of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), Acid Rain Program (ARP). The focus is on the 
impact of regulatory as well as preceding firm decisions on fuel and abatement technology 
choices. It also notes research relevant to the estimation methodologies in this paper 
exploring abatement system incentives and power plant fuel switching activities.  
A significant body of research explores the response of power plants to regulatory 
changes, particularly around sulphur dioxide abatement efforts mandated by the Clean Air 
Act (CAA). One reason for this is that we hope to learn lessons that will be valuable in the 
next great energy transition of decarbonising the energy sector. So, while the current paper 
studies changes related to sulphur dioxide emissions, the subject may have wider interest 
as similar regulatory methods may be applicable to carbon dioxide emissions as well. 
Metcalf and Weisbach (2009), for one, note that a properly functioning tax related to carbon 
capture that specifically targets U.S. power plants could lead to the capture of 80- to 90-per 
cent of emissions. Importantly, they argue for a tax on power plants – as has been done 
with sulphur dioxide regulations – as the simplest regulatory approach as it would involve 
taxing a few thousand entities rather than a consumer-facing programme which would need 
to track the emissions of several million consumers. Additionally, it is important to be 
reminded that regulatory changes do not happen in isolation. For instance, Muller (2018) 
defines GDP less environmental damages as a measure of augmented GDP and 
subsequently an augmented measure of environmentally adjusted value added as EVA 
growth. They find that the thirty U.S. states that installed FGD systems in their period of 
interest – 2005 to 2011 – had augmented growth rates on average 0.12-per cent higher than 
in states that did not install FGD systems. This is fitting with EIA (2011) which notes 
differences in nett sulphur dioxide emissions between FGD and non-FGD equipped power 
plants under the same regulations. Muller’s augmented GPD measure resulted in FGD 
systems having a benefit-cost ratio of 20:1 to 53:1, depending on state. Such substantial 
returns were due to the substantial public benefits and comparatively minor firm costs 
involved with FGD systems. Such returns will hopefully eventually be the case with carbon 
capture technologies as well.  
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But to the purpose of this review, the regulatory environment around sulphur dioxide 
emissions in the U.S. is a rather complex set of sometimes competing regulations. Ellerman 
(2003) provides a very brief overview of the federal CAA in regard to sulphur dioxide 
emissions starting in 1990: 
“The acid rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, included in Title 
IV, required fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units to reduce sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions by 50% in two phases. In the first, known as Phase I and extending 
from 1995 through 1999, generating units of 100 MWe of capacity and larger, 
having an SO2 emission rate in 1985 of 2.5 lbs. per million Btu (#/mmBtu) or higher, 
were required to take a first step and to reduce SO2 emissions to an average of 2.5 
#/mmBtu during these transitional years. Phase II, which began in 2000 and 
continues indefinitely, expanded the scope of the program by including all fossil-
fuel-fired generating units greater than 25 MWe and increased its stringency by 
requiring affected units to reduce emissions to an average emission rate that would 
be approximately 1.2 #/mmBtu at average annual heat or Btu input in 1985-87, and 
that would be proportionately lower for increased total fossil-fuel fired heat input. 
The nation-wide Phase II cap on SO2 emissions is 8.9 million tons, which is 
approximately the product of total baseline (average 1985-87) heat input and the 
emission rate target of 1.2 #/mmBtu.” 
Ellerman also notes that, because the units that had to comply with sulphur dioxide 
reductions under Phase I were the largest emitters, the bulk of emission reductions were 
the result of changes at Phase I power plants. These were often in the Midwest, and so 
nearly 75-per cent of early sulphur dioxide emission reductions took place in the region – 
larger in share than the region’s energy production. They also note that sulphur dioxide 
allowance costs are generally smaller than other start-up costs for new power plants, such 
as permitting and siting related costs. So, for power plants under Phase II – generally newer 
and cleaner – permit prices are a smaller consideration. Compliance costs are also 
substantially lower than initially anticipated due to exogenous factors such as rail prices as 
well as improvements in FGD technologies. Ellerman’s line of research then naturally lead 
to Ellerman and Dubroeucq (2006) where they ask whether it is better to modernize – “clean 
up” – existing power plants or replace them with newer units. From 1985 through 2002 
they find that the clean up of old, existing power plants made the largest contribution to 
sulphur dioxide reductions rather than replacement by clean (in terms of sulphur dioxide) 
natural gas power plants, particularly since the introduction of the ARP’s cap-and-trade 
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program. What newer natural gas power plants have instead done is reduce the cost of 
compliance over the period. That is, as the emissions cap hadn’t changed, the quantity of 
abatement needed among the remaining high sulphur coal (HSC)-consuming power plants 
is reduced when natural gas power plants are used. 
Schmalensee and Stavins (2013) note that earlier railroad deregulation – the Staggers 
Rail Act of 1980 in particular – contributed substantially to the lower-than-expected total 
costs of CAAA/ARP compliance that have been realised. This is due to Powder River Basin 
(PRB) coal becoming affordable for many Midwest power plants.53 They also note that 
public benefits from sulphur dioxide abatement have been substantially greater than 
expected due to reductions in small particulate matter in downwind communities. 
Schmalensee and Stavins also discuss how conservative politicians now oppose cap-and-
trade approaches even though their predecessors championed them. As a result of modern 
opposition and subsequent judicial efforts, the sulphur dioxide trading markets have 
effectively collapsed, and similar efforts will likely face greater opposition. Schmalensee 
and Stavins (2019) then provides an overview of adjustments to the CAA over the last 50 
years with a focus on the success of the various policy instruments chosen. They then note 
that the CAA, once dynamic, has increased in complexity over the years and has become 
impossible to update since becoming a partisan political issue. Subsequently, they argue 
that implementing a cap-and-trade approach to address climate change will likely be 
impossible in the U.S. as long as the current political environment remains. Important to 
this research, they then argue for practicality in new regulatory approaches and research, 
for example “giving greater attention to suboptimal, second-best designs”. 
Several other papers have studied components of the sulphur dioxide regulatory 
environment. Bellas (1998) studies incentives to improve FGD performance in the early 
years of regulation through 1992. They suggest that direct regulation on emissions levels 
provides less incentive to innovate. Bellas finds that costs of FGD systems were generally 
constant until the end of their period of interest when regulatory incentives began to change. 
At that point, regulation switched to a permit market, cap-and-trade system perhaps leading 
to more innovation. However, a decade later Bellas and Lange (2008) find that the cap-
and-trade system did not lead to more efficient, less costly FGD systems on its own. Rather, 
market deregulation occurring in the period was necessary to allow innovations to occur 
and be implemented. They find the combination of incentives and leeway to innovate 
 
53
 The PRB is an area of Montana and Wyoming of substantial U.S. energy policy interest due to vast, high-quality, low sulphur coal 
reserves with low extraction costs. 
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resulted in substantial (40-per cent) reductions in the parasitic load of FGD systems. 
Arimura (2002) also studies Phase I of the CAA’s Acid Rain Program (ARP) which began 
in 1995. Phase I’s implementation generally fell under the direction of public utility 
commissions (PUCs) – state-level regulatory bodies. PUCs often initially allowed cost 
recovery, for example by surcharges onto customers for compliance with the CAA. This 
incentivises continued high sulphur coal (HSC) usage at power plants in states with HSC 
mines. Arimura also suggests that uncertainty over PUC regulations lead to more fuel 
switching and blending than allowance purchasing. It is important to note, however, that 
the study was conducted given the FGD equipment installed – after the installation decision 
was already made – so does not include switching to FGD-connected production.  
A confounding policy change to note is that deregulation of the energy sector occurred 
in many U.S. states during the early years of the CAA’s ARP (deregulation was particularly 
concentrated in 1995 through 2002). Borenstein and Bushnell (2015) find that deregulation, 
from vertical monopolies/investor-owned utilities (IOUs) operating under cost-of-service 
regulation, to nonutility generators and small producers selling to resellers, did not result 
in expected price drops for customers. Rather, this resulted in rent shifting and prices now 
based on retail price instead of cost which turned out to be similar. Borenstein and Bushnell 
instead find that any rate changes were driven by generation technology advances and 
natural gas price fluctuations. Fowlie (2010) looks at differences in technological 
investment activities at power plants to reduce smog pollutions. Critically, they compare 
power plants in states where the energy sector underwent deregulation/restructuring versus 
those where PUCs remained in control. Fowlie finds that deregulated firms spend 
significantly less on capital intensive abatement technologies. Bushnell and Wolfram 
(2005) also find that fuel efficiency improvements were modest after deregulation, 
restructuring, and public divestiture. They note that both divested and non-divested power 
plants showed similar fuel efficiency improvements. They make the case that ownership 
itself has little impact on performance, but rather that changes in incentives drive change – 
not who owns a power plant. Chan, Fell, Lange, and Li (2017) look at restructuring from 
1991 through 2005, comparing IOUs in states with and without restructuring. They find a 
1.4-per cent fuel efficiency improvement, 8-per cent decrease in cost per heat unit, and also 
a lower capacity factor – the percentage of time a power plant is operating at 100-per cent 
capacity. They find that the nett effect was a 15-per cent reduction in operating expense as 
well as a reduction in emissions of around 7.5-per cent.  
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Naturally, the impact of new regulations as well as restructuring and deregulation 
extended beyond power plants. Di Maria, Lange, and Lazarova (2018) study the energy 
sector’s restructuring and find that it increases uncertainty about cost recovery (compared 
to PUCs allowing cost recovery, etc.). This results in coal purchase contracts with more 
emphasis and rigidity on price adjustment mechanisms. Basically, they find that power 
plants try to offset increased downstream uncertainty by reducing upstream risk – shifting 
risk upstream. The upstream result is a greater emphasis on efficiency and productivity at 
coal mines contracting with restructured plants – about a 17-per cent productivity 
improvement. However, the authors note that transaction costs related to contracting may 
also increase. One of the methods written into these contracts are automatic fuel adjustment 
mechanisms (FAMs) which were previously discussed in Gollop and Karlson (1978). 
These allow passing through changes in fuel costs only. Gollop and Karlson note that 
allowing fuel cost passthrough may reduce efficiency as power plants as their operators 
would more often choose to adapt to changing conditions through fuel changes rather than 
other inputs whose cost is not automatically, contractually passed on to other parties. 
Related to CAA implementation, Douglas and Wiggins (2015) find that the ARP led to 
mine closures or reduced output across Appalachia and the Illinois coal basin which are 
sources of HSC. Specifically, they find a negative elasticity of coal mine output to sulphur 
allowance prices for mines producing above the 77th percentile in sulphur content of coal – 
those mines producing coal with the most polluting potential in terms of sulphur dioxide 
emissions. Of additional relevance to this paper, they also note that the regulators and 
legislators of HSC-producing states implemented policies to encourage the installation of 
FGD systems at power plants specifically to encourage the purchase of more local HSC.  
Kneifel (2008) studies the impact of fuel contracts on compliance costs related to the 
ARP’s cap-and-trade program. They find that fuel contract lock-in is an additional source 
of compliance costs as they restrict a power plant’s response to regulatory changes. They 
also note that contracts increase the incentive to install FGD systems at plants that have 
traditionally purchased HSC, and as a result, would explain why some boilers installed 
FGD systems when Phase I of the ARP began. They also suggest that existing contracts for 
LSC reduce the incentive to install FGD systems. Related to my research, they also argue 
that a power plant-level decision model is more appropriate than a boiler/generator-level 
one. Among the reasons that the models would differ is that, when using a cost 
minimisation objective, a power plant-level model allows choosing between boilers of 
different designs and fuel usage. This would also imply that a power plant operator decides 
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whether to install an FGD system based on the characteristics of all boilers/generators at a 
power plant, not just the one(s) that an FGD system will be integrated with. 
Jha (2015) argues that regulators are less willing to pass through sudden, higher coal 
purchase costs to consumers resulting in more of power plant input purchases via long-term 
contracts. These long-term contracts are generally more expensive – roughly 3-per cent 
higher for procurement and storage – than the minimum of spot prices available to power 
plants at a given moment. That is, they find that firms under regulation are willing to in 
effect pay for lower price variance. They find that the more variance there is in spot prices, 
the longer the duration and larger the quantity stipulated in contracts signed are. They find 
that power plants will on average trade a 0.22-per cent increase in mean procurement costs 
for a 10-per cent reduction in the variance of costs. Yet another study on the impact on 
contracting, Lange (2012) notes that before the ARP, contracts didn’t generally differ on 
price within the contracted sulphur dioxide content bounds required for coal deliveries. But 
after the ARP’s implementation, contracted coal prices are generally stipulated to be 
reduced for coal approaching the contracted sulphur upper bound – so now coal prices 
became responsive to sulphur content changes within contracts. 
Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) find that increasing the number of alternative input 
possibilities results in reduced contract durations. They argue that reforms reducing rail 
rates, environmental regulation becoming more flexible through market-based approaches, 
and deregulation of electricity markets increased options (as would FGD installations). 
Alternatively, larger quantity contracts or being located very near a mine increases contract 
duration. Kosnik and Lange (2011) analyse long-term contracts for coal delivery and the 
“shock” of implementation of the 1990 clean air act amendment. However, they argue that 
previous research that considered inefficiencies caused by being stuck in long term 
contracts is incorrect. Rather, they claim that many – even most – contracts were 
sufficiently flexible that when the CAAA passed, power plant operators and their supplying 
mines were able to renegotiate. Additionally, Kosnik and Lange note that with flexible 
contracts, firms have less need to renegotiate when an exogenous shock occurs. The 
flexibility of contracts is specifically measured in their study by the flexibility of contract 
price adjustment mechanisms, number of years to expiration, quantities under contract, and 
the distance between the parties involved. 
It is well known that one of the most substantial innovations within the CAAA is the 
ARP’s cap-and-trade system of tradeable permits allowing the emission of sulphur dioxide 
from power plants. Considine and Larson (2006) provide another overview of the U.S. cap-
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and-trade system. They note that considerable substitution between emissions, fuels, labor, 
and capital occurs at power plants. In the short run – with fixed permits and capital, changes 
in lower sulphur coal (LSC) price have the largest impact on input decisions. In general, 
they also find that changes in fuel prices are more important than changes in emission 
permit prices in both the short and long-run in regard to factor substitution. However, cap-
and-trade programs do generally reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals and reduce 
risks through enabling flexibility as well as signalling prices for factor use. This is 
particularly important for basically irreversible capital investments such as in choosing an 
FGD system. Considine and Larson also do not find a significant elasticity between 
emissions and permit stocks which makes sense as fuel costs are the primary determinant 
of production choice. 
But adding a twist to the regulatory story, Frey (2013) notes that the power plants 
regulated under Phase I, those with more stringent state regulations, and those with lower 
expected installation costs – including newer units owned by firms that have already 
installed FGD systems (learning by doing) – are more likely to install FGD systems. They 
also note that sometimes both cap-and-trade/market-based regulations overlapped with 
command-and-control regulations in such a way as to restrict a state’s power plants to a 
smaller set of possible abatement strategies such as through specific abatement approaches 
being required. The result is that the most stringent regulation drives the abatement 
decision, sometimes undermining the flexibility that a cap-and-trade system is meant to 
provide. Related, Knittel, Metaxoglou, and Trindade (2019) find that power plants which 
were not in restructured markets remained more responsive to price – having a cross-price 
elasticity of coal consumption with respect to natural gas prices of 0.28 versus 0.14 for 
power plants in restructured/deregulated markets. This may also be due to power plants in 
restructured markets undertaking different investments that locked in systems to specific 
fuel types or by operating under different production and profit models. 
Creamer (2012) uses a cost minimisation model of the abatement decision – that firms 
will choose a strategy or combination of strategies to comply with environmental 
regulations. Creamer compares buying tradeable permits for sulphur dioxide emissions, 
switching to LSC, and adopting abatement technologies such as FGD systems. They note 
that cost minimisation behaviour seems to hold even with regulatory market distortions and 
external shocks such as changes in local or state regulations and subsidies, contracting 
related costs, and railroad influence. Creamer also finds that the installation and operating 
costs of FGD systems impacts their adoption with a lag (perhaps due to planning period 
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lengths), and that again with a lag, price changes are passed on in electricity prices. They 
also note a decline in the use of long-term coal purchase contracts with regulation as well 
as increasing prices and demand for bituminous coal which has a higher heat content per 
unit as well as per sulphur content. They also find substitutability between LSC usage and 
FGD installations – that increasing LSC prices lead to more FGD adoption as does 
increases in FGD efficiency. Yet, they find that FGD systems and the price of cap-and-
trade permits for sulphur dioxide are uncorrelated. Yet Insley (2003) analyses the decision 
to install FGD systems versus purchasing emission allowances and finds that higher permit 
prices provide more incentive to install FGD systems. Insley also suggests that greater 
permit volatility leads to a lower probability of FGD installation – the alternative value of 
an FGD installation is less certain – including the pausing and cancelling of FGD 
installations that are underway. One reason for this result is that power plants rely more 
heavily on LSC when prices drop and mix LSC with HSC more often when permit prices 
drop. Along the cost minimisation theme, Knittel (2002) finds that regulatory programmes 
linked to power plant performance and fuel cost passthrough are related to greater 
efficiency improvements at power plants. Importantly, fuel cost incentive programmes 
must result in some accountability to power plant operators for cost changes – both positive 
and negative. This again highlights the importance of a cost-minimising decision 
framework for studying the behaviour of power plants. Hite, Forster, and Rausch (1999) 
instead study the disposal of FGD by-products, particularly from wet scrubber-type systems 
in their geographic area of interest of Ohio. At that time, FGD by-products were often 
disposed of in landfills resulting in a sizeable waste stream. They note that there are 
substantial incentives – public and private – to finding alternative, perhaps beneficial uses 
for FGD by-products which have been partly but not entirely realised in the present. 
Another popular theme is innovation incentives in sulphur dioxide abatement 
technologies. Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) note that in the earliest years of the CAA that 
emission reduction requirements were too lenient to encourage innovation. One of the 
secondary selling points of the ARP’s cap-and-trade programme was that it would 
encourage innovation, but Gagelmann and Frondel note that no consensus in the literature 
is reached on whether the programme actually encouraged more innovation than other 
regulations. Yet, they note that the ARP was profoundly effective as it “ended a decade-
long stalemate on acid rain legislation” enabling more stringent regulation, and in turn, 
more innovation in the 1990’s and 2000’s than would have been possible under other 
regulatory approaches. Others such as Spulber (1985) find that emission taxes and tradeable 
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permits are more efficient in an industry allowing the free entry and exit of smaller firms – 
as in the case of the energy sector after deregulation/restructuring, compared to standards 
which may result in substantial fixed costs related to technology requirements. Karp and 
Zhang (2012) review the abatement decision with asymmetric information and strategic 
behaviour. One result is that they find that more durable capital investments as well as more 
effective (efficient, less costly) abatement technologies all favour a tax-based policy rather 
than a quota in efficiency terms. Increasing external investments, then, also result in 
favouring a tax-based approach. These investments also increase spillovers as in secondary 
benefits to innovation. Keohane (2003) simulates the decision to install an FGD system 
under different regulatory regimes – comparing the cap-and-trade based ARP outcome 
against a hypothetical command-and-control “prescriptive” uniform standard. They 
conjecture that the command-and-control method would have resulted in about 33-per cent 
more FGD installations. The FGD systems would have had higher operating costs and been 
installed at power plants with higher costs of switching to LSC as an alternative. The 
aggregate result is estimated to be up to a 25-per cent reduction in aggregate compliance 
costs under the cap-and-trade program. 
Taylor, Rubin, and Hounshell (2003) also study the relationship between government 
policies and innovation in FGD and related technologies. They find that CAA regulations 
resulted in greater abatement innovations than state sponsored innovation programs would 
have accomplished alone. They note that the specifics of a regulation also guide innovation 
efforts toward a specific path. They also find that there are technological spillovers – in this 
case that abatement innovation efforts have led to efficiency improvements and cost 
reductions elsewhere within- and between-power plants. Taylor, Rubin, and Hounshell 
conclude that “the stringency, flexibility, market size, and time allowed to achieve 
mandated emission reductions” are drivers of the rate of technological innovation in 
abatement technologies and show this for both sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides 
abatement. 
Popp (2003) uses patent data to analyse innovation in FGD design around CAA 
implementation. Prior to 1990 – when the CAA relied on command-and-control regulation 
– FGD innovations generally lowered their operating costs rather than increasing system 
efficiency. These FGD systems met, but didn’t generally strive to greatly exceed, the 90-
per cent efficiency requirement of the time. However, with a switch to the market-based-
approach of the ARP’s cap-and-trade programme, FGD innovations then focussed on 
improving system removal efficiency. (They also note that the rate of innovation decreased 
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after 1990, perhaps since more abatement alternatives to FGD systems became cost 
effective). Thus, it is important to consider the long-term innovation incentives that may 
result from a policy. Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2004) also study the diffusion of 
innovations related to pollution abatement. They find that technological advances – in rate 
and direction – are influenced by both the market and regulation. Subsequently, they argue 
that market-based incentives will be more effective, in price, efficiency, etc. than 
command-and-control approaches. Yet, they expect that investments in abatement 
technologies will be suboptimal due to weak environmental protections and spillover 
effects in many cases. They then suggest that one strategy is a policy that encourages 
experimentation – that implementing and judging several approaches by similar standards 
is a productive method to search for innovations. Their recommendation fits well with the 
objective of this paper.  
Hoel and Karp (2002) continue a long line of research stemming from Weitzman’s (1974) 
analysis of prices versus quantities as regulatory methods in the presence of asymmetric 
information.54 They study when environmental damages depend on the stock of a pollutant 
rather than a flow and again assume asymmetric information between regulators and 
polluters on abatement costs. As before, a steeper marginal abatement cost curve favours 
the use of taxes. Hoel and Karp also find that taxes become preferable as the discount rate 
or the decay rate of the stock increases or the decision period of those involved decreases. 
This is likely the case for sulphur dioxide emissions, and the authors argue that taxes would 
also be preferable for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Nordhaus (2007) also 
argues for tax-based (and presumably subsidy-based) approaches rather than quantity 
approaches to environmental regulations. They argue that tax-based approaches allow an 
easier integration of the economic costs involved into a firm’s calculations and that taxes 
are particularly preferable when uncertainty and learning exist. Nordhaus also argues that 
quantity limits can lead to market volatility and that a tax can be used to offset losses from 
removing other distortionary taxes and encourages less rent-seeking. However, Nordhaus 
also notes some popular and political opposition to taxes as well as distrust of political 
entities to set taxes effectively and fairly – without loopholes. Yet, Papadis and Tsatsaronis 
(2020) argue, as many have, that some sort of global carbon tax will almost certainly be 
 
54
 Other continuations of Weitzman’s work include Yohe (1977) – regulation of multiple firms or products and intermediate products, 
Adar and Griffin (1976) – marginal damages uncertainty does not have the same issue and addition of auctions to the comparison, 
Watson and Ridker (1984) – additional functional forms and an interesting empirical application, and Stavins (1996) – correlated 
abatement cost and damages uncertainty. 
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required to address the current pressing issue of climate change but that several barriers to 
an implementation exist including frequent opposition to tax-based approaches.  
In this paper I derive several empirical estimates. Where I estimate variable costs, I 
assume fuel and abatement technology costs are additively separable into parts, and so 
estimates fall within the hedonic price model (HPM) methodology of Rosen (1974). Uri 
(1982) uses a HPM to explore the usage – energy shares – and price of competing fossil 
fuel inputs and notes the extent of their substitutability. Stanton and Whitehead (1995) also 
use a HPM to estimate the implicit price of sulphur in coal. Their results suggest a higher 
price on sulphur in the eastern U.S. but are otherwise comparable to others in the literature 
and this paper as they suggest the price estimate is roughly the removal costs associated 
with sulphur in coal. Busse and Keohane (2007), and He and Lee (2016) provide related 
HPM applications by attempting to discover the specific cost components of coal at U.S. 
power plants. Busse and Keohane are concerned with policy implications related to PRB 
coal. He and Lee use privileged data to estimate price discrimination practices by coal 
mines based on known sulphur by-product production decisions at power plants. I adjust 
their frameworks to explore the costs passed on to mines related to using marginally dirtier 
coal in energy production, and through cost incidence (Carver, 1924), roughly estimate the 
full variable abatement cost involved. One issue is that Gerking and Hamilton (2010) note 
that changes in regulation sometimes lead to only small substitutions between HSC and 
LSC even though these inputs should be highly substitutable. The issue, they suggest, is 
that “spatial monopolists” – railroads in particular – favoured LSC transportation as these 
generally involved longer distances and higher profits. This may suggest that there would 
be a delay in when a power plant substitutes from one fuel to another. Yet fuel prices are 
something that power plants can adjust to over the long run.  
Lange and Bellas (2007) also estimate an implicit price of sulphur in coal using 
contracted coal purchase order data and a HPM methodology. Specifically, they compare 
the contracts made by firms immediately preceding and after inclusion in Phase I of the 
ARP. Their result is substantially lower than other estimates and suffers from a smaller 
sample size but is an interesting approach. Lange and Bellas (2005) study FGD innovation 
and compliance cost reductions over the long run following the ARP’s 1990 
implementation. Importantly, the ARP both expanded the market for FGD systems – the 
number of power plants required to reduce emissions – and increased competition from 
other emission reduction strategies. They find that both operation and construction costs 
had a one-time price drop following the 1990 implementation, but they also report that rates 
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of change then followed the preceding pattern. They suggest this result implies that 
innovation provided for “a great leap forward in cost reductions, but not necessarily 
subsequent ongoing progress.” 
Gerking and Hamilton (2008) also study the determinants of greater PRB LSC usage in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s. They note, as had Busse and Keohane (2007), that declining rail 
rates following deregulation as well as decreasing mining costs in the PRB led to increased 
demand for PRB coal. So, again relative prices appear to drive power plant decision 
making.  Gerking and Hamilton note too that the market power of railroads in setting freight 
rates for LSC is important – railroads are balancing their market power against competing 
abatement prices. Ellerman and Montero (1998) are also interested in how declining rail 
rates in the period 1985 through 1993 lead to higher utilisation of PRB coal across the 
Midwest energy system and subsequently less sulphur dioxide emissions rather than being 
reduced by CAA mandates. Additionally, they find that some states enacted stricter state-
level sulphur dioxide emission regulations while others enacted legislation to enable the 
continued use of HSC. Closely related, Rose, Taylor, and Harunuzzaman (1993) study how 
some states supported the continued use of HSC, sometimes by allowing (sometimes 
upfront) cost recovery surcharges on customers relates to CAA compliance. 
I also explore interfuel substitution at power plants from a slightly new perspective. 
Others, including Atkinson and Halvorsen (1976) also explore interfuel substitution 
between coal, oil, and natural gas. They find that power plants behave as if coal and oil are 
homothetic, but not necessarily for coal and natural gas. This makes sense as coal and oil 
are more often burned in the same system – often with oil as a start-up fuel for coal-
consuming boilers. They also find power plant returns to scale (RTS) that are slightly 
increasing. Their RTS result is not substantially different from Nerlove (1963), Christensen 
and Greene (1976), and Bernstein and Parmeter (2019), each finding that intermediate-to-
large coal and natural gas power plants operate near-constant returns to scale (CRTS). 
Bernstein (2020) also estimates the return to scale specifically at natural gas power plants 
as 0.94. (Bernstein also finds increasing power plant efficiency – as a means of cost 
reduction – to have occurred with deregulation). Returning to interfuel substitution, Stern 
(2012) provides a meta-analysis extending to industry beyond the U.S. energy sector. He 
generally finds demand for competing fuels outside the energy sector to be more elastic 
than those within the sector.  
In this paper I specifically study interfuel substitution based on the literature 
implementing a dynamic linear logit model as a system of thoroughly defined equations 
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describing a market, here the U.S. energy sector. This necessity comes from the 
characteristics of energy sector demand – any instrument at this level would almost 
certainly fail the instrumental variable exclusion restriction because of the pervasive, direct 
influence of the energy sector on all production and quality of life. To develop the 
estimation procedure, I rely on Considine and Mount (1984) who derive the basic linear 
logit model, further developed in Considine (1990), and transformed into a dynamic model 
in Jones (1995) where its use in analysing interfuel substitution in large markets is 
demonstrated. EIA (2012) provides guidance on usage with finer time-incremented data, 
and Steinbuks and Narayanan (2015) show an implementation of the model over a finer 
geographic scale. While the latter study addresses interfuel elasticities internationally, I 
apply it to the U.S. to account for market differences between North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) regions.55 I then uniquely use the method for estimating 
demand elasticities to compare FGD and non-FGD power plant “markets”. I also find it 
necessary to estimate the impact of abatement technologies on fuel demand as a nett effect 
repeatedly. Ryan (2012), and Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2016) utilise a log-log estimation 
of elasticities of demand including a set of covariates, and instrument to address 
endogenously determined price. They estimate, however, a downstream market from coal 
demand for energy where instruments are more valid.  
Other relevant research is briefly noted here. LaCount, Haeuber, Macy, and Murray 
(2021) note other features that they believe contributed to the success of the CAAA’s 
“Good Neighbor” provision which prohibit emissions that substantially damage 
neighbouring state air quality. These include greater transparency through near-continuous 
emissions monitoring and public access to more data than most programmes, compliance 
directly related to emissions reduction requirements, and automatic application of penalties 
– all contributing to high levels of compliance. Löffler, Burandt, Hainsch, and Oei (2019) 
explore the issue of stranded assets, specifically in regard to the ongoing renewable energy 
transition. They expect that stranded assets will be substantial, primarily in the coal and 
natural gas share of the energy sector. They argue that policy implemented with substantial 
foresight can reduce the amount of stranded assets substantially. In the EU with a 2050 
focus year, the amount of stranded assets could be reduced by 75-per cent, perhaps 
comparably in the U.S. The authors then compare this outcome to a short-sighted stranding 
of likely 200-billion euros of energy infrastructure by 2035. Raff and Walter (2020) analyse 
 
55
 The role of NERC regions, general structure of U.S. energy production, and some basic definitions are included in the appendix 
(A3.2 Glossary of Energy Sector Terminology and U.S. Organizational Chart). 
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spillover effects at U.S. power plants due to reduction efforts in at least one of the six 
pollutants of the CAA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) following a 
power plant’s nonattainment designation. They find that following a non-attainment 
designation for sulphur dioxide or carbon monoxide, power plants also significantly 
decrease emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides as these can be jointly emitted 
and abated pollutants. 
In total, the literature suggests sulphur dioxide abatement decisions have an impact on 
emissions which then influence input decisions at U.S. power plants. However, the market 
and regulatory environment where this occurs has an incredibly complex history. To limit 
the scope of this study to something manageable I note that one of the decisions to consider 
is whether to use FGD systems as part of the power plant’s sulphur dioxide abatement 
approach. This, in turn, appears to be cost-based when the regulatory environment allows 
choice. So, I next explore the U.S. energy sector transition to a less polluting system in 
terms of sulphur dioxide. Then, I contribute to themes in the literature by exploring FGD 
system choice. This leads to putting estimates on some of the prices tied to the performance 
of FGD systems. 
3.3 Exploring the U.S. Energy Transition 
This section explores the U.S. energy sector transition of declining sulphur dioxide 
emissions. I begin by contrasting trends in national ambient air sulphur dioxide levels 
against the sulphur content of coal entering U.S. coal power plants – the primary source of 
ambient sulphur dioxide levels. Next, I breakdown the sulphur content side of this 
comparison into that entering power plants with FGD systems versus those without. I then 
put estimates to the scale of the difference before proceeding to evaluate differences within 
power plants that have both boilers with and without FGD systems. I then apply a 
regression discontinuity and kink (RD/RK) design to evaluate whether sulphur content 
changes with an FGD system installation to evaluate whether the preceding results are 
based on endogenous factors. I also evaluate the retention of mine sources before versus 
after FGD installation and the timing of installations. After this fairly expansive 
exploration, I present a simple model of the fuel purchase decision. 
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3.3.1 Energy Transition Outcomes and Plant Level Heterogeneity 
An exploration of U.S. coal consumption and emission trends suggests that abatement 
technology adoption leads to the consumption of dirtier fuels but cleanly.56 In Figure 14, 
the U.S. trend of ambient air sulphur dioxide concentrations – driven by coal power plant 
emissions – decreases over the last 35 years, while the average sulphur content of coal 
entering U.S. power plants first decreases, and then increases. Over the same period, total 
coal consumption increased 60-per cent from 1980-2005, and then declined to a net 14-per 
cent increase by 2015 in part due to the shale gas boom (EIA, 2019). Substitution away 
from coal likely contributed to reduced ambient air concentrations in later years. However, 
there are at least three factors involved: substitution to cleaner coal, substitution away from 
coal altogether, and adoption of abatement technologies while consuming dirtier coal. 
Further scrutiny is necessary. 
 
 
FIGURE 14 SULPHUR DIOXIDE TRENDS IN AIR AND U.S. POWER PLANT COAL 
Notes: Orange line (top): Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates decreasing sulphur content in 
coal delivered to U.S. power plants relative to a 1980 baseline of approximately 1.6 pounds of sulphur dioxide content per million 
BTU’s (pounds/mmBTU) of coal. Blue (bottom) line: From 1980 to 2015, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
monitoring of sulphur dioxide mean daily concentration across the U.S. indicates a substantial decline from around 155 to 20 
ppb SO2 during the period of EPA observation. Reductions closely mirror each other until around 2000, when they sharply 
diverge. The period is characterised by both substantial abatement technology adoption, and importantly, the rollout of new 
phases of EPA’s Acid Rain Program. From 2000, more power plants were required to limit emissions or buy emissions 
allowances, substantially increasing the market for tradable permits at a time when technological advancement allowed 
substantial reductions in power plant emissions through abatement technologies. From 2005, we also see a decline in coal 
demand, yet by 2015 total coal consumption is still up 14-per cent over 1980. 
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In Figure 15, I divide the coal power plants in the U.S. energy sector into those with and 
without FGD systems. Those without FGD systems must rely primarily on lower sulphur 
coal to meet emissions requirements affordably. Not only are levels different, but industry 
trends diverge. While FGD power plants maintain roughly historical levels of sulphur 
content in fuel purchases, non-FGD power plants have sought lower sulphur coal 
alternatives. There is a drop following the introduction of the Acid Rain Program in 1995, 
accompanied by a jump in sulphur content at FGD enabled power plants as structural 
changes in demand – less non-FGD power plants buying higher sulphur coal – precede 
changes in coal supply. Operators build power plants to match the specification of the coal 
they expect to use, which is historically locally sourced. However, non-FGD power plants 
have had to change sources resulting in, for instance, higher exploitation of Wyoming’s 
Powder River Basin low sulphur coal reserves and a subsequent decrease in demand for 
higher sulphur Appalachian coal. 
 
 
FIGURE 15 COAL SULPHUR CONTENT AS DELIVERED TO U.S. POWER PLANTS 
Notes: Trend of mean sulphur content in pounds per millions of BTU heat units (pounds/mmBTU) at U.S. power plants using 
sulphur dioxide abatement technology (initially top line in blue) versus power plants without (initially bottom line in orange). 
Both the mean sulphur content is substantially different and their trends diverge. The non-FGD share of the sector has had to 
continually reduce sulphur dioxide in inputs while FGD plants have been able to substitute technology for input reductions. The 
number of retiring non-FGD plants exceeds that of newer FGD power plants built resulting in differences from Figure 14. 
Sources: Author calculations based on EIA data (EIA, 2008, 2016c). 
 
But there are many qualities to coal, so I present some of these separated by power plant 
abatement technology in Figure 16. We observe that coal sulphur content is higher at power 
plants with FGD equipment. It also appears that FGD installation is endogenous to power 
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abatement technology decision. Power plants located near higher sulphur coal sources 
choose to install abatement technology as the heat content of the fuel is advantageous. 
Avoided transportation costs also offset abatement technology operating costs and other 
liabilities from continuing to use high sulphur coal. U.S. power plants with FGD installed 








FIGURE 16 COMPARISON OF COAL QUALITIES USED AT FGD AND NON-FGD POWER PLANTS 
Notes: Coal characteristics, separated by whether coal power plants (N≈300) use FGD technology (=1 if used). For years 2008-2015 
from approximately 110,000 coal purchase observations. These years provide more extensive data than preceding ones due to an 
expansion of power plant reporting requirements. Descriptions and possible interpretations follow: 
(top-left) Sulphur content: FGD power plants choose dirtier fuel on average. 
(top-right) Ash content: FGD power plants also receive slightly dirtier fuel in ash content as this is correlated with sulphur content 
(coefficient of 0.20). 
(centre-left) Delivery size (a capacity proxy): Power plant orders are about the same size, but the FGD plant set has larger outliers. 
(centre-right) Price per million British thermal units (mmBTU) at the gate: Delivered price is about the same on average, but with 
considerable heterogeneity. We might expect these prices to be about the same in a market equilibrium with differences in operating 
costs factored in. 
(bottom-left) Heat content per short ton: Power plants using higher sulphur fuels are also tapping into higher quality in terms of heat 
content (correlation coefficient of 0.52) 
(bottom-right) Distance from source: FGD power plants avoid substantial transportation costs resulting from adaptation and instead get 
more heat content per-dollar. 




I now derive empirical estimates fitting with the preceding exploration. Because the 
abatement decision is endogenous to aspects of the production environment that alter 
production costs, these result in factor collinearity and attempts to estimate primitives will 
result in more frustration than insight. However, we can estimate the net effect of FGD 
installation on sulphur demand, conditional on noting that abatement equipment is not 
randomly assigned. I then contrast an ordinary least squares (OLS)-based estimate against 
a difference-in-difference (DiD) sort of estimate (Snow, 1856; Ashenfelter, 1978; and 
Ashenfelter and Card, 1985) to note the level of decision endogeneity. 
As in the preceding graphics, I use a large dataset accumulated from U.S. government 
sources that I combine into a more comprehensive picture of decision making in the U.S. 
energy sector. I use Energy Information Administration (EIA) data from 2008 through 2015 
collected through mandatory reporting requirements at U.S. power plants on forms Annual 
Electric Generator Report (EIA-860) and Power Plant Operations (EIA-923), and for 
years 1972 through 2007 based on Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Plants (FERC-
423).57 Of the roughly 1.5 million fuel purchase order observations available, nearly 
900,000 involve coal purchases which I combine with data on FGD installations at 
receiving power plants.58 One matter is the identification of the appropriate measure of fuel 
sulphur content – I use the metric pounds of sulphur per-million British thermal units 
(mmBTU) and outline the data preparation steps in appendix A3.1 Data Preparation. 
I first estimate by OLS the demand for coal sulphur content by whether an FGD system 
is in use plus a time trend. This estimate is of the net difference in sulphur demand without 
attempting to discover the complicated relationship between power plants and supply 
primitives. The coefficient on sulphur dioxide abatement technology installed, SO2Controls 
in Equation (14), cannot be considered a treatment effect as FGD installation is not by 
random assignment. Instead, it is a coefficient estimate of differences in sulphur demand at 
coal power plants that have FGD systems.59 I use power plant-level purchase data –
deliveries, d, at a power plant, p, in a month, t, and estimate the net effect from 
(14) ln(𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝐷1𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡 + 𝛽y𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 
 
57
 Data collection via FERC-423 was superseded by EIA-923 in 2008. While the newer reporting requirement provides a greater 
variety of details, the earlier data is sufficient for much of this analysis. 
58
 Power plants are included in the dataset if they have a total capacity of one megawatt (MW) or greater and are connected to the 
grid.  Exceptions are power plants in Hawaii and Alaska where all power plants connected to the grid are included.  Generators range in 
capacity from 0.1 MW to 1,440 MW with a mean and median of 58.2 MW and 5.6 MW, respectively. 
59
 Note individual year or year-month controls versus a continuous trend variable does not qualitatively change the coefficient of 




The result is a conservative estimate on sulphur feed into boilers with FGD equipment 
because a power plant may have many separate boilers with and without ties to FGD 
systems at a large site. It measures a policy-relevant effect, however, of having at least 
some access to abatement technology capacity and allowing within-plant substitution. The 
estimate – I find a roughly 40-per cent higher level of sulphur content at FGD-enabled 
power plants – is the mean difference we observe in Figure 15. 
I then separate the estimate into 5-year periods by interacting SO2Controls with period 
vector 𝜽, while retaining the annual trend, 
(15)        ln(𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡𝜽
𝑇𝑫𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 + 𝛽𝑦𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 
 
Due to high retrofit costs and power dynamics between the sector and the state, we observe 
a long period of adaptation, primarily of non-FGD power plants transitioning to low sulphur 
coal and higher rates of retirement among aging non-FGD plants. The pre-1980 difference 
in sulphur demand is around 15-per cent, and more recently, over 50-per cent. As we 
observe in Figure 15, the divide is driven by the average sulphur demand among remaining 
non-FGD power plants falling. 
Finally, I highlight the endogenous nature of the adoption decision by using power plant 
fixed effects, 𝚽, and time fixed effects, T, resulting in a quasi-DiD estimate as60  
(16) ln(𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝐷1𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡 +𝚽𝑝 + 𝑻𝑡 + 𝜖𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 
 
This specification identifies the effect of sulphur dioxide controls on sulphur demand after 
accounting for constant power plant-level decisions, e.g. location. I do not suggest a 
rigorous causal interpretation of the coefficients, but rather the decision’s endogenous 
basis. I find half or so of the effect of FGD installation can instead be attributed to location, 
e.g. availability of high versus low sulphur coal nearby. Table 4 reports the estimates for 




 In effect, the estimation is as a DiD on all power plants recentered on when their SO2 controls are installed. This is because DiD 
treatments are as if the entire group is treated at the same time. Angrist and Pischke (2009) may be referenced for a proof on the 
relationship between DiD and fixed effects estimation of this form. 
61
 The normality of the fitted residuals in these and all estimates in this paper were found satisfactory based on visual inspections. 
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TABLE 4— SULPHUR DEMAND BY ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY  
 Net effect Separate periods Plant-level FE 
SO2controlsa 0.409*** - 0.222*** 
 (0.0628) - (0.0518) 
SO2*(1980 and earlier) - 0.157 - 
  - (0.163) - 
SO2*(1981 to 1985) - 0.305*** - 
  - (0.104) - 
SO2*(1986 to 1990) - 0.252*** - 
  - (0.0961) - 
SO2*(1991 to 1995) - 0.360*** - 
  - (0.0835) - 
SO2*(1996 to 2000) - 0.473*** - 
  - (0.0812) - 
SO2*(2001 to 2005) - 0.438*** - 
  - (0.0841) - 
SO2*(2006 to 2010) - 0.478*** - 
  - (0.0640) - 
SO2*(2011 to 2015) - 0.520*** - 
  - (0.0764) - 
Annual trend -0.0249*** -0.0265*** - 
     (1972 base year) (0.00166) (0.00177) - 
Constant 0.398*** 0.424*** 0.315*** 
  (0.0396) (0.0427) (0.0314) 
Plant level and year fixed effects No No Yes 
R-squared 0.144 0.147 0.552 
Notes: Based on 835,802 observations from 1972 to 2015. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses clustered at the power plant level: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
Significant at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
a equals one if FGD present 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2008, 2016c). 
 
The empirical exploration need not end at comparing power plants with versus without 
sulphur dioxide abatement technologies. One question immediately arises – where is the 
change in fuel composition occurring? Is it at the power plant level, or are there differences 
within power plants – at the boiler scale? In the next section, I refine the exploration to 
viewing how fuels differ within power plants where some boilers are connected to FGD 
systems while other are not. 
3.3.2 Exploring the Transition at the Boiler Level 
It seems important to discover where fuel decisions are made at power plants – at the 
refined scale of boilers (drivers of generators), or at the power plant aggregate perhaps 
containing many boilers? Doing so informs on how asset owners make decisions about 
pollution strategies. In this case, does it matter whether a technology is regulated at the 
facility level, or at a more refined scale? To explore this question in the context of the U.S. 
energy sector, I extract another dataset from the substantial volumes of EIA data relied on 
in the preceding section. Unfortunately, the time scale is a limited for the sort of data needed 
to explore boiler-level decisions. Starting in January 2008 through the end of the data 
prepared for this study, selected US power plants had to provide fuel consumption data at 
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the boiler level on a monthly scale. Boiler level data on a monthly increment is the smallest 
scale that we can reasonably expect for such a study. I then link the boiler consumption 
data to information on which boilers within power plants are connected to FGD systems. I 
focus on the several hundred power plants in the U.S. that have both boilers connected to 
FGD systems and boilers without. However, the result is quite similar when I add back in 
data on power plants that have exclusively non-FGD or all-FGD enabled boilers, which is 
about half of the power plants in the dataset. The result is that we observe differences in 
the sulphur content of fuel occurring at the boiler level within power plants. Figure 17 
provides a graph of mean sulphur content, weighted by fuel quantities, of coal going into 
boilers with FGD systems versus without FGD systems connected. Clearly, boilers with 
connected FGD systems are fed substantially higher sulphur coal. And while the time scale 
of analysis is limited, the difference in sulphur content appears to be widening. I also note 
that power plants with both sorts of arrangements in place tend to substantially favour FGD-
connected systems. In total, the quantity of fuel fed into the FGD-connected boilers is 9.6 
times greater than that into their non-FGD boilers. Another implication is that observing 
power plants at the facility level likely results in conclusions similar to observing at the 
smaller, boiler scale where data is available for fewer years. 
 
 
FIGURE 17 COAL SULPHUR CONSUMPTION AT THE BOILER LEVEL AT U.S. POWER PLANTS 
Notes: Dataset is the U.S. power plants that have both FGD and non-FGD connected boilers within the same 
facility. The measure in each month is the mean sulphur content in pounds per mmBTU consumed within the 
relevant group where boiler-level measures are weighted by the quantity consumed. FGD connected boilers also 
consume substantially more in quantity at these power plants. We observe the sulphur content into FGD connected 
boilers is about twice that of non-FGD boilers and the difference appears to grow over the period of observation. 
Note that FGD boilers account for about 9.6 times more coal consumption at these power plants than do non-
FGD boilers. The implication is that observing the data at the power plant level results in equivalent conclusions 
to observing at a smaller scale where data is only available for a subset of years. 
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We can then compare sulphur content differences within mixed power plants, to the 
difference between power plants specialising in either FGD or non-FGD boilers. Figure 18 
reports the difference between specialising power plants which is quite similar in both scale 
and trend over time. The reason for this consistency is that power plant emission rules 
generally apply at the stack – what we can equate to the boiler level in this analysis. So, 
there is not an incentive to regulate differently at power plants that specialise versus mix. 
 
 
FIGURE 18 SULPHUR CONTENT AT POWER PLANTS ENTIRELY WITH/WITHOUT FGD SYSTEMS 
Notes: Dataset is the U.S. power plants specialising in operating all boilers with or without FGD systems 
connected. The measure in each month is the mean sulphur content in pounds per mmBTU consumed within the 
relevant group where boiler-level measures are weighted by the quantity consumed.  Following the national trend 
toward desulphurisation, the FGD connected power plants account for 3.6 times more consumption than their 
non-FGD counterparts on average. As we previously observed, the non-FGD power plants are on average hauling 
coal a substantially greater distance – generally from Wyoming – to meet their generating requirements. 
Sources: Author calculations based on EIA data (2016a, 2016c). 
 
I conclude this section on the boiler scale of power plant coal consumption by putting 
OLS estimates to the trends noted in Figure 17 and Figure 18. These estimates are derived 
by a basic specification on the presence of SO2 controls (FGD system) and monthly sulphur 
content data, 𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑡 = 𝛽0 +𝐷1𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝐷2(𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡) +
𝛽𝑚𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡. I report on power plants that mix FGD and non-FGD connected 
boilers, then also report on those that exclusively choose one or the other production 
method. Table 5 reports very similar differences in sulphur levels and time trends between 
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TABLE 5— BOILER AND SPECIALISING POWER PLANT SULPHUR TRENDS 
 Mixed power plants, boiler-level Specialising power plants 
SO2controlsa 0.738*** 0.765*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0169) 
SO2controls*Monthly trend 0.0094*** 0.007*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Monthly trend -0.008*** -0.005*** 
     (January 2008 base) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Constant -0.609*** 0.748*** 
  (0.0169) (0.0126) 
R-squared 0.9889 0.9848 
Notes: Fitted on the monthly summary data by group (FGD/non-FGD boilers, FGD/non-FGD 
power plants) resulting in 192 observations each analysis. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at the power plant level: *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** Significant at the 5 
per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. We observe very similar levels and trends in 
each study suggesting that it is the boiler level that determines power plant results, fitting with the 
level that regulations are applied at U.S. power plants. 
a equals one if an FGD system is connected 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2016a, 2016c). 
 
While I have shown that the fuel sulphur content into U.S. power plants is related to the 
abatement strategy selected – FGD or non-FGD connection at the boiler level – questions 
remain. Some of these are again related to causality. For instance, do power plants install 
FGD systems to burn dirtier coal given a standard, or do regulators tighten a standard and 
power plants respond by installing FGD systems to continue burning locally sourced coal? 
In the next session, I address this question by first using a regression discontinuity and kink 
design, followed by an assessment of supplier turnover. 
3.3.3 An RD/RK Exploration of Fuels Switching with FGD Installation 
Observing that fuel sulphur content differs between power plants with versus without 
FGD systems is interesting but not causally interpretable. For one, power plants that install 
FGD systems might be located near higher sulphur content sources. Such a result is fine in 
that it still informs policy. But what is required is some sort of evidence of how firms are 
changing their purchasing decisions around the FGD installation decision. Observing 
differences in price, heat content, and other characteristics of high versus low sulphur coal, 
plants may install FGD systems and source coal from entirely new sources. However, 
power plants might also seek to continue burning locally sourced coal. We might also 
expect that long-term supply contracts would lead to such a result. However, installing an 
FGD system is itself a long-term proposition allowing for reconsideration of a firm’s entire 
operating strategy. Either way, more causally interpretable results are needed.  
In this section I provide some evidence on the purchasing decisions of power plants 
around the FGD installation decision. One issue is that the U.S. energy sector is incredibly 
diverse for a sector that supplies a relatively homogeneous good to households and 
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industry. Energy producers of substantially different scales, production technologies, and 
ownership arrangements provide power to a massive, interconnected, and diversely 
regulated grid. So, any result needs to both report some sort of mean and suggest the 
heterogeneity of responses. We should expect that some power plants do in fact seek to 
retain local suppliers, which may be owned by the same authority. At the same time, others 
will be operating strictly based on cost minimisation while others are operating under less 
competitive strategies. So, I implement a combined regression discontinuity and regression 
kink (RD/RK) design as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis (1.5.5 Regression 
Discontinuity and Kink Methodologies and Estimates). Preceding the statistical results, 
however, I map them graphically to demonstrate both the heterogeneity involved and 
robustness of the mean result. 
I select the joint RD/RK estimation strategy as a particularly flexible approach to 
suggesting a causal relationship. It allows estimation of both changes in magnitude and 
trend around some critical event. In the case of sulphur dioxide abatement technology, the 
event is the installation and start-up of an FGD system at a power plant. As noted in the 
preceding section, using the power plant level allows the use of a longer period of 
observation as boiler level data is available for a limited period. The prior section also notes 
that power plants that install FGD systems also primarily produce power using FGD 
connected boilers and so this is a sufficient scale of comparison, though it almost certainly 
underestimates the change somewhat. The RD/RK estimation methodology follows. It 
relies on a combination of RD and RK methods – the RD design capturing some magnitude 
change in the time series of interest, and the RK design capturing any adjustment in the rate 
of change of the variable of interest. As noted in the first chapter, while the RD design is 
justified as a separate method in Card, Lee, Pei, and Weber (2012) and many applications, 
Angrist and Pischke’s (2009) description of the estimation strategy is sufficiently flexible 
to estimate both sorts of effects. 
Diverging from the RD/RK design in the first paper of this thesis, power plant FGD 
systems are installed at different points in time. The point of this critical event is denoted 
𝑘𝑖 for power plant i. The dataset built for this study includes information on power plant 
sulphur consumption, as a component of coal, on a monthly scale. It also includes the year 
of FGD system installation. Given the time discrepancy, I design the estimation strategy 
such that it would underestimate an effect by comparing sulphur consumption starting at 
the year after installation to the sulphur consumption up to the end of the year of FGD 
installation. I also only consider the first installation at power plants, as some subsequently 
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upgrade or add more FGD units. The resulting dataset includes all months in the years 1972 
through 2015. Within this period, 231 power plants had a first FGD installation completed. 
Adding to the robustness of the results to follow, the diverse timing of these installations 
lessens the statistical impact of singular exogenous events such as other policy changes and 
geopolitical occurrences. For each power plant, let 𝑥𝑖 be an adjusted month of form 𝑥𝑖 =
(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖) where time is in standard calendar months. The hypothesis is that the event – 
or treatment – at 𝑘𝑖 fundamentally changes underlying demand such that a binary indicator 
can be used in the model of form 
(17) 𝐷𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑘𝑖
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 < 𝑘𝑖
 
 
Then, let 𝑌𝑖 be the outcome of interest in observation i. In this case, let 𝑌𝑖 be the natural 
log of total sulphur content of fuel entering a power plant i versus the amount entering at 
event time 𝑘𝑖. In practice, the total sulphur content at 𝑘𝑖 is the quantity at the last fully 
operational month up to and including in the year 𝑘𝑖. The reason for this measure is so that 
the consumption decisions at power plants of substantially different sizes can be compared 
because we are comparing consumption changes at each power plant relative to itself. The 
resulting estimate approximates a percentage change in sulphur consumption around the 
𝑘𝑖-timed event of an FGD system installation. Developing the measure based on total 
amounts also allows for changes in total production capacity toward more FGD-involved 
consumption and away from boilers not connected to FGD systems, giving a net effect at 
the power plant level. 
A visual result of the framework is presented in Figure 19. Both axes are in effect adjusted 
to zero baselines – of sulphur consumption level immediately preceding FGD installation 
on the y-axis, and time of installation on the x-axis. Each dot represents an ith power plant’s 
fuel purchase sulphur content from the 231 power plants in the sample. Given that these 
occur on a monthly scale, there is substantial heterogeneity in the points both before and 
after treatment. Trend lines pre- and post-treatment are included. While these are 
significantly different, it is also interesting to see the magnitude of outliers – that some 





FIGURE 19 RD AND RK PLOT AROUND U.S. POWER PLANT FGD INSTALLATIONS 
Notes: Based on the first installation of FGD equipment at each power plant among the 231 in the period of 
interest of 1972 to 2015. The x-axis is adjusted to the end of the year of FGD installation, and the y-axis adjusted 
to the quantity of sulphur in the fuel purchased immediately preceding FGD activation. 
Sources: Author calculations based on EIA data (EIA, 2008, 2016a, 2016c). 
 
The more formal framework and results follow. As the purpose of the model is to estimate 
the impact of an event or policy enacted at 𝑘𝑖, not the influence of primitives on Y, the 
functional form for estimation is simple. Let a function 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) approximate for the 
purpose at hand the true relation 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑋𝑖) which has a potentially large set of 
determinants of demand, 𝑋𝑖. The conditional expectation of Y can be written as  
(18) 𝐸[𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖] + ([𝑌1𝑖|𝑥𝑖] − [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖])𝐷𝑖. 
 
As before, let the functional form of the pre-treatment conditional expectation be  
(19) [𝑌0𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 
 
and post-treatment conditional expectation with both different slope and intercept be 
(20) [𝑌1𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 
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(21) 𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑖 
 
The coefficient 𝛼 identifies any effect resulting in a discontinuity – the RD effect, and 𝛽 
any change in the linear rate of change from k onward – the RK effect. 
I present two sets of estimates for robustness in Table 6. The first is estimated on changes 
in sulphur content per mmBTU of coal consumption to fit with preceding estimates in this 
paper. I then estimate on the dependent variable of changes in total sulphur consumption 
as discussed in this section. The results are statistically significant and similar. Focussing 
on the total-based estimates, post-FGD installation the mean quantity of sulphur content 
increases by 30.7-per cent on average and the rate of change adjusts from slightly 
decreasing to a 0.84-per cent annual increase in sulphur content.62 
 






Date (actual – 𝑘𝑖)
 -0.002*** -0.0003 
    (0.0002) (0.00024) 
RD: D=1 (actual ≥ 𝑘𝑖) 0.288*** 0.268*** 
    (0.0450) (0.0611) 
RK: Month*D 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 
    (0.0003) (0.00036) 
Constant -0.252*** 14.483*** 
  (0.0543) (0.0929) 
Observations 87,714 87,714 
R-squared 0.79 0.70 
Notes: Dependent variables relative to levels immediately preceding FGD 
installation at 𝑘𝑖 . Based on the first installation of FGD equipment at a 
power plant among 231 power plants in the period of interest of 1972 to 
2015. Robust standard errors clustered at the power plant level in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** Significant at the 5 
per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2008, 2016a, 
2016c). 
 
It immediately follows to ask whether coal of different qualities is purchased from the 
same source as prior to FGD installation – after perhaps undergoing less pre-treatment, or 
instead sourced from mines accessing higher sulphur content coal reserves. Source mine 
data at the power plant scale is, unfortunately, only available from 2008 onward on a subset 
of power plants under the EIA's enhanced reporting requirement. This is, however, a decent 
sample of power plants from which to speculate – 48 with an FGD installation in the period 
and 133 without. I first make a list of power plants that have FGD systems installed in the 
period, then divide it into pre-installation and post-installation – the year after FGD 
 
62
 Changes of 30.7% ≈ (𝑒0.268 − 1) ∗ 100 and 0.84%≈ 12 ∗ (𝑒(0.001−0.0003) − 1) ∗ 100, respectively. 
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installation and onwards – groups. I then make a list of the power plants that do not install 
FGD systems and divide this into first and second half of period groups. In both the FGD 
installation and no change groups I then compare the lists: pre- to post-installation, and first 
half to second half groups. I arrive at mean and median supplier retention rates and develop 
relevant histograms which are reported in Figure 20.  
On the left side of Figure 20, the distribution of the share of coal suppliers retained after 
an FGD installation is reported. The mean and median supplier retention rates are 46-per 
cent and 40-per cent among 48 power plants, respectively. Additionally, the modal response 
is to retain 20-per cent to 30-per cent of suppliers. For comparison, the right side of Figure 
20 reports the distribution of the share of coal suppliers retained by power plants without 
FGD installations in the first versus second half of the period. The mean and median 
retention values are 63-per cent and 67-per cent on 133 power plants. The modal response 
is to preserve all existing contracts. 
The results appear to refute, at least in the 2008 through 2015 period, the alternative 
proposition that power plants are primarily installing FGD systems to retain their existing 
long-term contracts. This is likely because the power plants in this sample are already under 
regulation and primarily burning lower sulphur coal to meet emission caps. It would not be 
particularly beneficial to both install an FGD system and retain the same suppliers. 
 
 
FIGURE 20 COAL SUPPLIERS RETAINED WITH AND WITHOUT FGD INSTALLATION  
Notes: Based on lists of the suppliers to coal power plants among the sample of power plants required to submit source data for the 
2008-2015 period of observation. For the power plants that install an FGD system, I divide their list of suppliers into pre- and post-
FGD installation. As a comparison group, I use the reporting power plants that did not install FGD systems in the period and divide 
their supplier list into first and second periods and again analyse the amount of supplier switching.  
(left) Share of coal suppliers retained after an FGD installation in the period 2008-2015. The mean and median supplier retention 
rates are 46-per cent and 40-per cent among 48 power plants, respectively. 
(right) Share of coal suppliers retained in the first versus second half of the period 2008-2015. The mean and median values are 63-
per cent and 67-per cent on 133 power plants.  
From a comparison of their retention histograms, the power plants that installed FGD systems retained less than half of their coal 
suppliers after installation – most often retaining 20-30-per cent of suppliers. In comparison, power plants that did not install FGD 
systems usually made fewer changes to their supplier list – most often none. 




This section concludes with a short note on FGD installation timing around 
environmental policy changes. As discussed in the literature review, substantial national 
changes in sulphur dioxide limits occur in the U.S. in 1971 with the Clean Air Act, the 1990 
establishment of the Acid Rain Program (ARP), 1995 deadline for compliance for the 
ARP’s Phase I power plants, and 2000 deadline for the more expansive set of Phase II 
power plants. Comparatively minor adjustments to sulphur dioxide emission regulations 
occur as required in the interims and at smaller geographic scales. Figure 21 presents the 
count of FGD system installations in each year against the backdrop of tightening sulphur 
dioxide emission restrictions. At each stage, the impending requirements as well as the 
problem they sought to address were well-known to both industry and the public.  
Despite well-publicised information on when sulphur dioxide regulations would come 
into effect, we observe that FGD installations often occur in the interim between policy 
changes. This occurs for several reasons. For one, we know that the cost of an FGD system 
is substantial – a later section of this paper notes mean and median FGD system prices of 
$105.9 million and $28.3 million (2016 dollars). Against the price of FGD systems, power 
plants can contrast the cost of cleaner fuel alternatives and purchasing emission allowances. 
So, we should not be at all surprised to find that power plants install FGD systems often 
off policy change years. Rather, as a natural course of business, they balance the competing 
costs involved and install systems when it is appropriate to do so given the age and 
replacement schedules of existing equipment. It is even possible that an FGD system is 
installed earlier out of convenience but bypassed until needed. Unfortunately, this natural 
progression of FGD system installations limits the econometric techniques that can be 
successfully applied as we cannot expect a policy shift to result in clean changes in FGD 
installation rates.  
The argument on timing having been made, we can observe an uptick in FGD installation 
rates between adoption of the ARP program and the Phase I implementation deadline – 
from 1990 to 1995. The power plants under this phase were the 110 largest sulphur dioxide 
emitters at the time, and so economies of scale likely play a role in their abatement 
technology choice as the returns to an FGD system installation could be substantial. The 
Phase II implementation from 1995 to 2000 brought all remaining power plants with a 
boiler size above a certain minimum capacity (75 megawatts of electricity output), so 
included more power plants where the fixed cost requirements of an FGD system are 
prohibitive. These may also more often be reserved for peak demand periods when the 
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return to operating is higher. The conclusion is that sulphur dioxide restrictions lead to FGD 
installations, but at a pace and timing that fits within greater power plant considerations 
around cost.  
 
 
FIGURE 21 FGD INSTALLATIONS AND KEY REGULATORY EVENTS 
Notes: Plot of FGD system installation frequency by year, with important sulphur dioxide 
policy change years denoted. These include the 1971 Clean Air Act adoption, 1990 
establishment of the Acid Rain Program (ARP), 1995 deadline for the ARP’s Phase I set of 
power plants to comply, and 2000 deadline for the more expansive Phase II set to enter 
compliance. 
Sources: Author calculations based on EIA data (2008, 2016a, 2016c). 
 
So far, this paper has reviewed the field’s relevant literature and put some estimates on 
the effects of abatement technology installation on power plant sulphur demand. These 
estimates have included the net effect across the industry, the power plant response at a 
within-facility level, and changes in which mines are contracted to supply coal. Having 
provided a body of evidence that firms do increase fuel sulphur content after FGD 
installation, and tend to primarily specialise in higher sulphur coal with FGD installation 
versus lower sulphur coal without, I precede with a structured model of the power plant 
decision-making process. 
3.4 A Simple Model of Regulated Power Plants  
In this section, I compose and validate a model for thinking about the domestic power 
plant-level decision-making process. In doing so, I develop some tools to explore market 
structure despite the industry’s complexity and which are general enough to be applicable 
beyond the U.S. energy sector. The domestic U.S. energy sector is the limited scope of this 
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paper as the national scale retains the final say on domestic policy despite contemporary 
movements toward international cooperation on environmental issues. I begin with a model 
of demand at domestic sites for inputs of differing polluting characteristics, then add the 
impact of policy-driven technological intervention. I continue to anchor the discussion in 
the context of demand for power plant fuels of differing sulphur content and their polluting 
potential. The impact of abatement technologies on demand for high versus low sulphur 
fuels are observed.  
The model in this paper describes a regulated sphere where there is an incentive to adopt 
an abatement technology at power plants under regulation. For comparison, an unregulated 
sphere has a lack of regulatory incentives and power plants are assumed to unreservedly 
respond to price when choosing quantities of inputs to production. I keep the decision 
whether to buy clean or dirty inputs simple by also assuming it is price-based, conditional 
on regulatory limits, I structure the discussion as choosing between coal with some sulphur 
content, and a cleaner alternative such as coal with less sulphur or natural gas that 
contributes zero sulphur. 
The model will highlight the importance of abatement and transportation costs and 
indicates that the fuel decision occurs in two stages: whether to consume at all, then how 
much of the polluting version given some emissions limit. It also suggests that 
policymakers focus on the power plants using dirtier fuels, as those only consuming cleaner 
versions would be worse off by switching back. The implications for fuel demand from 
placing a pollution cap, followed by availability of abatement technology, guide the 
discussion. 
The production function: I take the input selection decision as separate from the output 
decision as fitting with many industries. In energy production, the necessity to contract the 
delivery of fuels and stockpile to avoid discontinuities in service separates the spheres of 
purchase and consumption. The person making the two decisions may be the same or 
separate as the institutional knowledge required differs. An implication is that the literature 
on output decisions at power plants is not directly applicable to this analysis of input 
decisions. Instead, the link is thought of for expositional purposes as occurring at some 
weekly power plant operational meeting – the team that makes output decisions, staffed 
with an economist or two, meets with purchasers to coordinate. Some discussion of 
expected production given emissions limitations occurs, then purchasing plans are adjusted 
to ensure inputs will be available. By allowing a weak link between output and input 
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decisions, I can assume a cost minimisation purchasing objective subject to some output 
requirement.  
For tractability, firms –slightly inaccurately power plants – select between two sorts of 
fuels which are dirty and clean substitutes. Dispensing with engineering details which are 
outside the scope of the model, output in mmBTU’s are converted to electricity. In terms 
of output – accounting for differences in power plant efficiency – demand for coal and 
natural gas are perfect substitutes and the end-user cannot tell which fuel is used to generate 
their electricity.63 As a simplification, perfect substitution is useful – output, E, is the sum 
of outputs in mmBTU from dirty, D, and clean, C, inputs as 𝐸 = 𝐶 + 𝐷 (see Note 5). An 
implication is that in the context of fuel purchases, C and D should be studied in terms of 
heat potential in units of mmBTU to match output E. Relaxing this demand functional form, 
however, does not negate the fundamental model implications. I do note that the literature 
suggests many intermediate to large coal and natural gas power plants operate near-CRTS 
(Nerlove, 1963; Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1976; Christensen and Greene, 1976; Bernstein 
and Parmeter, 2019; Bernstein, 2020). While I challenge the interpretation of CRTS in 
appendix A3.3 Returns to Scale in Electricity Generation, the net effect of the matter is as 
if CRTS is in effect. These simplifications imply that firms make production decisions 
based on real output, and that this output is generally stable. Equivalently, the firm has a 
constant expectation. 
 
Note 5 - Deriving 𝑬 = 𝑪+ 𝑫 
Output, E, in mmBTU, from consuming volumes of dirty input, D, and clean substitute, C, at 
efficiencies 𝑎𝐷  and 𝑎𝐶 , is converted to electricity in processes outside the model. Modelling as 
strictly additive, 𝐸 = 𝑎𝐷𝐷
𝛽𝐷 + 𝑎𝐶𝐶
𝛽𝐶 which we can describe in terms of output as 𝐸 = 𝐷 + 𝐶. 
Alternatively with more assumptions required, when power plants consume D and C in the same 
physical system, the efficiency in terms of mmBTU is roughly the same to match plant capacities, 
so 𝑎𝐷 = 𝑎𝐶 = 𝑎. Since many intermediate and large coal and natural gas power plants operate at or 
near CRTS, 𝛽𝐷 = 𝛽𝐶 = 1. Rather than short tons and cubic feet of volume, for coal, D, and natural 








 The perfect substitutes assumption is often used in analyzing the U.S. energy sector, for example Hoel (2009) and Long and Stähler 
(2018). But it also receives criticism, for instance in Long (2014) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012) on the grounds that it does not 
represent well the substitution of biofuels and other new alternatives against coal and natural gas. 
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Budget and emission constraints: Prices and lack of monopsony influence are assumed. 
That is, the total cost is also additive in source price-quantity pairs, and at the power plant 
level prices are taken. Then, for dirty and clean input prices 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃𝐶 , the expenditure, or 
budget requirement, is 𝐵 = 𝑃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶. Additionally, assume emissions, ℰ, can be equated 
back to batches of dirty inputs as ℰ = 𝛼𝐷 for constant 𝛼, where 0 < 𝛼 < 1. If 𝛼 = 0 no 
dirty alternative exists, and as a result, no relevant emission occurs. In the other extreme, 
𝛼 = 1 suggests the input’s only purpose is to pollute. The constant α assumption is 
generally realistic as power plants must expect fuel meeting a standard, else continually 
adjust operations at some cost. 
The essence of the model is that three well-known cases result: 
(i) The clean option is cheaper: A corner solution of all clean inputs is optimal and 
zero emissions result. This result is not particularly interesting to study because 
there is no environmental problem to address. 
(ii) The dirty option is cheaper: A corner solution of all dirty inputs is optimal for the 
firm, and 𝛼𝐷 pollution occurs. Manipulating this case drives the analysis. 
(iii) Prices of inputs are equal: The optimal choice is any combination of clean and dirty 
inputs resulting in output E. This case is unstable. For instance, enacting an 
emission standard with any compliance cost whatsoever results in the dirty option 
becoming more expensive than cleaner ones and the situation transitions to case (i). 
It would be careless to continue without first testing whether this model is descriptive of 
the U.S. energy sector. In the following section, I devise and implement a test of whether 
power plant purchasing patterns suggest a perfect substitutes relationship. Afterwards, I 
proceed by adding regulation in terms of an emissions cap and then abatement technology 
that effectively relaxes that cap. 
3.4.1 Testing the Perfect Substitutes Description of U.S. Energy Producers 
As discussed in a preceding section, there are several U.S. power plants – about half of 
those reporting data in the relevant period – that have both FGD connected boilers and non-
FGD alternatives on premises. These power plants primarily produce energy via their FGD 
connected systems but also buy coal with a lower sulphur content on average for their non-
FGD systems. This setup frequently results in received coal prices at the power plant level 
being available for both high sulphur coal and low sulphur coal. I design a testing 
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methodology and use this data to explore how closely the perfect substitutes assumption 
fits U.S. coal power plants. 
A defining quality of the perfect substitute production and additive budget model is that 
firms dramatically, rather than incrementally, change fuel input composition in response to 
price changes. Without regulation, these choices are between full specialisation in high or 
low sulphur coal or natural gas. With regulation, the optimal choice is either full 
specialisation in low sulphur coal or natural gas, or a mix with quantities of high sulphur 
coal. I test the applicability of the perfect substitutes model by computing own- and cross-
price elasticities of demand grouped by the relationship between prices 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃𝐶 . We 
should expect to find little response to price changes at most ratios as the perfect substitute 
relationship suggests all switching activity occurs as one fuel transitions from being more 
to less expensive. That is, we might expect firm price elasticities of demand to appear very 
inelastic except around 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝐶 , when they should instead be very elastic, as depicted in 
Figure 22. In comparison, an imperfect substitutes relationship would result in a more 
distributed switching activity. In practice, we might instead observe fuel switching around 
𝑃𝐷 + 𝜇 = 𝑃𝐶  due to unobserved differences in operating costs, 𝜇. For instance, 𝜇 ≠ 0 might 
be some unobserved net marginal abatement cost tied to selecting the polluting input. Such 
divergence reveals the scale of unobserved abatement, production, and switching costs 
involved, or at least the share not passed to consumers and other parties. 
 
FIGURE 22 EXPECTED ELASTICITY ACTIVITY AROUND POINT OF PRICE EQUALITY 
Notes: A perfect substitutes model of firm behaviour suggests that when the firm’s 
objective is cost minimisation, specialisation in one input to production results. In the U.S. 
energy sector, we usually expect either full specialisation in input C or a stable mix of C 
and D. Input switching occurs when prices change such that the more expensive input 
becomes the cheaper one. An indicator of this transition will be own- and cross-price 
elasticities that are higher around the point of price equality. Without hidden costs, the 
transition point will be when 𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝐶 , otherwise when 𝑃𝐷 + 𝜇 = 𝑃𝐶 . 
 
𝑃𝐷 = 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝐷 > 𝑃𝐶 𝑃𝐷 < 𝑃𝐶 
|ℇ𝑖𝑖|,  
|ℇ𝑖𝑗| 
𝑃𝐷 ∶ 𝑃𝐶 
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To test whether the perfect substitutes model is appropriate, I estimate elasticities by 
groups defined by the relationship of input i, to alternative input j, as 
𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑗
𝑃𝑗
 which is the 
price advantage of input i. I compare (i, j) pairs of high sulphur coal and natural gas (HSC, 
NG) and low sulphur coal and natural gas (LSC, NG) and iterate over price ratio groups 
beginning where coal prices are 50-per cent less than natural gas prices. Because coal power 
plants often use natural gas during start-up, we often observe prices and quantities for both 
fuels. I estimate own- and cross-price elasticities by a log-log transformation of prices and 
quantities to find the net effect of a price change on quantity.64 I use the coal data outlined 
in the introduction, plus over 500,000 observations on natural gas purchases. However, in 
each estimation group, estimates are on only several tens-of-thousands of observations 
where the same power plant purchases both coal and natural gas. 
I present HSC-NG own-price and cross-price elasticities in Figure 23, and LSC-NG 
estimates in Figure 24. Fuel switching behaviour at high sulphur coal power plants provides 
the more striking result as one would expect. Group elasticities are inelastic and often 
statistically indistinguishable from zero while 𝑃𝐶 < 𝑃𝐷. However, the highest elasticities 
observed suggest that fuel switching occurs in the range of HSC being 15- to 30-per cent 
more expensive than natural gas. There can be many causes of this point, for example, 
additional power plant benefits to coal use, substantial costs to scaling up natural gas 
consumption, and expectations that natural gas prices will not remain lower. Contracts on 
fuel and by-product provision as well as coal shutdown costs may also make it challenging 









FIGURE 23 HIGH SULPHUR COAL ELASTICITIES BY OPPORTUNITY COST 
Notes: Own- and cross-price elasticities for high sulphur coal grouped by the price ratio against the clean alternative of natural gas with 
around 2,000 observations in each group. Estimated by log-log specification using power plant monthly price and quantity data for power 
plants where both coal and natural gas are used. I include 95-per cent confidence interval bars. The perfect substitutes model suggests 
that more fuel switching activity will occur at some ratio than elsewhere. Without differences in operating and hidden costs,  this 
switching point would be around price equality. Elasticity estimates suggest peak activity instead occurs when natural gas is at least 15-
per cent cheaper than low sulphur coal suggesting hidden switching or other costs. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from the EIA (2016a, 2016c). 
 
The LSC-NG comparison provides less support for the perfect substitutes model in such 
cases. We still observe the highest elasticity estimates when LSC is 15- to 30-per cent 
cheaper than natural gas, but also observe a more gradual increase in elasticities. Power 
plants, then, may act as though they have perfect substitute preferences between clean and 
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FIGURE 24 LOW SULPHUR COAL ELASTICITIES BY OPPORTUNITY COST 
Notes: Own- and cross-price elasticities for low sulphur coal grouped by the price ratio against the clean alternative of natural gas. 
Estimated by log-log specification using power plant monthly price and quantity data for power plants where both coal and natural gas 
are used. I include 95-per cent confidence interval bars. The perfect substitutes model suggests that more fuel switching activity will 
occur at some ratio than elsewhere. Without differences in operating and hidden costs, this switching point would be around price 
equality. Elasticity estimates suggest peak activity instead occurs when natural gas is at least 15-per cent cheaper than low sulphur coal. 
The perfect substitute effect for low sulphur scale is less pronounced than in the high sulphur coal versus natural gas case. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from the EIA (2016a, 2016c). 
 
While not indisputable support, I find the perfect substitutes relationship plausible, 
particularly at high sulphur coal-consuming power plants. I now proceed under this not 
entirely fictional assumption and add regulation and abatement technologies to the model. 
3.4.2 Adding Regulation and Abatement Technology 
From the introductory model and preceding empirics, we can expect that fundamental 
market shifts are required to drive changes in fuel makeup. Another implication of stability 




Adding an emission standard has different impacts on energy producers depending on their 
initial case. If the clean fuel is initially cheaper – case (i) – no change occurs. However, if 
a producer is in case (ii) and the standard is binding, a change in equilibrium quantity 









. In coal for energy production, this is in pounds of sulphur per mmBTU. Figure 
 
65
 As long as the net effect is that the dirty fuel with compliance costs remains cheaper than the clean alternative, else the power 














Price ratio of low sulphur coal to natural gas
Own-price elasticity Cross-price elasticity (low sulfur coal-natural gas)
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25 illustrates the decision with a standard in place. This is the starting point for the analysis 
of abatement technology implementation. 
 
 
FIGURE 25 FUEL SELECTION WHEN THE DIRTY INPUT IS CHEAPER AND A STANDARD IS SET 
Notes: Price of clean input, C, is 𝑃𝐶  which is higher than the price, 𝑃𝐷  of dirty input, D. The 
binding constraint is in terms of quantity of dirty inputs, ?̅?, which derives from the emissions 
cap ℰ̅ = 𝛼𝐷 for polluting share α. From the perfect substitutes demand and contracted output 
(quantity E) assumptions, the emissions cap fully explains the combination of dirty and clean 
shares selected and total expenditure level, B. From an unregulated origin, the cap results in 
a reduction in dirty fuel which is offset by an increase in the clean alternative. 
 
We observe a standard dilutes the emissions content of the average unit of fuel. The 
power plant operator does not need to purchase only cleaner coal or natural gas – though 
these are options – but rather might mix sources. The average quantity of pollutants in 
pounds of sulphur per-mmBTU decreases and emissions decrease relative to without a 
standard.66 Much policy to date relies on setting a standard or comparable tax in a domestic 
market. However, there is the potential for offsetting as dirtier inputs are now free to export. 
From a regulated sphere, dirty inputs may enter unregulated ones – emissions leakage.67 
Adding abatement technology: If an emissions cap reduces demand for D, then we expect 
a relaxation of that cap to increase demand. The use of FGD systems effectively does this 
by operating at some removal efficiency such that ?̅?′ =
ℰ̅
𝛿𝛼
 where 𝛿 = 1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 is 
 
66
 The behaviour of the single interior result in case (ii) results from cost minimisation subject to meeting the output expectation or 
commitment, and the emission constraint, as min
𝐷,𝐶
𝑃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶 subject to 𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶) = 𝑓(𝐷) + 𝑓(𝐶) and ℇ ≥ 𝑓(𝛼, 𝐷) = 𝛼𝐷. While it 
is a simple framework, I explore the robustness of the interior result in appendix A3.4 Exploring the Interior Result of the Input Selection 
Model. 
67
 In Phase I of the U.S. Acid Rain Program, provisions were made through a tracking requirement to avoid within-U.S. emissions 















the passthrough share. Less is emitted per unit of fuel – only share δ of the polluting 
potential counts against the emissions cap and sulphur dioxide into the production process 
diverges from the emissions out of it into the atmosphere. We should also find that the 
effective price of the dirty input increases due to abatement technology operation and the 
slope of the budget line 
𝑃𝐷
𝑃𝐶
 then increases. However, increasing D displaces costlier C. With 









 where 𝛿𝑒 denotes operating the abatement system at some efficiency. This efficiency 
is up to, but perhaps less than, the system’s rated capacity as another matter to consider. 
The net effect must be cost savings versus the power plant operator choosing to meet the 
cap without abatement technology under the cost minimisation assumption. 
A starting point is to consider changes in abatement technology as costless. The firm is 
unambiguously better off by a decrease in the budget required to B’ in Figure 26. However, 
firms using the clean alternative are not enticed into the dirty input market as it remains 
cheaper to use the clean alternative. 
 
FIGURE 26 FUEL SELECTION WITH COSTLESS ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY 
Notes: Relative to the emissions cap, power plants that prefer the dirty input D because the price 
𝑃𝐷  is lower, prefer a larger input share in D. An abatement technology operating at an 
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 such that 𝛿 = (1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) results in an effective cap of ℰ = δ𝛼𝐷. The share 
of the dirty input increases to ?̅?′ and costly C decreases. Total expenditure then decreases to 𝐵′ 
relative to meeting the emissions cap without abatement technology. 
 
With a cost to FGD system operation, the budget requirement increases relative to a 
costless technology, but an upper limit exists due to the alternative of not operating the 




















system is designed to operate at some specific efficiency, bypassing it part of the time is 
equivalent to reducing efficiency.68 The efficiency then is up to, but perhaps less than the 
system’s rated capacity. Figure 27 suggests the complication. 
 
FIGURE 27 FUEL SELECTION WITH VARIABLE ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY AT SOME COST 
Notes: Abatement technology that has some operating cost limits when a firm will adopt or use 
it at full efficiency. Here some abatement operating cost can result in the operator selecting back 
out of using the abatement technology and instead meet the cap by mixing dirty and clean 
alternatives if 𝐵′′ exceeds 𝐵. 
 
While I have explored the firm-level abatement decision, the policymaker’s perspective 
is to harness the cumulative power of large swaths of the industry transitioning to satisfy 
domestic emission reduction requirements. From firm decisions to market demand requires 
an aggregation process. Here I suggest industry aggregates from a set of perfect substitute 
demanders to market demand that is downward sloping in price but otherwise unspecified. 
This change in relationship with aggregation results from differences in the price at which 
firms switch between clean and dirty inputs due to differences in transportation, mining, 
operating, and transaction costs. I again pause to test the model, now whether the resulting 




 See an extensive analysis of the bypass decision Rubin and Nguyen (1978). 
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3.4.3 Testing Whether Price Elasticities Differ by Abatement Method 
As in the preceding figures, demand at power plants with FGD systems are more stable 
than those using the dirty input without technology improvements due to flexibility. 
Differences in elasticities occur as it would take a increases across all available 𝑃𝐷, 
alternatively decreases in 𝑃𝐶 , for FGD power plants to instead save by specialising in input 
C. This is because an FGD system preserves the choice of using coal as more types of coal 
can be used while still meeting emissions constraints. It would require changes in 𝑃𝐶  across 
the sector. FGD equipped power plants should have more inelastic own-price elasticities of 
demand in coal, and subsequently alternative fuels, than plants without FGD.69 We can test 
this prediction by estimating market-level own- and cross-price elasticities separated into 
groups of power plants with and without abatement technology. The prediction is that both 
sets of elasticities will be more inelastic among FGD-enabled power plants at the market 
level. 
I estimate market-level own- and cross-price elasticities grouped by abatement 
technology – whether FGD systems are in use – by using use the dynamic linear logit model 
of Jones (1995) which builds on the linear logit framework of Considine and Mount (1984) 
and constraints on homogeneity of degree zero, symmetry, and adding up in Considine 
(1990) such that the system of demand equations add up to total expenditure and only real 
prices matter.70 I then update the method with additions from Battese (1997) to consider 
zero cost-share observations, EIA (2012) to use monthly-scale observations, Steinbuks 
(2012) to include a general market trend, and from Steinbuks and Narayanan (2015) a 
method to account for country differences with fixed effects which I apply to U.S. NERC 
regions as I aggregate to that scale as in EIA (2012). 
I then diverge from the literature with three additions. First, I divide high and low sulphur 
coal into separate consumption shares and derive own- and cross-price elasticities between 
high sulphur coal, low sulphur coal, and natural gas. Second, I estimate on fuel data restated 
in heat content in mmBTU’s, which is the primary unit of quantity in power plant input 
decisions. Third, I estimate own- and cross-price elasticities by power plants with and 
without abatement technology to address the central empirical question. The recent decline 
in U.S. natural gas prices results in additional exogenous variation and estimation basically 
 
69
 In particular HSC and LSC own-price elasticities and HSC-LSC and HSC-NG cross-price elasticities. 
70
 However, this form has a longer history. Theil (1969) suggests a precursor by Warner (1962) and then proceeds to develop an 
estimation form based on Warner that is close to Considine and Mount (1984). However, McFadden (1974) traces it back to several 
precursor methods published throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
149 
 
takes the approach of attempting to describe the market well. Because any candidate 
instrument for an instrumental variable approach almost certainly fails to satisfy the 
exclusion restriction in estimating energy elasticities, other alternative approaches are 
limited. 
Fortunately, the dynamic linear logit model provides elasticity estimates that are both 
adherent to theory and flexible to cost functional form. I use the notation convention from 
Jones (1995) and add a monthly indicator variable following EIA (2012). I estimate on a 
system of equations for all fuels except one which I drop and use to normalise those that 
remain. An underlying assumption of the methodology is that we can describe each input 
as a share, e.g. high sulphur coal from total fuel consumed. For quantity 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 of fuel i at 













𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖 +∑𝜙𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
where I suppress the unit subscripts identifying observations as at the U.S. NERC region 
scale and include matrix 𝑿 of covariates. Desirable constraints of homogeneity of degree 
zero (HDO) and symmetry (Slutsky) are imposed by model formulation, respectively, 
∑ 𝜙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 0
𝑁
𝑖  and 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝜙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑗,𝑡𝜙𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 for input pairs i and j, and I assume adding up 
restrictions: ∑ 𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 1, ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 0, and ∑ 𝜙𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖 = 0 (see Note 6). The log-log, static form of 
the model derived by Considine and Mount (1984) (also see Theil, 1969) is then 
(23)      𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑁,𝑡




) + (𝜙𝑖,𝑖+1 −𝜙𝑖+1,𝑁)𝑆𝑖+1,𝑡𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑖+1,𝑡
𝑃𝑁,𝑡




⋯+ (𝜙𝑖,𝑁−1 − 𝜙𝑁−1,𝑁)𝑆𝑁−1,𝑡𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑁−1,𝑡
𝑃𝑁,𝑡
) + (𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑁,𝑡) 
 
where I derive a separate equation for each 𝑖 ≠ 𝑁 fuels (all except one). A dynamic 




), and controls for the general market trend, month effects, and year effects 
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are added following Considine and Mount (1984), EIA (2012), and Steinbuks (2012), 
respectively, as  
(𝛼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝑁,𝑡)ln (𝐺𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽𝑖,𝑚 − 𝛽𝑁,𝑚)𝑀𝑚
12
𝑚=2 +∑ (𝛾𝑖,𝑦 − 𝛾𝑁,𝑦)𝑌𝑦
2015
𝑦=2009 . Battese (1997) 
suggests indicator variables for when a cost-share is at or near zero to account for corner 
solutions. I specify these as 𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑁,𝑡
) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑆𝑁,𝑡−1
) = 0. I 
add NERC region fixed effects as in EIA (2012) to account for regional differences in 
interfuel substitution. The fixed effects follow from a method to account for country 
differences in interfuel substitution in Steinbuks and Narayanan (2015). I aggregate to 
NERC region data where the price of fuel i in period t is the mean of individual power plant 
purchase prices weighted by quantities. 
 
Note 6 – Constraints of HDO, Slutsky Symmetry, and the Value of the Adding Up Restrictions 
Assume in a time, t, income, I. To show ∑ 𝜙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 0
𝑁
𝑖 , let 𝐸(𝑃1 , 𝑃2 , … , 𝑃𝑁 , 𝐼). From the Euler 








𝐼 for homogeneity of degree k. Divide by 𝐸(∙) and note 












𝑖=1 +𝜙𝐼 . Assume that 𝜙𝐼 = 0 from the 
preceding model – E is mandated or contracted – and let N include cross price elasticities. To show 




𝑆𝑗(𝜙𝑗,𝐼 −𝜙𝑖,I) from substitution and income effects, respectively.  Let 𝜙𝑗,𝐼 = 𝜙𝑖,𝐼 (equality of the 
income effect), which I extend to 𝜙𝑗,𝐼 = 𝜙𝑖,𝐼 = 0 by the prior assumption on E, then 𝑆𝑖𝜙𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗𝜙𝑗,𝑖. 
The adding up restrictions ensure that the system of demand equations add up to the total 
expenditure, ∑ 𝑆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 1: ∑ 𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 1 ensures they are equal to full expenditure even if no change 
occurs, ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 = 0 that there is a net zero effect from changes in other preferences, and ∑ 𝜙𝑖,𝑗
𝑁
𝑖 = 0  




For the fuels high sulphur coal (HSC), low sulphur coal (LSC), and natural gas (NG), the 
dynamic linear logit system becomes a system of two equations where I normalise by 
natural gas.71 Estimates for HSC and LSC are derived using the system72 
 
71
 Petroleum fuels account for a small share of modern power plant demand, particularly in per-BTU terms, and I drop them from 
estimation. However, EIA (2012) finds petroleum fuels as a complement in coal power plants as a start-up fuel. 
72
 Estimates are invariant to which fuel is dropped and the remaining fuel’s estimates are then inferred. The high-versus-low sulphur 










) + (𝜙𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝐿𝑆𝐶 − 𝜙𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐺)𝑆𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡
𝑃𝑁𝐺,𝑡




(𝛼𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝛼𝑁𝐺,𝑡) ln(𝐺𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑚 − 𝛽𝑁𝐺,𝑚)𝑀𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑚
12
𝑚=2 + ∑ (𝛾𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑦 −
2015
𝑦=2009
𝛾𝑁𝐺,𝑦)𝑌𝑦 +∑ (𝛾𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶 − 𝛾𝑁𝐺,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶)𝑌𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶
8
𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶=2 − (𝑑𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑁𝐺,𝑡)𝐷𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡 +
(𝑑𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡−1 − 𝑑𝑁𝐺,𝑡−1)𝐷𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡−1 + (𝜖𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑁𝐺,𝑡) 
 
and 
(25)        𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡
𝑆𝑁𝐺,𝑡




) + (𝜙𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝐿𝑆𝐶 − 𝜙𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐺)𝑆𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝐻𝑆𝐶,𝑡
𝑃𝑁𝐺,𝑡




(𝛼𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝛼𝑁𝐺,𝑡) ln(𝐺𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑚 − 𝛽𝑁𝐺,𝑚)𝑀𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑚
12
𝑚=2 +∑ (𝛾𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑦 − 𝛾𝑁𝐺,𝑦)𝑌𝑦
2015
𝑦=2009 +
∑ (𝛾𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶 − 𝛾𝑁𝐺,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶)𝑌𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶
8
𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐶=2 − (𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑁𝐺,𝑡)𝐷𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡 + (𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡−1 −
𝑑𝑁𝐺,𝑡−1)𝐷𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡−1 + (𝜖𝐿𝑆𝐶,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑁𝐺,𝑡). 
 
From the resulting coefficients, the short-run cross-price elasticities are developed in 
Considine and Mount (1984) and Considine (1990) and reported in Jones (1995) as73 
(26) ℇ𝑖,𝑗
𝑆𝑅 = (𝜙𝑖,𝑗 + 1)𝑆?̅? 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
Coefficients 𝜙𝑖,𝑖 used in deriving own-price elasticities follow from the homogeneity 





, and thus 
(27) ℇ𝑖,𝑖
𝑆𝑅 = (𝜙𝑖,𝑖 + 1)𝑆?̅? − 1. 
 
Table 7 presents own- and cross-price elasticity estimates for the combined market and 
separated by abatement technology while the full set of coefficients are reserved for 
appendix A3.5 Coefficients from Linear Logit Estimation. Very inelastic own-price 
elasticities suggest FGD technology results in lock-in to high sulphur coal, and coal in 
general. Power plants without abatement technology instead are dedicated to cleaner fuels 
 
73





 but are not needed in this study. 
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and have less inelastic demand for coal. An implication is that if the regulator wants to 
increase dirty fuel consumption domestically, power plants with FGD installed are 
somewhat inflexible on the matter once set up. That is, once power plants install FGD 
equipment the effect is resilient. The regulator may then want to consider policies that 
incentivise non-FGD power plants using coal to install FGD systems and switch to dirty 
coal consumption. In the U.S. energy sector, we arrive at an implementation issue – it is a 
slow process to retrofit FGD systems onto power plants – taking up to 36 months, with up 
to six months of the power plant offline (EPA, 1974; Chaaban, Mezher, and Ouwayjan, 
2004; Kulshrestha, 2018). But this sort of delay will not be the case for all markets and 
environmental remedies. I now briefly explore the implications of a few modifications to 
the model before evaluating the manipulation of abatement costs as policy options. 
 
TABLE 7— SHORT-RUN PRICE ELASTICITIES BY SULPHUR ABATEMENT TECHNOLOGY  
 All power plants with FGD without FGD 
Own-price       
High sulphur coal -0.37 (0.042) -0.16 (0.055) -0.85 (0.062) 
Low sulphur coal -0.49 (0.046) -0.19 (0.068) -0.63 (0.061) 
Natural gas -0.31 (0.036) -0.79 (0.165) -0.26 (0.025) 
Cross-price       
High sulphur coal-low sulphur coal 0.22 (0.040) 0.13 (0.054) 0.29 (0.048) 
High sulphur coal-natural gas 0.16 (0.037) 0.03 (0.009) 0.56 (0.051) 
Low sulphur coal-high sulphur coal 0.17 (0.031) 0.17 (0.067) 0.06 (0.010) 
Low sulphur coal-natural gas 0.32 (0.036) 0.03 (0.009) 0.56 (0.061) 
Natural gas-high sulphur coal 0.09 (0.020) 0.42 (0.145) 0.05 (0.004) 
Natural gas-low sulphur coal 0.18 (0.019) 0.47 (0.140) 0.05 (0.005) 
Notes: I derive elasticity estimates from the coefficients of the dynamic linear logit model 
which I estimate on 576 observations at the NERC region scale. Standard errors in parentheses 
– all elasticities are statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better. I present the full 
set of coefficients used to derive these elasticities in appendix A3.5 Coefficients from Linear 
Logit Estimation. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2016a, 2016c). 
 
3.4.4 Some Extensions: Emissions Taxes, Permits, and By-Product Sales  
I note the effects of some model extensions: nonlinear cost functions, taxes, emissions 
permits, and by-product disposal or sales. A nonlinear cost function, e.g. quadratic in one 
or both inputs, weakens the result. But if a corner solution in either input occurs initially 
with a nonlinear cost function, the analysis is likely unchanged. If instead, costs are such 
that a mix of inputs is preferred and the constraint nonbinding (𝐷 ≤ ?̅?), then the emissions 
cap and relaxation through technology will not lead to a response anyway. But if the 
regulation is nonbinding, the circumstances are not particularly interesting to consider. If 
instead, the demander prefers a mix of inputs such that the cap is binding (𝐷 ≥ ?̅?), then 
installation of abatement technology still effectively relaxes it. 
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Adding a per-emissions unit tax changes the slope of the budget line – steepening it – 
and increasing the budget requirement. Consider a transformation of the budget function to 
𝐵 = 𝜏ℰℰ + 𝑃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶 where 𝜏ℰ is the per-unit emission tax. Since ℰ = 𝛿𝛼𝐷, the revised 
expenditure is 
(28) 𝐵 = (𝜏ℰ𝛿𝛼 + 𝑃𝐷)𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶 
 
If all firms were to face the same price on the dirty input, the effect of an emissions tax 
would be either no effect at all on emissions or an entire effect of all firms switching to the 
clean alternative. However, firms face different prices for inputs, e.g. transportation costs 
may differ. Realistically, firms face bundles of other fuel price determinants and 
transportation costs, and we may think of energy and polluting qualities as a function of 
distance – choice increasing with transportation distance. However, a limited set of options 
are cost-effective for each firm versus switching to a clean alternative with a different 
delivery cost. The effect of the per-unit emissions tax is that firms with dirty input prices 
close to that of the clean alternative may switch, while those with a considerable price 
advantage continue to favour the dirty input. Within an international context, these costs 
result in emissions leakage – with higher emissions taxes, more regulated firms shun the 
dirty fuel, and more is available to export to less regulated markets. 
Adding by-product sales has the opposite effect of a tax and influences the efficiency 
decision of abatement technology.74 With by-product production, the firm’s profit function 
also includes the cost of purchasing any by-product inputs, but also a potentially profitable 
price and quantity for the by-product through sales to industry and agriculture. This 
capacity may incentivise operating at higher efficiency, or installing more efficient 
technology than necessary to meet a regulatory cap. As an example, He and Lee (2014) 
find 39-per cent lower sulphur dioxide emissions at power plants following the marketing 
of products made from the by-product process. Encouraging by-product production may be 
a useful policy as it incentivises the clean consumption of dirty inputs and potentially 
induces negative leakage. 
 
74
 We might ask whether by-product sales are a common occurrence. He and Lee (2014) give an overview of this market. Keeping 
in mind that there is some alternative disposal cost, they model a full firm profit function including the by-product decision. In summary, 
it is becoming quite common and around the year 2010, the share of total gypsum sales from synthetic means surpassed that from mining 
in the United States. This was driven by gypsum derived from SO2 capture which accounted for 5 million metric tonnes of the 10 million 
metric tonnes from synthetic sources and 18 million metric tonnes in total. 
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Finally, consider tradable permits with an initial allocation.75 Scale allotments such that 
one permit, ?̅? = ℇ̅ = 𝛼?̅? (the output with a cap alone). With trade, the polluter can choose 
to purchase permits beyond their cap and require 𝐷 − ?̅? = 𝑒 and thus 𝑒(ℇ̅, 𝛿, 𝛼, 𝑃𝐷, 𝑃𝐶) 
when those with abatement technology can abate more than their cap. Then firms may 
increase abatement efficiency or attempt to acquire inputs with lower polluting potential 
and sell or buy permits if cheaper to do so. Tradable permits may then result in positive or 
negative emissions leakage, and perhaps both, due to geographic nuances. But an abatement 
system may also allow greater leeway in selling excess permits under a tradeable permit 
system. But then permit quantities must be set such that it is beneficial to abate at a higher 
efficiency. For systems operated at full efficiency, there is no remaining capacity for this.  
Of course, the U.S. and any other modern economy is not an isolated system – a closed 
economy – all are open to trade to some extent and local effects may be transmitted abroad. 
The good or bad news, depending on perspective and direction of domestic changes, is that 
changes in U.S. policy alone do not appear to influence the emission levels from coal-based 
energy producers in international trade partners. Exploring this statement is beyond the 
scope of this paper, so the argument and link to other research in this area is instead included 
in appendix A3.6 Discussion of Why Domestic Policy May Not Impact Trade Partners. In 
the following section I instead return to the state of the U.S. energy sector with a cap in 
place and consider some policy levers through which a regulator might attempt to influence 
nationally aggregated emission levels. 
3.5 Finding Policy Levers: Four Variable Abatement Costs 
For output, E, the selection of emissions cap, ℇ̅, FGD system passthrough, 𝛿, and 
polluting content of the dirty input, 𝛼, determine the effective emissions cap in units of D. 
Within an emissions permit market, the cap also becomes a matter of allotments, A, and 
permit purchases, e, as ?̅? =
ℇ(𝐴,𝑒)
𝛿𝛼
|𝐸. The output decision at a power plant – the selection 
of E – influences emissions and is well covered in the existing literature. The social planner 
can conceivably manipulate emissions and output indirectly such as by interfering in 
transmission networks – manipulate congestion (Bjørndal, Jörnsten, and Rud, 2010; Gao 
and Sheble, 2010) which is beyond the scope of this paper. Permit prices adjustments and 
the permit allocation process are other forms of variable costs which are well-researched 
 
75
 In an ideal permit market, anyway. In practice several regulatory and legally mandated changes complicated matters during the  
U.S. Sulphur dioxide tradable permit program. See a discussion of these in, for instance, Schmalensee and Stavins (2013). 
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(see for instance Boutabba, Beaumais, and Lardic, 2012 on manipulating permit prices, and 
Schmalensee and Stavins, 2013 on the allotment process). The two remaining variable costs 
of abatement, related to consuming fuel with higher sulphur content net of other costs, and 
of implementing an abatement technology with greater efficiency, are of interest here.  
I use a hedonic price model to put some scale on these potential targets of policy leverage. 
That is, if a policymaker wants to encourage investment in technology that alters abatement 
decisions, what scale of investment must they aim for? The basis of the price estimates is 
that for a power plant to consume dirtier fuel, costly operating and facility changes must 
occur. These costs may be present in the form of higher-priced equipment to process higher 
sulphur coal, but also higher operating costs which are partially passed on to source mines 
as well as end-users according to cost incidence. I first estimate through the hedonic price 
assumption the sulphur abatement costs per mmBTU passed onto mines, and then through 
calculating incidence, conjecture on the costs incurred by power plants. I then turn to the 
installation costs of FGD systems and again use a hedonic price framework to estimate the 
price of system efficiency differences at the time of installation. 
For data, I begin with the fuel purchase information used in the prior analyses and append 
5,400 power plant observations on installation and status of sulphur dioxide abatement 
equipment (EIA, 2016a), and data linking coal purchases to mines of origin for roughly 
6,900 unique power plant-mine relationships using U.S. Department of Labor, Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) data (2016a, 2016b). The depth of information on fuel 
purchases needed for this analysis is only available on 2008 and newer observations due to 
enhanced power plant reporting requirements on Form EIA-923 (EIA, 2016c). I then use 
data from the EIA on the full history of power plant installations of FGD systems in EIA 
(2016a) – over 500 installations since 1948 – to decompose system costs. As before, I 
carefully consider units of measure and perform all comparisons in terms of per-heat 
content of fuel in mmBTU’s as discussed in appendix A3.1 Data Preparation.  
In the spirit of Rosen (1974) and building on Busse and Keohane (2007) and He and Lee 
(2016), I first estimate costs related to sulphur content, α. I assume the price of fuel 
deliveries, p, are additively separable. The baseline set of coal descriptors, 𝑿, are sulphur 
and ash content in pounds per mmBTU as primary environmental concerns, heat content in 
mmBTU per ton and delivery distance as primary concerns of production, and total order 
quantity in mmBTU included to account for bulk discounts and market power. Year, Y, and 
month, M, indicators account for market trends and cyclical events. I also use a set of year 
indicator variables interacted with sulphur content as a proxy for pollution permits, and 
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power plant fixed effects, Φ, to account for differences in management and negotiating 
power, among other more consistent power plant factors. A set of interaction, I, and own-
quadratic terms, Q, account for complex trade-offs between fuel characteristics and price.76 
Coalmine state of origin indicators control for supply-side regulation, though these may 
account for much of the same variation as distance (their interpretation is not of immediate 
interest). I also take the opportunity to add an indicator for by-product production following 
He and Lee (2016), and SO2 controls (FGD system) usage following Busse and Keohane 
(2007). They argue that, with FGD system and by-product production, firms have 
committed – are locked in – to higher sulphur coal and mines are aware of these statuses 
and price discriminate. I have suggested in this paper that it is really about flexibility – 
being able to accommodate a wider selection of coal and the negotiating power this results 
in. Finally, I account for the countervailing matter of increased operating costs passed to 
mines when using higher sulphur coal with FGD systems in place using interaction term 
SO2Controls*Sulphur. I discuss this interaction as the abatement variable cost (AVC). It is 
the share of the increased operating cost that mines incur as a discount on the fuel price 
during negotiations. From abatement variable cost and incidence estimates, I then derive a 
back-of-the-envelope confidence level estimate for the scale of offset that would encourage 




 for power plant input-price elasticity of demand, 𝑝, and mine price 
elasticity of supply 𝑚. I then weight by its inverse to estimate the total abatement variable 
cost.77 I estimate the full specification as 
(29)     𝑃𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂2C𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝.𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑂2C𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡) + 𝑿𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽 +
+𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑑𝛽𝑠 + 𝛽𝑏𝑩𝒚𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝑝,𝑡 + 𝑰𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽𝑥𝑖 +𝑸𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽𝑥𝑞 + 𝒀𝛽𝑦 +𝑴𝛽𝑚 +
(𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 ∗ 𝒀




 For Distance in 100’s of miles, BTU’s in mmBTU per short ton, Quantity of order in mmBTU, and Sulphur and Ash content in 
pounds per mmBTU; interactions, I, are Distance*BTU’s, Distance*Quantity, Distance*Sulphur, Distance*Ash, BTU’s*Quantity, 
BTU’s*Sulphur, BTU’s*Ash, Quantity*Sulphur, Quantity*Ash, Sulphur*Ash; and quadratics, Q, are squared values of Distance, 
Sulphur, Ash, BTU’s and Quantity. 
77





 is the sum of power plant plus end user incidence. But is this how the power plant operator 
views it, or do they negotiate based only on what they will incur?  As power plants are an intermediary that negotiates on bo th supply 
and demand, they might instead incur share 
𝑚 𝑐
( 𝑚+ 𝑝)( 𝑝+ 𝑐)
, denoting 𝑐 as the end user price elasticity of demand. For a public, not-for-
profit oriented utility, we might expect the former estimate, and a wholly private and loosely regulated utility the latter. This extension, 
however, does not impede our ability to roughly estimate total abatement costs from that incurred by mines. 
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for fuel delivery, d, to a power plant, p, in a month, t. I then estimate a full set of comparison 
statistics in the form of a specification chart on the sulphur dioxide AVC. The goal is to 
assess the stability of the estimate to changes in functional form. The baseline form is 
(30)     𝑃𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝.𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑂2C𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑝,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡) + 𝑿𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽 +
+𝒀𝛽𝑦 +Φ𝑝 + 𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 
 
and 26 = 64 combinations drawn from (𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑑𝛽𝑠, 𝛽𝑏𝑩𝒚𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝑝,𝑡, 𝑰𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽𝑥𝑖, 
𝑸𝑑,𝑝,𝑡𝛽𝑥𝑞 , 𝑴𝛽𝑚 , (𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑑,𝑝,𝑡 ∗ 𝒀
𝑻)𝛽𝑦𝑠, {}) are appended to make the specification chart 
set. 
The full and baseline specification estimates are reported in Table 8, followed by the 
specification chart as Figure 28. Baseline and full specification estimates are average 
variable costs of -14.7 cents and -13.3 cents per mmBTU, and the mean of the 26 estimates 
in the specification chart is -14.1 cents per mmBTU. This is a roughly 6-per cent discount 
from the mean and median delivered prices of 250.5 and 230.8 cents per mmBTU and does 
not include any offsetting by-product sales. These are the mine incidence (discount) with a 
roughly doubling of coal sulphur content as FGD-enabled power plants on average use coal 
with two pounds of sulphur content per mmBTU rather than one. Estimates across all 26 
specifications are also statistically significant, though there is a great deal of variability in 
the heterogeneous energy sector. The preceding linear logit-based market elasticity 
estimate was roughly 𝑃 ≈ −0.4, and national estimates of 𝑚 can be found in the 
literature. Zimmerman (1977) and Zimmerman (1981) provide estimates of 2.03 and 3.58, 
respectively, from cost analyses approaches.  Boeters and Bollen (2012), and Knittel, 
Metaxoglou, Soderbery, and Trindade (2019) find estimates of 3.92 and 3.6 to 3.7 by 
market simulations, and EIA (2020e) reports that a value of 5.0 is used in agency market 
analyses. The estimated variable abatement cost range is then  13.3 (
0.40
2.03+0.40
)⁄ = 80.8 
cents per mmBTU to 14.7 (
0.40
5.0+0.40
)⁄ = 198.5 cents per mmBTU. These are in the ballpark 
of estimates of 146.5 to 234.5 cents per mmBTU in Srivastava and Jozewicz (2001), but 
lower than much earlier estimates in Devitt, Yerino, Ponder, and Chatlynne (1976) and 
Tilly (1983) in present value terms which may be the result of learning and innovation.78 
 
78
 Estimates in Devitt, Yerino, Ponder, and Chatlynne (1976) of 167.3 to 458.4 cents per mmBTU, and Tilly (1983) of 140.7 to 378.1 
cents per mmBTU (not CPI adjusted). In the former, the estimate is converted from annual dollars per kilowatt, and in the later from 




TABLE 8— HEDONIC MODEL OF DELIVERED COAL PRICES 
 Baseline Full 
SO2 abatement variable costa -14.71*** -13.34*** 
 (4.97) (4.48) 
SO2 abatement fixed costb 7.24 7.49* 
 (4.63) (4.39) 
Heat contentc 14.90*** 4.57 
    (1.06) (18.17) 
Total order quantityd -3.34e-06*** -2.07e-06 
   (7.74e-07) (7.55e-06) 
Sulphur contente -9.58** 25.73 
    (4.59) (23.84) 
Ash contente 2.30*** -3.15 
 (0.49) (5.04) 
Distancef 0.79 9.80 
    (0.51) (6.21) 
Distance squaredf - -0.13*** 
  - (0.04) 
By-product production capacityg - -8.88 
    - (6.66) 
Constant -106.10*** -63.61 
  (26.99) (235.50) 
Additional control variablesh     
Plant level fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year effects (2008 base) Yes Yes 
Quadratic terms No Yes 
Interaction terms No Yes 
Year*sulphur content No Yes 
Month-year (January 2008 base) No Yes 
Coal mine state of origin (22 states) No Yes 
Observations 94,559 94,559 
R-squared 0.72 0.74 
Notes: The dependent variable is the price of coal per mmBTU. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at the power plant level. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** 
Significant at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
a FGD in operation*sulphur content. b Equals one if FGD in operation. c In mmBTU/short ton. 
d In mmBTU. e In pounds/mmBTU. f In 100's of miles. g Equals one if capable of by-product 
recovery. 





FIGURE 28 SPECIFICATION CHART FOR HEDONIC MODEL OF FGD VARIABLE COSTS  
Notes: Estimates based on 26=64 combinations of dependent variables in addition to base specification in Equation (30). The 
baseline estimate is denoted with a red marker and the full specification estimate with blue. The dependent variable is the 
price of coal per mmBTU and estimates are based on 94,559 coal deliveries at 321 power plants in years 2008 to 2015, with 
standard errors clustered at the power plant level. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2016a, 2016c) and MSHA (2016a, 2016b). 
 
The second marginal abatement cost I explore is associated with a change in FGD system 
designed efficiency at the time of installation. This requires a longer planning horizon to 
utilise for geopolitical purposes. I use FGD installation prices and estimate the cost 
associated with the parameter 𝛿 = (1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓) by estimating on changes in system designed 
efficiency directly. As the dependent variable, I used power plant reported FGD installation 
prices from EIA-860 operation reports (EIA, 2016a) which are consumer price index (CPI) 
adjusted to 2016 dollars as installations occurred over the period 1948 to 2016. I again 
assume the price to be additively separable into component costs as fitting with Rosen’s 
(1974) framework. I use gas exit rate as a proxy for system capacity, installation year, 
sulphur and ash content per cent design specification, and an indicator for whether the 
system produces a by-product such as calcium carbonate. Additional controls are vectors 
to separate by FGD system type, manufacturer, and sorbent used. Finally, the coefficient 
of interest is the design efficiency of the system, Efficiency. The full specification is 
(31)    𝐹𝐺𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑖 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝑭𝑮𝑫𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝑖𝛽𝑢 +𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒓𝑖𝛽𝑣 + 𝑺𝒐𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑖𝛽𝑤 +































for FGD installation i. Some power plants have more than one installation over the period 
(as many as eight), but these are often installed several years apart. The average is two 
installations per power plant and the mode is one. The result is then that a power plant fixed 
effect is not particularly informative compared to the amount of variation discarded. 
I again build a specification chart, here on the baseline form 
(32)  𝐹𝐺𝐷𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑎𝑠𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 + 𝑖 
 
and, coincidentally, 26 = 64 combinations drawn from (𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑖, 𝛽4𝐴𝑠ℎ𝑖, 
𝛽5𝐵𝑦𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖, 𝑭𝑮𝑫𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝑖𝛽𝑢, 𝑴𝒂𝒏𝒖𝒇𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒓𝑖𝛽𝑣, 𝑺𝒐𝒓𝒃𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑖𝛽𝑤, {}) appended. Table 
9 reports baseline and full specification estimates, followed by the specification chart in 
Figure 29. I estimate $1.1 million, $1.4 million, and $1.3 million per-per cent increase in 
system efficiency from the average as the baseline, full specification, and specification 
chart mean estimates, respectively. For context, mean FGD system cost is $105.9 million 
(2016 dollars), and the median is $28.3 million – indicating positive skew in the 
distribution, and mean and median removal efficiencies are 88.0-per cent and 90.4-per cent, 
respectively, with a standard deviation of 10.8. These values suggest a substantial upfront 
investment to commit to changes in a system that remains in operation for decades. If a 
regulator’s interest is in reserving efficiency as an international policy instrument, one 
could imagine subsidising greater efficiency at installation. But then, the regulator must 





TABLE 9— HEDONIC MODEL OF FGD INSTALLATIONS AT U.S. POWER PLANTS 
 Baseline Full 
Sulphur removal efficiencya 1.10*** 1.43 
    (0.43) (0.89) 
Gas exit rateb 0.09*** 0.10*** 
    (0.01) (0.02) 
Specification of sulphurc - -2,564 
    - (5,787) 
Specification of ashc - -523.9 
    - (1,419) 
By-product productiond - 3,259 
    - (27,111) 
FGD installation year -511.90 1,927 
    (626.60) (1,305) 
Constant 932,154 -70,921 
  (1,276,006) (178,927) 
Additional control variables     
FGD type controls No Yes 
Sorbent type and FGD manufacturer No Yes 
Observations 568 400 
R-squared 0.32 0.56 
Notes: Dependent variable is the price of FGD installation in 2016 dollars. Estimates include 
installations at 294 power plants in years 1948 to 2016. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** Significant at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at 
the 10 per cent level. 
a An engineering specification. b In cubic feet per minute. c In per cent by weight. d Equals one 
if the installed equipment is capable of by-product production. 




FIGURE 29 SPECIFICATION CHART FOR HEDONIC MODEL OF FGD INSTALLATIONS  
Notes: Estimates based on 26=64 combinations of dependent variables in addition to the base specification in Equation (32). 
I denote the baseline estimate with a red marker and the full specification estimate with blue. The dependent variable is the 
price of FGD installation in 2016 dollars, and estimates are of the per-per cent FGD efficiency price change in millions of 
dollars. Estimates based on 400 to 568 installations at 294 power plants in years 1948 to 2016 based on the specific run’s 
specification. 
























Having put estimates to the highlighted energy sector abatement costs, I now conclude the 
discussion by summarising the results.  
3.6 Conclusion  
In this paper I have explore the U.S. energy sector’s transition away from being a source 
of substantial sulphur dioxide emissions partially by using abatement technologies. This 
transition was undertaken to address what was perhaps the most pressing environmental 
concern in the U.S. for a time. As several nations begin another great energy transition – 
away from fossil fuel-based energy production as we know it altogether – it seems an 
important moment to reflect on and explore in depth the mechanisms and incentives behind 
the last transition. This paper has focussed entirely on the sulphur dioxide issue from the 
input side – how changes in the sulphur content of coal and method of power plant 
consumption led to changes in resulting emissions. But it is not to be taken entirely 
retrospectively, rather to inform the policy development that lies ahead. 
To summarise the econometric results, this paper shows that sulphur demand at U.S. 
power plants differs by the abatement strategy chosen. The abatement decision is, however, 
endogenous – the result of power plant and supply characteristics. Even so, the contrast in 
sulphur demand between FGD-enabled power plants and those without is substantial. I 
show that differences in the consumption of coal sulphur content also occur within power 
plants – at the boiler infeed level which is the most refined scale both relevant and possible. 
These within-power plant differences mirror those between power plants that specialise in 
production with or without FGD systems installed. I then show that the mean sulphur 
content of coal consumed, as well as the set of mines supplying a power plant, change with 
an FGD system’s installation. The timing of FGD installation does not strictly coincide 
with national scale policy changes for a variety of power plant operational reasons. 
Regardless, it is the installation and start-up of abatement technology that allows power 
plants to consumer higher sulphur coal cleanly and thus increase demand for it. 
I then present a simplified model of U.S. energy producers and find some empirical 
support for the resulting proposition that they tend to treat high sulphur coal versus low 
sulphur coal or natural gas as perfect substitutes. During this process I find an approximate 
scale for heterogenous hidden costs or other factors impacting when power plants choose 
to switch fuels. I then show that market level differences between FGD and non-FGD 
power plants are apparent in their market demand elasticities. I ex ante expected that power 
plants with abatement technology make fuel purchase decisions based on high sulphur coal 
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prices, and those without are more responsive to the price of natural gas and low sulphur 
coal. However, I also find that power plants with FGD systems have more inelastic demand 
because they have less incentive to substantially change fuels. Finally, I identify at least 
four forms of variable abatement costs that power plants incur with FGD types of abatement 
technology, and I put estimates to the two least studied ones. These are related to changes 
in coal sulphur content and abatement system efficiency. Such estimates inform on the scale 
of intervention needed to incentivise fuel changes in support of policy objectives. 
Avenues of further exploration abound despite the breadth of the existing literature and 
this contribution. These include further consideration of the abatement adoption decision 
under risk, uncertainty, and learning. An appendix to this paper outlines why the domestic 
effects explored here are unlikely to lead to international implications – itself a growing 
field of study. Application of the domestic model to other nations and pollutants as well as 
greater integration with models of negotiation and agency must also be considered. Finally, 
any estimates of elasticities or prices – such as those in this paper – must periodically be 
updated to reflect changing market dynamics. Hopefully this analysis supports such 













4. An Approach to Measuring Inequality Growth Vectors 
I bridge the divide between theoretical and empirical studies of inequality by 
presenting a method to estimate a coefficient that is not quite the elasticity of 
marginal utility of consumption, . Calling it implied-η, I discuss how it 
compares to true measures of η, methods to estimate it, and how it reports on 
inequality in the same units as used in some theories of inequality 
preferences. I provide national long-run estimates for 135 countries based 
on four datasets. I also discuss using the volatility of implied-η over time as 
another measure of interest and derive some intra-society estimates in the 
same units as η. 
Keywords: Inequality, economic growth, distribution, the elasticity of marginal utility, 
preferences. 






Estimates of social inequality or economic growth imply a social preference. This 
preference results from bargaining between society’s members over the structure of society. 
This connection is at least true if we are to believe that representative government 
represents. Yet in the study of social preferences over inequality and several other matters, 
an entirely different, theory-based statistic is used rather than any of our many measures of 
inequality in practice. This statistic is generally the elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption, .79 In this paper I do not estimate  in the traditional sense – as a stable and 
perhaps shared social preference. Instead, I estimate the  implied by inequality trends in 
economic growth. In doing so this paper bridges the two literatures. I refer to the resulting 
estimate as implied-η.  
Implied-  informs on the net effect of economic and social policies involved in economic 
growth. It enables a determination of whether these policies lead to distributional results 
that match social preferences. But an implied-  estimate is not the same as a true measure 
of  because there are stochastic, and at least exogenous, elements impacting economic 
growth. Over long periods, however, when the highs and lows of economic growth even 
out and we estimate on the average trend, implied-  is comparable to  estimates. When 
estimating over shorter periods, such as on year-over-year growth, this new method instead 
tells us something unique, in comparison to traditional  estimates, about the structure of 
the economy. That is, if the practitioner can overcome matters of measurement error in their 
data. As will be explored, both long- and short-run estimates almost certainly have 
implications for the study of inequality, instability, and redresses to the rise of populism. 
4.1.1 A Brief Literature Review 
As an introduction, there are many ways to estimate  which is generally taken, for better 
or worse, as a constant or a stable average of society’s preferences over time. Dasgupta 
(2008), Atkinson and Brandolini (2010), and no doubt others note that  is almost certainly 
not constant across the income distribution but is taken as such for analytical tractability – 
as an average. Estimates generally, but not exclusively, fall within = [1, 2] and rarely 
deviate from = [0.5, 3]. Higher values imply a preference for a more equal society – less 
 
79
 Often defined as = −
𝑐̅(𝑡)𝑢′′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
𝑢′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
 for some clearly twice-differentiable function representing the utility of consumption. 
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tolerance for policies that increase inequality, among other interpretations, and conversely 
so.80  
Evans (2005) provides a list of revealed preference methods and estimates on 20 OECD 
countries based on Stern’s (1977) national tax data approach. It has become a benchmark 
in the literature. Groom and Maddison (2019) provide a useful comparison of the five 
revealed preference methodologies in action for the U.K. – the variety most comparable in 
principle to the method in this paper. There are several other examples of  estimates based 
on tax, demand, consumption, or other preference revealing bases, individually or through 
public choice. Among these are estimates on 17 Latin American countries in Moore, 
Boardman, and Vining (2020), six transitioning Eastern European countries in Seçilmiş and 
Akbulut (2019), and individual country estimates in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), 
Blundell (1988), Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993), Cowell and Gardiner (1999), 
Evans (2004a), Evans (2004b), Evans, Kula, and Nagase (2014), Evans, Kula, and Sezer 
(2005), Evans and Sezer (2002), Evans and Sezer (2005), Kula (1984), Kula (2004), Moore, 
Boardman, and Vining (2013), Percoco (2008), Stern (1977), and no doubt others.81 The 
reader will find implied-  estimates are generally higher than tax-based or other revealed 
preference approaches because we are measuring something different.  
As further comparisons, Layard, Mayraz, and Nickell (2008) derive estimates of  based 
on happiness surveys and arrive at a lower mean value of 1.26 across 50 countries compared 
to the mean of the preceding contributions of 1.38 across the 40 national averages. In the 
other direction, stated preference-based estimates can be substantially higher. In, for 
example, Carlsson, Daruvala, and Johansson-Stenman (2005), Johansson-Stenman, 
Carlsson, and Daruvala (2002), and Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2010) estimates approach a high 
of three. But this is not consistently so, for example Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn (1999) find 
estimates well below what Weitzman (2007) considers to be the lower bound that any 
reasonable economist would consider of = 1. However, Pirttilä and Uusitalo (2010) 
demonstrate that stated preference approaches are highly sensitive to how hypothetical 
questions are posed, in their case resulting in estimates of < 0.5 and > 3 for the same 
group depending on how the question is presented.82 
 
80
 Other uses of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption include as a representation of risk aversion (across states of the 
world), prudence (aversion to downsides), fluctuation aversion (preferences for lifetime consumption smoothing), and in practical 
matters of long-run public planning. 
81
 These estimates are available in appendix A4.1 Comparison of η and Implied-η Estimates alongside the applied-  estimates from 
this paper, where available. 
82
 These questions are generally based on Okun’s (1975) concept of a leaking bucket and one’s willingness to tolerate a loss  in the 
transfer of assets. Such a notion can certainly be presented and interpreted differently. 
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Estimating  by various methods occurs somewhat frequently when sufficient privileged 
data is available. Unfortunately, such estimates are undertaken as an entirely distinct 
endeavour from the measurement of inequality. Yet societal preferences summarised in  
result in social policies impacting inequality.83 It is not then the purpose of this paper to 
compare methods of estimating , but rather to reconcile them through an alternative that 
measures the result of competing preferences – the societal net effect of the choices that 
drive all estimates of  and the progression of inequality.  
In fact, existing methods are all fine and follow a pattern I do not exceptionally deviate 
from: In return for accepting some structure, the practitioner receives estimates of , here 
implied- , from not quite equivalent perspectives. Generally, users compare estimates 
derived from competing methods and use them, for instance, in the Ramsey Rule (Ramsey, 
1928; see also an intuitive discussion in Gollier, 2012). This use has a profound impact on 
social and, in particular, intergenerational planning. The Ramsey Rule provides an 
expression for the risk-free social rate of time preference. This is the social discount rate 
used by several nations, including the U.K., and organisations such as the International 
Panel on Climate Change. A more thorough discussion of its uses and interpretations can 
be found in Groom and Maddison (2019). Critically, an  of one versus two – both common 
estimates – has a substantial impact on public planning. This is particularly important in 
questions involving substantial periods before the returns to effort are realised, such as on 
global climate change mitigation expenditures and decisions on the handling and storage 
of fissile waste. For instance, in Tol (2010), the social cost of carbon (SCC) is sensitive to 
assumptions about the rates of risk and inequality aversion, with a higher  implying a 
preference for a substantially higher SCC. Yet current estimates of  come with significant 
limitations. 
4.1.2 Issues in the Measure of η 
One issue that hampers the use of  in social planning is that estimates are based on tax 
or demand data, happiness reports, or hypothetical surveys on a limited subset of the 
population (too often on university students in the latter case). These bases each offer a 
partial, limited picture of the economy and we do not observe the whole, net effect of 
competing preferences. It can very well be that individuals prefer a more equal society – 
 
83
 For instance, the social discount rate (SDR), sometimes known as the Ramsey rule (based on Ramsey, 1928) and the social rate 
of time preference (SRTP), is 𝑆𝐷𝑅 = 𝛿 + 𝑔𝑡  for the pure rate of time preference, 𝛿, and growth rate, g, over time horizon t. If 𝑔𝑡 > 0, 
then future generations are better off than earlier ones. In equilibrium we would then seek to discount the future more to shift benefits to 
earlier, poorer generations. For a larger  – implying greater inequality aversion – we discount the future more. 
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suggested by some stated preference estimates, but also prefer greater personal income to 
use toward finding happiness – suggested by happiness-based estimates, and also support 
a national tax policy that balances these as well as other interests, perhaps unequally, in 
determining the state’s direct impact on consumption and inequality. Another issue that 
hampers the estimation of a global picture of inequality preferences is that each existing 
estimation procedure requires some level of access to privileged data. One must, 
tautologically, have access to national tax data to estimate on national tax data as in Stern’s 
(1977) approach.  
In response to these issues, I develop a method based on publicly available economic 
growth statistics to derive the  implied by the distribution of economic progress. These 
estimates are in comparable units to the indicators of preference derived by revealed, stated 
preference, and other approaches, but do so by observing the result of the whole economic 
process. In another application of the framework, I derive measures based on the volatility 
of economic growth. So, while preferences may be stable, as my predecessors and I 
generally assume in , the preference structure I find implied by inequality trends are rarely 
stable as short-run implied-  estimates deviate from long-run ones. An implication is that 
most economic growth policies do a poor job of matching social preferences during 
economic booms and busts. 
I next outline the limited structure we must accept for the estimation strategy to yield 
meaningful results. I then estimate long-run implied- ’s for several – 135 – countries using 
four datasets. These are followed by a discussion of short-run estimation and the sensitivity 
of the approach to variation in the data. Finally, I extend the discussion to comparable-
valued estimates of changes in inequality between social groups within society. 
4.2 Methodology 
The underlying method is not particularly complex, nor the estimation strategy itself 
insightful, and I unabashedly refer them as ad hoc. In effect, an economy is “black-boxed” 
– we jump to the conclusion of the economic process and observe the sharing of the spoils 
of the aggregate economic process. These traditions of redistribution, perhaps sensitive to 
whether the economy is growing or shrinking, may reveal social preferences. In this 
section, I outline the minimum required structure, followed by the implications I use in 
relating inequality preferences to economic growth trends. I then outline an estimation 




4.2.1 Structural Assumptions 
A common statistical assumption provides much of the needed structure: incomes or 
consumption, 𝑐𝑖, are lognormal (LN) (McAlister, 1879) distributed in society in each t 
period of observation, 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)~𝐿𝑁(𝜇(𝑡), 𝜎
2(𝑡)). It is perhaps worth noting that any 
distribution can be approximated by the lognormal or any other distribution, and various 
tests beyond the purpose of this paper to discuss suggest whether the approximation is 
appropriate. A limitation of this estimation method, however, is that the population of 
interest must be sufficiently large to be described well by the LN distribution. Assuming 
LN distributed c is powerful. Analytical estimates for mean, median, and modal values of 
the distribution are 𝑐̅ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 +
1
2
𝜎2), 𝑐̃ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇), and 𝑐𝑀𝑜 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 − 𝜎2), 
respectively. Extending from Emmerling, Groom, and Wettingfeld (2017), respective 















2 ) where 
∆𝜇0,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇0 and ∆𝜎0,𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑡
2 − 𝜎0
2. While ?̃?𝑡 is driven by changes in 𝜇 – so I also refer 






2  as inequality-
driven growth and by 𝑔𝜎2.   
From the lognormal analytical values, it follows that ?̅?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑜 when ?̅?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 = 0. 
The implication is that no inequality-driven growth occurs if the economy is structured to 
maximise median growth, 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ?̃?𝑡, resulting from a distribution-independent wealth-
generating process.84 I also note that a vector in (12𝜎
2, 𝜇) space that maximises mean growth, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ?̅?𝑡, maximises the rate of ascent through 𝑐̅ level sets.
85 The vector orthogonal to 𝑐̅ 
from any initial (12𝜎0





2  (see Note 7). There can also be vectors in this space based on 
preferences over distribution during degrowth. ∆𝜇0,𝑡 = 0 follows from median degrowth 
minimization, and I assume the preference for wealth preservation similarly mirrors wealth 
creation. Importantly, I do not suppose that we actually choose 𝜎2 and 𝜇 as a society, but 
rather these are salient proxies for society’s choice of institutional structures responsible 




 For instance, growth may be driven by total, or per-worker savings as generally assumed in aggregate growth models. It may also 
occur stochastically. The growth process itself is outside the scope of this paper just as many models of economic growth instead ignore 
distribution. 
85
 Or through level sets of a preference-preserving transformation such as 𝑙𝑛(𝑐)̅. We might also use (𝜎2, 𝜇), and in either case derive 
comparable estimates from consumption data as (𝑙𝑛(𝑐)̅ − 𝑙𝑛(𝑐̃), 𝑙𝑛(?̃?)). 
171 
 
Note 7 – The Optimal Growth Path in (
𝟏
𝟐
𝝈𝟐, 𝝁) Space 






≥ 0) from the perspective of annual 
national statistics, we treat it more accurately as a continuous process. The unconstrainted (over 



































((?̅? − ?̃?), ?̃?) space with form ?̇? = ?̅? −
1
2
?̇?2. Choose the distribution of ?̇? and 
1
2
?̇?2 to maximize 
growth in ?̅? which is the transition through ?̅? level sets. From the right triangle altitude theorem, 






 for length of a level set, c, and its altitude, f, in (
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4.2.2 Deriving Critical Points 
Values of  take on special significance relating to mean and median growth, at least in 
a certain class of utility functions. In particular, = 2 implies a median maximising growth 
preference, and = 1 a preference for consumption potential or mean maximising growth. 
I derive these implications structurally using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
representative utility form (Atkinson, 1970) which is usually defined, as in Dasgupta 
(2008), as  
(33) 𝑢(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) = {
𝑐𝑖(𝑡)
1− (1 − )−1, 𝑖𝑓 > 0, ≠ 1
ln(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) ,      𝑖𝑓 = 1
} 
 
and a discounting-free, more than one-period welfare maximisation objective such as 
(34) 𝑚𝑎𝑥
 







2(𝑡)). A more comprehensive model is presented in the next 
chapter, Mean-Spirited Growth, that includes discounting, a fully specified objective, and 
additional constraints. The primary outcome does not change, but rather results in growth 
pathways centred on the vectors I describe here. I assert that the specific controls by which 
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we distribute the result of our distribution-independent growth process are not important at 
present and so I do not state them in the objective. As will be seen, the implied-  estimates 
that result can exceed the bounds of > 0 required in Equation (33). This occurs as 
economies may distribute the returns to economic growth in ways that do not match any 
rational CRRA-based preference. 
From the CRRA utility form, = 1 implies proportional changes in 𝑐𝑖 are of equal utility 
value across the distribution as also noted by Dasgupta (2008) (Note 8). It follows that 
mean growth maximisation – plan the economy to grow mean consumption potential – 
maximises welfare growth. As additional evidence on the relationship between = 1 and 
mean growth maximisation, we might observe that ln(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) is a monotonic transformation 
of 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) and so represent the same ordinal preference. 
 
Note 8 – Proportional Changes are of Equal Utility Value when 𝜼 = 𝟏 
Dispensing with t in the discounting-free model, let a proportional change be 𝑐1 = 𝑎𝑐0. When =
1, ∆𝑢1−0 = ln(𝑐1) − ln(𝑐0) = ln(𝑎𝑐0) − ln(𝑐0) = ln(𝑎) + ln(𝑐0) − ln(𝑐0) = ln(𝑎). 
 
= 2 instead implies that percentage changes are of equal utility – that same percentage 
increases and decreases in consumption are of equal value (Note 9). Such a society then 
prefers to maximise the mean of growth rates, which Euclid shows would be the geometric 
mean across the economy in such an application. Critically, under the LN assumption the 
geometric mean is equal to the median, implying a preference for maximising median 
growth. Supporting the = 2 connection, Buchholz and Schumacher (2010) note that 
when agents in society emphasise their relative position – their distributional status – that 
= 2 is implied as meeting a no-envy condition (in the relative sense). They define this as 
a preference where no generation of an ith person envies another generation because their 
distributional status is consistent. I note this is equally applicable to any ith and jth persons 
in a consumption distribution and is most consistent with a median growth objective (also 





Note 9 – Percentage Changes are of Equal Utility Value when 𝜼 = 𝟐 
A necessary but not sufficient proof for the connection between median growth emphasis and =





















− 1. Then for = 2 as well 
as other values ≠ 1, %∆𝑢1−0 =
𝑐0
𝑐1






− 1.  
The sufficient proof for why = 2 should be singled out then follows from Buchholz and 
Schumacher’s (2010) no-envy condition specification. To show this and that the no-envy condition 
is not dependent on intertemporal framing, first suppose that the welfare objective is over two 








 if > 0, ≠ 1, subject to the constraint 𝑐𝑖 +𝑚𝑐𝑗 = 𝑦. The 
constraint reports the distribution of the returns from production where 0 < 𝑚 < 1 is a production 
and transfer efficiency parameter. Applying the Lagrangian method with shadow price 𝜆, interior 
solutions – which are necessary for the two-person society to exist – satisfy 𝑐𝑖
− − 𝜆 = 0, 𝑐𝑗
− −













comparison, Buchholz and Schumacher (2010) define no-envy in the relative sense as that person i 

























 which are equal to the optimal distributions 𝑐𝑖
∗, 𝑐𝑗
∗ when = 2. Buchholz and Schumacher 
provide a similar defence of = 1 when absolute changes, such as mean growth, matter. 
 
For values off critical points = 1, 2, as  increases above = 2, losses are increasingly 
considered worse than symmetric consumption gains around the median, and conversely 
so as preferences decrease below 2. I also suppose that = 0, which is outside the values 
generally defined for CRRA utility because it does not imply a concave preference over 
consumption, implies that making anyone better off through mean consumption growth is 
valued equally, even if people in the rightmost tail receive all the gains. I now present an 
estimation strategy based on these observations. 
4.2.3 Estimation Strategy 









2 = 0 ⟺ ?̅?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 when 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)~𝐿𝑁(𝜇(𝑡), 𝜎
2(𝑡)). I then conjecture that 
preferences are revealed (Samuelson, 1938, 1948) by growth policies such that ⟺ replaces 
⇒ at the start of each logical chain. To use these logical chains in the measurement of , 
suppose 𝑓(𝑎) approximates  for any real value 𝑎 and satisfies the two critical point 
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distributional conditions of = 𝑓(?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎,  ?̅?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 = 0) = 2 and = 𝑓(?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎,  ?̅?𝑡 −
?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎) = 1. Also observe that growth and degrowth preferences are a reflection about the 
negative diagonal in (
1
2
𝜎2, 𝜇) space. This diagonal necessarily reports stagnant growth and 
so bisects the space into growth and degrowth half-spaces.  
I use the expanded arctangent argument ATAN2 (Organick, 1966) to write a relation that 
satisfies these conditions and transitions smoothly and continuously through and around 
= 1, 2 to estimate implied-  as: 
(35)  ≈ arctan (?̅?, ?̃?) { 
4
𝜋
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2(?̅?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡, ?̃?𝑡)             𝑖𝑓 ?̅?𝑡 ≥ 0
4
𝜋
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2( −?̃?𝑡, −(?̅?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡)) 𝑖𝑓 ?̅?𝑡 < 0
 
 
where I preserve the sign in the negative growth scenario as the off-the-shelf ATAN2 
function uses it to determine which quadrant the user has in mind.86 This method of 
estimation also results in = 𝑓(?̃?𝑡 = 0,  ?̅?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎) = 0 and performs as expected on 
= [−1, 3] during both economic growth and contractions. Such a range encompasses the 
η values expected in preference-based, economy-wide estimates which are generally in =
[1, 2], as well as implied preferences for extreme poverty increasing and decreasing 
redistributions. From the LN assumption, estimates outside of = [1, 3] are likely long run 
socially unsustainable anyway. Values of < 1 imply modal degrowth – robbing from the 
poor to benefit the rich, while values of > 3 imply mean degrowth – reducing total future 
consumption potential in society. Interestingly, Buchholz and Schumacher (2010) also 
bound reasonable estimates from above by = 3 and below by = 1 based on 
“circumstance solidarity.” This concept seems fitting based on the implications derived 
here – any economy based on satisfying the preferences of much of the population must 
fall within the bounds of neither robbing from the poor nor future generations. 
To summarise the estimation strategy, I recognise the decomposition of national growth 
– using mean and median values or sufficient distributional data – as a vector normalised 
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  𝑖𝑓 𝑥 = 0 & 𝑦 < 0
undefined  if 𝑥 = 0 & 𝑦 = 0







, respectively. Without an increase in intuition, we can clearly also write the argument directly in terms of growth 




2  in the arctangent argument. 
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to the origin in (𝑔𝜎2, 𝑔𝜇) space. The approximation of  is the angle of that growth vector. 
More precisely, I express the angle of the vector in  units and assume distributional 
preferences consistently imply inequality preferences. Figure 30 depicts the transformation 
of growth direction without consideration of its magnitude into implied-  values during 
both growth and degrowth by using the polar coordinate system.  
 
FIGURE 30. IMPLIED-  VALUES (ANGLES) ON THE MEAN GROWTH VECTOR CIRCLE 
Notes: Angles in  units as the implied-  measure are derived from estimates of ?̃? and ?̅? − 𝑔. The relative growth rates of these estimates 
during growth and degrowth – the distribution of the aggregate returns to economic growth – implies social preference over inequality. 
Values outside of = [1, 3] are likely long-run socially unsustainable: Values < 1 imply modal degrowth – robbing from the poor to 





4.2.4 Theoretical Sensitivity to Measurement Error 
Suppose Equation (35) is written as a vector-valued function, 𝑓, and let         
𝐷 = 2?̃?2 + ?̅?2 − 2?̅??̃?. When ?̅? ≠ ?̃?, the resulting Jacobian matrix is87 
(36) 𝑱𝑓(?̅?, ?̃?)= [
   ?̅? −?̃?











 are otherwise zero when ?̅? = ?̃? ≠ 0 and undefined when ?̅? = ?̃? = 0. The 
resulting vector Laplacian for nonzero and defined values is 
(37) ∆𝑓 = [
?̃?(?̅? − ?̃?) − ?̅?(2?̃? − ?̅?)






The Laplacian is particularly useful in this application as growth vectors – based on 
averages of growth measures over time – are themselves averages and so subsequent 
estimates of  are average based. A Laplacian informs on how much a measure will diverge 
from the average change over time. It is immediate from comparing 
2
𝐷2
 to the values within 
the vector component of the Laplacian that measurement error is greater for small growth 
values, particularly those summing to less than two-per cent. So, the growth vector 
approach appears limited in its ability to measure well the  implied by small levels of 
growth unless they are measured very well. However, the relationship noted in ∆𝑓 suggests 
more nuance is in order. Setting ∆𝑓 = 0 reveals by the quadratic formula that divergence 
from the mean approaches zero at ?̃?∗ = −
1−√5
2
?̅? and similarly for degrowth. This relates 






 after simplifying and rationalising. Subsequently, this results in a 
growth vector implying ≈ 1.30. However, the benefit is that the general impact of 
measurement errors is predictable. For long run estimates that are typically greater than 
1.30, we should expect short-run estimates of mean and median growth to underestimate  
in response to measurement error.88 Conversely, for long run estimates of  less than 1.30, 











 If we believe that, for a given ?̅?, a value ?̃? > ?̃?
∗
 will underestimate . These are in a relation associated with  estimates larger 
than 1.30, and conversely for greater values of ?̃?. 
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estimates will tend to underestimate preferences in an economy for either extreme mean- 
or median-emphasising growth policies. 
4.2.5 Methodological Discussion 
The increasing availability of national mean and median income and consumption 
estimates allows the estimation of implied-  for nations where other estimates of  are not 
available. This is because the alternatives rely on more privileged data – some access to the 
economic system of interest. The assumptions we must accept to do this are at least 
comparable in abstractness to existing revealed-preference approaches. And while we may 
question the accuracy of estimates other than when = 1, 2 as they are mechanically 
derived, I note that most existing country-level estimates fall within = [1,2]. 
Implied-  estimates should be considered with caution, however. For one, there is likely 
measurement error in national statistics, particularly estimates based on small survey sizes 
or limited market access. If the expectation of such errors is zero, however, then there is no 
effect on long-run estimates. But as shown in the preceding section, short-run estimates – 
where realisations of measurement error are unlikely to be zero – are concerning. Second, 
economic growth, and therefore implied-  estimates, include the impact of exogenous 
factors. If we believe the expectation of the influence of exogenous shocks on economic 
growth is also zero, we can again be unconcerned with long-run estimates on growth trends. 
However, short-run estimates contain potentially informative volatility effects as such 
volatility includes information too. If we suppose actual preferences embodied in  are 
stable, a desirable quality of an economic system is that economic distributions also report 
a stable implied- . Unfortunately, the practitioner cannot easily distinguish between 
measurement error and volatility effects. While it is also desirable to have accurate 
estimates, the two matters are of different scales of importance – one is a matter of 
measurement while the other impacts welfare. So, while we might estimate implied-  in 
the short-run and discuss volatility, measurement error in national statistics means that such 
estimates must be considered cautiously. 
We might also explore what is being measured in comparison to other methods. Implied-
 provides the summary, net effect of policies and institutions – including social norms and 
historical power-sharing processes – on the distribution of economic gains in society. Often 
the estimates to follow are higher than from, say, the tax policy-based approach in, for 
example, Evans (2005). Policy-based estimates only account for part of the picture and 
often imply a preference for a more unequal distribution supporting mean growth. 
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Meanwhile, stated preference estimates sometimes suggest that individuals prefer a more 
equal distribution. Somewhere in between such estimates, the divergent preferences driving 
various policies in society reconcile and result in the economic distributions from the 
aggregate economic process that we observe.89  
4.3 Empirical Applications 
I estimate long-run implied-  values using four country-level datasets. I do so by OLS 
where data is sufficient, and two-point (starting versus end period) comparisons otherwise. 
I then estimate short-run implied-  values on a subset of the data for further discussion. If 
distribution mechanisms are entirely resilient to growth volatility, we should expect short- 
and long-run estimates to be the same as implied-  estimates. I then attempt to quantify 
implied-  short-run instability in an appropriate statistic. Finally, I extend the framework 
to estimate intra-society implied- ’s between social groups where one has historically held 
economic and political power.  
I use data based on the Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS), and World Inequality 
Database (WID) to demonstrate different long run estimation methods in the main body. In 
the appendix, I report additional long run estimates using datasets from the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which has substantial overlap with 
Eurostat data, and from the World Bank. The LIS provides comparable OECD country-
level data based on representative household surveys. The WID dataset includes percentile 
incomes for a more diverse subset of countries collected in several studies with a shared 
methodology. For the LIS data, I assume a lognormal relationship describes each country-
year observation, and then mean and median estimates are derived. In the WID data, for 
each country-year I test whether a lognormal distribution, and alternatively a gamma 
distribution, are sufficiently descriptive of the percentile data available. I then derive 
median and mean estimates. The estimation procedure for implied-  uses a comparison of 
two years in both short-run and long-run cases. Then when sufficient long-run data is 
available – when growth estimates are statistically significant at standard levels, I also 
estimate implied-  by OLS. 
While  is typically defined over consumption changes, I remain vague about whether to 
use income or consumption data. I use both measures as well as different measurement 
scales – individuals versus household levels in various forms – in the following 
 
89
 The impact of  on economic growth policy is explored further in Mean-Spirited Growth. 
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applications. I think this is a matter best left to practitioners as each sort of data implies 
something a bit different about society. The form of data should be case specific and 
carefully chosen based on their interests. Even noting that using consumption data is 
technically the correct basis, interpreting what, exactly, consumption entails and how we 
should measure it is up for debate, e.g. what do we include in consumption? The four 
datasets I use have slightly different bases and this likely influences some estimates. Some 
include various private and state transfers which likely benefit some income and 
consumption groups more than others. So too, estimates on a household versus per-capita 
basis should differ if household size is systematically different along the consumption scale. 
I do not neglect that different income and consumption measures have different policy 
applications. Rather, I use the data in the bases it is available in (minimally adjusting for 
inflation) and the reader can decide which is appropriate for their purpose.  
4.3.1 Long-Run Estimates of Implied-η 
I first use Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser’s (2016) LIS-based data which is adjusted to 
measures of equivalized disposable household income. This measure of purchasing power 
parity on a U.S. dollar basis, (PPP($)), is of adjusted incomes including all household 
inflows – earnings, capital-based income, and private and state transfers less taxes. The 
result is then divided by the number of “equivalent” adults to arrive at comparable figures. 
I report LIS-based estimates in Table 10. Due to less frequent sampling, often seven or 
eight years of data are available per country and regression-based estimates unobtainable 
with confidence. For those where both OLS and two point-based estimates can be derived, 
the results are generally similar. Countries with a reputation for more equal distribution 
generally have higher eta values than the United States which has a reputation for 
emphasizing economic growth rather than notions of equitability. The single estimate with 
negative mean growth across the period, Hungary, has a substantially lower implied-  
estimate which suggests the poor experienced more of the degrowth burden compared to 
wealthier citizens from the harsh financial crises that occurred in the period. The mean of 
the 25 implied-  estimates (by two-point method) is 1.78 versus mean estimates of 1.35 
and 1.42 from Evans’ (2005) list of 20 OECD countries. The higher estimate suggests a 
preference for higher levels of expenditure on the poor, public goods, and programmes 
benefitting future generations, e.g. enforcing a higher social cost of carbon and more 




TABLE 10—GROWTH RATE AND LONG-RUN IMPLIED-  ESTIMATES, LIS DATA 
 Period a Two-point 
 
OLS 
   ?̅? b  ?̅? b  c 
Australia 1981-2010 (8) 1.79 1.70     1.38** 1.77 
Austria 1994, 2004 0.87 2.11 - - 
Belgium 1985, 2000 3.10 1.53 - - 
Canada 1981-2010 (10) 1.02 1.66 0.90 1.59 
Czech Republic 1992, 2010 3.98 1.89 - - 
Denmark 1987-2010 (7) 1.13 1.77 1.15 1.86 
Estonia 2000, 2010 6.94 2.19 - - 
Finland 1987-2010 (7) 2.03 1.72 1.75 1.74 
France 1978-2010 (7) 0.90 2.11     0.79** 2.12 
Germany 1984-2010 (7) 0.69 1.78     0.56** 1.64 
Greece 1995, 2010 2.16 2.08 - - 
Hungary 1991, 2012 -0.25 0.26 - - 
Ireland 1987-2010 (8) 4.18 2.11 3.45 2.11 
Israel 1986-2010 (7) 2.24 1.78 1.67 1.80 
Italy 1986-2010 (11) 0.90 2.01     0.63** - 
Luxembourg 1985-2010 (8) 4.19 1.94 2.63 1.92 
Netherlands 1993, 2010 1.77 1.77 - - 
Norway 1979-2010 (8) 3.58 1.96 2.28 - 
Poland 1992, 2010 2.08 1.80 - - 
Slovak Republic 1992, 2010 3.06 1.84 - - 
Slovenia 1997, 2010 2.22 1.99 - - 
Spain 1980-2010 (8) 2.13 2.04 2.15 - 
Sweden 1981-2005 (6) 2.62 1.86 2.04 1.84 
United Kingdom 1979-2010 (9) 2.86 1.68 2.41 1.80 
United States 1979-2013 (10) 0.70 0.97 0.77 1.33 
Notes: Estimates based on the annual rate of long-run growth in PPP-adjusted equivalised 
disposable household income. All OLS estimates reported are statistically significant at the 
1-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors (White, 1980) unless otherwise 
noted to improve readability (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per 
cent. c Statistical significance of OLS-based implied-  estimates is the least from the two 
estimated values used in its composition. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which 
is derived from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. 
 
Table 11 reports WID data-based estimates. These estimates are on percentile, pre-tax 
national income at the distribution percentile threshold. The income includes pensions and 
all other sources of transfer and is at the individual, rather than household level of the 
population over 20 years of age. These estimates are CPI-adjusted but left in the local 
currency. The estimation procedure is to first fit a LN, alternatively a Gamma (Γ) 
distribution to the percentile data. I then use a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(Massey, 1951) to check whether the fitted distribution represents the data well. The 
analytical values of these distributions are the basis for estimating implied- .90 While the 
estimation methodology relies on an LN distributional assumption, I substitute Γ-based 
estimates whenever the Γ distribution fits the data and the LN does not. Γ-based estimation 
generally, but not exclusively, results in higher estimates. Since the WID data sometimes 
covers substantially longer periods, e.g. France from 1900-2014, I also report estimates 
 
90
 Though implied-  estimates need not be based on fitted analytical values. One can also estimate directly on the data’s mean and 
median values and currently I see no definitive advantage to either approach. 
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over important national historical periods. Estimating on subperiods also allows the 
derivation of some implied-  estimates for the USSR/Russian Federation which is 
otherwise too inconsistent across the entire 1961 through 2015 period to derive statistically 
significant, OLS-based estimates (see Note 10). 
 
TABLE 11—GROWTH RATE AND LONG-RUN  ESTIMATES, WID DATA 
 Period a Lognormal Gamma 
  ?̅? b 
 
 ?̅? b 
 
 
Brazil c 2001-2015 (15)     1.24** - 1.25 2.16 
China d 1978-2015 (38) 5.63 1.63 5.36 1.83 
     Transition 1978-1999 (22) 4.65 1.62 4.45 1.81 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 9.29 1.78 8.69 1.92 
Côte d'Ivoire e 1988-2014 (6)    -1.48** -0.36 -1.84 - 
Egypt f 1999-2015 (6) 1.45 2.17 1.30 2.19 
France g 1900-2014 (83/102) 2.21 2.27 2.43 2.10 
     LIS comparison 1978-2010 (26/33) 
 
2.43 0.41 1.13 1.04 
     Pre-WWII 1900-1939 (20/27) - 2.83  0.68   2.49* 
     Post-war 1946-1969 (22/24) 4.52 - 4.58 - 
     Transition 1970-1999 (25/30) -  2.87 1.40 - 
     Present 2000-2014 (11/15) 2.47 -0.12 - - 
India h 1951-2013 (54/63) 1.84 - 2.05   1.89* 
     Postcolonial 1951-1964 (12/14) 2.06 2.34 2.31 - 
     Transition 1965-1999 (32/35) 1.86 1.92 1.86 - 
     Present 2000-2013 (10/14) 3.74 1.68 4.42 0.59 
Palestine f 1996-2011 (10)   -1.33*  -0.28**  -1.26*  -0.23** 
Russia i 1961-2015 (25/36) - - - - 
     USSR 1961-1989 (3/10) - - 2.38 2.06 
     Transition 1990-1999 (6/10) - - -5.38    - 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 2.89 2.53 4.09 2.18 
Turkey f 1994-2016 (16) 2.19 - 2.06     2.28** 
United States j 1962-2014 (51) 1.47 1.50 1.42 1.74 
     LIS comparison 1979-2013 (35) 
 
1.44   1.68** 1.56 1.75 
     Transition 1962-1980 (17) 1.62 - 1.50 - 
     Reaganomics 1981-1992 (12) 2.53 0.60 1.77 1.44 
     Present 1993-2014 (22) 0.81 - 1.28 1.90 
Notes: Estimates based on growth and distribution of pre-tax income among individuals age 20 and over. 
Distributions fit to annual percentile income thresholds by maximum likelihood estimation. All OLS 
estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard 
errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). Statistical significance of implied-
 estimates is the least from the two estimated values used in its composition. 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data in c Morgan (2017); d Piketty, Yang, and Zucman (2017); e 
Czajka (2017); f Alvaredo, Assouad, and Piketty (2018); g Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty (2018); 
h Chancel and Piketty (2017); i Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman (2018); j Piketty, Saez, and Zucman 




Note 10 – Estimates for the Russian Federation/USSR by the Two-Point Method 
We can also derive estimates for the Russian Federation/USSR by the two-point method as a matter 
of general interest. The economic collapse during the transition period resulted in increases in 
inequality – the poor experienced (much) greater losses. The negative values estimated suggest a 
national experience that does not fit any rational CRRA utility-based preference. 
 Period 𝑔  
Overall 1961-2015   1.78  1.87 
USSR 1961-1989   3.57  2.35 
Transition 1990-1999 -4.69 -0.39 
Present 2000-2015   4.34  2.39 
Notes: Mean growth rates and implied-  values for 
the Russian Federation/USSR over important 
historical periods. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from 
Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman (2018) available 
from World Inequality Database (WID), WID.world. 
 
 
I report additional long-run estimates based on OECD and World Bank data – both 
income and consumption-based in the latter – in appendix A4.2 Long-Run Estimates of 
Implied-η Based on OECD and World Bank Data. These estimates are sometimes on 
substantially shorter periods and show greater variability across the diverse sets of countries 
involved. The mean of the estimates are 1.89, 1.73, and 1.70 for the OECD, World Bank 
income, and World Bank consumption data, respectively. These, like the means of the LIS 
and WID-based estimates, suggest a general social preference for greater public goods 
expenditure and environmental protection than preceding revealed preference estimates 
have suggested. I now produce some short-run estimates which perhaps have greater 
implications for the study of social unrest. 
4.3.2 Short-Run Estimates – Measuring Economic Volatility 
Long-run estimates imply social preferences embodied in . Or more accurately the mean 
value of  implied by the national economic process. Short-run estimates, however, include 
both measurement error – noted as a substantial concern in the methodology section – and 
the effect of economic “booms” and “busts” on distribution. We can often estimate implied-
 annually, and if we believe our data of sufficient quality, find a summary statistic on 
distributional volatility. Short-run estimates do not imply annually changing social 
preferences because exogenously driven volatility influences distribution. But what we do 
measure is the impact of exogenous pressures on economic growth – whether economic 
distributions are relatively stable or add to inequality by benefitting income groups 
differently during shocks, booms, and busts. Suppose preferences are stable, or at least 
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slowly changing. A stable implied-  is preferable and a volatile one supports beliefs of 
economic injustice which may increase susceptibility to nationalistic and other self-
preservation rhetoric. To explore this concept, I first compare short-run implied-  estimates 
to the tax-based, equal sacrifice approach estimates in Evans (2005) which use a panel of 
OECD countries in 2002. I then propose some measures to quantify implied-  volatility. 
Evans (2005) uses Stern’s (1977) equal sacrifice approach which relies on data from 
income tax schedules, the CRRA utility functional form explicitly for structure, and 
“equality of taxation” traceable to Mills (1848) for legitimisation.91 If we assume that tax 
structure is a result of political discourse, generally stable, and representative of social 
preferences over the tax component of distribution – perhaps a fair assumption in the OECD 
– then Evans provides a useful comparison. The LIS-based data I use – chosen for quality 
and consistency – is not annual, but instead available at varying intervals. I choose the 
shortest available intervals that include the year 2002 and estimate implied- . Presented in 
Table 12, I often arrive at divergent estimates from Evans as well as the preceding long-
run implied-  estimates. This may suggest instability in the distribution of the returns to 
economic activity. Instability implies that something akin to “booms” and “busts” also 
occur in the economic distribution. 
 
TABLE 12—COMPARING EVANS (2005) AND LIS-BASED SHORT-RUN IMPLIED-  ESTIMATES 
 Period a ?̅? b  from Evans (2005) c Long-run  d Short-run  
Australia 2001, 2003 0.93 1.67 1.77 1.21 
Austria 2000, 2004 2.29 1.74 2.11 1.46 
Belgium 1997, 2000 5.51 1.33 1.53 0.88 
Canada 2000, 2004 1.67 1.28 1.59 2.01 
Czech Republic 2002, 2004 4.66 1.29 1.89 1.83 
France 2000, 2005 0.61 1.37 2.12 2.36 
Germany 2000, 2004 0.42 1.36 1.64 -0.05 
Hungary 1999, 2005 3.80 1.36 0.26 1.95 
Ireland 2000, 2004 4.22 1.24 2.11 1.66 
Italy 2000, 2004 1.33 1.37 2.01 1.32 
Norway 2000, 2004 2.78 1.32 1.96 1.55 
Poland 1999, 2004 0.33 1.48 1.80 -0.61 
Slovak Republic 1996, 2004 1.19 1.52 1.84 1.39 
Spain 2000, 2004 -1.49 1.18 2.04 1.26 
United Kingdom 1999, 2004 4.12 1.24 1.80 1.87 
United States 2000, 2004 0.28 1.30 1.33 1.67 
Notes: Comparison of Evans’ (2005) equal sacrifice approached-based  estimates to long-run and short-run 
implied-  estimates based on growth in PPP-adjusted equivalised disposable household income. 
a Start and end years for the two-point, or slope formula-based estimates. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 
c Average of Evans’ “high” and “low” estimates. d Best available estimates from Table 10. 
Sources: Author calculations based on Evans (2005), and Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which is derived 




 The result is an estimation strategy that takes advantage of differences between marginal and average tax rates. Equality of taxation 
is related to the concept of equality of sacrifice – that no one is more or less inconvenienced than others. 
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I next report in Table 13 three estimates of implied-  volatility based on the LIS dataset 
which has some overlap with the countries in Table 12. These volatility measures are based 
on the span of the LIS-based data available. The measures I compare are the spread as 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 of implied-  estimates in the period, the coefficient of variation (CV) quotient, 
𝐶𝑉𝜂
𝐶𝑉?̅?
 which is the normal CV of implied-  over the normal CV of mean growth, and the 
variance of implied-  estimates, 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) (see Note 11 for its derivation). The period of 
these estimates only includes limited data following the 2008 financial crisis where the 
extent of distributional resistant to economic volatility would be further tested.  
 
Note 11 – Deriving 𝑽𝒂𝒓(𝜼) in the Polar Coordinates Space 
As estimates of  are based on converting growth vectors into a polar coordinates-type space, 




convert  estimates into radians. Then note cos =
𝑥
𝑟
 and sin =
𝑦
𝑟
 for angle  in an (𝑥, 𝑦) space 
with a hypotenuse (or circle with radius) r. Assume that the distribution of the returns to growth are 
independent of the scale of growth and then conveniently set 𝑟 = 1. So, cos (
𝜋
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) = ?̃?. Use these values for each observation to find their averages and subsequently the 












)𝑁𝑖=1 ). Then 
compute the variance in the standard way, here as 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) =
1
𝑁




Lower 𝑀𝑎𝑥 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 spread and 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) values are associated with countries that have 




, however, are less consistent – countries can have high values of 𝐶𝑉  obscured by 
high values of 𝐶𝑉?̅?, or one measure can be higher without consistency. In comparison to 
implied-  estimates which are independent of growth magnitude, the CV quotient 
confounds any estimate by reintroducing magnitude. Perhaps a more useful statistic will be 
developed in future research. But from the statistics I derive, 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) for the Nordic 
countries versus other estimates is perhaps indicative of the statistic’s value. We might 
then, for instance, more efficiently counter international extremist recruiting or 
environmental degradation by directing international efforts and funding to strengthening 




TABLE 13—IMPLIED-  VOLATILITY ESTIMATES BASED ON A SUBSAMPLE OF LIS DATA 
 Period a 𝑀𝑎𝑥 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑉 /𝐶𝑉?̅? 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) 
b  
Australia 1981-2010 (8) 2.87 1.13 1.47  
Canada 1981-2010 (10) 3.36 0.84 1.50  
Denmark 1987-2010 (7) 1.93 0.65 0.66  
Finland 1987-2010 (7) 2.35 0.45 0.80  
France 1978-2010 (7) 3.35 0.38 1.50  
Ireland 1987-2010 (8) 2.35 0.36 0.68  
Israel 1986-2010 (7) 2.64 0.86 0.97  
Italy 1986-2010 (11) 3.57 0.29 1.56  
Luxembourg 1985-2010 (8) 2.38 0.71 1.16  
Norway 1979-2010 (8) 2.20 0.52 0.47  
Spain 1980-2010 (8) 2.61 0.43 1.25  
Sweden 1981-2005 (6) 2.16 0.40 0.77  
United Kingdom 1979-2010 (9) 2.78 0.39 0.87  
United States 1979-2013 (10) 2.73 0.83 0.96  
Notes: Estimates based on the annual rate of long-run growth in PPP-adjusted equivalised disposable household 
income. Max-Min reports the spread in implied-  estimates over the period, 
𝐶𝑉 /𝐶𝑉?̅? the normal coefficient of variation of implied-  to that of mean growth, and 𝑉𝑎𝑟( ) the variance of 
implied-  estimates. 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Uses the mean of the angle for the sample mean calculated 












)𝑁𝑖=1 ), for the 𝑖 = 1: 𝑁 implied-  estimates of a country. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which is derived from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. 
 
Having outlined a process to use the implied-  estimation methodology to explore short-
run volatility, it seems entirely appropriate to consider how accurate estimates may be. The 
empirical section already cautioned that some estimates taken over small changes in 
economic growth will be particularly prone to the impact of measurement error. These are 
in economies with limited economic growth which are also reporting long-run estimates 
toward the extremes of  plausibility. One source of error can be the basis used for deriving 
estimates of ?̅? and ?̃? as it is entirely possible that the estimates derived by fitting a LN or Γ 
distribution will differ from nonparametric estimates. This is generally more of a concern 
for the estimation of ?̃? in the presence of substantial income inequality which results in 
more income flows to those represented in the rightmost tail of a distribution. Because of 
this issue, I next explore the impact of the basis for ?̅? and ?̃? estimates. 
4.3.3 Exploring the Impact of the Parametric Assumption 
It is the intention of this method of estimation that practitioners use high quality and 
preferably readily available national statistics to estimate implied- . The use of the LN 
distribution in this paper allows us to arrive at a convenient method for estimating . But 
as in most of the preceding  estimates, the intention is not to imply that the lognormal 
distribution must be fit to national datasets. To so assert such a requirement would 
substantially constrain the framework’s applicability to those with access to privileged data 
and a small subset of countries where distributional data is publicly available. However, in 
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the methodology section, the sensitivity of results to measurement error suggests that, 
particularly for small levels of growth, deviations in ?̅? and ?̃? can bias results. This is found 
to be truer for estimates that move away from a growth vector implying an  of 1.29. 
One source of deviation is how we measure ?̅? and ?̃?. The theory relies on the LN 
assumption, while in practice it is expected that nonparametric values will normally be 
used. As one of several other alternatives, a gamma distribution is also possible as used in 
parts of Table 11. To compare the sensitivity of estimates to such assumptions, I again use 
the WID distributional data and estimate  from the nonparametric mean and median values 
as well as based on values from fitting the lognormal and gamma distributions. To minimise 
confounding errors from short-run volatility, I estimate based on the long-run WID data 
and do not divide it into national subperiods of geopolitical interest. However, for many 
periods – particularly when growth is substantial – the difference in resulting  values in 
subperiods is often similar to the differences found in the summary period-based estimates.  
The comparison  estimates and their differences are reported in Table 14. We can 
observe that difference between LN, Γ, and nonparametric-based estimates of  are fairly 
trivial. In many cases, the difference in resulting  is small – less than 10-per cent. There 
are, however, exceptions. Countries with higher existing income inequality based on the 
Gini coefficient such as Côte d'Ivoire and the United States have a higher divergence 
between parametric and nonparametric estimates. This is fitting with a scenario where LN 
and Γ distributions do not fit well around the median value due to more substantial wealth 
flows to households in the rightmost tail of the income distribution. However, analysing 
the LN, Γ, and nonparametric estimates themselves is also informative. We might, for 
example, observe that the difference between the LN and nonparametric-based estimates 
for the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire are the largest in the sample. However, comparing the LN 
and nonparametric estimates suggests a similar policy – that the powers in control of the 
economy prefer an unequal distribution. This is also the case for the United States which 
had the second largest deviation in estimates – between the Γ and nonparametric estimates. 
In this case, all three  estimates point to a similar conclusion – that the economy is 




TABLE 14—THE IMPACT OF THE LOGNORMAL PARAMETRIC ASSUMPTION 
 Estimate basis Differences 
 LN Γ Non LN − Γ 
 
LN − Non Γ − Non 
Brazil a - 2.16 2.44 - - -0.28 
China b 1.63 1.83 1.79 -0.20 -0.16  0.04 
Côte d'Ivoire c -0.36   - 0.21 - -0.57 - 
Egypt d 2.17 2.19 2.36 -0.02 -0.19 -0.17 
France e 2.27 2.10 2.13  0.17  0.14 -0.03 
India f - 1.89 1.79 - -    0.10 
Palestine d -0.28 -0.23 -0.39 -0.05   0.11  0.16 
USSR g - 2.06 2.23 - - -0.17 
Russia - present g 2.53 2.18 2.20  0.35  0.33 -0.02 
Turkey d - 2.28 2.37 - - -0.09 
United States h 1.50 1.74 1.35 -0.24  0.15  0.39 
Notes: Comparison of  estimates based on Lognormal (LN), Gamma (Γ), and Nonparametric 
(Non) bases. Based on growth and distribution of pre-tax income among individuals aged 20 and 
over. Data includes the summary periods in the WID dataset where distributional data is available 
to avoid confounding short-run volatility issues. The exception is the USSR and present Russian 
Federation data where each trend is individually stable but in comparison different. Distributions 
fit to annual percentile income thresholds by maximum likelihood estimation. Only OLS estimates 
that are statistically significant at the 10-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors 
are used in the analysis. Statistical significance of implied-  estimates is the least from the two 
estimated values used in its composition. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data in a Morgan (2017); b Piketty, Yang, and Zucman 
(2017); c Czajka (2017); d Alvaredo, Assouad, and Piketty (2018); e Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and 
Piketty (2018); f Chancel and Piketty (2017); g Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman (2018); h Piketty, 
Saez, and Zucman (2016), available from World Inequality Database (WID), WID.world. 
 
Before concluding the empirical section, I turn to presenting an intra-society measure 
equivalent to implied-  estimates. In societies with clearly defined subgroups and a history 
of income inequality, an implied-  estimate is perhaps informative on how inequality 
between and within groups is changing over time. This suggests inequality preferences 
within those groups given the constraints of society as well as the preferences of society in 
general. 
4.3.4 An Extension into Intra-Society Measures of Implied Inequality 
Without the benefit of comparable supporting structure, I devise -scaled estimates to 
describe between-group dynamics. That is, I compare the economic result implied between, 
say, gender and racial groups in society driven by historical social structures. This synthetic 
 estimate suggests whether the net effect of a policy is to increase ( > 2), maintain ( =
2), or decrease ( < 2) equality between groups. These estimates are on less firm 
theoretical ground as no distributional assumption seems appropriate, nor does the vector 
associated with = 1 have relevance. Instead, I rely on the vector implying = 2 is of 
equality of growth between the social group of interest which experiences economic growth 
rate 𝑔𝑖, and a dominant baseline group which experiences economic growth rate 𝑔≠𝑖. For 
estimates to make sense, the historically socially dominant group’s statistic must be 𝑔≠𝑖 
and I estimate deviations from it. The growth values resulting in = 0 does gain an 
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interesting interpretation – the structure of the economy is such that it caters only to the 
dominant group.92 This structure is equivalent in the prior framework to an economy 
designed only to benefit the wealthy in the right-tail. The between-group synthetic-  
estimate can be derived as 
(38)  ≈ 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠(𝑔≠𝑖 , 𝑔𝑖) { 
4
𝜋
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2(𝑔≠𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖, 𝑔𝑖)             𝑖𝑓 𝑔≠𝑖 ≥ 0
4
𝜋
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2( −𝑔𝑖, −(𝑔≠𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖)) 𝑖𝑓 ?̅?𝑡 < 0
 
 
where values of 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑔≠𝑖 must be specified at comparable points in their respective 
distributions – say both are either mean or median growth values – for the estimates to 
make intuitive sense. 
Table 15 provides estimates based on U.S. Census Bureau mean and median household 
and personal income data from 1967-2017. The overall, implied-  estimate on the data is 
near unity over the 51 years – close to the preceding LIS-based estimate and the general 
belief that the U.S. economic system is organised to maximise long-run mean (roughly 
gross domestic product per-capita) economic growth. Within-group estimates use median 
and mean growth within each population subgroup and are comparable in interpretation to 
prior estimates. Between-group estimates instead compare the growth vector of, say, 
households that identify as Black versus White non-Hispanic households. To compare 
vectors between genders, I instead use personal income estimates. White non-Hispanic 
households, and male where applicable, are taken as the baseline group because U.S. 
national-scale policymakers – the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. 
government – remain overwhelmingly White non-Hispanic and Male.93 Race and gender-




 We might also want to consider subtracting 1 or 2 from the estimate if we want to recenter it on values of 1 or 0 instead of on an 
 equivalent scale. But then we sacrifice the interpretation of  = 0. 
93
 In 1967, 2.6-per cent of the U.S. Congress was non-Hispanic White, and 2-per cent female. In 2017, these shares have grown to 
20.0-per cent and 19.5-per cent, respectively out of 535 national representatives (The Brookings Institute, 2019). 
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TABLE 15—LONG-RUN  BETWEEN GROUP ESTIMATES, U.S. CENSUS DATA 
 Within-group 
(median to mean) 
versus White, non-Hispanic 
 
at medians at means 
Overall (51) 0.90 - - 
Black (46) 1.40 2.28 2.04 
Asian (30) 1.47 2.24 1.93 
Hispanic (46) 1.08 1.80 1.81 
  versus Male 
Female (51) 1.97 2.35 2.23 
Male (51) 1.49 - - 
Notes: Comparable-scale estimates of  values within and between major racial 
and gender groups in the United States, 1967-2017. All underlying growth 
estimates are derived by OLS and statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or 
better using Huber–White standard errors on the number of observations noted in 
parentheses. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from the United States Census Bureau 
(2018, 2019). 
 
Table 15 suggests that inequality is increasing overall and within each ethnic group, but 
at a faster rate for White non-Hispanic and Hispanic groups. At median points of 
comparison, inequality is decreasing between both Black and Asian households and their 
White non-Hispanic counterparts, but inequality is increasing for Hispanic households. 
Black and non-Hispanic White convergence around median values is also found in, for 
instance, Couch and Daly (2004), Jones, Schmitt, and Wilson (2018), Sakano (2002), and 
Smith (1978). Inequality is also slightly decreasing – or at least stable – between Black and 
non-Hispanic White households at mean values. Within-gender estimates suggest nearly 
stable inequality between women, but growing inequality for men. Between-gender 
estimates suggest decreasing inequality for women versus men. These sort of estimates 
without a strong theoretical basis should be taken with caution. However, the general 
implication – decreasing relative economic status of roughly median income white 
American males is hardly surprising as it is a frequent complaint of that group (Anderson, 
2016; Kimmel, 2013). 
4.3.5 Empirical Discussion 
This research presents a simple method to estimate something comparable to the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption – the  value as a measure of inequality 
preferences, based on publicly available economic growth data. Estimating on such data 
allows the generation of comparable estimates for countries where data availability is 
insufficient to estimate  using revealed and stated preference methodologies. Implied-  
estimates are akin to measures of the net effect in society as they include preferences over 
tax and other institutional structures – traditionally used separately to measure  – and other 
social preferences over the distribution of the returns to economic growth. The long-run 
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estimates are robust to mean-zero errors in the measurement of economic statistics but 
require sufficient time-series data to ensure this occurs. Short-run estimates are susceptible 
to measurement error but also include inseparable, desirable information on the volatility 
of implied- . This volatility in economic growth returns may be another source of social 
unrest even when the long-run trends of economic growth and inequality trends are 
desirable. I also extend beyond the bounds of the theory developed and provide a method 
to estimate comparable-scaled values for inequality growth between different groups in a 
population. These compare growth trends at, say, the median value of two groups, and 
suggest whether the median consumers of each group are converging in consumption 
potential. These estimates should be considered with caution. However, the results fit with 
the general picture of rising non-Hispanic White male discontent with their changing social 
position, at least in the United States.  
Of particular theoretical interest is the result that implied-  estimates are very often 
higher than those estimated by other revealed preference approaches. The mean of 
estimates on the 20 OECD countries in Evans (2005) are 1.35 and 1.42 (two estimation 
methods), on the 17 Latin American countries in Moore, Boardman, and Vining (2020) is 
1.33, on the six transitioning Eastern European countries in Seçilmiş and Akbulut (2019) 
are 1.52 and 1.19 in 2000 and 2015, respectively, and the mean of 20 mostly separate 
estimates on the U.K. alone is 1.58.94 In comparison, the mean of implied-  estimates based 
on LIS, WID, OECD, World Bank income, and World Bank consumption data are 1.78, 
1.58, 1.89, 1.73, and 1.70, respectively.95 Additionally, the implied-  outlier estimates are 
generally much larger or smaller than in the revealed preference approach sets. Such higher 
estimates have implications in, for example, setting the social cost of carbon (SCC) and 
expenditures on environmental protection and public goods (suggesting all should be 
higher).  
I do not find the disparity between implied-  and traditional  estimates damning, but 
rather encouraging. There has been a simmering debate in the literature on this matter – 
descriptive as simmering as it has reached a point of intractability. Repeated estimates in 
the range of = [1, 1.5] have resulted in some experts such as Stern (2007) recommending 
these sorts of values be used in policy development, with a preference toward unity. As a 
 
94
 Mean of U.K. estimates is based on estimates in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), Blundell (1988), Blundell, Pashardes, and 
Weber (1993), Cowell and Gardiner (1999), Evans (2004a), Evans (2005), Evans and Sezer (2002), Evans and Sezer (2005), Evans, 
Kula, and Sezer, (2005), Groom and Maddison (2019), and Stern (1977). 
 
95
 Based on the two-point formula estimates for the LIS-based, OECD, and World Bank estimates; and the best available full period 
estimates (LN when available, alternatively Г based) from the WID data. 
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result, such values have been integrated into government calculations affecting a variety of 
planning. Yet, Weitzman (2007) suggests that = 1 is the absolute lowest value that a 
reasonable economist would consider and is certainly not an average. Buchholz and 
Schumacher (2010), too, put = 1 as the lowest bounds of societal economic solidarity 
and values of  are likely higher. The most substantial and methodical rebuke, however, 
comes from Dasgupta (2008) who suggests that true values of  are almost certainly higher 
– in the range of = [1.5, 3] or even higher, as lower values imply “absurdly high” societal 
savings ratios and other behaviour. The natural reply to such criticisms has been to observe 
that rigorous revealed preference estimates suggest low values of . Here instead mean 
implied-  estimates are in line with Dasgupta’s expectations. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
One of the net effects of competing social preferences is the distribution of the returns 
from economic growth. I estimate these social preferences as the summary statistic implied-
. Inequality in the distribution of the returns to economic growth has been a matter of 
substantial debate going back to at least Veblen (1899). More recently, Atkinson (1970) set 
in motion the debate on how to measure inequality preferences well. I avoid much of the 
debate altogether by measuring the theoretical indicator for inequality preferences directly 
from economic growth trends, rather than advocating for some more indirect indicator. The 
inequality growth vector approach to estimating implied-  is admittedly ad hoc. But it is 
also simple to execute, relies on generally publicly available data, is applicable to a variety 
of circumstances, and I think the process is fairly intuitive. It also sets a difficult policy 
challenge – the design of economies aligned with social preferences during both economic 
booms and busts, not just on the average. At a minimum, I present a measure of inequality 
that bridges the theory and practice of studying inequality which allows new international 




5. Mean-Spirited Growth 
We contribute to the Solow-Swan strain of economic growth literature by 
integrating national distributional aspects into a dynamic model of economic 
growth. We show that country specific optimal growth policies balance 
distributional “preferences” against savings propensities of different 
percentiles of the emerging income distribution. We then present 
international comparisons of growth decomposition into distributional 
statistics and propose new measures of economic performance. Historical 
economic performance reveals heterogeneous patterns of inequality 
increasing (e.g. US, UK, Germany, China) and decreasing (e.g. Ireland, 
France, Netherlands, Vietnam) economic growth around the world. These 
comparisons reveal the implicit efficiency-equity trade-offs in each country’s 
set of national economic growth and social policies.* 
Keywords: Inequality, economic growth, distribution, the elasticity of marginal utility, 
preferences. 
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Over the last 80 years, per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth has become the 
go-to measure of economic “success” at the national level. As a result, National Accounts 
dutifully report this measure of economic performance, we compare countries on this basis, 
and allocate development assistance by this measure. Whether evaluating countries within 
the purview of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), or New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
initiatives, one finds per-capita GDP growth an important metric of success. It serves as 
such explicitly but also signals to non-governmental organisations where to direct limited 
resources. Sufficient growth to nudge a country from developing, to in-transition, to 
developed-economy status may result in the loss of substantial aid. 
Per-capita GDP growth, 𝐺?̇?, however, is increasingly viewed as a poor measure of growth 
in wellbeing. For one, Rawl’s (1971) conception – institutions, and concept – the outcome 
of justice, suggest different places have different distributive institutions and hence 
outcomes. Critically, for non-symmetric distributions – as income and consumption tend to 
be – mean, median and modal measures of centre differ. 𝐺?̇? is, roughly, a measure of change 
in the mean of the income distribution and does not report on changes in the median and 
mode of a non-symmetric distribution. It provides no information about the distribution nor 
does any representative agent sort of conception based on it or any other single datapoint. 
It is even possible that measures of 𝐺?̇? can be positive without a change in consumption for 
much of the population – statistical prosperity without real correspondence. The possibility 
of a disconnect between growth statistics and shared prosperity has, naturally, resulted in 
increasing calls to move beyond 𝐺?̇? (e.g., Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi, 2010). 
Growth theory has, however, focussed on the mean because it is indispensable – it makes 
complex questions about society and welfare tractable. In terms of growth and wellbeing, 
it is then generally assumed that improvements for the representative, generally mean agent 
imply improvements for the population it represents. In national statistics, this has always 
been proxied for by per-capita mean income. Within the realm of theoretical exploration 
where this assumption is explicit, or the limitations imposed by it so well known that it is 
practically explicit, the limited representativeness of 𝐺?̇? is clear. However, the practice of 
placing great importance on 𝐺?̇? when its representative agent origin is not explicit, for 
instance in national accounts and development policy, has led to discontent with and debate 
about the usefulness of 𝐺?̇?.  
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Because the representative agent assumption is explicit, rising inequality does not 
contradict the Solow-Swan factor decomposition strain of growth literature (Solow, 1956) 
as this literature does not say anything at all about the matter. In effect though, the 
representative agent is too simple – it represents a uniform population.96 One is tempted to 
appeal to the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criteria to suggest the representative agent 
method is sufficient. For instance, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) suggest their form of 
factor decomposition is descriptive of “international variation in the standard of living.” 
Yet the non-normal, non-symmetric nature of income implies it is only descriptive of 
variation in the mean agent’s standard of living and not that of the other 𝑁 − 1 members 
of a potentially diverse, N size population. Another way to view this matter is that the factor 
decomposition strain of economic growth makes no claim about the ownership of factors 
of production, yet policy based on it presumably assumes a desirable dispersal of returns.  
The distributional dimension means that a level of 𝐺?̇? can be achieved in different ways. 
The lognormal distribution is particularly useful in visualising this. It has tractable 
analytical properties and generally fits income and consumption data well. It is well known 
that the mean, median, and mode of it take forms 𝑐̅ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 +
1
2
𝜎2), 𝑐̃ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇), and 
𝑐𝑀𝑜 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 − 𝜎2). Extending from Emmerling, Groom, and Wettingfeld (2017), the 




















2  where ∆𝜇0,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇0 and ∆𝜎0,𝑡
2 = 𝜎𝑡
2 − 𝜎0
2. Here, we observe it is possible that 
increases in 𝜎2 can drive growth in mean income, increasing inequality. But inequality-
driven growth also implies that for many workers – those earning and consuming around 
the mode – the economic outlook worsens. The most common, modal, experience would 
then conflict with national statistics that indicate “economic growth.”97 Next, an empirical 




 Alternately, it can be represented by a degenerate distribution (all have the same value). 
97
 The mean-modal spread also exceeds the mean-median gap sometimes proposed as a measure of inequality suggesting the latter 
is insufficient in capturing the issue. 
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5.2 An Empirical Exploration 
The factor decomposition literature suggests that levels of 𝐺?̇? can be achieved in different 
ways – combinations of capital, labour, productivity, etc. Using the lognormal assumption, 
levels of 𝐺?̇? can also be achieved through combinations of growth in μ and σ2 which indicate 
how distribution is structured in an economy. As with factors of production, policies and 
institutions can facilitate growth in either one or both distributional dimensions. Growth in 
μ and σ2 highlight the trade-off between growth in the median and the right tail of the 
distribution, respectively, for overall per-capita growth. We perform growth distributional 
decomposition on some internationally comparable datasets containing mean and median 
income data which suggest how different distributional policies impact growth. 
We utilise Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), World Bank, and World Inequality Database (WID) datasets to 
derive growth paths that countries have taken. The LIS and OECD provide comparable 
estimates based on extensive, representative household surveys. The World Bank dataset –
also survey-based – includes data on income and consumption for a more diverse set of 
countries. The WID data instead includes percentile incomes across the distribution for a 
few countries using a shared methodology. For each country, we assume a lognormal 
distribution relationship, and then decompose the median to estimate μ followed by the 
mean to estimate residual σ2. Figure 31 presents the LIS and OECD data decomposition 
into the share of economic growth contributable to median (μ-driven) and inequality (σ2-
driven) growth. We can observe that despite using similar household-scale measures, the 
OECD data generally suggests less unequal growth. More importantly, differences within 
each dataset are apparent. Nations with similar mean growth rates achieve it by different 
distributional processes. Notable inequality-increasing outliers are the United States, 
Germany, and Canada over the last 30 to 40 years. In contrast, Ireland, France, the 
Netherlands, and Hungary experienced growth in combination with reductions in 
inequality.98 Of course, growth and distributional statistics cannot identify all sources of 
unrest – discontent over immigration and essential commodity and fuel prices (in Hungary, 










FIGURE 31. LIS AND OECD DATA ANNUAL GROWTH RATE DECOMPOSITION 
Notes: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) estimates (black dot markers) based on PPP-adjusted equivalised 
disposable household income from surveys conducted between 1979 and 2013. OECD estimates (red diamond 
markers) based on CPI-adjusted household income in national currencies from surveys conducted between 1975 
and 2017. OLS estimates of annual growth rates in μ, 𝜎2, and mean growth for countries listed in Table 32 of 
appendix A5.1 Data Tables Supporting Figure 31 and Figure 32. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from OECD (2019), and Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which 
is derived from the LIS Database. 
 
Within the preceding LIS and OECD datasets, all countries experienced 𝐺?̇? on average 
along various distributional trajectories. Decomposition of the World Bank dataset in 
Figure 32 provides a more varied picture as it describes nations with more varied 
institutions, endowments, and states of development. We might qualitatively make some 
observations. Along the rightmost edge of the data mass signifying greater inequality-
driven growth, we find the United States, Germany, Bangladesh, urban India, and South 
Africa. These countries are known for increasing concern over inequality, but generally 
stable political regimes over the period. On the other extreme edge signifying decreasing 
inequality-driven growth, we find Mexico and several Central and South American 
countries. These are known for stronger communal traditions but also political instability 
over the period. We might suggest that while distribution is but one factor in economic 
“success”, too unequal growth in either direction leads to social disquiet. We observe that, 
at least mechanically, there is an equity-efficiency trade-off that occurs. We can also 
observe that negative growth is not experienced equally as in the case of Croatia – that 






FIGURE 32. WORLD BANK DATA ANNUAL GROWTH RATE DECOMPOSITION 
Notes: World Bank income-based survey data (black dot markers) and consumption-based data (red diamond 
markers). OLS estimates of annual growth rates in μ, 𝜎2, and mean growth for countries listed in Table 33 of 
appendix A5.1 Data Tables Supporting Figure 31 and Figure 32. Estimates based on PPP-adjusted household per-
capita income and consumption expenditures. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from World Bank (2019). 
 
National policies are not necessarily designed to share the returns to production in any 
socially preferred way. It is difficult to make the case that socially destructive levels of 
inequality are actually in the public’s interest. However, when national policies do embody 
“preferences”, different trajectories in μ and σ2 also result. Observed growth paths embody 
the political costs of growth, distribution and historical ownership of policy. Rich histories 
have, perhaps, led to traditions of sharing the returns to economic growth in each country 
that we would generally lump together as “preferences.” Growth in μ versus σ2 is one salient 
result. However, how does an economy move from preferences over sharing to embarking 
on a growth path? A review of the literature on growth, distribution, and measuring 




5.3 Literature Review 
An entire academic industry discusses inequality and growth and produces supplemental 
statistics to 𝐺?̇?. These generally do not acknowledge the representative agent source of the 
issue but do tend to explore the non-symmetric distributional departure of measures of 
centre. Often this is by jumping to conclusions on the matter – lamenting inequality and 
developing statistics without the nuance of what preferences are in a society.  
One introductory statistic for inequality is the spread between per-capita (mean) income 
and the median, with 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 < 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 indicating inequality (Barro 2000). Measuring the 
spread of means and medians is important where inequality is concerned because an 
economic policy that focusses on one or the other – the mean versus median debate, still 
neglects the distributional issue.99 Yet the spread, or growth in the spread, is merely 
descriptive and ignores notions of fairness, institutional constraints, or other “social 
preferences” over distribution.  
Another popular distributional measure is the Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912; Dalton, 1920) 
in the form summed over the Lorenz curve (Lorenz, 1905). Despite its popularity, Atkinson 
(1970) discusses why it is insufficient for the task. Among the criticisms, it too neglects 
preferences, and we append that it only provides a static snapshot. In the context of 
economic growth, a dynamic measure is more relevant. 
Another approach has been to consider the distributional implications of economic 
growth, sometimes quite formally, without arriving at a statistic. The implication is that 
either more or less inequality is beneficial, not that a certain amount of inequality is 
preferred. Early endeavours of this variety include Kuznets (1955, 1973), Stiglitz (1969), 
Solow (1974), and Leontief (1983). Among other conclusions, they suggest an important 
role of different savings rates along the income distribution. However, by not taking the 
inequality problem “beyond the drawing board”, we did not inherit a functional statistic 
from these endeavours. 
Advancements in the study of growth and inequality have also progressed alongside 
general methodological improvements. Van der Ploeg (1983) provides an optimal control 
approach and fascinating implementation of a predator-prey model to employment and 
growth. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) offer a game-theoretic, political economy model 
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 Note, however, the median has an important distributional quality that is robust to increases in the tail. 
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of appropriation among interest groups. However, as with their predecessors, these 
remained academic rather than practical endeavours.  
Others have instead focused on poverty reduction resulting in more actionable poverty 
indices. The most introductory of these is a measure of the share of the population living 
below some poverty line – the headcount ratio. The poverty gap index, Watts index (Watts, 
1964; Zheng, 1993), Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index (Sen, 1976; Shorrocks, 1995), and Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke indices (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) all improve on the 
headcount notion by incorporating the intensity of poverty. Other measures such as the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) take a more general perspective on wellbeing as 
advocated for by Sen (1999). The MPI – for better or worse – summarises progress across 
the Human Development Index through a subjective weighting scheme to arrive at a 
measure of welfare (UNDP, 2010; Alkire and Jahan, 2018). One cannot seriously argue 
that mass poverty is ever socially optimal, and these indices share the merit of focussing 
the discussion on the most severe of distributional shortcomings. This study in no way 
seeks to supplant such measures. However, what about cases where the issue is not extreme, 
pervasive poverty, but rather general discontent with the distribution of growth? 
Interest in differences in inequality and growth have resulted in several empirical 
explorations in recent decades. International comparisons have been particularly 
fashionable such as by Barro (1991, 2000). These generally link economic growth to 
measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient to arrive at some conclusion on whether 
inequality supports or hinders growth. See overviews in, for example, Shin (2012), Cingano 
(2014), and Grigoli and Robles (2017). This body of research has been less informative in 
total, however, as some find inequality positively, and others negatively, related to 
economic growth. 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), like others, find that income inequality is harmful to 
growth. However, they attempt a plausible, non-savings-based explanation linking income 
inequality to policies that do not protect property rights and thus do not protect the private 
returns to investment. Halter, Oechslin, and Zweimüller (2014) add a time dimension – 
inequality increases economic growth in the short run but reduces it in the long term, 
perhaps linked to Persson and Tabellini’s institutional argument. Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003) instead suggest a more complicated relationship – that changes in inequality in either 
direction reduce growth. Then in a manner not unlike the argument that higher earners save 
more, Jones (2019) suggests a model where those with the highest incomes drive 
innovation. Finally, Jorgenson (2018) reiterates the many arguments to date that we should 
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measure welfare rather than income because it captures notions of inequality, poverty, and 
distribution that income cannot. 
Yellen (2016), Chetty et al. (2017), and Fried, Novan, and Peterman (2018) have also 
weighed in on the enduring challenge of inequality and economic policy. These have 
generally lamented the state of inequality rather than chart a path forward. Perhaps this is 
because attempts to simplify the distributional discussion have not always been well-
received (Piketty 2015). The level of criticism levelled at incorporating, or even discussing 
inequality and economic growth are striking given the discussed explicit limitations of the 
factor decomposition growth literature.  
After reviewing the wealth of work, lack of consensus, and intensity of criticism, one 
may want to just jump to the punchline as in Stiglitz (2016) and prescribe a broad, generally 
common sense, but expensive set of remedies. Perhaps a more practical approach begins 
with an observation that factors at both the top and bottom of the income distribution impact 
economic growth. As such, no single statistic captures whether economic growth benefits 
a society (Voitchovsky, 2005, 2009). Instead, practitioners should seek to complement 𝐺?̇? 
with appropriate context on distribution and preferences in a policy-relevant manner. 
Our goal is to arrive at a useful complementary statistic to 𝐺?̇?. We begin by building on 
the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model, which fuses the Ramsey rule for how much a 
society should save, with modern growth theory (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 
1963). We also note recent empirical work on the relationship between inequality and 
savings that supports the premise that the wealthy save a larger share of income. U.S. tax 
data covering a century puts firm numbers in support of the belief that there are differences 
in savings rates (Saez and Zucman, 2016). As a general matter of allocating scarce personal 
resources, we expect the trade-off between current consumption and savings to hold beyond 
the U.S. Closely related, research using a global poll of over 1.7 million people suggests 
there is some relatively consistent income satiation point where savings rates go from zero 




 The global average satiation point is $60,000 to $95,000/year depending on estimation method. The satiation point appears to 
differ both geographically and demographically. 
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5.4 Incorporating Consumption Distribution into Growth Theory 
We have made claims on how modern growth theory and indicator statistics fall short of 
policy need. We now put foundations from the literature to work by, in effect, making a 
single change to the Solow-Swan paradigm. While a more sophisticated approach to 
studying economic growth and inequality than using a representative agent is needed, it 
should transparently integrate economic distribution yet result in clear, concise policy 
recommendations. We build on recent advancements in Emmerling, Groom, and 
Wettingfeld (2017) and incorporate a representative distribution, rather than a 
representative agent, into an efficient capital market assumption. The resulting model 
suggests how growth contributes to mean and all other consumption points through 
competing influences. 
We assume the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility form (Atkinson, 1970) 
which has particularly desirable analytical properties, and the lognormal form (McAlister, 
1879) of representative consumption (income minus savings) distribution (Arrow et al. 
2014; Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009; Battistin, Blundell, and Lewbel 2009).101 We 












where we abstract from uncertainty, note that 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)~𝐿𝑁(𝜇(𝑡), 𝜎
2(𝑡)), and that for any 
agent, i: 
(40)  𝑢(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) = {
𝑐𝑖(𝑡)
1− (1 − )−1, 𝑖𝑓 > 0, ≠ 1
ln(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) ,      𝑖𝑓 = 1
}  
 
which incorporates the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, . That is, rather than 
concerning ourselves with the welfare function of a representative agent, we use the 
objective as in Emmerling, Groom, and Wettingfeld (2017) as the welfare over the 
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 Limitations to the representative consumer approach beyond what have already been discussed can be found in Caselli and 
Ventura (2000). 
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𝑑𝑐(𝑡)for 𝑡 = (0, … , 𝑇). 
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 We have abstracted from population growth in this application which is traditionally included in the RCK model. 
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distribution as a whole while incorporating preferences over distribution represented in . 
We then want to choose the “institutional structure” to maximise our objective which is 
subject to  and the initial distribution. However, it is impossible to write a satisfactory 
function for something as ambiguous and far-reaching as the institutional structures of 
society that distributes the returns from production. Instead, we proxy for it by jumping to 
the structure's convenient distributional representations - values of μ and σ2. 
The objective is subject to a system of differential equations describing developments in 
capital and consumption possibilities (see Note 12 for their derivation): 
(41) ?̇?(𝑡) = [∫ 𝑠(𝑐𝑖(𝑡))𝑑𝑐(𝑡)
𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥
0
] − 𝛿𝑘(𝑡), 
(42) 𝑐̅̇(𝑡) = −
𝑢′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
𝑐̅(𝑡)𝑢′′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
𝑐̅(𝑡)(𝑓′(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝛿 − 𝜌), 
 
where 𝑘(0) > 0, the production function 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) is of simple Cobb-Douglas form, and the 
savings rate can be dependent on position in the distribution.104  
 
Note 12 – Deriving the Mean Consumption State Equation 
Derivation of the RCK state equations is well known. Equation (41) is a natural extension of the 
Solow-Swan and RCK model capital accumulation equations. Equation (42) is derived based on a 
present value Hamiltonian of equations (39) and (41): For tractability, choose the generally well 
known value 𝑐̅(𝑡) and define ℋ𝑝𝑣 = 𝑒
−𝜌𝑡𝑢(𝑐̅(𝑡)) + 𝜆(𝑡)?̇?(𝑡) with costate variable 𝜆(𝑡) and use the 
simpler capital accumulation form ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝑐̅(𝑡) − 𝛿𝑘(𝑡). As an optimal control problem, 
the first-order necessary conditions for a maximum are 
𝜕ℋ
𝜕𝑐̅
= 0 and 
𝜕ℋ
𝜕𝑘




𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑢′(𝑐̅(𝑡)) − 𝜆(𝑡) = 0 and 
𝜕ℋ
𝜕𝑘
= 𝜆(𝑡)(𝑓′(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝛿) = −?̇?(𝑡). Then, to find how the state 


























 and rearranging the result as ?̇?(𝑡) = −
𝑢′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
𝑢′′(𝑐̅(𝑡))













 The per-capita Cobb-Douglas production function adopted is of form 𝑓(𝑘(𝑡)) = 𝐴𝑘(𝑡)𝛼 with total factor productivity multiplier 
𝐴, and output elasticity of capital 𝛼. In practice it is fitted to initial period economic parameters. 
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Equation (42) is a modified Keynes-Ramsey Rule (Ramsey, 1928) which we can restate 
as 𝑐̅̇(𝑡) =
𝑐̅(𝑡)
(𝑓′(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝛿 − 𝜌) where the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption at the mean is = −
𝑐̅(𝑡)𝑢′′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
𝑢′(𝑐̅(𝑡))
. The implication is that we weight changes 
in consumption by an assumed common social preference containing the inverse marginal 
utility of consumption. This links the literature on inequality preferences to growth and can 
be contrasted against Negishi (1960). A convenient distributional assumption also links 
savings and growth as we specify the savings function to include the recent literature on 
unequal savings rates and satiation points as 
(43) 𝑠(𝑐𝑖(𝑡), 𝑏) = {
0,               𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) < 𝑏 
𝜓(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)), 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖(𝑡) ≥ 𝑏
} 
 
where b is some point of satiation – an ancillary condition on utility signifying whether 
necessary consumption is satisfied in each period before the agent saves for later 
consumption (e.g. continued consumption in retirement). We derive 𝑏 from observations 
in Saez and Zucman (2016) and Jebb, Tay, Diener, and Oishi (2018) which can be either 
relative to the distribution or absolute. The embedded function 𝜓(∙) conceptually satisfies 
𝜓′(∙) > 0 and at least initially 𝜓′′(∙) > 0, but in practice requires less sophistication to get 
the expected results. In appendix A5.2 Implications of Some Alternative Model , we explore 
different interpretations – the implications of choosing a uniform savings rate as well as of 
setting b as absolute rather than relative. A dystopian, or revolt constraint can also be 
specified – for instance that median consumption in any period cannot be lower than the 
initial poverty level. The rational is that if much of the population is pushed into abject 
poverty, one may expect a collapse of the sort of institutions that make economic activity 
predictable and modellable. 
The operation and design of the model is purposefully simple. An “economy” arrives at 
an efficient outcome by balancing the influence of the concavity of the distribution-
weighted utility function from consumption for all agents, against savings-driven growth 
supported by the upper tail.105 The state equations 𝑐̅̇(𝑡), ?̇?(𝑡), and the impact of  are in 
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turn dependent on the distribution through savings and initial distributional conditions 𝜇(0) 
and 𝜎2(0) > 0.106 
5.5 A Simulation 
In the model, “social preference” over income distribution has a pervasive influence on 
distribution and growth. Some have made ethical arguments why there might be a social 
preference at all, while others just assume that such preferences exist (Stern, 2007; 
Dasgupta, 2008; Tol, 2010). An alternative is to suppose that institutions supporting a set 
of economic growth paths are constrained by popular mandate. A distribution process then 
emerges that appears as if society has preferences over the degree of inequality. We can, at 
a minimum, interpret  as a summary parameter of complex institutional arrangements that 
underpin distribution in society – it implies an  as in the preceding paper.  
The appropriate value of the social preference indicator  is a matter of ongoing debate 
and methodological development. See, for example, Evans (2005), and Groom and 
Maddison (2019).107 Emmerling, Groom, and Wettingfeld (2017) note that estimates of  
vary from 0.4 to 4 depending on the context, and the preceding chapter finds long-run, 
national estimates rarely fall outside = [1, 2.5]. Notably, some argue for = 1, 2 as 
holding special significance (Buchholz and Schumacher, 2010; Dasgupta, 2008; Groom 
and Maddison, 2019; Stern, 2007; and Tol, 2010). = 1 suggests a social preference for 
consumption maximisation – an emphasis on developing mean consumption potential, 
while larger values suggest greater inequality aversion. Some instead specifically advocate 
for = 2 on the premise of emphasising balanced economic growth – an emphasis on 
median growth. We remain detached from the normative debate and rather explore the 
implications of inequality preferences on optimal economic distribution. 
To form a concrete example of the impact of , we start from initial conditions 
𝜇(0), 𝜎2(0) derived from U.S. national statistics on median and mean household income 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2019) and calibrate parameters in the preceding model from popular 
sources.108 We then perform repeated simulations to obtain preferences for 30-year growth 
paths in a 𝜇 and 𝜎2 space for select parameter values in = [0.5, 4]. By the lognormal 
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and 𝜎2(𝑡) = 2(ln(𝑐(̅𝑡)) − 𝜇(𝑡)) for 𝑡 = (0,… , 𝑇) derived from the mean of the lognormal distribution. 
107
 , the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, is interpretable as social inequality aversion among other uses. 
108
 Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015) is used to calibrate the production function and other parameters as 
well as Saez and Zucman (2016) and Jebb, Tay, Diener, and Oishi (2018). 
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distributional assumption, we can represent results in a grid of average annual growth rates 
of mean, median, and modal incomes as in Figure 33. Optimised economic progress after 
30-years falls along the dashed line resulting from the mean under the lognormal 
assumption. The direction and extent of pathways in (𝜎2, 𝜇) space differ by preference over 
. After an initial correction from the real-world trend because present levels of inequality 
are not preferred, growth pathways generally fall along what we may approximate as a 
vector as discussed in the preceding chapter. We also include a projected growth path based 
on the 1967-2017 U.S. trend. Naturally, the real trend includes all sorts of shocks not 
included in the η-based simulation. 
 
 
FIGURE 33. OPTIMAL 𝜇 AND 𝜎2 PARAMETERS OVER 30 YEARS CONDITIONAL ON  
Notes: Optimal growth paths in (𝜇, 𝜎2) space for the U.S. depending on the social preference for 
inequality represented by η (higher value interpretable as a preference for less inequality) and 
projected U.S. growth based on the 1967-2017 trend. These are overlaid on a contour map of the 
implied annualised mean, median, and modal growth rates. 
Sources: Author calculations based on repeated simulations and data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2019). 
 
We must remain aware of the lognormal distributional assumption when interpreting 
Figure 33 and the results in general. One issue is that the lognormal approximates the bulk 
of any income or consumption distribution well, but not ultrawealthy outliers. We could 
use the gamma distribution or more sophisticated alternatives, but the capacity to represent 
growth in a space where mean, median, and modal implications can be represented 
simultaneously would be lost. Instead, the point is to have an intuition for when critical 
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economic and social parameters, like inequality preference, drive the results, and not the 
distributional assumption. 
It is also important to discuss the implications of our welfare function. Over the 30-year 
planning horizon, the decisionmaker weighs each agent i’s benefit in each period t against 
every other agent’s benefit in every period (see discussion in, for instance, Gollier, 2011). 
The planning horizon is critical because the  parameter summarises inequality preferences 
between every i in every t. Preference for less inequality (higher ) implies not just a 
preference for more equal distribution in each period, but also greater intertemporal 
redistribution to earlier periods to balance later gains from economic growth, regardless of 
the discount rate. Thus, a forward-thinking, multiyear planning society with inequality 
aversion may behave as if discounting even if 𝜌 = 0. 
Some observations: After the initial correction of distributional policy to match 
preferences, planning horizon, and lack of real world instability, we see the = 2 path 
settles into distribution-preserving growth (?̅?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑜). The = 1 path also settles 
into what would be mean-maximising growth in a short run, noniterative model. However, 
a preference for greater inequality, ( < 1), results in higher average mean growth through 
higher capital accumulation from savings. This higher annualised growth rate, however, is 
driven by gains enjoyed in later years at the expense of lower consumption in earlier ones. 
Similarly, a preference for economic policy focused on median rather than mean income, 
advocated for instance by Aghion et al. (2013), European Commission (2014), and Stiglitz 
(2012) based on inequality aversion, might maximise short-run but not long-run median 
growth. Policy emphasising greater inequality can also result in higher median growth 
(eventually) through savings. The issue is whether we can first tolerate lower median 
growth and then greater long-run inequality. Under the lognormal assumption, another 
trade-off is a reduction in, or possibly negative, modal growth.  
Instead of choosing to monitor median income as our metric, suppose instead a society 
acts to maximise median income growth. That is, suppose that society chooses policies 
suggesting an  (recall, however, this is a parameter) that maximizes growth in 𝑐̃ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇). 
From a sufficiently long-run perspective, we might then choose to maximise growth in the 
mean, 𝑐̅ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 +
1
2
𝜎2) too, since growth in σ2 has a positive effect on growth in μ 
through savings. But this would require ignoring intergenerational differences and instead 
supposes that growth in the annualised average is sufficiently rewarding. But this conflicts 
with what  is indicating which is a preference over inequality between all i and t. The 
point is also not to choose , a parameter indicating social preferences. The optimal 
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distributional policy instead follows from (and the previous chapter suggests) an  
parameter representing preferences. 
 More generally, emphasising either mean or median growth does not necessarily result 
in increased total wellbeing based on the CRRA utility form. For many social preference 
values where ≠ 1, 2, planning for growth in either mean or median statistic is socially 
suboptimal. Instead, for any social preference over distribution and inequality an entirely 
different optimal growth path is preferred. A national statistic emphasising economic 
growth in any form alone is not informative on whether national preferences over 
distribution are being addressed. 
A static statistic is also insufficient to describe progress. Along the optimal growth paths 
in (𝜇, 𝜎2) space, a mean-median relationship or other such comparisons, one value tends 
to grow comparatively faster in most preference scenarios. Current statistics on distribution 
do not adequately reflect that even stable social preferences result in changing levels of 
inequality with changing incomes. 
We also note that projected U.S. growth continuing from the 1967-2017 trend – generally 
predictable in the long-run as a linear estimate fits the 1967-2017 data well – is not 
generally short-run optimal under plausible inequality preferences which would be 
indicated by an  closer to 1.5 or 2. Instead, the current policy suggests an as-if social 
preference more unequal. The result is a sacrifice of growth potential by any measure of 
centre – mean, median, or mode.109 The result is that any policy “revolution” to a more 
equitable preference-based growth policy begins with economic upheaval. We find support 
for this in Banerjee and Duflo (2003) where any preference change incurs a temporary loss 
in ?̇?𝑐. A policy conflict then occurs – a representative government, knowing , cannot 
justify a growth trend suggesting an inequitable social preference, yet policymakers would 
be hesitant to embark on a radical policy realignment if ?̇?𝑐 is the metric of economic 
success. 
Finally, we can put comparisons on perhaps more familiar ground as a set of comparative 
distributions in Figure 34. These emphasise how different values of  result in different 
consumption distributions over time.110 One might appeal to the Keynes-Ramsey Rule 
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 Graphically, a trend maximizing short run growth in one measure of center, for instance the mean, would run perpendicular to 
the mean growth contour lines – traversing them by least distance. 
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(𝑓′(𝑘(𝑡)) − 𝛿 − 𝜌) to understand their relationship.111 A 
preference for less equality, or greater inequality, (smaller ) results in a preference for 
more income growth in the right tail. Under the lognormal assumption, this necessarily 
results in a reduction in modal income growth and a fattening (higher frequency) in at least 
some upper-intermediary (middle) incomes. There is a greater dispersal across incomes too 
– less common experience across households which might impact national cohesion. 
Unfortunately, this outcome again highlights the inadequacy of both mean and median 
measures. Both measures may register growth, while a subset of agents around the mode 
are pushed into poverty. 
 
 
FIGURE 34. CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION AT 30 YEARS, BY  VALUE 
Notes: Consumption distributions and measures of centre for select values of η. Initial distribution based on 
recent U.S. national statistics and projected distribution based on 1967-2017 U.S. growth trend. A smaller 
η value, representing a greater preference for inequality, results in higher growth in inequality and the right 
tail. Und the lognormal assumption, the modal statistic may decrease even if the median and mean increase 
as projected based on current U.S. policy – a particularly adverse effect for much of society. 
Sources: Author calculations based on simulations and data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2019). 
 
Whatever national preferences over distribution and growth are, a complementary 
national statistic to 𝐺?̇? appears warranted. It can inform whether growth policy is placing 
the economy on a preferred or at least familiar path. Policymakers and the public can then 
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 One may also want to appeal to this in attempting to estimating values of η empirically. That is, suppose η implied in any period 




judge whether the path is desirable in part based on whether they take a normative or 
positive perspective. We conclude by presenting candidates for the purpose. 
5.6 Economic Performance in Terms of Distribution 
The emphasis of this paper is on the importance of incorporating social preferences over 
distribution into economic growth policy. At a minimum, policies over distribution result 
in growth paths as if there is a preference, even if it is one that does not benefit most of 
society. A statistic indicating when we have departed from a distributional growth path, 
preference, etc. complements 𝐺?̇? because it says something about whether growth policy 
will be regarded as equitable or at least results in outcomes that match expectations. Policy 
fitness, in turn, informs on whether policy supports social stability. It can also say 
something about 𝐺?̇? – whether it will exceed or fall short of what the factor decomposition 
growth literature predicts because of the savings-distribution relationship. 
Whether a growth path matches social preferences is the important characteristic for 
monitoring distribution, not which path we are on. One way to develop a statistic that 
informs on this is to incorporate  as a benchmark and contrast it against implied-  
measures as in the preceding paper or other comparisons. Incorporation results in an 
internationally comparable statistic while retaining national context because we ask how 
closely growth policies match each society’s preference in the aggregate. We then compare 
how on-target each society’s policies are, rather than comparing growth when preferences 
over how growth is achieved may be radically different. 
To incorporate the benchmark, consider a growth statistic over the distribution of form  
(44) 𝜈(∙) = 𝐷(𝑡) − 𝐷( ) 
 
where 𝐷(𝑡) reports as the realisation a measure of economic performance in t, 𝐷( ) 
identifies what the society would prefer in the same units based on social preferences, and 
a positive (negative) value of 𝜈(∙) suggests greater (lesser) inequality growth than preferred.  
An approach in somewhat familiar units readily emerge. An equivalent measure to an  
growth path is the explicit rate of divergence of two points on the income distribution. 
Mean and median statistics are often available. Suppose 𝐷( ) is the growth rate of 
divergence in mean and median implied by social preference value , and 𝐷(𝑡) the 
observed rate of divergence in the same period. The new statistic follows as 
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(45) 𝜈𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ = 𝑔(𝑡)𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ − 𝑔( )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  
 
If the lognormal assumption fits the distribution, we might estimate 𝜈𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  from its 







which is growth attributable to a spread in the distribution. If 𝑔( )𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  is based on 
= 2, signifying a preference for equal growth such that ?̅?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡
𝑀𝑜, this implies 






2  but this is an exception. 
We may also want to revisit the normal coefficient of variation (CV) based on its 
familiarity in the field and general usefulness in discussing distribution. The appropriate 
statistic, however, is the divergence from preferences over the growth rate of the coefficient 
of variation, 𝑔𝐶𝑉 :
112 
(46) 𝜈(𝐶𝑉) = 𝑔(𝑡)𝐶𝑉 − 𝑔( )𝐶𝑉 
 
The Gini coefficient is a popular and intuitive measure of inequality, and we would be 
remiss to leave it out. As in the preceding forms, a comparison of growth in the observed 
Gini coefficient, 𝑔(𝑡)𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 , to the implied socially optimal trend in a society, 𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 , is most 
informative: 
(47) 𝜈(𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖) = 𝑔(𝑡)𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 − 𝑔( )𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 . 
 
Finally, one approach is to state 𝐷(𝑡) as the value of  implied by distributional growth 
in each period, (𝑡), e.g. implied- . We can then compare this to 𝐷( ) =  as society’s 
generally constant social preference. The statistic on growth and distribution is then113  
(48) 𝜈( ) = − (𝑡) 
 
An advantage of benchmark 𝐷( ) =  is that each  value identifies a growth path with an 
approximate rate of divergence, and so has a dynamic perspective “baked in”. An issue is 
that we must measure the abstract quality (𝑡) consistently and frequently. Another issue 
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 From the normal coefficient of variation 𝐶𝑉 =
𝜎
𝜇










 In this representation of 𝜈(∙), the realisation and pure preferences switch places. This is so that the sign of 𝜈( ) has the same 
interpretation as in the comparison measures. 
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is the interpretation of the units of measure as 𝜈  is in units of divergence from preferences. 
However, this would hardly be our first economic measure in abstract units. 
As an empirical starting point, Table 16 through Table 18 report average annual values 
for the four proposed measures of 𝐷(𝑡) for countries based on five datasets. The values for 
𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  are also equivalent to 𝜈(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ )( = 2) – the values of 𝜈(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ ) 
if we assume the social preference is an equal growth rate across the distribution. Except 
for the directly -based statistic, these values are normalised by mean growth to report the 
rate of divergence, or inequality growth, per-per cent growth. The  measure does not 
require normalisation because the statistic informs on the  path of the economy without 
regard to the magnitude of growth. When sufficiently long time-series are available as in 
the WID dataset, we also report values for significant periods of development. Because the 
measures are composed from OLS estimates on different qualities of the data – annual Gini 
coefficients, mean, median, and residual values – not all 𝐷(𝑡)(∙) estimates are statistically 
significant and reported for all countries. Consequently, the global picture is not 
representative – only nations with sufficiently stable growth and data collection initiatives 
are included – those where at least one distributional measure can be calculated at generally 




TABLE 16—GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION TREND ESTIMATES, LIS AND OECD DATA 









LIS data       
Australia 1981-2010(8)     1.38** 0.16 
 
0.52     0.40**     1.77** 
Canada 1981-2010(10) 0.90 0.25 1.03 0.59 1.59 
Denmark 1987-2010(7) 1.15     0.10**     0.81** - 1.86 
Finland 1987-2010(7) 1.75 0.17 1.14 0.75 1.74 
France 1978-2010(7)     0.79**  -0.10*     -0.46**  -0.63*     2.12** 
Germany 1984-2010 (7)     0.56**     0.23**      0.88**     0.79**     1.64** 
Ireland 1987-2010(8) 3.45    -0.09** -0.40    -0.17** 2.11 
Israel 1986-2010(7) 1.67 0.14  0.29 0.62 1.80 
Italy 1986-2010 (11)     0.63** - -   0.60* - 
Luxembourg 1985-2010(8) 2.63    0.06** - 0.26     1.92** 
Norway 1979-2010 (8) 2.28 - -     0.21** - 
Spain 1980-2010 (8) 2.15 -    -0.31** - - 
Sweden 1981-2005(6) 2.04    0.11**  0.97     0.44** 1.84 
United Kingdom 1979-2010(9) 2.41 0.14  0.37     0.29** 1.80 
United States 1979-2013(10) 0.77 0.37  1.12 0.70 1.33 
OECD data 
           
Canada 1976-2017 (42) 0.85 0.14 0.54 0.31 1.80 
Denmark 1985-2016 (16) 0.99 0.19 1.36 0.57 1.71 
Finland 1986-2017 (32) 1.63 0.13 0.82 0.55 1.81 
Germany 1985-2016 (14) 0.60 0.13 0.43 0.97 1.82 
Hungary 1991-2016 (15)     1.02**    -0.14**   -0.60**    -0.30**     2.15** 
Israel 1990-2017 (14) 1.88 - - 0.17 - 
Italy 1984-2016 (17)   0.33* - -   1.18* - 
Luxembourg 1986-2016 (15) 1.46 0.07 0.23 0.46 1.90 
Netherlands 1977-2016 (17) 0.92 -0.09 -0.44   0.17* 2.11 
New Zealand 1985-2014 (10) 1.45      0.15** -   0.32* 1.78 
Norway 1986-2017 (14) 2.19 - -     0.17** - 
Sweden 1975-2017 (15) 1.86 0.06 0.29 0.49 1.92 
United Kingdom 1975-2017 (23) 1.23 0.14 0.30 0.42 1.79 
United States 1995-2017 (13) 0.54 - 1.26 0.76 - 
Notes: 𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  is the growth rate of divergence of mean and median income as an annual percentage change that 
is approximated by estimating the change in ln(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ ). 𝑔𝐶𝑉 is the growth rate in the coefficient of variation 
approximated by estimating 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑉). 𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the growth rate of the Gini coefficient. We approximate  by the growth 
vector approach in the preceding paper. A limitation of the CRRA utility function is that only > 0 are considered 
valid and so lower values imply policies diverging from CRRA utility-based preferences. All estimates reported are 
statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 
5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). Statistical significance of all inequality estimates is the least of the two estimated 
values used in their composition. 
a Number of observations, in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which is derived from the 




TABLE 17—GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION TREND ESTIMATES, WORLD BANK DATA 









Income basis       
Argentina--Urban 1987-2017 (27)   0.88* -0.60 -1.07  -0.59* 2.46 
Australia 1981-2014 (10) 1.65 0.10  0.14 0.20 1.87 
Bolivia 1990-2017 (19) 2.83 -   -0.58* - - 
Brazil 1981-2017 (33) 2.72 -0.24 -0.36 -0.14 2.24 
Canada 1981-2013 (11) 1.09 - -     0.25** - 
Chile 1987-2017 (14) 2.20 -0.43 -0.58 -0.35 2.37 
Colombia 1992-2017 (19) 2.69   -0.16*    -0.29**  -0.15* 2.17 
Costa Rica 1981-2017 (31) 4.20 0.15 -     0.09** 1.77 
Croatia 1988-2015 (8)    -0.32** -0.73 -3.90    -4.16** -0.51 
Czech Republic 1993-2015 (14) 2.19 -0.08 -0.40 - 2.09 
Ecuador 1987-2017 (20) 3.09   -0.22*    -0.40**    -0.24** 2.23 
El Salvador 1991-2017 (23) 0.96 -0.90 -1.47 -1.42 2.56 
Estonia 1993-2015 (14) 4.45   -0.07* -0.27    -0.16** 2.08 
Germany 1991-2015 (18) 0.72 0.19     0.54** 0.54 1.71 
Guatemala 1986-2014 (5) - - - - 2.24 
Honduras 1989-2017 (28) 2.27 -0.18 -0.34    -0.11** 2.19 
Israel 1986-2016 (10) 1.94 - -     0.23** - 
Latvia 1993-2015 (15) 4.53     0.06** -     0.19** 1.92 
Lithuania 1993-2015 (13) 6.54 -    -0.13** - - 
Malaysia 1984-2015 (12) 2.65 -0.14 -0.32 -0.17 2.15 
Mexico 1989-2016 (15)   1.05* -0.49 -0.68   -0.53* 2.40 
Nicaragua 1993-2014 (6) 3.49 -0.34 -0.55 -0.36 2.32 
Panama 1989-2017 (24) 3.31 -0.19 -0.33 -0.21 2.20 
Poland 1985-2015 (15) 1.76 0.12 0.35 0.54 1.83 
Slovenia 1993-2015 (13) 2.09    -0.14**    -0.66** - 2.15 
United States 1986-2016 (10) 0.86 0.24 0.43 0.31 1.62 
Uruguay 1981-2017 (14) 0.95 - -  -0.24* - 
Consumption basis      
 
 
Bangladesh 1983-2016 (9) 1.17     0.30**     0.75** 0.61     1.48** 
China--Rural 1990-2015 (13) 6.09 - - 0.09 - 
China--Urban 1990-2015 (13) 6.74 0.07     0.08** 0.19 1.90 
Côte d'Ivoire 1985-2015 (10) -2.36     -0.19** - - 
Georgia 1996-2017 (22)     1.67** - -  -0.13* - 
Ghana 1987-2016 (7) 3.46     0.10** - 0.20 1.87 
India--Rural 1983-2011 (6) 1.33     0.09** - - 1.88 
India--Urban 1983-2011 (6) 1.69 0.18     0.21** 0.33 1.73 
Indonesia--Rural 1984-2017 (25) 4.00 0.07 - 0.20 1.90 
Indonesia--Urban 1984-2017 (25) 3.73 0.13 0.11 0.23 1.81 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1986-2016 (11) 2.35 -0.13 -0.34 -0.23 2.15 
Kazakhstan 1996-2017 (18) 4.39 -0.11 -0.43 -0.40 2.12 
Mauritania 1987-2014 (7) 2.24 -    -0.74**    -0.54** - 
Mexico 1984-2016 (15) - - - - 2.53 
Morocco 1984-2013 (6)     1.61**  0.11* - -  1.85* 
Pakistan 1987-2015 (12) 2.90 -  -0.12* - - 
South Africa 1993-2014 (7) 3.34     0.25** -     0.11**     1.59** 
Sri Lanka 1985-2016 (8) 2.45 0.17   0.20* 0.29 1.75 
Thailand 1981-2017 (23) 3.28 -0.17 -0.40 -0.22 2.19 
Tunisia 1985-2015 (7) 2.23 -0.20 -0.55 -0.38 2.21 
Turkey 1987-2016 (17) 2.95 -    -0.19** - - 
Ukraine 1992-2016 (19) 3.03    -0.11** -0.50 -0.47 2.13 
Vietnam 1992-2016 (10) 6.30    -0.05** -0.26 - 2.07 
Notes: 𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  is the growth rate of divergence of mean and median income as an annual percentage change, 
approximated by estimating the change in ln(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ ). 𝑔𝐶𝑉 is the growth rate in the coefficient of variation 
approximated by estimating 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑉). 𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the growth rate of the Gini coefficient. We approximate  by the growth vector 
approach in the preceding paper. A limitation of the CRRA utility function is that only > 0 are considered valid and so 
lower values imply policies diverging from CRRA utility-based preferences. All estimates reported are statistically 
significant at the 1-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 
10 per cent level). Statistical significance of all inequality estimates is the least of the two estimated values used in their 
composition. 
a Number of observations, in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 




TABLE 18—GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION TREND ESTIMATES, WID DATA 









Brazil c 2001-2015 (15)   1.25 Г  -0.14 Г    -0.20** -0.23 Г    2.16 Г 
China d 1978-2015 (38) 5.63 0.23 0.05 0.24 1.63 
     Transition 1978-1999 (22) 4.65 0.24 0.08 0.34 1.62 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 9.29 0.15 -0.02 0.06 1.78 
Côte d'Ivoire e 1988-2014 (6)    -1.48** -0.41 -0.31 - -0.36 
Egypt f 1999-2015 (6) 1.45 -0.15 -0.25 -0.33 2.17 
France g 1900-2014 (83/102) 2.21 -0.27 -0.24 -0.14 2.27 
     LIS comparison 1978-2010 (26/33) 
 
2.43 0.75 0.33 0.05 0.41 
     Pre-WWII 1900-1939 (20/27)   0.68 Г   -0.67 Г 
 
-  -0.40 Г 2.83  
     Post-war 1946-1969 (22/24) 4.52 - -0.10 0.08 - 
     Transition 1970-1999 (25/30)   1.40 Г   -0.06 Г 
 
- -  2.87 
     Present 2000-2014 (11/15) 2.47 1.11 0.37 -0.06 -0.12 
India h 1951-2013 (54/63) 1.84 - -0.08 0.15     1.89* Г 
     Postcolonial 1951-1964 (12/14) 2.06 -0.38 -0.48 -0.31 2.34 
     Transition 1965-1999 (32/35) 1.86 0.06 -0.03 0.12 1.92 
     Present 2000-2013 (10/14) 3.74 0.20  0.10 0.53 1.68 
Palestine f 1996-2011 (10)   -1.33* -0.29 -0.28  -0.28*    -0.28** 
Russia i 1961-2015 (25/36) - - - - - 
     USSR 1961-1989 (3/10)   2.38 Г   -0.05 Г 
 
-   -0.27 Г    2.06 Г 
     Transition 1990-1999 (6/10)  -5.38 Г   - 
 
-   -1.44 Г - 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 2.89 -0.79 -0.36 -0.22 2.53 
Turkey f 1994-2016 (16)   2.06 Г -   -0.32*   -0.38 Г       2.28** Г 
United States j 1962-2014 (51) 1.47 0.29 0.08 0.37 1.50 
     LIS comparison 1979-2013 (35) 
 
1.44    0.21** 0.03 0.42     1.68** 
     Transition 1962-1980 (17) 1.62 - -0.06 - - 
     Reaganomics 1981-1992 (12) 2.53 0.66 0.27 0.33 0.60 
     Present 1993-2014 (22)   1.28 Г   0.07 Г    -0.29**   0.35 Г   1.90 Г 
Notes: Annual estimates used as the basis of these measures are derived from percentile distributional data. 𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄  is the 
growth rate of divergence of mean and median income as an annual percentage change, approximated by estimating the change in 
ln(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛⁄ ). 𝑔𝐶𝑉 is the growth rate in the coefficient of variation approximated by estimating 𝑙𝑛(𝐶𝑉). 𝑔𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 is the growth 
rate of the Gini coefficient. We approximate  by the growth vector approach in the preceding paper. A limitation is the CRRA 
utility function is that only > 0 are considered valid and so lower values imply policies diverging from CRRA utility-based 
preferences. All estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors 
unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). Statistical significance of all inequality estimates is the least of 
the two estimated values used in their composition. 
a Number of observations, in parentheses, where a lognormal/gamma distribution fits the data sufficiently well based on the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Massey, 1951). b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. Г Denotes estimates based on the 
gamma distribution when lognormal-based estimates do not fit the data sufficiently well – these estimates are explored in appendix 
A5.3 The Gamma Distribution Alternative 
Sources: Author calculations based on World Inequality Database (WID) data discussed in: c Morgan (2017); d Piketty, Yang, and 
Zucman (2017); e Czajka (2017); f Alvaredo, Assouad, and Piketty (2018); g Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty (2018); h 
Chancel and Piketty (2017); i Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman (2018); and j Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016). 
 
Whatever the form of 𝐷(𝑡), a couple approaches can be taken to setting the benchmark 
𝐷( ). One may be called a proactive or normative approach. That is, set a measure of 
performance based on careful societal introspection (whom do we want to be as a society?) 
and define the measure of performance as a comparison to it. In a sense, we decide what is 
"fair" and then evaluate growth in those terms. It is suggested we may refer to this as the 
European approach.  
One may also take a positivist approach. That is, look at where countries are and impute 
the social preference associated with their status. From a policy perspective, what a 
practitioner does is make apparent the extent of the trade-off between μ and σ2, or mean 
and median growth, evident in a country’s existing trajectory. We may then ask whether 
something different – a policy intervention, ought to be done when current and long-run 
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distributional paths differ. It is suggested that we may refer to this as the U.S. approach, 
though these are generalisations.  
In the U.S. approach, historical measures of 𝐷(𝑡) replace 𝐷( ) in future periods without 
requiring the exogenous discovery of underlying social preferences. In the European 
approach, one may take these values as a starting point, but need not take the current state 
of the economy indicated, revealed preference estimates of , or long-run or short-run 
implied-  estimates, or other historical indicators of distribution as the benchmark of 
performance. 𝐷( ) may in fact differ substantially from that implied by existing policies. 
In any event, even among experts one method cannot be agreed on (Drupp, Freeman, 
Groom, and Nesje, 2018), and both have some merit. 
5.7 Concluding Remarks 
If a population has no preference over distribution, GDP growth (not even requiring it in 
per-capita form) is a sufficient statistic as implicit in it is that more consumption potential 
without regard to distribution is preferred. A standard argument stemming from the Kaldor-
Hicks compensation criteria is to make the pie as large as possible and then figure out how 
to distribute it later. If the public is confident in the state’s omniscience and the elite’s 
generosity, then perhaps GDP growth remains sufficient, whatever distributional 
preferences are. However, Sen (2000) argues that Kaldor-Hicks advocacy for potential 
Pareto improvements to be sufficient is not a defensible criterion if there is no mechanism 
and no intent for gainers to compensate losers. Suppose, given the existence of extreme 
wealth, poverty, and discontent among the poor and marginalised, that we side with Sen 
and cannot trust in unmonitored distribution.  
A statistic that includes an agnostic representation of preferences is useful in monitoring 
economic progress. Not taking a stance on what the social preference value ought to be is 
an advantage. A preference for more inequality may, for instance, be representative of how 
rapidly a country prefers to modernise through capital accumulation, i.e. China’s capital 
hungry modernisation initiatives. It may also be the product of longstanding religious or 
cultural beliefs that one would be on questionable ethical grounds to reject outright, i.e. 
Saudi Arabia’s theocratic-supported monarchy. In comparison, measures like the static 
Gini coefficient imply that a decrease in inequality is preferable. The proposition of new 
statistic 𝜈(∙) makes no such claim on optimal distribution and instead represents the 
deviation from any distribution-growth path. 
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𝜈(∙) also offers the advantage of representing the dynamic nature of growth better as it 
uses the rate of divergence in measures of centre. Static alternatives such as the mean-
median spread, mean/median ratio, coefficient of variation, Gini, and measures of poverty 
are only appropriate if the mean and median grow in proportion – which we have shown is 
unlikely. Static measures cannot represent the changing nature of distribution with 
economic growth. At best we end up comparing static values in two periods without 
guidance on whether the change is beneficial.  
𝜈(∙) also challenges that the method of conducting international comparisons changes. 
Formulating 𝜈(∙) as relative to national preferences has the advantage of informing on how 
well national policies fit. It is a measure of deviation rather than placing international values 
side-by-side without context. This suggestion is not to say that comparing components 𝐷(𝑡) 
or 𝐷( ) between countries does not make for good discussion. But keeping the statistic as 
the composite 𝜈(∙) is more informative when comparing, say, an OECD member against an 
LDC with different institutional arrangements, production potential, and social traditions. 
In the model, we have treated η as a constant parameter, but like target 𝐺?̇?, the 
unemployment rate, or inflation, it is almost certainly subject to change over time. For 
instance, societies may be willing to sacrifice equality in favour of rapid modernisation 
over some period, and then transition to preferring a more equal dispersion once some 
quality-of-life potential is attainable through redistributions or economic reorganisation.114 
In operation, consider if economic growth is distributed more unequally than preferred 
because society’s preferences have shifted to a more equitable distribution (η has 
increased). Then 𝜈(∙) > 0 and an interpretation is that future growth is bought at a higher 
price – greater sacrifice – than desired in the present given the remaining needs of society 
today. If instead society changes to favour individual success – a chance at attaining 
personal wealth and status become paramount (  decreases), then 𝜈(∙) < 0 implies a more 
equal distribution is occurring than fitting with a society that now prefers to gamble. 
Estimating η and 𝐷( ) well is essential work and exploring how the  summary of 
preferences changes over time is an interesting avenue for further research. These are some 
of the many questions this research leads to, rather than answers. 
To conclude, we cannot discard measures of the magnitude of growth such as 𝐺?̇? because 
they say something vitally important. They tell us how the per-capita consumption potential 
 
114
 Or conversely so. Society may exhibit a preference for improving the conditions of the poorest first, but then prefer to gamble 
and allow unequal growth after most of the population’s basic needs are met. 
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of society is changing – whether the capacity for better lives is increasing. But by 
summarising the welfare distribution into a preference-free measure of centre, they do not 
inform on how consumption is operationalised. Moving from a representative agent to a 
representative distribution basis when modelling economic growth reveals what we give 
up in using the representative agent assumption. Clearly, at least one more statistic is 
needed. This statistic(s) should portray the dynamic nature of distribution and growth and 
embody social preferences over trade-offs inherent in national distributional policies. As a 
practical matter, a companion to 𝐺?̇? should be simple to formulate and interpret. The 
proposals on 𝜈(∙) generally meet these conditions and are based on our distributional-growth 
model. The model itself and the statistics based on it perhaps make sense of some 
inconsistencies in economic growth and social outcomes. For instance, improvements in 
measures of economic growth but not measures of national satisfaction, or vice versa, may 




Conclusion – Contributions of Non-Cooperative Environmental 
Policy Examples and Vector-Based Inequality Analyses 
As a thesis must make a distinct contribution to our body of knowledge, I outline here 
what I think are some qualifying contributions from the chapters of this thesis. 
The Introduction lays out a simple argument for non-cooperative, even unilateral strategy 
for addressing pressing environmental concerns. Using basic game-theoretic language, I 
identify the bounds when a NEP approach is more likely to be effective than seeking 
cooperation from all parties. The NEP perspective has substantial implications for 
environmental protection and redress when limited resources are available. Applying the 
NEP criteria identifies policies that we might pursue to try and achieve a minimal redress 
of an environmental problem when first-best and perhaps even second-best and satisficing 
options do not have sufficient public support to be successful (though a NEP might also be 
first-best, second-best, or satisficing). It is an alternative decision-making approach like 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and Simon (1956) applied to environmental policies. 
I then study environmental decisions on a local scale that sum to a substantial concern. 
Among the contributions is the specification of a damages function that is more appropriate 
for thinking about local-scale environmental problems because it allows for a site’s total 
environmental destruction. The change in the specification is deceptively simple as the 
impact on analyses and optimal policy are substantial. For one, the damages from any sort 
of local damage-generating industrial activity in a region can be minimised by clustering 
at a reduced number of sites (sometimes one) once some scale of total production is 
reached. It is a redress to the persistent problem of the tragedy of the commons (Stavins, 
2011) by way of taking some sites out of production altogether. I observe that the limiting 
factor is transportation costs, which generally decline over time, and thus the potential to 
reduce the impact of production on the environment is increasing. For some activities, such 
as the storage of nuclear wastes, the implication is that policymakers should seek to 
accumulate waste to as few global sites as possible, and so this research will remain 
permanently relevant. I have also applied the framework to several settings within and 
outside environmental policy and find behavioural adaptation, when it can occur, must be 
carefully considered in local environmental policy design. 
Next, I explore policies to address the plastic recycling crisis which now impacts every 
species and environment on the planet. At the core of the issue is that the producers of the 
goods that become waste have little responsibility for that waste resulting in pushes for 
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more expansive EPR programs in recent years. I propose a perhaps odd framework that 
falls under the EPR and DfE umbrellas. It is to optimally impose a micro-tax on producers 
based on the number of different materials in a product and jointly subsidise recyclers based 
on the number of materials within that product that they instead process. The result is that 
any product so regulated becomes profitable to fully recycle through producers reducing 
its material complexity and ensuring that product’s remaining complexity is tied to the 
profit motive of recyclers. An iterative product improvement process then emerges to make 
newer versions of products more recyclable. Unfortunately, such a proposal is novel in the 
environmental, sustainability, and recycling and waste spheres so there is a lack of evidence 
on their effectiveness. I instead explore the theory and efficiency of the proposal and 
advocate for its experimental usage. 
Then, I explore a large application of NEP – policies to influence the clean consumption 
through abatement technologies of otherwise dirty inputs to production. To do so, I explore 
coal consumption in the U.S. energy sector and how power plants that install FGD systems 
are able to use high sulphur coal while meeting sulphur dioxide emissions restrictions, 
while their non-FGD counterparts must use cleaner coal which is more expensive per heat 
unit. I explore this disparity from multiple angles and with diverse empirical techniques. In 
the process of modelling the power plant abatement and fuel choice decision I also 
contribute a nonparametric method to identify market structure and use it to test whether 
the U.S. energy sector exhibits perfect substitutability between high sulphur coal and 
natural gas or low sulphur coal inputs to production. I also provide estimates of market 
own- and cross-price elasticities of demand for coal and natural gas which are separated by 
whether power plants have FGD systems installed to show that the resulting markets behave 
differently. Finally, after identifying four different types of abatement costs involved with 
FGD installation and operation, I estimate the two types with limited coverage in the 
literature. Ultimately, the goal is a general framework and empirical approaches to make 
policy decisions about energy and similar matters. The results are meant to inform the 
current and future energy transitions. 
While the three applications I present of NEP are not exhaustive, I think they support the 
case that there are NEP type alternatives to traditional environmental policy approaches. 
The NEP approach suggests that even when a majority, through the median voter or another 
decision mechanism, opposes decisive environmental action, regulators might nonetheless 
design and implement policies that improve environmental quality. 
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With some apprehension, as the subject is generally outside the bounds of environmental 
economics, I then report the results from my study of social preferences over inequality and 
the distribution of economic growth. I develop a theoretical framework for estimating the 
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, , implied by the distribution of the returns to 
economic growth in society. The method relies on publicly available mean and median 
national income or consumption statistics, and so allows estimates that are not possible by 
other methods. Particularly useful is that this new implied-  estimate bridges the practice 
and theory of inequality by measuring inequality in the same units as used in models of 
inequality. I provide implied-  estimates for several countries and periods based on four 
datasets. I then include a follow-on measure – the volatility of implied- , as a measure of 
how economic shocks, booms, and busts impact the comparatively wealthy and poor in 
societies. The framework is then extended to study inequality between sex, racial, and 
social groups in the same  terms. 
I then conclude with a second chapter on inequality and economic growth, co-authored 
with Ben Groom of the London School of Economics and Political Science and Eli Fenichel 
of Yale University, where we present a more comprehensive model of inequality, economic 
growth, and distribution in society. Following international comparisons of inequality 
increasing and decreasing growth trends, an optimal control model is presented where the 
impact of  as a parameter representing social preferences over inequality and economic 
growth is explored. This chapter concludes with an argument for adopting a companion 
statistic to GDP per capita and similar growth statistics which reports on the deviation of 
economic distributions from societal preferences over inequality. 
In this thesis I have studied two linked social problems. I first researched cases where 
presumably scarcity and consumption concerns result in opposition to environmental 
protection. But then, we should ask whether the distribution of scarcity, alternatively 
existing consumption patterns, is optimal. So, I then undertook the measurement of social 
preferences implied by inequality to find a method to measure when preferences and 
realisations diverge. Environmental protection and economic inequality are two issues 
locked in a brutal cycle. Suboptimal inequality results in greater scarcity and then 
opposition to policies that would limit immediate consumption. But then overconsumption 
of the environment reduces public goods as well as future consumption, resulting in more 
conflict over resources and inequality. We require approaches to environmental and social 
policy development that make progress on both problems without limiting consumption. I 




References Introduction and Conclusion 
Aumann, Robert J. 2019. Lectures on Game Theory. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Barrett, Scott. 1994. “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade.” Journal 
of Public Economics 54 (3): 325–338. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90039-6 
Barrett, Scott. 2003. Environment & Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-
Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Black, Duncan. 1948. "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making." Journal of 
Political Economy 56 (1): 23-34. https://doi.org/10.1086/256633 
Dasgupta, Partha. 2021. The Economics of Biodiversity: The Dasgupta Review. HM 
Treasury. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-economics-of-biodiversity-
the-dasgupta-review 
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1998. “New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: 
Inequality and Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 57 (2): 259-287. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00099-6 
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Some areas of this dissertation warrant further discussion, data sharing, or the 
presentation of additional results. Such results may be particularly interesting to some 
readers but are generally not strictly within the environmental scope of the main body of 
this thesis. Each appendix referenced in the main body is presented in separate sections in 
the order initially referenced. 
A1.1 Damage Functional Forms 
This appendix supports the four marginal damage functional forms in Figure 2 by 




FIGURE 35 GENERAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DAMAGE FUNCTIONAL FORMS 
Notes: Four general damage functional forms resulting in the marginal damage forms in Figure 2. 
(top-left) Case for dispersion: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) > 0.  
(top-right) Case for clustering: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) < 0.  
(bottom-left) Local indifference case: 𝑑′(𝑥) > 0, 𝑑′′(𝑥) = 0 




































A1.2 Siting Framework Applied Beyond the Environment 
The results of this paper are not intended to imply that the 100-per cent damages 
functional addition, nor aggregating and dispersing policies, are uniquely applicable to 
matters of environmental policy. Rather, it is a simple adjustment which may be widely 
applicable. In this section, three additional applications are provided. Two are presented 
empirically while the third pertains to a subject of greater secrecy where empirics would 
be difficult but the story is clear.  
A1.2.1 Prostitution, Illicit Activities, and Safe Sites 
Matters of prostitution, illicit drug use and sales, homelessness, and levels of general law 
and regulatory enforcement come to mind when searching for social policy-related 
applications of an aggregating doctrine. Whether in the Holbeck neighbourhood of Leeds 
in the U.K., or Amsterdam’s Red-Light District, city planners sometimes seek to cluster 
solicitation and prostitution provision into a designated area. If one expects social damages 
– either as a direct consequence or indirect result of associated behaviours to be substantial 
or fit the case for clustering, this organisation might be warranted. Solicitation, biowaste, 
illicit drug use, noise and late hours, and unruly behaviour among patrons might best be 
avoided entirely in residential neighbourhoods. However, policymakers must remain 
cognizant of the potential for leakage, general equilibrium versus partial equilibrium 
effects, and long-run adjustments to supply and demand. 
I explore the implementation of the Holbeck Managed Zone (HMZ) in Leeds using a 
combination RD (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960) and RK design. While prostitution 
is legal in Great Britain, soliciting in public and several related behaviours remain crimes. 
The HMZ, officially piloted in October 2014 and later made permanent, is an area where 
the authorities tolerate solicitation and related activities, and additional social services are 
sometimes offered to prostitutes. The HMZ itself is small, falling within a roughly two 
square kilometre area where it is allowed on twenty partial streets in inner Leeds. 
Reportedly 12-15 women work within the zone each night (BBC, 2018). It has, however, 
faced strong opposition from some residents of surrounding neighbourhoods in recent years 
(Bindel, 2019), and in addition to requiring a greater police presence drawn from existing 
resources, additional officers have become necessary (Leeds City Council, 2018). We 
should then expect an initial drop in all sorts of criminal activity around the HMZ with 
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implementation, followed by increases in criminal activity over time as leakage occurs and 
possibly greater supply and demand move into the area.   
I use Lower layer Super Output Area (LSOA)-level data on crime reports and population 
levels for years 2011-2018 from the UK Police (2020) and Office for National Statistics 
(2019, 2020) to explore the impact of the HMZ implementation on surrounding 
communities. The UK divides into roughly 35,000 LSOA’s, each with a mean population 
of around 1,600; LSOA’s are the smallest statistical scale in the U.K. where population 
figures are consistently available. Another advantage of LSOA’s is that they tend to follow 
roads and other geographic features. In this case, the HMZ falls primarily within one 
LSOA, with a few permissible roads extending into a functionally similar LSOA. In total, 
the two LSOA’s encompass about three square kilometres with a population of roughly 
1200 each in 2011, and a density of 819 people per square kilometre. But the HMZ is 
concentrated into two-thirds or less of this area. In all functional aspects, the HMZ area is 
also less residential and more industrial than neighbouring LSOA’s.  
The primary interest is the impact on the HMZ’s surrounding neighbourhoods, and I 
compose data series of inner and outer rings of LSOA’s around the HMZ. The inner ring is 
composed of seven LSOA’s that border the HMZ’s two LSOA’s. The seven LSOA’s have 
a combined area of 13.53 square kilometres and a population density of 756 per square 
kilometre in 2011. An outer ring of 27 LSOA’s then borders the inner ring and has a 
combined area of 37.86 square kilometres and population density of 1,205 per square 
kilometre in 2011.115 It appears that the HMZ area is selected to avoid more densely 
populated neighbourhoods. However, it is a short stroll from such places and the lack of 
distance is perhaps not sufficient to prevent leakage. 
Using crime report data, I compose monthly crime summaries in the form of the number 
of crimes reported in each zone – HMZ, inner ring, outer ring, and greater Leeds – without 
any sort of weighting by crime severity. I then divide these by annual LSOA population 
data from ONS which reports midyear population estimates. The resulting data are the 
monthly crime report incidences per capita and does not include unreported crimes. I have 
included all crime data for three reasons. First, the categories used by the U.K. Police 
changed over this period. Second, officers likely take some discretion in deciding charges 
 
115
 HMZ LSOA’s: E01033013 and E01033032. Inner ring LSOA’s: E01011366, E01011362, E01011363, E01033015, E01033016, 
E01011364, and E01011368. Outer ring LSOA’s: E01011284, E01011292, E01011293, E01011294, E01011318, E01011369, 
E01011370, E01011371, E01011372, E01011373, E01011375, E01011482, E01011483, E01011467, E01011678, E01011729, 




and so a crime that might fall into one category in one period, may later fall into a lesser or 
more severe category after a change in enforcement policy. Third, I am after the net effect 
on the neighbourhoods under review. 
Unfortunately, the analysis must be more complicated than comparing the HMZ to 
greater Leeds. A feature of the HMZ is that prostitutes and punters should be able to report 
other activities they observe to police and social workers. The nature of crime reporting in 
the HMZ then changes. Any decrease in criminal activity – or what is considered criminal 
– may be offset by a greater likelihood of reporting. Another issue is that the HMZ and 
surrounding areas are under greater scrutiny – more intensively policed than greater Leeds.  
I summarise the monthly data into yearly observations for scrutiny in Table 19. This 
includes the reported crime incidence per-capita in the Holbeck Managed Zone (HMZ), 
two surrounding areas – an inner ring and outer ring encompassing the HMZ, and greater 
Leeds excluding the HMZ and rings. 
 
TABLE 19 —SUMMARY OF CRIME INCIDENCE AROUND THE HOLBECK MANAGED ZONE 
 HMZ Inner Ring Outer Ring Rest of Leeds  
2011 0.3623 0.4195 0.4109 0.1197  
2012 0.2723 0.4319 0.3779 0.1000  
2013 0.2406 0.4131 0.3672 0.0921  
2014 0.2177 0.3784 0.3067 0.0838 HMZ implemented 
2015 0.2203 0.3505 0.3052 0.0923  
2016 0.2310 0.3539 0.3523 0.1028  
2017 0.2233 0.3908 0.3730 0.1096  
2018 0.2439 0.4072 0.4032 0.1192  
Notes: Annual summary of the number of crime reports of all types reported in the Holbeck 
managed zone (HMZ), the immediate surrounding area (inner ring), the area surrounding 
the inner ring (outer ring), and the rest of Leeds, without any sort of weighting scheme based 
on severity, etc. The nature of reporting changes in the HMZ after the zone is piloted because 
prostitutes and those soliciting can now, for example, report other crimes observed. The 
emphasis in the analysis is on the impact in the inner and outer rings from increased police 
presence, a shift of activities out of these areas into the HMZ or other areas, and then growth 
in general supply and demand across the area from insufficient containment within the HMZ. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from U.K. Police (2020), Office for National 
Statistics (2019, 2020). 
 
We should find two changes – first, a decrease driven by changes in the manner of 
policing, and second, an offsetting increase driven by a greater concentration of activity 
(supply and demand) into the HMZ and the surrounding area. I illustrate the HMZ case in 
Figure 36. I plot monthly reported crime incidence for the HMZ (red hollow triangles), the 
immediate surrounding inner ring (black circles), outer ring (hollow blue circles), and 
greater Leeds excluding these areas (green hollow circles). Because what is reported within 
the HMZ has changed, it is only present for non-causal comparison. However, what occurs 
in the inner and outer rings is informative. We first observe drops in incidence where we 
cannot separate the effect of changes in police presence from the effect of a change in 
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activity location. These effects are particularly pronounced in the inner ring as we would 
expect. We then observe an increase in incidence over time in both rings as more criminal 
and unruly activity concentrates into the area. In a few years, we will also be able to observe 
the impact of additional police resources since assigned to the area. At present, however, it 
appears that attempts to aggregate one activity into the HMZ results in substantial spillovers 
impacting the entire area. 
 
 
FIGURE 36 PER-CAPITA CRIME REPORTS IN AND AROUND THE HOLBECK MANAGED ZONE 
Notes: Black solid markers: Crime reports per-capita (incidence) in an inner ring – the area immediately 
surrounding the Holbeck Managed Zone (HMZ). Blue hollow markers: Incidence in outer ring – the area 
immediately surrounding the inner ring. Red hollow triangles: Incidence within the HMZ. Green hollow markers: 
Incidence in greater Leeds excluding the Holbeck managed zone and surrounding rings. We see an initial impact 
from changes in policy, policing activity, and concentration into the HMZ, followed by increases in criminal 
activity across the three zones of interest from adaptation. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from U.K. Police (2020) and Office for National Statistics (2019, 2020).  
 
An RD/RK design following the framework of section 1.5.5 Regression Discontinuity 
and Kink Methodologies and Estimates results in the empirical estimates reported in Table 
20. The estimate of the RK value in the outer ring is of particular interest as it supports the 
visual presentation that the crime incidence grew more rapidly in the area surrounding the 
HMZ – evidence of a concentrating of activity into the area. So, clearly caution is in order 
with clustering policies when adaptation is possible. Site selection is also clearly important 
– the HMZ and surrounding rings have higher reported crime incidence than greater Leeds 
to begin with. The moment of implementation, however, does not appear to involve any 
other particularly causal officially known event. But I do observe that drops in crime 
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incidence in the rings precede official implementation of the zone by a month or two. At 
the point of discontinuity, what we are attempting to measure is not the effect of allowing 
solicitation in the HMZ, but the impact of a change in policy, movement of prostitution 
siting, and greater policing efforts in the surrounding area which might all precede official 
implementation. Nevertheless, police reports hardly capture an accurate picture. Outreach 
programmes such as the Basis Sex Work Project, the Leeds City Council, and West 
Yorkshire Police advocate for the HMZ and similar programmes because of the positive 
impact on those engaged in prostitution (BBC, 2018; Leeds City Council, 2020).  
 
TABLE 20 — RK AND RD DESIGN ESTIMATES ON HMZ IMPLEMENTATION 
 Inner ring Outer ring 
Date (actual – k) -0.000076 -.00022*** 
    (.000046) (0.000028 
RD: D=1(actual ≥ k) -0.0051*** -.0019* 
    (0.0015) (0.0011 
RK: Year*D 0.00022*** .00043*** 
    (0.000053) (0.000035 
Constant 0.033*** .026*** 
  (0.0013) (0.00085) 
Observations 96 96 
R-squared 0.34 0.67 
Notes: Holbeck Managed Zone implementation with k=October 2014. 
Dependent variable is the monthly number of crimes reports per-capita in the 
area immediately surrounding the HMZ (inner ring), and the area surrounding 
the inner ring (outer ring), 2011-2018 (see annual summary data reported in 
Table 19. Greater police presence in the area and a drawing of activity into the 
zone when the HMZ pilot is implemented decreases crime initially, but then 
the rate of incidence increases over time as the zone plausibly “spills over” 
due to close proximity to inner and outer ring neighbourhoods. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from U.K. Police (2020) and 
Office for National Statistics (2019, 2020). 
 
We can find similar clustering programmes in place when the target audience is 
particularly hard to reach. Illicit drug users, for instance, are being served by at least 78 
drug consumption facilities – colloquially safe injection sites – across Western Europe as 
of 2018 (EMCDDA, 2018). These provide benefits within drug user communities by 
lowering disease transmission rates, overdose deaths, and providing access to counselling. 
However, they also provide community benefits as clustering sites. Similarly, provision of 
homeless shelters may face opposition from conservative factions in society based on the 
provision of a public benefit to what they might see as a private problem. Arguments on 
ethical grounds are unlikely to be persuasive, but arguments based on damage avoidance 
to personal property might be compelling.  
282 
 
This framework also suggests a basis for nonenforcement zones for other laws. Examples 
include the designated nonenforcement zone for drug dealers unilaterally implemented by 
park management to address a particularly intractable drug dealing problem in central 
Berlin’s Görlitzer Park (Connolly, 2019). This is certainly in the spirt of non-cooperative 
environmental policies. Such applications receive substantial public criticism which should 
be weighed against any benefits sought. I also note that remuneration for the provision of 
a public service to impacted residents is missing in each of these examples. I now discuss 
a policy leading to clustering on a global scale. 
A1.2.2 Fighting ISIS and International Terrorism 
The Islamic State (IS) inherited from al-Qaeda a brutal legacy of armed conflict with the 
U.S. and allies across Western Asia.116 Following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
the U.S. and western leaders committed to fighting against generally Salafi-based jihadist 
organisations in foreign countries rather than at “home”. This is generally referred to as the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). President George W. Bush and Bush administration 
officials made this case on several occasions. For instance, first publicly in November 2002: 
“The best way to keep America safe from terrorism is to go after terrorists where they plan 
and hide.” (Bush, 2002), and later even more pertinently: “We are fighting these terrorists 
with our military in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do not have to face them in the 
streets of our own cities.” (Bush, 2004). Even before the establishment of IS, foreign 
fighters were drawn to Afghanistan and Iraq to fight against coalition occupation forces.117 
These occupations drew in fighters who might have otherwise engaged in terrorist attacks 
in the West. The implication is that allowing a soft border through Turkey, Pakistan, and 
other routes into such areas reduces the threat to Western Europe and North America. It 
can also allow identification of nationals who have travelled to the region and attempt to 
return. 
I use data on the number of terrorist attacks from 1990-2018 in Europe, Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and the rest of the world from the Global Terrorism Database (2020). Yearly summary 
data is reported in Table 21 for reference. I then use an RD/RK design – without any sort 
of weighting scheme for severity of attacks or impact – to explore the relief from terrorist 
 
116
 To be clear, the Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), and by the Romanized Arabic acronym “Daesh”.  
117
 The author was part of these forces in 2005 and has firsthand knowledge of efforts to stem the flow of insurgents into Iraq. 
However, also see Byman (2007). 
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activities in Europe which occurred as potential terrorists instead concentrated into 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
TABLE 21 —SUMMARY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 Iraq & Afghanistan Europe Rest of the World  
1990  2   448   3,437   
1991  33   780   3,870   
1992  71   860   4,140   
1993  6   234   508   
1994  27   679   2,750   
1995  23   405   2,653   
1996  16   651   2,391   
1997  22   597   2,580   
1998  8   246   680   
1999  21   374   1,000   
2000  24   487   1,313   
2001  17   486   1,410  Invasion of Afghanistan 
2002  44   232   1,057   
2003  202   221   855  Invasion of Iraq 
2004  411   105   650   
2005  772   180   1,065   
2006  1,120   168   1,470   
2007  1,388   134   1,720   
2008  1,520   372   2,913   
2009  1,640   347   2,735   
2010  1,721   394   2,711   
2011  1,729   293   3,054   
2012  2,906   367   5,256   
2013  4,295   427   7,319   
2014  5,758   1,177   9,973  Worldwide caliphate declared 
2015  4,679   1,021   9,277   
2016  5,000   406   8,220   
2017  3,917   404   6,659   
2018  3,138   271   6,198   
Notes: Number of terrorist attacks of all types reported in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Western and Eastern Europe, and the rest of the world without 
any sort of weighting scheme based on severity, etc. The nature of reporting 
changes in Iraq and Afghanistan after invasion and occupation, and we 
cannot be sure of the quality and consistency of reporting from the rest of the 
world. In Europe, reporting suggests subsequent decreases after the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and an increase when Islamic State 
compels attacks globally. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from the Global Terrorism 
Database (2020). 
 
Figure 37 then illustrates the results. I focus on terrorist attacks in Europe (black markers) 
because data from the rest of the world (hollow red markers) is almost certainly not 
comprehensive and may be inconsistently reported. I also illustrate data from Iraq and 
Afghanistan (hollow blue triangles), but this data is undoubtedly inconsistent as the nature 
of reporting and attacks changes with an occupation. The key takeaway is that the invasion 
and occupations of Afghanistan, and in particular more accessible Iraq, led to substantial 
concentrations of extremists into the theatre from abroad including from Europe. 
Unfortunately, we then see an increase in reported attacks in Europe and the rest of the 
world over time as the Islamic State has a substantial, digitally savvy recruiting activity. 
Attacks in all areas are also attenuated by the declaration of a “worldwide caliphate” in 
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2014 in response to increased pressure in Iraq. Concentrating an unwanted activity does 
not result in a “free lunch” elsewhere when adaptation is possible. 
 
 
FIGURE 37 TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD 
Notes: Number of terrorist attacks scaled to their highest values in the period. Solid black markers: Terrorist attacks 
in Western and Eastern Europe. Blue hollow triangles: Reported terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan – the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) primary theatres of operation during the period of interest. Red hollow markers: 
Reported terrorist attacks in the rest of the world. We observe drops in terrorist attacks in Europe and the rest of 
the world with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These invasions were countered by international anti-
occupation forces often using terrorist attacks and recruiting based on extremist ideologies. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (2020). 
 
In Table 22 I also provide estimates of the observed effect using the RD/RK design. In 
this example, the decision to invade Afghanistan and in particular Iraq by the U.S. and 
coalition forces could coincide with greater vigilance in the European Union. Yet we have 
also observed that the declaration of a worldwide caliphate in 2014 – a call for dispersed 
global attacks – could not be prevented by vigilance. We might also at least take the actual 
timing of the invasion of Iraq as not connected to any individual terrorist’s activities. It is 
clear that both an RD effect occurs – reducing the incidence of terrorist attacks in Europe, 





TABLE 22 — RK AND RD DESIGN ESTIMATES ON THE GWOT 
 Afghanistan Iraq 
 (k=Oct 2001) (k=Apr 2003) 
Date (actual – k) -0.46*** -1.59** 
    (0.11) (0.68) 
RD: D=1(actual ≥ k) -24.29* -155.80*** 
    (13.22) (15.63) 
RK: Year*D -1.12 4.26*** 
    (0.84) (0.71) 
Constant 60.36*** 64.63*** 
  (9.51) (7.27) 
Observations 158 151 
R-squared 0.18 0.72 
Notes: Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq on k dates as components of the Global War on 
terrorism (GWOT). Dependent variable is the monthly number of terrorist attacks reported 
across Western and Eastern Europe from 1990 through early 2020 (see annual summary data 
reported in Table 21). The estimation period for the Afghanistan effect is January 1990-March 
2003, and for the Iraq effect is November 2001-June 2014. There is a substantial drop in 
attacks in Europe coinciding with the invasions of in particular Iraq by coalition forces, but 
then an increase in the rate of attacks thereafter. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 per cent level, ** Significant 
at the 5 per cent level, * Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (2020). 
 
I now qualitatively present a historical example where we would not expect adaptation 
by “polluters” over time. 
A1.2.3 Development of Nuclear Arsenals 
In a rush to build the first nuclear weapons, the possibility of incidental exposure and 
damages during research, development, and manufacturing were at first a distant secondary 
concern. Weapons programmes used a vast network of sites in production – several dozen 
locations across the U.S., U.K., and Canada – in what would eventually be called the 
Manhattan Project (Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2019). Several sites were contaminated 
in the course of mining, processing, and testing materials as well as by accidents. At first, 
the justification for contamination resulted from a combination of ignorance and the 
necessity of ensuring victory in World War II. But the scale of the costs involved became 
impossible to ignore. Current estimates put the liability from the sum of the U.S. nuclear 
weapons programme at around $377 billion, a considerable share of which accumulated in 
the early years (U.S. GAO, 2019). The dangers of both radioactive exposure and nuclear 
proliferation soon changed weapons development. To minimise the threat to population 
centres, by 1943 much of the most dangerous activities – the production and preparation of 
plutonium – was transferred to an isolated site near Hanford, Washington which is still used 
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for waste storage.118 This sort of consolidation occurred in other nuclear programmes as 
well – at Windscale/Sellafield in the U.K., and until the fall of the U.S.S.R. at Mayak 
(Pearce, 2019; Diakov, 2011).119 
A1.3 Plastic Production Volume, 1939-2016 
Reproduction of global plastic production estimates from Geyer, Jambeck, and Law 
(2017) for years 1950-2015, supplemented by 1939 and 1945 estimates from Freinkel 
(2011) converted to millions of metric tons (MMT). 
TABLE 23 — ESTIMATES OF GLOBAL PLASTIC PRODUCTION BY YEAR 
 Plastic Production 
(millions of metric tons) 
 Plastic Production 
(millions of metric tons) 
1939 0.097 1982 73 
1945 0.371 1983 80 
1950 2 1984 86 
1951 2 1985 90 
1952 2 1986 96 
1953 3 1987 104 
1954 3 1988 110 
1955 4 1989 114 
1956 5 1990 120 
1957 5 1991 124 
1958 6 1992 132 
1959 7 1993 137 
1960 8 1994 151 
1961 9 1995 156 
1962 11 1996 168 
1963 13 1997 180 
1964 15 1998 188 
1965 17 1999 202 
1966 20 2000 213 
1967 23 2001 218 
1968 27 2002 231 
1969 32 2003 241 
1970 35 2004 256 
1971 38 2005 263 
1972 44 2006 280 
1973 51 2007 295 
1974 52 2008 281 
1975 46 2009 288 
1976 54 2010 313 
1977 59 2011 325 
1978 64 2012 338 
1979 71 2013 352 
1980 70 2014 367 
1981 72 2015 381 
Notes: Estimates of global plastic production in millions of metric tons (MMT). A substantial increase 
in global plastic production coincides with waste management firms becoming common. 
Sources: 1950-2015 data reproduced from Geyer, Jambeck, and Law (2017). 1939 and 1945 estimates 




 An inexcusable footnote to the Hanford legacy is the forced displacement of Native Americans in the area (Atomic Heritage 
Foundation, 2017), and possible legacy effects on the Columbia River Gorge from poor containment of early waste storage. 
119
 Nuclear processing appears to have expanded to other sites in the Russian Federation in recent years. However, Russian or any 
other domestic policy – particularly secretive ones – does not necessarily match social preferences. 
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A1.4 Description of SIC Code 4953: Refuse Systems and Number of New Firms 
This appendix reports the definition of refuse systems (waste management firms) and 
the number of new firms reported in Orbis. Verbatim from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.display?id=955&tab=description): 
4953 Refuse Systems  
Establishments primarily engaged in the collection and disposal of refuse by 
processing or destruction or in the operation of incinerators, waste treatment 
plants, landfills, or other sites for disposal of such materials. Establishments 
primarily engaged in collecting and transporting refuse without such disposal are 
classified in Transportation, Industry 4212.  
• Acid waste, collection and disposal of  
• Ashes, collection and disposal of  
• Dumps, operation of  
• Garbage: collecting, destroying, and processing  
• Hazardous waste material disposal sites  
• Incinerator operation  
• Landfill, sanitary: operation of  
• Radioactive waste materials, disposal of  
• Refuse systems  
• Rubbish collection and disposal  
• Sludge disposal sites  
• Street refuse systems  




TABLE 24 — ESTIMATES OF NEW WASTE MANAGEMENT FIRMS IN THE EU BY YEAR 
 New Firms  New Firms  New Firms  New Firms 
1799 1 1916 3 1950 26 1984 346 
1827 1 1917 2 1951 21 1985 396 
1832 1 1918 1 1952 20 1986 388 
1848 1 1919 5 1953 19 1987 439 
1856 1 1920 4 1954 66 1988 577 
1866 1 1921 5 1955 46 1989 647 
1867 1 1922 6 1956 55 1990 956 
1868 2 1923 4 1957 58 1991 1257 
1875 1 1924 2 1958 46 1992 1308 
1878 1 1925 4 1959 37 1993 1406 
1880 1 1926 4 1960 46 1994 1406 
1887 1 1927 4 1961 37 1995 1508 
1888 1 1928 10 1962 52 1996 1510 
1890 4 1929 22 1963 39 1997 1621 
1891 1 1930 5 1964 102 1998 1672 
1893 1 1931 2 1965 75 1999 1708 
1895 1 1932 3 1966 75 2000 1995 
1896 2 1933 9 1967 65 2001 2015 
1897 1 1934 10 1968 161 2002 2371 
1898 1 1935 8 1969 101 2003 2584 
1899 6 1936 4 1970 124 2004 2831 
1900 4 1937 13 1971 106 2005 3080 
1902 2 1938 2 1972 118 2006 3319 
1904 2 1939 6 1973 184 2007 3688 
1906 1 1940 12 1974 180 2008 3760 
1907 2 1941 4 1975 131 2009 3861 
1908 1 1942 6 1976 160 2010 4352 
1909 1 1943 1 1977 169 2011 4476 
1910 2 1944 5 1978 185 2012 4721 
1911 2 1945 11 1979 250 2013 4987 
1912 1 1946 15 1980 233 2014 4660 
1913 2 1947 15 1981 217 2015 4426 
1914 2 1948 17 1982 251 2016 4255 
1915 26 1949 23 1983 371 2017 4171 
      2018 3692 
Notes: Number of new SIC code 4953: Refuse Systems firms in Europe from the first record in 1799 through 2018. 
These are summed by year of the date of incorporation for firms within the countries that would eventually comprise 
the 28 member European Union. A substantial increase in global plastic production coincides with the growth in 
waste management firms post-World War II. The second phase of even more rapid growth begins in the 1970s with 
the recycling revolution. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from Orbis accessed on March 3rd, 2019. 
 
A1.5 Nuclear Power Plant Construction Permit Approvals, 1955-2018 
This appendix supports Figure 9 by reporting the share of commercial nuclear reactor 
construction permits approved and the nuclear share of U.S. energy sector output spanning 
the full history of civilian nuclear power. 1955-2011 data are from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, supplemented by 2012-2018 data from the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Substantial public outcry follows the Three-Mile Island 
accident in 1979 and subsequently increased regulatory measures were put in place. Zero 
new construction permits are then taken to the approval stage for over three decades. 
289 
 





Operable units Permanently 
shut down 
Share of energy 
production (per cent) 
 
1955 1 0 0 0 0  
1956 3 0 0 0 0  
1957 1 1 1 0 0  
1958 0 0 1 0 0  
1959 3 1 2 0 0  
1960 7 1 3 0 0.1  
1961 0 0 3 0 0.2  
1962 1 6 9 0 0.3  
1963 1 2 11 1 0.3  
1964 3 3 13 1 0.3  
1965 1 0 13 0 0.3  
1966 5 2 14 1 0.5  
1967 14 3 15 2 0.6  
1968 23 0 13 1 0.9  
1969 7 4 17 0 1  
1970 10 3 20 1 1.4  
1971 4 2 22 0 2.4  
1972 8 6 27 2 3.1  
1973 14 15 42 0 4.5  
1974 23 15 55 2 6.1  
1975 9 2 57 0 9  
1976 9 7 63 1 9.4  
1977 15 4 67 0 11.8  
1978 13 4 70 1 12.5  
1979 2 0 69 1 11.3 Three-Mile Island 
incident 1980 0 2 71 0 11 i cident 
 1981 0 4 75 0 11.9 (March 28th) 
1982 0 4 78 1 12.6  
1983 0 3 81 0 12.7  
1984 0 6 87 0 13.5  
1985 0 9 96 0 15.5  
1986 0 5 101 0 16.6  
1987 0 8 107 1 17.7  
1988 0 2 109 0 19.5  
1989 0 4 111 3 17.8  
1990 0 2 112 0 19  
1991 0 0 111 1 19.9  
1992 0 0 109 2 20.1  
1993 0 1 110 0 19.1  
1994 0 0 109 0 19.7  
1995 0 0 109 0 20.1  
1996 0 1 109 3 19.6  
1997 0 0 107 2 18  
1998 0 0 104 1 18.6  
1999 0 0 104 0 19.7  
2000 0 0 104 0 19.8  
2001 0 0 104 0 20.6  
2002 0 0 104 0 20.2  
2003 0 0 104 0 19.7  
2004 0 0 104 0 19.9  
2005 0 0 104 0 19.3  
2006 0 0 104 0 19.4  
2007 0 0 104 0 19.4  
2008 0 0 104 0 19.6  
2009 0 0 104 0 20.2  
2010 0 0 104 0 19.6  
2011 0 0 104 0 19.3  
2012 2 0 104 0 19  
2013 0 0 100 4 19.4  
2014 0 0 99 1 19.5  
2015 1 0 99 0 19.6  
2016 3 0 99 0 19.8  
2017 1 0 99 0 20  
2018 1 0 98 1 19.3  
Notes: U.S. nuclear power plant construction and operating permits, functional power plants, and share of national 
energy production. Building permits issued exceeds the number of power plants because not all are completed. 
Following the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident, several were completed but no new building permits issued for three 
decades. The number of sites has since declined, and those nearing retirements are unlikely to be replaced. 
Sources: Data reproduced from Energy Information Administration (1955-2011) and United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (2012-2018). 
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A2.1 Improving Recyclability Through Standardisation Auctions 
In this section I outline a second approach to the recycling problem. This method is more 
applicable when the interest is instead to standardise an entire waste stream. This approach, 
while possibly very interesting to consider, is outlined in the appendix rather than the main 
body because the applicable policy instrument that I arrive at is fairly well-known. I show 
that one efficient approach is to institute a Vickrey-style auction over the right to an 
industry’s product or packaging design, as applicable. So, a complex – even intractable –
problem may find a solution in an existing and thoroughly studied instrument. 
In some cases, standardisation across firms in an industry might prove more effective in 
reducing recycling costs. Suppose the issue is not the number of materials in a product and 
their separability. Rather, the stream of materials is indistinguishable at an acceptable cost. 
As an example, the most common plastic bottle material, PET, is easily distinguished from 
HDPE and PP caps and lids.120 PET sinks in water (density versus water of 1.33-1.39) while 
HDPE (0.94-0.97) and PP (0.93-0.94) are buoyant (Aguado and Serrano, 1999). HDPE and 
PP, however, are difficult to distinguish from each other in processing rates that are 
economical despite having substantially higher value when separated than mixed. Even 
differences within a plastic class, for instance between different PP bottle compositions, 
can hinder recyclability (Eriksen, Christiansen, Daugaard, and Astrup, 2019). 
We might attempt to modify the prior framework – instead of N materials within a 
product, consider N materials across industries producing similar items. However, the issue 
at hand is markedly different as contamination by just a few firms who disagree with the 
policy cancels out the efforts of all others. Instead, industry requires a framework to reach 
universal agreement on a standard. This calls for efficient industry standardisation through 
a redistribution auction. 
Unfortunately, the conditions where industry standardisation occurs spontaneously are 
stringent. Ostrom (1990) lists conditions common in communities reaching agreement 
without state intervention based on hundreds of case studies, and Coase (1960) outlines the 
difficult set of conditions for an agreement. The most evident takeaways from Ostrom and 
Coase are that spontaneous order is rare and takes substantial effort to maintain. 
Furthermore, even if industry recognises an innovation as unequivocally beneficial, the rate 
of technological change might be unacceptably slow and unpredictable (see a within-firm 
case study by Carlson, slow industry adoption over seven-decades by Snowden, and a case 
 
120
 And occasionally PET and polyethene (polyethylene) (PE) caps and lids. 
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of industry failure to adopt altogether by Calomiris, in Coordination and Information, 
1995). The state might instead require a more immediate industry change yet seek to 
preserve the industry’s expertise in devising an appropriate standard and then require its 
universal adoption.  
It might be optimal for producers to adopt a single standard, e.g. HDPE or PP for all 
bottle caps, more efficient to raise a tax for development of efficient sorting means, or more 
efficient for firms to opt-out of the problem altogether by removing their product from the 
market or make them markedly distinguishable, e.g. HDPE and PP caps in different shapes. 
Here I contribute to the first option – efficiently choosing an industry standard, and address 
how to choose one by pairing auction and redistribution mechanisms. 
A2.1.1 Finding an Efficient Industry Standard and Defining Evaluation Criteria 
Suppose the goal is to standardise an industry, and on the advice of Ostrom, Coase, and 
the observation that standardisation has not already occurred, the regulator does not expect 
an industry to standardise without intervention. Note that many forms of potentially 
recyclable refuse, e.g. bottles, labels, and bottle caps, are differentiated for marketing 
purposes because firms receive an advantage from customer recognition. Despite the firm’s 
private benefit from product differentiation through marketing, due to the severity of the 
environmental impact of nonrecycled waste, the regulator decides to set a standard.121 
Deciding to set a standard does not inform on what the standard should be, however. 
Moreover, unlike standards in the sense of quantity limitations, product standardisation is 
multidimensional, and a regulator is less appropriately informed than industry to decide. 
Society would benefit from a mechanism by which industry itself decides a standard 
meeting basic recyclability and efficiency criteria. 
Standardisation of materials entering the recycling stream is important because even 
small shares of impurities markedly reduce the value of recycled material. To have a 
familiar language, let us continue to suppose we want to improve the recyclability of bottle 
caps. The goal is to ensure all bottle caps are the same, but leave their design, within reason, 
to the industry through a decision process.122 The example of bottle caps is particularly 
 
121
 Weitzman (1974) discusses when a price versus quantity-based regulation is more efficient. Here I do not intend that we reduce 
quantity at all, but rather standardize an industry’s product. There is an all-or-nothing quality to success in the current scenario, and so 
neither a tax nor quantity regulation is applicable. Rather, I propose a framework for industry to choose a specification-based standard. 
122
 “Within reason” means that industry be allowed to design the product through some industry decision process, but the result is 
constrained to meeting some minimum requirements on recyclability. 
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fitting because they are entirely recyclable, but one of the barriers to profitable recycling is 
the cost of sorting their variety into differentiated lots. 
I present a simple case: Suppose we only require a uniform (standardised) product –
recyclability concerns beyond homogeneity are not within the scope of this analysis. 
Further, there is a strict all or nothing nature to the problem – any heterogeneity makes all 
units of the waste unprofitable to recycle. This condition makes the problem different from 
the chapters of this thesis and many environmental problems where marginal changes in 
pollution levels have value. Here, heterogeneity results in entire lots of waste not being 
recycled and instead released into the environment with uncertain, long-term, and negative 
consequences. 
For structure, volumes of the material to be regulated are 𝑎𝑖 > 0 for all firms in the 
industry, 𝑖 = 1: 𝑁, such that ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑎 and I scale to firm market shares, 
𝑎𝑖
𝑎




𝑠𝑁 such that ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑠 = 1. Each share 𝑠𝑖 is associated with a product type 𝓈𝑖 differing 
by firm in a fully differentiated market. Alternatively, we may view 𝑠𝑖’s as groups of firms 
within a market that share a product design and coordinate to influence regulation. Suppose 
firms and market shares already exist – that the regulator seeks to apply a standard to an 
existing market. As with many environmental problems, the regulator seeks to correct an 
environmental problem occurring from a perhaps longstanding production tradition. That 
is, we do not realize there is going to be an environmental problem until it occurs. As a 
matter of expositional efficiency, I rank market shares from the largest, 𝑠1,  to smallest, 𝑠𝑁. 
Initially also suppose perfect information about and between firms – everyone knows each 
other’s market shares and costs of changing product type. Also suppose that 𝑠𝑖’s are stable 
and that small changes in cost do not lead to substantial changes in market share. Finally, 
assume initially that there are no fixed costs to changing product types and the relevant 
marginal cost, in the sense of being dependent on 𝑠𝑖, of changing to another type is a 
constant, shorthanded 𝑐(𝓈𝑖 → 𝓈𝑗) = 𝑐 for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, and comparisons of 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑠𝑗, 𝑐𝑠𝑖 to 𝑐𝑠𝑗, 
and 𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑖 to 𝑎𝑐𝑠𝑗 are equivalent for any scalars c, a. An implication is that if standard 
monitoring and enforcement costs are per-unit and uniform, we can disregard them in this 
calculation. 
One depiction of industry and the costs of switching product types is presented in Figure 
38. If all firms switch to an entirely different standard, 𝓈𝑜, 𝑜 ∉ 1:𝑁, then the total cost of 
industry compliance is ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑐
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑐 ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑐. But industry can achieve a uniform, 
ceteris paribus more recyclable product at a lower cost than enforcing a wholly foreign 
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standard that does not match any existing firm’s product type. Since setting the industry 
standard as any firm i’s type allows that firm to avoid cost 𝑐𝑠𝑖, choosing any 𝓈𝑖 achieves 
homogeneity at a lower cost than by choosing 𝓈𝑜. Further, 
(49) 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1) ≤ 𝑐(1 − 𝑠2) ≤ ⋯  ≤ 𝑐(1 − 𝑠𝑁) ≤ 𝑐 
 
and with strict inequalities whenever market shares are not equal. So, for an industry 
where firm 𝑖 = 1 has at least as much market share as any other, a least cost, efficient 
solution is to set the industry standard to an industry modal product type such as 𝓈 = 𝓈1. 
The cost to the industry of change is then 𝑐∗ = 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1). 
 
 
FIGURE 38. INDUSTRY MODEL WITH UNIFORM MARGINAL COST OF CHANGE 
Notes: Representation of the entire industry as market shares 𝑠𝑖  of different product types 𝓈𝑖 for all 𝑖 = 1: 𝑁. The 
marginal cost of changing product type is c such that the cost for the entire industry to change to an outside option, 
𝓈0, is c. If a standard is set to 𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖, then 𝑐𝑖 = 0, else 𝓈 ≠ 𝓈𝑗, then 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑐𝑠𝑗(𝓈𝑗). I order shares from largest to 
smallest which has no corresponding relevance in the real world so choosing the standard at the ½ mark is arbitrary. 
It is immediate that choosing 𝓈1 results in the least industry cost, 𝑐
∗
= 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1) which is an efficient solution. 
 
However, all firms 𝑖 ≠ 1 have reason to oppose standardisation to 𝓈1 as each incurs cost 
𝑐𝑠𝑖 that the industry leader avoids. Further, unless 𝑠1 ≥
1
2
, the savings to firm 𝑖 = 1 cannot 
be sufficient to offset the cost to all other firms, not that the industry leader has a unilateral, 
unprompted incentive to offer recompense anyway. By just choosing 𝓈1, the regulator picks 
policy winners and losers and may attempt to do so against prohibitive levels of opposition. 
So, at a minimum, the regulator should consider policy mechanisms that usually allow 
industry to arrive at the efficient solution on their own. We should also compare policy 
alternatives using some rational criteria that capture the competing interests of firms and 
the public. I emphasise three often-used criteria to judge competing policies: efficiency, 
political feasibility (shorthand: feasibility), and equitability.  
An advantage is that we begin with the knowledge that an efficient policy is one that 
results in 𝓈 = 𝓈1 which is the standard set to a modal product type (here Firm 1’s type). In 
comparison, the most feasible policy is the solution that minimises opposition to setting an 
𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖. We might set opposition in terms of cost – a rational perspective – as 𝑐𝑠𝑖’s and then 
𝑠1(𝓈1) 𝑠2(𝓈2) 𝑠3(𝓈3) 𝑠𝑁(𝓈𝑁) 







discuss in terms of shares.123 In this sense, too, setting 𝓈 = 𝓈1 minimises total industry 
opposition, but by satisfying only one firm – the largest. We might also measure opposition 
as the number of firms that must pay at all to convert. In this all-or-nothing perspective, 
setting 𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖 for any i without compensation to firms 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 are equally worse than any 
alternative except setting 𝓈 = 𝓈𝑜. The appropriateness of these feasibility measures, which 
I call type I and II, is specific to industry lobbying behaviour. The most equitable solution, 
in comparison, is one where the post-policy marginal cost paid is equal between firms, that 
𝛼1𝑐 = 𝛼2𝑐 = ⋯ = 𝛼𝑁𝑐 for policy prescription 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑁. This may also be referred to 
as the envy-free state – the prescription where no firm prefers the per-unit cost of converting 
that any of their competitors must pay. Weaker measures are sometimes appropriate. We 
might consider whether a policy is revenue neutral – whether the revenue collected from 
firms stays within the industry or is captured or supplemented by the state. Setting 𝓈 = 𝓈1 
is efficient and maximises type I feasibility, but alone does nothing to address equitability 
nor type II feasibility. It is also revenue neutral as no money has changed hands. I now 
compare some alternative mechanisms using these criteria against the regulator picking a 
winner. 
Two immediate alternatives are to choose the mean or median product type. Suppose we 
randomly assign the standard – equivalently hold a lottery. One method is an unweighted 
lottery where each firm receives one ticket of equal probability of winning, then 







𝑖=1 = 1, and 𝑃𝑟(𝓈 ≠ 𝓈𝑖) = (1 −
1
𝑁
). For the unweight (u) lottery, the 
expected industry cost is, 𝐸 [𝑐𝑈|𝑃𝑟(𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖) =
1
𝑁
] = 𝑐 (1 −
1
𝑁
) > 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1) = 𝑐
∗ unless 
all firms have equal market share, then this is met with equality as the median would equal 
an industry mode as well as the mean.124 Alternatively, suppose the lottery is weighted (w) 
by share – the value of each firm’s ticket is in proportion to their market share. Then, 
𝑃𝑟(𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑃𝑟(𝓈 ≠ 𝓈𝑖) = 1 − 𝑠𝑖, and recall ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑠 = 1. Then, 𝐸[𝑐
𝑤|𝑃𝑟(𝓈 =
𝓈𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖] = 𝑐(1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ) > 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1) = 𝑐
∗.125 Again, if all firms hold equal market 
share, this relation is instead met with equality as the mean would equal an industry mode 
and the median. In both cases the expected total conversion cost of outright setting standard 
𝓈 = 𝓈1 is less than if we set by a lottery. In addition to not addressing feasibility and equity 
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 This is a simplification, there are likely differences between the cost of switching and willingness to pay to avoid switching in 
practice (e.g. funding lobbying efforts). 
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𝑖=1 = 𝑐 −
1
𝑁
𝑐 = 𝑐 (1 −
1
𝑁
) > 𝑐(1 − 𝑠1) = 𝑐
∗. 
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 Note 𝐸[𝑐𝑤|𝑃𝑟(𝓈 = 𝓈𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖] = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑐(𝑠 − 𝑠𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑠
𝑁
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑐𝑠 ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑁
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2𝑁
𝑖=1 = 𝑐(𝑠
2 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ) =
𝑐(1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁




concerns, we find these lotteries are unlikely to be efficient. Small firms – those where 𝑠𝑖 <
1
𝑁
, however, are in particular more likely to support the unweighted lottery because it 
provides a larger probability that their type is chosen and thus, their expected cost is lower. 
Nevertheless, the odds are stacked against any one firm, and in addition to being inefficient, 
total expected type I feasibility decreases while equitability is unchanged. 
We might also suppose a process akin to visually selecting the median and choose the 
product type at the ½ share mark. One issue is that there is no natural reason why firms are 




they are the market leader, and if we suppose market share is a naturally continuous concept 
as depicted for convenience – which it is not – then choosing the median results in the 
efficient solution. We should otherwise accept the ordering and depiction is arbitrary, 
though convenient, and that choosing the firm at the ½ mark is another form of lottery by 
market share. 
A2.1.2 Regulating Industry with Paired Auction and Redistribution Mechanisms 
What the regulator requires is a mechanism that allows industry itself to choose a 
standard, preferably efficiently. The lack of standardisation without intervention suggests 
there are barriers to this process. One issue is that standardisation requires all but one firm 
to accept an expense to standardise. Another is that firms are in competition and would not 
want to give away competitive advantage, either in knowledge, advertising potential, or 
market position to competitors. The mechanism needs to aggregate firm preferences 
without incurring large transaction costs while protecting the privacy of firm valuations. 
Open bargaining between several firms clearly does not meet these requirements. However, 
a variety of auction mechanisms exist that would allow industry to choose a product type 
endogenously. Some of these preserve bidder privacy – through sealed bids – and can be 
conducted with low transaction costs. Surely some forms of auction are more desirable than 
a regulator picking winners and losers or using chance. Collecting auction revenue, for 
instance, provides an opportunity to explore to what extent both feasibility and equitability 
measures can be improved. 
To be clear, I explore an auction to choose the industry standard. That is, the winning 
firm specifies aspects of the product that eventually enters the recycling stream, and all 
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producers in the industry then use this product design.126 This process clearly requires non-
excludability – that no competitor can be excluded from using the design. Allowing 
excludability, instead, assigns monopoly rights to a firm, and as such, every firm would 
have the same bid amount – the monopolist’s value of the entire industry. With these 
conditions in place, I provide a very brief review of the auction literature, explore bidding 
mechanisms that should result in the efficient solution 𝓈 = 𝓈1, and then discuss how the 
revenue can be used to address the other desirability criteria. 
A2.1.2.1 A Briefest Review of the Auction Literature 
It is fashionable to observe that the earliest surviving, Western, record of auctions occurs 
in the 5th century BC (Herodotus, 1824 trans.) which is also around the time of the first 
surviving recorded instance of random allocation by drawing lots (Leviticus 16:8, King 
James Version). It is also fashionable to note that auctions have occasionally found use at 
points of great historical importance, e.g. the auctioning of the Roman empire in 193 AD 
(Hekster and Zair, 2008). However, the study of allocation by chance, within the study of 
probability theory, received earlier substantive theoretical interest beginning in the 16th 
century (Hacking, 2013). Auctions, in comparison, did not receive substantive theoretical 
treatment until the 1960’s (Cassady, 1967). We might trace modern interest in auction 
theory specifically to Vickrey’s (1961) study of second-price sealed-bid auctions which I 
will show are, here too, half of an efficient solution to optimal standard selection that also 
addresses other criteria.  
Many auction mechanisms have been explored since 1961 from Vickrey’s game-
theoretic perspective. See Klemperer (1999) for a survey, Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) 
for important theoretical contributions, and Milgrom (2012) for an analysis of several 
examples. The auction literature includes propositions to address environmental problems 
specifically too. The auction of tradeable emissions permits receives substantial interest. 
See an early proposal to use a Vickrey auction in Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980) 
to get firms to reveal their true costs of abatement, or a recent discussion of alternatives in 
He and Chen (2014). But proposals and applications have been found in many other 
environmental areas, e.g. optimal allocation of the commons (Montero, 2008), maintaining 
renewable natural capital quality (Teytelboym, 2019), and conservation auctions to 
preserve biodiversity (de Vries and Hanley, 2016). The theory supporting the combination 
of auctions and paired revenue redistributions has been explored at length in, for example, 
 
126
 So, we must continue to require some minimum recyclability aspect of the product. 
297 
 
Green and Laffont (1979) as an early yet comprehensive work. Porter, Shoham, and 
Tennenholtz (2004) also provide an intuitive introduction to auction redistributions with 
similar criteria to the ones I propose. The auction I propose is, albeit, roughly backwards 
of Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz’s mechanism. The other agents (firms) in their setting 
pay (uniformly) for the most efficient firm to complete some task. Here instead, I propose 
the firm that would incur the greatest loss from performing a task bids to win such that it 
pays all other firms in the industry through an auction revenue redistribution to complete it 
instead. This task might be viewed as a “bad” by industry members as their participation in 
the auction takes the form of bids to avoid a greater loss. Moulin (2010) provides a proof 
that “goods” and “bads” can be handled equivalently in a Vickrey auction – rather than the 
firm with the highest valuation receiving the good, we search among agents by comparing 
disutility’s. 
Close parallels also occur in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) and applied 
computing. Cavallo (2006) initiated a wave of interest in the field by proposing a Vickrey 
auction paired with a redistribution to all participants of a form we might trace back to 
Bailey (1997). See, for example, Guo and Conitzer (2008) on the dominance of Vickrey 
auction-Bailey redistributions versus other auction forms, Guo and Conitzer (2010) on the 
efficiency of Bailey type redistribution mechanisms versus other forms, and efforts to 
overcome the budget balance issue without losing efficiency or making other compromises 
in Mishra and Sharma (2018). AI, applied computing, and similar applications occur in 
settings where enriching an external party through auction revenue – generally the seller of 
a good or the state – has no useful equivalent. Rather, the goal is to allocate efficiently and 
redistribute auction revenue within the system (here industry) while retaining the auction’s 
strategy-proof quality – the concept that players (here firms) report their true value of the 
item being auctioned to the auction mechanism. 
I add to the auction-redistribution literature by first outlining a paired auction and 
distribution mechanism resulting in an efficient allocation under the conditions of the 
preceding section. I then find the industry conditions necessary for efficient allocation 
without more intrusive intervention. I then relate the framework to auctions with more 
realistic information and industry structural assumptions – the result is proposing a 
Vickrey-type auction to overcome, foremost, informational constraints, followed by a 
redistribution of the winning bid to all other firms to offset conversion costs. 
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A2.1.2.2 A Paired Loss Avoidance Auction and Redistribution  
 I continue with the preceding industry and perfect information structure. Suppose a first-
price auction is held for the right to industry’s standard. Each firm has a private valuation 
of the loss they incur if the industry does not standardise to their type, 𝑣𝑖(𝓈𝑖)|𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 =
𝑐𝑠𝑖(𝓈𝑖), such that, dispensing with the 𝓈𝑖 type notation, 𝑣1 ≥ 𝑣2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑣𝑁, which are 
related by strict inequalities whenever market shares are not equal. Alternatively, the value 
to a firm of retaining their type as the industry standard is zero, 𝑣𝑖(𝓈𝑖)|𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 0. 
Tautologically the cost of changing their type to the industry standard when their type is 
already the industry standard is zero. The potential payoffs to i with bid 𝑏𝑖 in this loss 
avoidance auction are then127 
(50) 𝑝𝑖 = {
−𝑏𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖 > 𝑏𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠)
−𝑐𝑠𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑏𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠)
 
 
Firm i receives a higher payoff from winning when −𝑏𝑖 > −𝑐𝑠𝑖 and so bids up to 𝑐𝑠𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖. 
With knowledge of the payoff functions of all other firms, we expect bid 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 𝑐𝑠𝑗 for 𝑖 < 𝑗 
as I rank firms by market share, and expect Firm 1 to place the winning bid of 𝑏1 = 𝑐𝑠2 
(plus some nearly zero tiebreaking amount, ). If firms bid above their cost of transitioning 
to the standard, they risk incurring a larger loss. But also, firms recognise that their 
competitors, including their next closest smaller competitor lose more if they bid more than 
their own transition costs as well. Each firm, including Firm 1, then chooses the least bid 
from the interval 𝑐𝑠𝑖 ≥ 𝑏𝑖 ≥  𝑐𝑠𝑖+1, and so chooses 𝑏𝑖 =  𝑐𝑠𝑖+1 (plus ). 
Even without a redistribution mechanism, the process remains efficient because Firm 1 
has the highest valuation and bids to win such that 𝓈 = 𝓈1 results – the type adopted across 
the industry is again the modal type. It remains politically infeasible and inequitable, 
however, and all firms 𝑖 ≠ 1 oppose it on the grounds of conversion costs and loss of 
advantage to Firm 1. Winning Firm 1 might also oppose it because they are paying for the 
right to keep using their design, which is already theirs by trademark, copyright, patent, or 
tradition. However, Firm 1 might also support the framework when they gain an advantage 
from industry transition. Their per-unit cost of industry transformation – in the form of their 
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 That is, the resulting conditional or dependent valuation and payment (bid) pairs, (𝑣𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖), in the function 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖  are 




, and is unimportant to the greater discussion. 
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bid paid – is less than or equal to that of any other firm in the form of the incurred cost of 
changing to the standard product type. 
To address equity and feasibility – but sometimes risking efficiency in the process – 
consider a market-share weighted redistribution of the winning bid to the rest of the 
industry. Since (1 − 𝑠1) = (𝑠2 + 𝑠3 +⋯+ 𝑠𝑁), the market shares, excluding Firm 1 as the 
winning bidder, are of the form 
𝑠𝑖≠1
1−𝑠1
 and share-weighted distributions are 
(51) 𝜆𝑖 = 𝑐𝑠2 (
𝑠𝑖
1−𝑠1
) , 𝑖 ≠ 1. 
 
Knowing (or being able to conjecture) on the market shares of firms is a substantial 
advantage in determining fair redistributions. In other settings, the practitioner cannot 
determine any equivalent of this measure. In addition to causing mathematical complexity 
during analysis, distribution weights must often be suggested of symmetric size, 𝜆𝑖 = 𝜆 =
1
𝑁
 for all N firms involved in the redistribution as a best guess of sorts. See, for example, 
Bailey (1997), Cavallo (2006), Green and Laffont (1979), and Porter, Shoham, and 
Tennenholtz (2004). In comparison to an 
𝑠𝑖≠1
1−𝑠1
 distribution, one of size 1𝑁 is undesirable for 
large, but not small firms which might even receive a profit from converting. 
But then, in this setting I must ask whether it is ever the case that Firm 1 does not prefer 
to win and instead have their conversion costs partially offset by a competitor. Suppose 
Firm 1 follows a min-max strategy – minimise the maximum cost another firm’s actions 




) − 𝑐𝑠1 when another firm, w, wins and Firm 1 receives a distribution of 
w’s bid. Consistent with the min-max assumption, Firm 1 believes Firm 2 will bid to win 
and Firm 1 expects the payoff to be  
(52) 𝑝1 = {




) − 𝑐𝑠1,  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 1 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 2 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠
 
 
I compare these payoffs to determine when the market structure – the shares of firms – 
results in Firm 1 bidding to win. From −𝑐𝑠2 > 𝑏2 (
𝑠1
1−𝑠2
) − 𝑐𝑠1,  









is required for Firm 1 to bid 𝑏1 > 𝑏2. That is, 𝑠1 must be at least large enough that Firm 1, 
with such beliefs over 𝑏2, prefers to win rather than take a share-weighted distribution of 
Firm 2’s bid but pay the rest of their own conversion cost. Also consistent with a min-max 
strategy, Firm 1 bids as though they believe Firm 2 will asymmetrically bid 𝑏2 = 𝑐𝑠2. Then, 
the two largest market shares must satisfy 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 (
1−𝑠2
1−2𝑠2
). On the other end of the 
spectrum, Firm 1 believes Firm 2 to follow a symmetric strategy and bid 𝑏2 = 𝑐𝑠3, then  





which requires information on the size of the three largest firms. Notice that these functions 
are increasing in 𝑠2, and 𝑠2 and 𝑠3, respectively – the alternative values of taking a pay-out 
increases for Firm 1. Suppose 𝑠3 = 1 − 𝑠1 − 𝑠2, a triopoly, then 𝑠1 > √𝑠2(1 − 𝑠2) is 
required. A plot of the market structure required for the efficient solution to emerge is 
illustrated in Figure 39. It illustrates, as a set of level curves, the minimum required 𝑠1 size 
for different conjectures on Firm 2’s bidding behaviour and Firm 2’s market size – the 
minimum conditions for an efficient solution to result without more complex state 
intervention. Focussing on the min-max strategy, I note along the blue line the minimum 











 is required. As an alternative for comparison, suppose that Firm 1 













 is sufficient to result in an efficient solution (if 





FIGURE 39. MINIMAL MARKET STRUCTURE FOR AN EFFICIENT BID STRATEGY 
Notes: Level sets of the minimum size of the largest firm, Firm 1, based on the second largest, Firm 2, in the industry 
that is required for Firm 1 to bid to win. If Firm 1 uses a min-max strategy (minimise the maximum loss that other 
firms can force them to incur), Firm 1 must be at least as large as the values on the blue line for any Firm 2 market 
share on the horizontal axis. If Firm 1 instead supposes that Firm 2 has a symmetric strategy to their own, the 
alternative payoff to Firm 1 – the share they receive of Firm 2’s bid revenue – decreases. In the case of a triopoly, 
the additional maximum constraint as the red line occurs. I also illustrate an alternative conjecture that Firm 2 bids 
half their value (orange line) which is also the relevant conjecture if Firm 1 believes Firm 2 to follow a symmetric 





Figure 40 re-illustrates the market structure where the efficient solution results when 
Firm 1 follows a min-max strategy. These are the minimum market shares for Firm 1, given 
Firm 2, under which Firm 1 intends to win. We observe that as the size of Firm 2 increases, 
a decreasing variety of industry arrangements results in the efficient solution. As industry 






FIGURE 40. MARKET SHARES RESULTING IN EFFICIENT BIDS UNDER MIN-MAX STRATEGY 
Notes: Market structure leading to an efficient solution (𝓈 = 𝓈1) if Firm 1 assumes a min-max strategy. The 
minimum Firm 1 market share necessary (red line) increases as the alternative value – a redistribution share of 
another firm’s (Firm 2’s) winning bid increases. In the duopolistic case, 𝑠2 ≤
1
3
 is required for the efficient solution 
to emerge without further bid and distribution structure. 
 
Additional intervention can overcome market structural bounds. I have previously noted 
that researchers have proposed a redistribution weight of 𝜆 =
1
𝑁
 when no equivalent of 
market shares can be determined. Montero (2008) also proposes a framework that includes 
the winning bidder in a more complex redistribution scheme. Such modifications, in effect, 
result in different effective market shares in the distribution and lose either revenue 
neutrality or progress on other criteria in the process. It is also a minor point to extend the 
framework to idiosyncratic marginal costs. Suppose 𝑐 > 0 is the share of marginal costs 
common to all firms in the industry, let 𝑐𝑖 > 0 be firm i specific marginal costs, and 𝑠?̅? > 0 
be firm i’s unweighted market share. Let 𝑠𝑖 = (1 +
𝑐𝑖
𝑐
) 𝑠?̅? and the preceding framework 
holds. 
Maintaining an unmodified structure, when 𝓈 = 𝓈1, industry retains maximum type I 
feasibility when the auction redistributes all of Firm 1’s bid to Firms 2:𝑁. But, with a 
redistribution, we instead have an industry where perhaps all firms oppose the standard and 
type II feasibility is zero because everyone pays, albeit less than with no redistribution 
mechanism at all.128 One possible outcome is that a coalition or cartel of firms organises to 
disrupt any efforts to decide on or enforce an industry standard. 
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 With the exception of the preceding duopoly case. 




















The impact on equitability is more promising as it must improve with redistribution. 
Importantly, Cavallo (2006) emphasises the separability of bid and redistribution 
mechanisms – if the bid is efficient and Nash, distributional concerns can be considered 
independently. Observe when the regulator assigns the standard to any firm i without 
redistribution, 𝛼𝑖 = 0 and all 𝛼𝑗≠𝑖 = 1. But in the auction mechanism, suppose the market 
structure is such that Firm 1 wins. For Firm 1, 𝛼1𝑐 = −
𝑐𝑠2
𝑠1







 from their bid and share weighted distribution and adjustment costs, 
respectively. Then redistribution weights are 𝛼1 = −
𝑠2
𝑠1
 and 𝛼𝑖≠1 = 𝑠1 + 𝑠2 − 1. Setting 
𝛼1 = 𝛼𝑖≠1, full equitability occurs with industry structure such that 𝑠2 =
𝑠1(1−𝑠1)
1+𝑠1
 which can 






). Discovering the market 
structure resulting in equitability is more academic than practical, however. In practice, if 
a regulator prefers equitability and is willing to risk efficiency, they might prefer to 









) 𝑐𝑠𝑖 to losing firms. It is shown in Green and Laffont (1979) that 
equivalent measures to efficiency, feasibility, and equitability are traded off in the pursuit 
of a balanced budget. This has also been explored in, for instance, AI and applied 
computing in Guo and Conitzer (2008). 
Unfortunately, the perfect information assumption is not entirely realistic either. I now 
observe parallels between the outlined process and a Vickrey type auction with imperfect 
information. 
A2.1.2.3 Using a Vickrey Auction-Redistribution with Imperfect Information 
Experience tells us that when we move to the practice of environmental policy, the perfect 
information assumption, alternatively assuming truthful reporting, must be discarded. We 
instead prefer mechanisms that compel truthful reporting by making it in each relevant 
participant’s interest to do so and which still results in an efficient solution. While there are 
several auction types, the second price sealed bid (SPSB) Vickrey auction can be designed 
as a loss avoidance auction which generally arrives at the same solution as the preceding 
framework despite imperfect information. In this section, I explore how a Vickrey auction 




Tailored to this application, in the Vickrey auction we expect each firm to bid 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑐𝑠𝑖, 
expect to pay 𝑐𝑠𝑖+1 if they win, and the winner to be Firm 1. But with the loss of perfect 
information, I must assess whether firms are likely to have accurate estimates of 
competitor’s bids to bid accordingly, or whether they must resort to another strategy. This 
difference is vital because we have observed market structures in the perfect information 
version where Firm 1 is better off bidding to lose and receive a redistribution share instead. 
As firms in an industry requiring regulation of this sort are potentially large and established, 
I find it unlikely that the largest – those ranking first or second in an industry – would be 
unaware of their market share and that of their largest competitors. With cost, too, I believe 
it misguided to assume leading firms do not have a decent idea of their closest competitor’s 
costs, and at a minimum, would conjecture their competitor’s costs are not unlike their own. 
When we believe firms to be confident in their estimates of their competitor’s position, the 
possibility of Firm 1 bidding to lose remains. When instead there is substantial uncertainty, 
we might expect operators to always bid 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑐𝑠𝑖 – the standard Vickrey result – and an 
element of certainty in how firms act emerges from market uncertainty. 
In feasibility, we should not expect type I to change when firms expect the efficient 
solution to emerge from the Vickrey auction, as it is also the type I most feasible solution.129 
I again suppose that small firms are informed on large firm market shares, and perhaps 
costs, as benchmarks to compare their operations against. Then, their expectation over the 
redistribution share to expect is similar to the perfect information case. When we instead 
cannot suppose they have access to useful information, we should expect type II feasibility 
to decrease because firms cannot calculate an expected redistribution to compare to their 
cost of conversion. Risk averse firms would then rather not risk converting. 
In equitability, we observe that firm expectations on 𝛼𝑖 depend on the certainty of 
knowledge about the leading two or three firms in the market. This expectation, however, 
is not relevant to the bid decision due to the separability of bidding and redistribution 
mechanisms. However, the state must have accurate information on each firm’s 𝑠𝑖  and 𝑐𝑖, 
or 𝑐 when constant, to distribute fairly. Without this information, some firms have an 
incentive to overstate their 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 measures to increase the compensation they would 
receive. Compounding the matter, observe that 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖 is suggested by a firm’s bid as we 
expect their bid to be 𝑏𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖. Then, many firms – any not expecting to inadvertently win 
– have an incentive to overbid if the regulator knows all bid amounts. This is at least 
 
129
 Noting too the prior discussion of increased certainty in bids when firms are uncertain about competitors. 
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applicable to firms not expecting to win – a firm expecting to win can bid truthfully because 
they do not expect a distribution. The incentive to overbid results in uncertainty about the 
bidding behaviour of firms that are nearly, but not quite, the market leader, and the strategy-
proof property of standard SPSB Vickrey auctions with a redistribution is in jeopardy, in 
contrast to Cavallo (2006). However, a simple solution is to ensure that the agent in charge 
of redistributions is unaware of the nonwinning bid amounts and that the bidders are aware 
of this naivety – in essence the auctioneer ‘burns’ their information after determining the 
auction winner. This correction does not address the private information problem when 
determining pay-outs, but this problem is hardly unique to this setting nor should we expect 
it to be solved here. As in Bailey (1997), Cavallo (2006), Green and Laffont (1979), and 
Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2004), the worst case is that the regulator falls back on 
distribution weights 𝜆 =
1
𝑁
. But surely even weighting by publicly observable market shares 
is preferred by larger – and perhaps more influential – firms. 
The SPSB Vickrey auction in a setting of uncertainty appears as though it will perform 
comparable to the perfect information auction when the regulator takes certain precautions. 
I do observe, however, that the quality of information available to bidders about the largest 
firms in their industry impacts bidding behaviour. Uncertainty increases the likelihood that 
Firm 1 bids their value, but also increases opposition among smaller risk-averse firms. I 
also observe that concerns about equitability and conversion costs can lead to strategic 
bidding and loss of efficiency, but this is addressed with the compartmentalisation of 
bidding and distribution processes. The cost is that we forgo knowledge that would, in a 
nonstrategic setting, allow us to redistribute fairly (according to 𝑠𝑖’s). We could explore 
alternatives to Vickrey, but at this stage I do not find sufficient value in doing so: In the 
Vickrey auction, we have an instrument with well-known properties which is efficient and 
no less feasible or equitable than the perfect information case. However, the proposed 





A3.1 Data Preparation 
Sulphur content is reported as per cent by weight by the EIA which lists a one-per cent 
sulphur content as 1.00, and mandates reporting the average sulphur content of the 
purchased load or the monthly consumption, as applicable, to the nearest 0.01-per cent or 
1/100th of a per cent. Ash content follows the same format but to a required reporting 
accuracy of 0.1-per cent or 1/10th of a per cent. The conversion to per-mmBTU for a fuel 
order or consumption data using sulphur as the example simplifies down conveniently. 
Note from 





























Putting this together in one step using the sulphur per cent and mmBTU per ton reported 









I also note that the data contains several forms of petroleum-based fuel oils. I include a 
conversion for these sources as a matter of general interest because there is some nuance 
involved that is sometimes overlooked. Each of these has a different weight per unit of 
measure. The conversion from per cent by weight of a barrel to pounds per mmBTU 
follows: 



















The weight of fuel oil per gallon differs by the density, so each fuel oil grade has a 
different pound per gallon conversion factor. For instance, the weight of residual fuel oil is 
7.88 pounds per gallon on average. Using this as the conversion factor would be a mistake, 
however. What needs to be converted is the gallons of sulphur per barrel of fuel oil into 
pounds of sulphur per barrel. Using the fuel oil conversion, i.e. 7.88 pounds/gallon 
implicitly assumes the sulphur-to-fuel oil weight ratio is the same as the volume ratio, 
which it is not – the sulphur constituent is substantially heavier than fuel oil on average. I 
instead construct the correct conversion factor from sulphur’s weight per volume measure 
























Note the 17.275 pounds/gallon conversion factor differs from the 15.2 pounds/gallon factor 
found in some industrial sources. The smaller published number is based on a density of 
1.819 grams/millilitre – the density of sulphur at its boiling point of around 240 degrees 
Fahrenheit. As power plants are probably reluctant to accept fuel oil at the power plant gate 
at such a temperature, 17.275 pounds/gallon is more appropriate. Using it in the sulphur 



































Natural gas does not contain sulphur or ash content, and so no conversion is necessary. 
Finally, I reconcile the price of emissions in terms of permit costs with the model’s data 
format. Using the efficiency of the scrubbing technology, conversion factors for sulphur-












results in permit costs required per mmBTU, which can also be transformed into the 
average price per ton of coal by multiplying it by the mean mmBTU heat content per short 
ton. The sulphur-to-sulphur dioxide conversion factor, derived from their molecular 
weights, is approximately 1.9979. In practice, permit prices per ton of sulphur dioxide 
emissions have entered this research rather roughly. However, I provide for context the 
annual SO2 allowance auction weighted average spot prices from winning bids from the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Table 26. Allowance prices have 
plummeted in recent years (see a discussion of this in Schmalensee and Stavins (2013)). 
According to the EPA, emissions are well below the emissions budget (goal) of the Acid 
Rain Program (ARP) and related schema, resulting in downward pressure on allowance 
prices. Regardless of the cause, these changes impact the budget share of an emitting dirty 
versus clean alternative. 
 
TABLE 26— ANNUAL EPA SO2 AUCTION AVERAGE SPOT PRICE 
 Spot price ($) 7-year advance ($) 
2005 702.51 297.49 
2006 883.1 275.13 
2007 444.39 193.35 
2008 389.91 136.14 
2009 69.74 6.65 
2010 37.71 2.07 
2011 2.81 0.17 
2012 0.67 0.13 
2013 0.28 0.04 
2014 0.45 0.04 
2015 0.11 0.03 
2016 0.06 0.02 
Notes: Spot price and 7-year advance price of winning bids 
(weighted average). 




A3.2 Glossary of Energy Sector Terminology and U.S. Organizational Chart 
The U.S. energy sector includes different organisational levels of energy producers, and 
a brief taxonomy is in order. It should be just sufficient for the use at hand. 
NERC region: The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) system has 
existed in some form since 1968. Beginning as a voluntary association, the modern NERC 
has the authority to enforce energy sector standards impacting North America. The NERC 
divides the U.S. energy sector into eight regional, regulatory entities. 
Firm: This organisational level may operate one or several separate generating locations. 
The data I use is at a finer resolution, and so the firm is mentioned little in the specific 
application but likely has an important role in the underling power plant strategic decision 
making.  
Power plant: Synonymously a facility or power station. A power plant is a single location 
receiving fuel and then producing electricity. Production itself may occur in one or more 
subunits within the power plant operating on the same or different fuels and using some of 
the same or separate infrastructure. The binding connection is geographic as well as 
managerial – the power plant supplies generation to the same outgoing transmission lines 
and intra-power plant decision making comes from a single authority. Much of the data is 
at this level or finer. Fuel purchasing decisions are recorded at the power plant level. 
Boiler: This is the smallest relevant division involved in fuel consumption and is 
synonymous for my purposes with a furnace. Others have referred to this scale as the 
generator level, but the generator is what creates electrical output, not what consumes fuels. 
The boiler is the scale where the transformation of fuels into heat energy occurs and thus 
is the finest scale of fuel consumption data possible. These systems may be single-fuel or 
mixed, depending on design and operation. A boiler feeds steam into a turbine driving a 
generator or similar system, and waste gases pass through any abatement system on their 
way to the waste stack. These connections need not be one-to-one but often are.  
This organisational description is presented in Figure 41 where the specific NERC 




FIGURE 41 HIERARCHY OF THE U.S. ENERGY SECTOR.  
Notes: One region, Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO), is arbitrarily chosen to highlight. 
 
A3.3 Returns to Scale in Electricity Generation 
In this section I caution on the claim that 𝛽𝐷 = 𝛽𝐶 = 1, that electricity generation at power 
plants exhibits constant returns to scale as in, for instance, Christensen and Greene (1976) 
or Bernstein and Parmeter (2019). I present an argument on why this may occur in the data 
but does not inform on the underlying production relationship. 
To summarise, power plants can adjust their output by adjusting the fraction of time they 
or their subunits are active in the period of measure instead of by increasing their 
instantaneous fuel consumption. Power plants, representative of a whole class of industry, 
rely on some exogenous and expensive technology where ℓ suggests its operational status 
which fixes the level of all other inputs within a period, t. This technology is an engineering 
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constraint resulting in some operating range or specification and operating outside of it 
“voids the warranty”. As this ℓ is fixed, and in turn fixes all other inputs by engineering 
relation in t, the firm can only choose whether to operate or not. In the case at hand, power 
plants either produce 𝐸𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶, ℓ = 1) = 𝐷 + 𝐶, shut down 𝐸𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶, ℓ = 0) = 0, 
or perhaps only operate some subunit generators if so organised. At power plants, there 
may be many such constraints – boilers, generators, feed systems, cooling systems, and 
emissions controls. A second factor is that in the data, a period T may be composed of many 
t. An example is monthly data when the firm makes hourly production decisions. In a 
simpler case, consider a period of measure where T=2t. Then measured output in T is either 
0, 𝐸 = 𝑓𝑡(𝐷, 𝐶), or 2𝐸 = 2𝑓𝑡(𝐷, 𝐶) for 0, 1, or 2 periods t where the power plant is in 
operation. Within T then, the power plant will exhibit constant returns to scale as a doubling 
of inputs doubles output. However, this does not inform on the relationships between D, C, 
and E – only the share of T when the power plant is active changes. The aggregate in T may 
exhibit constant, decreasing, or increasing returns to scale or be entirely constant – the point 
is we cannot tell from most data. Adding yet another dimension, even if a power plant 
operates continuously in T, it may be composed of several sub-plant boilers only operating 
part-time and the issue stands. Even if a counterfactual were to exist that allows 
comparisons under two separate scale relationships, this might not be informative either. 
Consider that 𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑇𝑆 = 𝑎𝐸𝐷𝑅𝑇𝑆 for a given 𝐷 and 𝐶. But the difference in production, a, may 
be inseparable from other matters of power plant efficiency. Whenever any of these 
complicating dimensions exist, we cannot then estimate returns to scale in the sort of data 
we generally have available and interpret the result as informative on the underlying 
production technology. We might go about suggesting that a power plant operator reserves 
sufficient emergency capacity – say additional generators – such that they can behave in 
such a way that is equivalent in result to a CRTS or other relationship. 
A3.4 Exploring the Interior Result of the Input Selection Model 
The behaviour of the single interior solution of case (ii) is explored. Assume 𝑃𝐶 > 𝑃𝐷 
remains in effect even with compliance costs added into 𝑃𝐷 and that output E is determined 
first, or fuel purchased based on an expectation. The baseline production framework 
without regulation is 
(66) 𝜋 = 𝑃𝐸𝐸 − 𝑃𝐷𝐷 − 𝑃𝐶𝐶 




As E is set, and with an emissions standard, the firm selects D and C to minimise cost, 
(67) min
𝐷,𝐶,𝜆
𝑃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶 
 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶) = 𝑓(𝐷) + 𝑓(𝐶) 
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℇ ≥ 𝑓(𝛼, 𝐷) = 𝛼𝐷 
 
The simplified Lagrangian and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are then 
(68) ℒ𝐷,𝐶,𝜆1,𝜆2 = 𝑃𝐷𝐷 + 𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 𝜆1[𝐸 − 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶)] + 𝜆2[ℇ − 𝛼𝐷] 
(69) ℒ𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷 − 𝜆𝑓𝐷 = 0 
(70) ℒ𝐶 = 𝑃𝐶 − 𝜆𝑓𝐶 = 0 
(71) 𝜆1ℒ𝜆1 = 𝜆1[𝐸 − 𝑓(𝐷, 𝐶)] = 0 
(72) 𝜆2ℒ𝜆2 = 𝜆2[ℇ − 𝛼𝐷] = 0 
 
where 𝑃𝐷 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐸, ℇ, 𝛼 ≥ 0, 𝐷, 𝐶, 𝜆1, 𝜆2 ≥ 0, and fD is the first derivative of the production 
function with respect to the dirty input: 
𝜕𝑓(𝐷,𝐶)
𝜕𝐷
= 𝑓𝐷(𝐷, 𝐶) = 𝑓𝐷(𝐷) and similarly so for 𝑓𝐶 . 
Second derivatives then follow as 𝑓𝐷𝐷 and 𝑓𝐶𝐶 . The variables 𝐷, 𝐶, 𝜆1, 𝜆2 are endogenous, 
and 𝑃𝐷 , 𝑃𝐶 , 𝐸, ℇ, 𝛼 exogenous. The resulting Jacobian is 
(73) 


































































= 𝜆1 is the change in the optimal value of the cost minimisation objective function with 
a change in E – assumed positive, and 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕ℇ
= 𝜆2 is the change with a relaxation of the 
emissions cap. The signs of values and derivatives for the rest of the endogenous variables 
are assumed as 
 
𝐷, 𝐶 𝑓𝐷 , 𝑓𝐶 𝑓𝐷𝐷 , 𝑓𝐶𝐶
(+) (+) (−) 𝑜𝑟 0
 
 
Under the assumption of the 𝐸 = 𝐷 + 𝐶 form for the production function, 𝑓𝐷𝐷 = 𝑓𝐶𝐶 = 0, 































































































































The mathematical formulation with the emissions cap in place behaves as suggested in 






, we should also expect that 
an increase in any abatement technology efficiency that is subsequently installed will 
increase demand for D. 
A3.5 Coefficients from Linear Logit Estimation 
I present the coefficient estimates from the dynamic linear logit model group result for 
the year 2010 and later – the modern market. These are used to calculate the elasticities in 
the main body. 
 
TABLE 27— COEFFICIENTS FROM FITTING GROUPED DYNAMIC LINEAR LOGIT SYSTEM 
 Coefficient Standard error  Coefficient Standard error 
/a1 -0.001 . /a2 0.006 . 
/phi12 -0.304 (0.129) /g2 0.001 (0.005) 
/phi13 -0.647 (0.082) /d2 -2.493 (0.052) 
/phi23 -0.271 (0.080) /d22 -0.013 (0.046) 
/g1 -0.004 (0.005) /nerc21 -2.238 (0.090) 
/gamma1 0.009 (0.011) /nerc22 2.353 (0.062) 
/gamma2 0.004 (0.007) /nerc23 -2.299 (0.085) 
/d1 -2.222 (0.061) /nerc24 1.206 (0.069) 
/d11 0.058 (0.063) /nerc25 0.117 (0.064) 
/nerc11 -1.060 (0.064) /nerc26 0.635 (0.054) 
/nerc12 1.442 (0.072) /nerc27 0.311 (0.056) 
/nerc13 -1.661 (0.077) /yy11 0.037 (0.048) 
/nerc14 2.561 (0.066) /yy12 -0.061 (0.057) 
/nerc15 0.907 (0.064) /yy13 -0.175 (0.051) 
/nerc16 -1.051 (0.063) /yy14 -0.207 (0.047) 
/nerc17 -1.390 (0.062) /yy15 -0.274 (0.058) 
/y11 -0.026 (0.049) /m22 -0.010 (0.065) 
/y12 -0.222 (0.058) /m23 0.067 (0.066) 
/y13 -0.208 (0.052) /m24 0.075 (0.067) 
/y14 -0.333 (0.049) /m25 -0.023 (0.067) 
/y15 -0.345 (0.060) /m26 -0.204 (0.066) 
/m12 0.028 (0.068) /m27 -0.363 (0.067) 
/m13 0.083 (0.069) /m28 -0.309 (0.066) 
/m14 0.139 (0.070) /m29 -0.002 (0.067) 
/m15 -0.013 (0.070) /m210 0.090 (0.067) 
/m16 -0.238 (0.069) /m211 0.159 (0.067) 
/m17 -0.428 (0.070) /m212 -0.015 (0.066) 
/m18 -0.357 (0.070)    
/m19 -0.050 (0.070)    
/m110 -0.025 (0.070)    
/m111 0.045 (0.070)    
/m112 -0.043 (0.069)    
R-squared model 1 (lnS13) 0.9456    
R-squared model 2 (lnS23) 0.8997    
Notes: 576 observations. Estimated by fitting a system of equations by iterative feasible 
generalized nonlinear least squares (FGNLS). 





A3.6 Discussion of Why Domestic Policy May Not Impact Trade Partners 
While the focus of this paper is the domestic energy sector, it is certainly worth discussing 
the potential for transmission of domestic abatement policy effects onto the international 
market. A concept explored in the main body is that targeted and limited intervention in the 
price of abatement technologies can lead to cleaner consumption of dirtier fuels 
domestically. Here, I explore the extension that dirtier fuels may be imported – and cleaner 
ones exported. This concept of “negative leakage” – in this case to leverage technology to 
increase domestic sulphur demand and draw polluting fuels to their cleanest use – has 
received some attention. More generally the result is a shifting of higher polluting 
production or consumption back into a more regulated market. Winchester and Rausch 
(2013) present a model where emissions regulations in one region may decrease emissions 
elsewhere. However, in their accompanying computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, 
fossil fuel supply elasticities would have to be impractically large – approaching infinity – 
for negative leakage to actually occur. Yet Baylis, Fullerton, and Karney (2014) develop 
an alternative framework and CGE model where they establish the possibility of negative 
leakage. Such a framework is then explored further in Elliott and Fullerton (2014). Others, 
such as Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2016), identify negative leakage effects in real 
domestic policy, but in a downstream market (cement production). It is perhaps also 
important to note that Baylis, Fullerton, and Karney (2013) find that negative leakage 
situations always lead to net welfare losses – from decreasing consumption in the second 
economy as well as the first. 
In this appendix I outline an example partial equilibrium model which suggests that one 
of the second-order effects of abatement technology adoption in a regulated economy is the 
reduction in emissions in an unregulated trade partner through price. I then discuss why 
such negative leakage is unlikely and link to existing literature on the matter. I present the 
discussion in terms of a set of nations in agreement deciding how to influence an obstinate 
trade partner and note that the non-adopter’s response must be voluntary. Consider a two-
period, sequential decision where the international “Consensus” leads. As the majority 
demander of inputs and able to coordinate through the accord, Consensus primarily 
determines the price in the open market. The authority that rejects shared regulation, 
“Defector”, is small and their influence on open market price is minimal – simplified to 
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zero.130, 131 Without these comparative size assumptions, an international environmental 
accord is unlikely to be effective anyway. Whether the motive of Defector is to free ride 
(discussed at length in Barrett, 2003), or the policy would result in a net loss for Defector, 
is outside the model. At a minimum, assume Defector’s industry benefits at least initially 
from non-adoption, else they would advocate joining the accord.132 Both Defector and 
Consensus have an objective of providing a generally homogenous good, such as consumer 
energy, given their regulatory environment or possible lack thereof in Defector.133 
The setup of a small defector versus global consensus raises the critique of whether 
Defector’s actions are worth addressing at all. I suggest there are many cases where such a 
defection is still relevant. In the case of global greenhouse gas emissions, atmospheric 
concentrations have reached a level where a net decrease is required to maintain current 
temperatures (Pfeiffer, Millar, Hepburn, and Beinhocker, 2016). That is, all additional 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions contribute to the crisis. There are many other 
pollutants where even small doses are harmful, e.g. dioxins that increase cancer risk and 
that of a variety of other ailments (Sany et al., 2015), certain CFC’s resulting in ozone layer 
depletion (Barrett, 2003; Lickley et al. 2020), and exposure to fissile waste (Pearce, 2019). 
As an example, consider a nation intent on nuclear energy or arms production, but without 
sufficient regulatory empowerment to safeguard operations or store spent fuels safely. Even 
a small risk of radiation mishap can be of a regional, if not global, concern, e.g. the 
Windscale nuclear disaster of 1957 contaminating much of Northern Europe (Nelson, 
Kitchen, and Maryon, 2006; Pearce, 2019). 
When cases fitting the outlined scenario occur, the efforts of Consensus would be 
strengthened by policy tools that compel Defector to behave as though they abide by the 
Consensus’ international agreement. Another way to view this is to have policy tools that 
make the returns to defection insufficient. However, complex international relationships 
make traditional policy responses undesirable. What if Defector controls a vital resource 
that they can restrict in reply? Examples include total control of non-Soviet chromium, 
 
130
 That is, 
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑖
𝑑𝑒𝑓 = 𝜊 for input i. As 𝜊 → 0, 𝑃𝑖(𝑄𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑄𝑖
𝑑𝑒𝑓) → 𝑃𝑖(𝑄𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠). This scenario is representative of an economy which has 
never invested in clean energy, and, due to a lack of relevant natural resources, is wholly dependent on international markets for energy, 
which is not implausible. I also impose that Defector is sufficiently near Consensus-controlled sources that Defector does not face 
prohibitively greater transportation costs. 
131
 Espínola-Arredondo and Muñoz-García, (2011) note that under certain conditions a defector might invest in clean technology 
anyway – that defection serves other geopolitical purposes such as signalling. 
132
 Additionally, if the optimal selection for Defector were clean fuels, there would not be opposition to the accord save for the prior 
footnote. Presumably, national policymakers, like many of us, are unlikely to turn down a free lunch. 
133
 Enforcement and compliance are assumed perfect in Consensus – a sufficiently empowered regulator is needed for the policy to 
be effective anyway. 
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manganese, platinum, and vanadium supplies by apartheid South Africa (Thomson, 2008), 
a variety of rare earth minerals currently almost exclusively sourced in China (Tse, 2011; 
NBR, 2019), and threats against free movement through the Strait of Hormuz by Iran 
(Talmadge, 2008; Ratner, 2018). A less direct, less confrontational approach may be in 
order when seeking to influence regimes. Choosing which technologies receive research 
and development support, for instance, is hardly controversial in comparison to trade tariffs, 
export subsidies, or threats of retaliation.134 To develop an expectation of whether such 
policies will be useful, we require a model that transforms domestic, uncoordinated site-
level behaviour into international effects. 
To arrive at the international effects first requires aggregating the demand of a set of 
perfect substitute power plants into market demand that is at least downward sloping in 
price. This aggregation results from differences in the price at which firms switch between 
clean and dirty inputs due to differences in transportation, mining, and transaction costs at 
power plants and sources. Of the two abatement variable costs I have discussed, I use 
efficiency in this analysis. At Consensus power plants, let 
𝜕𝑄𝐷
𝜕𝑒𝑓𝑓
> 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝑄𝐶
𝜕𝑒𝑓𝑓
< 0 including 
from zero to some efficiency (abatement technology adoption).135 Let aggregation result in 
a same sign change in market demand. Then, from individual firm increases in abatement 
technology efficiency, market demand for dirty (clean) inputs increases (decreases) and the 
dirty fuel share of the market increases. 
A3.6.1 Partial Equilibrium Effects of Abatement Technology in Consensus 
I use market demand notation, 𝒟, and supply, 𝒮, for dirty, D (sub-D), and clean, C (sub-
C), inputs. From the preceding sections, emissions cap, ℰ̅, and abatement efficiency, 𝑒𝑓𝑓 
influence the dirty input share, 𝓈𝐷. Recall efficiency enters the regulated market 
participant’s decision as 𝛿 = 1 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓 which here I repurpose as a mean, resulting in effective 
emissions cap ?̅? =
ℇ̅
𝛿𝛼
. For simplicity, I work from changes in efficiency. Prices of dirty 
and clean inputs remain 𝑃𝐷 and 𝑃𝐶, and I denote excess demand by Θ. Consensus market in 
equilibrium (implicitly including exports) is described by the system 
 
134
 Cirone and Urpelainen (2013) suggest that trade sanctions may even increase free riding as they reduce the cost of further 
unilateral actions. 
135
 The capacity of the majority to impact the market requires that consumers are not rigidly contracted – that demand and supply 
are not perfectly inelastic, and that Consensus can exert market power through international policy coordination. 
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(80) 𝒟𝐷 − 𝒮𝐷 = Θ𝐷(𝒟𝐷, 𝒮𝐷) = 0 
(81) 𝒟𝐶 − 𝒮𝐶 = Θ𝐶(𝒟𝐶 , 𝒮𝐶) = 0 
(82) 𝒟𝐷(𝓈𝐷 , 𝑃𝐷),
𝜕𝒟𝐷
𝜕𝑃𝐷















(85) 𝒟𝐶((1 − 𝓈𝐷), 𝑃𝐶),
𝜕𝒟𝐶
𝜕𝑃𝐶









From the first condition, 𝒟𝐷 − 𝒮𝐷 = Θ𝐷(𝒟𝐷, 𝒮𝐷) = 0, the sign of the partial derivative 
𝜕𝒟𝐷
𝜕𝓈𝐷
> 0 implies that an increase in supply, 𝒮𝐷, occurs to maintain equilibrium. Rewriting 
excess demand in terms of the relevant supply and demand primitives, Θ𝐷(𝓈𝐷, 𝑃𝐷(𝓈𝐷)) 
where the implicit effect of dirty input share 𝓈𝐷 on 𝑃𝐷 is explicitly acknowledged. The 
effect in market equilibrium is then 
𝜕𝑃𝐷
𝜕𝓈𝐷
> 0. Then, from the assumption of aggregation from 
power plant level activity, 
𝜕𝓈𝐷
𝜕𝑒𝑓𝑓





> 0. Abbreviating, 
𝜕𝑃𝐷
𝜕𝑒𝑓𝑓
> 0 and 




A3.6.2 Resulting Impact on Defector 
Defector is unable to influence price and demands the cheapest and generally dirty input 
when pursuing cost minimisation subject to world prices. I abstract from geographical, 
transportation cost, and market barriers – Defector is close to Consensus and on generally 
friendly terms. I assume that Defector is responsive to price and so their demand curve 
must be downward sloping. Through the Consensus influence on price, Defector’s quantity 
demanded must then decrease when Consensus adopts abatement technologies because the 
price of the dirty fuel increases. Being otherwise indifferent between the dirty and more 
expensive clean alternative places a limit on the effect possible, but one which 
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 Defining a more complex market where 𝒟𝐷  has meaningful cross price elasticities such that 𝒟𝐷(𝓈𝐷, 𝑃𝐷 , 𝑃𝐶) and 𝒟𝐶((1 − 𝓈𝐷), 𝑃𝐶 , 𝑃𝐷) 
complicates the result without adding value to this deliberately simple discussion. 
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accomplishes the Consensus goal as well. I use the notation for Defector, def (superscript-




< 0 when 𝑃𝐷 <
𝑃𝐶 (else equal to zero), and 
𝜕𝑃𝐷
𝜕𝑒𝑓𝑓










< 0.  
As a specific functional form, I use constant elasticities of demand and supply. In 
Consensus, for dirt fuel share, 𝓈𝐷(ℰ̅, 𝑒𝑓𝑓) > 0, efficiency multipliers satisfying 𝐷, 𝐶 > 0 
and 𝜉𝐷 , 𝜉𝐶 > 0, elasticities of demand 𝜖𝐷 , 𝜖𝐶 < 0, and elasticities of supply 𝐷 , 𝐶 > 0. Then, 
determining the demand for dirty and clean inputs jointly,137 
(87) 𝒟 = 𝒟𝐷 + 𝒟𝐶 = 𝓈𝐷 𝐷𝑃𝐷
𝜖𝐷 + (1 − 𝓈𝐷) 𝐶𝑃𝐶
𝜖𝐶, 
(88) 𝒮 = 𝒮𝐷 + 𝒮𝐶 = 𝜉𝐷𝑃𝐷 𝐷 + 𝜉𝐶𝑃𝐷 𝐶 
 
resulting in separate market-clearing prices for a given level of 𝓈𝐷, 












For Defector with efficiency multiplier 𝑑𝑒𝑓 > 0 and elasticity of demand 𝜖𝑑𝑒𝑓 < 0, 
(90) 𝒟𝑑𝑒𝑓 = 𝑑𝑒𝑓[min(𝑃𝐷, 𝑃𝐶)]
𝜖𝑑𝑒𝑓. 
 

























) is negative and all other components of the 
derivative are positive. Notionally, Figure 42 partially illustrates when abatement 
efficiency improvements in Consensus result in reduced emissions in Defector. However, 
as 𝐷  is generally very elastic and 𝜖𝐷  and 𝜖
𝑑𝑒𝑓  inelastic, we should expect that drastic action 
– large changes in efficiency in Consensus – would be required to affect meaningful interior 
solution changes in Defector. However, when 𝑃𝐷 is close to 𝑃𝐶 , Consensus action may push 
Defector over a tipping point that results in Defector undertaking a clean energy transition 
 
137
 We might also suppose = 𝐷 = 𝐶 and 𝜉 = 𝜉𝐷 = 𝜉𝐶 suggesting indifference between fuels in the aggregate as well. 
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(see Farmer et al., 2019 and Beinhocker, Farmer, and Hepburn, 2018 on the importance of 
tipping points in pursuing climate goals). Reaching a tipping point is aided by the 






FIGURE 42 CONSENSUS AND DEFECTOR AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Notes: Abatement adoption and efficiency improvements result in increased dirty fuel share, from 𝓈𝐷 to 𝓈𝐷′ in Consensus and 
subsequently an increase in the shared dirty fuel price from 𝑃𝐷  to 𝑃𝐷′. Defector then decreases emissions due to decreased quantity 
demanded, while Consensus emissions do not increase due to abatement technology adoption. However, due to relative supply and 
demand elasticities in Consensus and the demand elasticity in Defector, changes in Defector quantity demanded and emissions may be 
small. We can similarly illustrate a simultaneous decrease in 𝑃𝐶  to 𝑃𝐶 ′. These changes lower D-threshold, the tipping point where 
Defector instead chooses the clean alternative. 
 
A3.6.3 Domestic Postscript: Lack of Transmission to International Markets 
The primary purpose of this appendix has been to suggest that, through a coordinated 
effort, a consensus of nations can compel an environmental accord defector to reduce 
emissions voluntarily. To make the argument, I have explored changes in domestic price 
resulting from technological changes that allow nations to consume dirty inputs to 
production cleanly. The model is tested on the U.S. domestic energy market where coal 
power plants use FGD systems that allow them to consume high sulphur coal without 
emitting the full sulphur content as sulphur dioxide. I now discuss why the U.S. domestic 
process has not led to the “export of cleanliness” abroad. 
First, when we move to the international trade in energy, the effects of changes in U.S. 
abatement technology have been overwhelmed by greater market forces. The central theme 
of this research has been that domestic decisions about energy policy and other 

























assumed no radical changes in supply or technology impacting the clean alternative. But 
ceteris paribus has not been the case in the U.S. as natural gas supply has increased with 
the shale gas boom resulting in unprecedented price decreases. The result is that demand 
for every quality of coal has plummeted domestically, while U.S. natural gas has remained 
landlocked until very recently (EIA, 2020c; EIA, 2020d).138 Figure 43 illustrates the 
replacement of coal-based electricity generation by natural gas starting in the mid-2000’s. 
A result is that more U.S. coal of all qualities is available to sell abroad. 
 
 
FIGURE 43 U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY FUEL TYPE 
Notes: Trend in U.S. net electricity generation by fuel type – coal, natural gas, and all other types including nuclear 
and renewable sources. Following the shale gas boom in the mid-2000’s we observe cheaper natural gas displacing 
coal-based energy production. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2020a). 
 
We can also observe in Figure 44 that coal exports were in decline following the 
implementation of the Acid Rain Program and up until the shale gas boom but have 
increased since. Interpreting in terms of the domestic market, we first observe a reduction 
in domestic slack, follow by oversupply as power plants transition away from coal.  
 
138
 In late 2017 the U.S. became a net exporter of natural gas, primarily to Canada and Mexico. Exports of U.S. LNG have also 









































FIGURE 44 SHARE OF U.S. COAL PRODUCTION EXPORTED 
Notes: After first declining in response to the Acid Rain Program, tradable permits, and FGD usage, the 
share of total U.S. coal production exported increases substantially following the shale gas boom in the 
mid-2000s which resulted in power plant fuel switching and coal supply slack. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (2019). 
 
Another departure from this paper’s theory is that the U.S. alone does not fit the definition 
of a consensus. That is, it does not alone determine world price. Responding to rather than 
setting world prices, U.S. coal competes against other sources, and only when at a price 
advantage can mines export (IEA, 2019). When sufficient details allow estimates of export 
coal sulphur content – since 1989 – we see both domestic-bound and export coal follow a 
similar trend in sulphur content until the shale gas boom as illustrated in Figure 45. 
However, slack in coal supply since 2005 eliminates any opportunity to test the negative 
leakage effect from domestic abatement technology. Instead, we observe a marked increase 
in the share of dirty fuel in exports – emissions leakage – while the U.S. transitions to 
cleaner natural gas domestically. Domestic policies that reduce emissions without 





FIGURE 45 COAL SULPHUR CONTENT OF EXPORTS VERSUS DOMESTIC POWER PLANT USE 
Notes: Trend in the coal sulphur content of U.S. production, energy sector domestic consumption, and 
coal exports. Shale gas expansion since the mid-2000’s lead to unprecedented slack in the U.S. coal 
supply of all qualities. Subsequently, sufficient high sulphur coal remains on the market to be priced 
cheaper and purchased by firms in unregulated markets. 
Source: Author calculations based on data from EIA (1993, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2018a). 
 
So then, what has been the impact on global emissions and the environment? We can 
observe the destination for U.S. coal since 2000, illustrated in Figure 46. There is first an 
increase in coal exports to the E.U., U.K., and Ireland, then Japan and South Korea – areas 
of less concern as they are regulated. But then, we observe increases in exports to nearly 
unregulated India and China.  
However, when we move away from the Consensus-Defector framework, there may be 
many suppliers and demanders of goods. In the case of coal, globally there are many 
sources of high sulphur coal at different costs. It is quite possible, then, that U.S. high 
sulphur coal exports displace more expensive, roughly equally high sulphur sources rather 
than displacing cleaner energy sources. On this proposition I encounter other emerging 
research: Wolack (2016) and Knittel, Metaxoglou, Soderbery, and Trindade (2019) model 
the international trade in energy and find the global displacement of dirty coal by similarly 
dirty U.S. coal. The U.S. alone, it seems, cannot disrupt the global status quo. So then, the 





FIGURE 46 IMPORTERS OF U.S. COAL, 2000-2018 
Notes: Trends in the import of U.S. coal. Increases in imports (ranked by country or body) to the #1 EU, and #10 UK 
and Ireland, followed by #3 Japan and #4 South Korea dominate increases in U.S. exports. These are countries with 
relatively clean consumption (sulphur removal) capacities. Increases then follow in #2 India and #13 China. #6 Canada 
decreased imports substantially from 2008 onward during the shale gas boom. #2 India, #3 Japan, & #4 South Korea 
had modest gains, and #5 Brazil, #8 Ukraine, #9 Morocco, #11 Egypt, #14 Chile, & #15 Argentina had flat demand 
over the period and there were modest increases in #7 Mexico, #12 Turkey (not pictured but adds context).     
Sources: Author calculations based on EIA data (EIA, 2020b). 
 
A4.1 Comparison of η and Implied-η Estimates 
In this section, several  estimates from the literature are compared to implied-  
estimates derived in this paper. As discussed, implied estimates are usually, but not 
exclusively higher and represent the net effect of tax and all other economic and social 
policies on the distribution of economic growth. The basis and period of observation for 
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Implied-  estimates 





Argentina (1) a 1.23 - - - 2.46 - 
Australia (2) b 1.67 1.77 - 1.85 1.87 - 
Austria (2) b 1.74 2.11 - 2.21 2.18 - 
Belgium (3) b, c 1.42 1.53 - 2.43 2.16 - 
Bolivia (1) a 1.06 - - - 2.09 - 
Brazil (1) a 2.09 - 2.16 2.41 2.24 - 
Canada (3) b, d 1.37 1.59 - 1.80 2.01 - 
Chile (1) a 1.22 - - 2.44 2.37 - 
Colombia (1) a 1.61 - - - 2.17 - 
Costa Rica (1) a 1.11 - - 1.45 1.77 - 
Czech Republic (4) b, e 1.35 1.89 - 1.99 2.09 - 
Ecuador (1) a 1.06 - - - 2.23 - 
El Salvador (1) a 1.13 - - - 2.56 - 
Estonia (2) e 1.20 - - - 2.08 1.63 
France (3) b, f 1.36 2.11 2.27 1.90 1.98 - 
Germany (3) b, c 1.41 1.64 - 1.82 1.71 - 
Guatemala (1) a 1.13 - - - 2.24 - 
Honduras (1) a 1.16 - - - 2.19 - 
Hungary (4) b, e 1.59 0.26 - 2.15 -0.54 1.7 
India (1) g 1.64 - 1.89 - - 1.81 
Ireland (2) b 1.24 2.11 - 1.65 2.22 - 
Italy (4) b, h 1.31 2.01 - 1.84 1.58 - 
Japan (2) b 1.46 - - -0.84 - - 
Latvia (2) e 1.13 - - 2.09 1.92 1.96 
Mexico (1) a 2.71 - - 1.87 2.40 2.53 
Netherlands (1) c 1.60 1.77 - 2.11 2.12 - 
New Zealand (2) b 1.50 - - 1.78 - - 
Nicaragua (1) a 1.14 - - - 2.32 2.04 
Norway (2) b 1.32 1.96 - 1.93 2.11 - 
Panama (1) a 1.15 - - - 2.20 - 
Paraguay (1) a 1.00 - - - 0.71 - 
Peru (1) a 1.05 - - - 2.47 - 
Poland (4) b, e 1.29 1.80 - 2.18 1.83 1.83 
Portugal (2) b 1.43 - - 2.68 2.88 - 
Slovak Republic (4) b, e 1.50 1.84 - 2.19 2.00 2.18 
Spain (3) b, c 1.32 2.04 - 0.02 1.37 - 
Turkey (3) b, i 1.17 - 2.28 2.02 - 2.09 
United Kingdom (20) b, c, 
j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r 
1.58 1.68 - 1.79 2.55 - 
United States (4) b, d, s 1.47 1.33 1.5 1.62 1.62 - 
Uruguay (1) a 1.71 - - - 2.19 - 
Venezuela (1) a 1.04 - - - 1.34 - 
Notes: Comparison of  estimates from revealed preference studies against implied-  estimates using the best 
available from Table 10, Table 11, Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31. National  estimates from the literature are the 
mean of the reported estimates when more than one is available (number of estimates used in parentheses). 
Sources: Derived or replicated from a Moore, Boardman, and Vining (2020), b Evans (2005), c Evans and Sezer 
(2005), d Kula (1984), e Seçilmiş and Akbulut (2019), f Evans (2004b), g Kula (2004), h Percoco (2008), i Evans, 
Kula, and Nagase (2014), j Stern (1977), k Blundell (1988), l Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber (1993), m Banks, 
Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), n Cowell and Gardiner (1999), o Evans and Sezer (2002), p Evans (2004a), q Evans, 
Kula, and Sezer (2005), r Groom and Maddison (2019), s Moore, Boardman, and Vining (2013). Author calculations 
based on data from t Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser (2016) which is derived from the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) Database, u World Inequality Database (WID) set including from Morgan (2017), Alvaredo, Assouad, and 
Piketty (2018), Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty (2018), Chancel and Piketty (2017), and Piketty, Saez, and 
Zucman (2016), v OECD (2019), and w World Bank (2019). 
 
A4.2 Long-Run Estimates of Implied-η Based on OECD and World Bank Data 
This appendix reports additional implied-  estimates. OECD (2019) data is from a 
collection of national household income surveys. For European Union countries, data is 
based on the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) survey, and for other 
countries are conducted by the respective national governments. As with the LIS-based 
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data, these measures use the equivalised household disposable income concept but define 
it as “the total income received by the households less the current taxes and transfers they 
pay, adjusted for household size with an equivalence scale.” The OECD data is then CPI 
adjusted (2010 basis) for comparison. Some of the estimates cover timespans of less than 
a decade and should be taken with caution. When the estimates of median and residual 
growth are statistically significant, OLS-based values are used to derived implied- . 
Otherwise estimates for each country are derived using growth between the first and last 
year of data available in the two-point method. 
 
TABLE 29—LONG-RUN IMPLIED-  ESTIMATES, OECD DATA 
 Period a Two-point 
 
OLS 
   ?̅? b  ?̅? b  c 
Australia 2000, 2016 3.14 1.85 - - 
Austria 2007, 2016 0.69 2.21 - - 
Belgium 2004, 2016 0.73 2.43 - - 
Brazil 2006, 2013 3.82 2.41 - - 
Canada 1976-2017 (42) 0.99 1.91 0.85 1.80 
Chile 2006, 2017 2.30 2.44 - - 
Costa Rica 2010, 2017 1.15 1.45 - - 
Czech Republic 1992-2016 (16) 2.86 1.99 2.00 - 
Denmark 1985-2016 (16) 1.14 1.68 0.99 1.71 
Estonia 2004, 2016 8.77 2.14 - - 
Finland 1986-2017 (32) 1.83 1.71 1.63 1.81 
France 1996, 2016 0.92 1.90 - - 
Germany 1985-2016 (14) 1.03 1.86 0.60 1.82 
Greece 1974, 2016 0.12 2.84 - - 
Hungary 1991-2016 (15) 0.74 2.12     1.02**     2.15** 
Iceland 2004, 2015 1.22 2.05 - - 
Ireland 2004, 2016 0.43 1.65 - - 
Israel 1990-2017 (14) 2.77 2.00 1.88 - 
Italy 1984-2016 (17) 0.48 1.84   0.33* - 
Japan 1985, 2015 -0.02 -0.84 - - 
Korea 2006, 2017 3.43 1.62 - - 
Latvia 2004, 2016 8.18 2.09 - - 
Lithuania 2004, 2016 8.19 1.98 - - 
Luxembourg 1986-2016 (15) 2.29 1.87 1.46 1.90 
Mexico 1984-2016 (9) 1.59 1.87     0.88** - 
Netherlands 1977-2016 (17) 0.93 2.18 0.92 2.11 
New Zealand 1985-2014 (10) 1.59 1.47 1.45 1.78 
Norway 1986-2017 (14) 2.54 1.93 2.19 - 
Poland 2005, 2016 5.72 2.18 - - 
Portugal 2004, 2016 -0.33 2.68 - - 
Russia 2008, 2016 3.37 2.55 - - 
Slovak Republic 2004, 2016 3.75 2.19 - - 
Slovenia 2004, 2016 0.69 2.09 - - 
Spain 2007, 2016 -1.29 0.02 - - 
Sweden 1975-2017 (15) 2.42 1.88 1.86 1.92 
Switzerland 2006, 2015 0.65 2.23 - - 
Turkey 2004, 2015 5.96 2.02 - - 
United Kingdom 1975-2017 (23) 1.62 1.75 1.23 1.79 
United States 1995-2017 (13) 0.93 1.62 0.54 - 
Notes: Estimates of annual rate of long-run growth in CPI-adjusted equivalised disposable 
household income. All OLS estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-per cent 
level or better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent 
level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per 
cent. c Statistical significance of OLS-based ’s is the minimum of the significance of 
median and inequality-driven growth estimates 




The World Bank (2019) provides a more extensive, but varied dataset that I use to 
estimate implied-  values. Table 30 reports income-based, and Table 31 reports 
consumption-based estimates. The data is derived from a collection of more than 1,500 
representative household surveys conducted by each nation or international agencies on 
their behalf. These, for instance, included more than 2-million total households in 2015. 
All data is 2011 PPP($) adjusted (with CPI based on IMF data) and based on household 
per-capita income and consumption expenditure data. In some cases, e.g. China, both urban 
and rural statistics are available which account for intra-country differences in prices. When 
sufficient data for statistical significance is available, OLS-based estimates of median and 
residual growth rates are used as well as two-point estimates of implied- . 
 
TABLE 30—LONG-RUN IMPLIED-  ESTIMATES, WORLD BANK INCOME DATA 
 Period a Two-point OLS 
   ?̅? b  ?̅? b  c 
Argentina--Urban 1987-2017 (27) -0.24 1.99   0.88* 2.46 
Australia 1981-2014 (10) 2.10 1.80 1.65 1.87 
Austria 2003, 2015 1.07 2.18 - - 
Belgium 2003, 2015 1.13 2.16 - - 
Belize 1993, 1999 -3.54 1.52 - - 
Bolivia 1990-2017 (19) 2.76 2.09 2.83 - 
Brazil 1981-2017 (33) 4.00 2.27 2.72 2.24 
Bulgaria 1992, 2014 -0.28 -0.53 - - 
Canada 1981-2013 (11) 1.16 2.01 1.09 - 
Chile 1987-2017 (14) 4.77 2.38 2.20 2.37 
China--Rural 1981, 1987 11.59 1.84 - - 
China--Urban 1981, 1987 6.51 1.96 - - 
Colombia 1992-2017 (19) 1.89 2.16 2.69 2.17 
Colombia--Urban 1988, 1991 0.37 2.84 - - 
Costa Rica 1981-2017 (31) 9.44 1.81 4.20 1.77 
Croatia 1988-2015 (8) -0.14 -0.59    -0.32**    -0.51 
Cyprus 2004, 2015 0.02 -0.98 - - 
Czech Republic 1993-2015 (14) 3.08 2.13 2.19 2.09 
Denmark 2003, 2015 1.34 1.47 - - 
Dominican Republic 1986, 2016 0.52 1.99 - - 
Ecuador 1987-2017 (20) 2.90 2.18 3.09 2.23 
El Salvador 1991-2017 (23) 1.68 2.56 0.96 2.56 
Estonia 1993-2015 (14) 7.40 2.15 4.45 2.08 
Finland 2003, 2015 1.70 2.06 - - 
France 2003, 2015 2.02 1.98 - - 
Germany 1991-2015 (18) 0.74 1.89 0.72 1.71 
Greece 2003, 2015 -2.59 -0.04 - - 
Guatemala 1986-2014 (5) 4.68 2.36 - 2.24 
Honduras 1989-2017 (28) 2.53 2.50 2.27 2.19 
Hungary 1987, 2015 0.09 -0.54 - - 
Iceland 2003, 2014 0.94 2.02 - - 
Ireland 2003, 2015 0.57 2.22 - - 
Israel 1986-2016 (10) 2.83 2.07 1.94 - 
Italy 2003, 2015 -0.30 1.58 - - 
Korea, Republic of 2006, 2012 1.77 2.05 - - 
Latvia 1993-2015 (15) 8.59 1.87 4.53 1.92 
Lithuania 1993-2015 (13) 17.53 1.97 6.54 - 
Luxembourg 2003, 2015 0.11 -0.69 - - 
Malaysia 1984-2015 (12) 4.02 2.26 2.65 2.15 
Malta 2006, 2015 3.52 1.83 - - 
Mexico 1989-2016 (15) 0.49 2.60  1.05* 2.40 
Netherlands 2004, 2015 1.13 2.12 - - 
Nicaragua 1993-2014 (6) 5.80 2.38 3.49 2.32 
North Macedonia 2009, 2015 2.58 2.50 - - 
Norway 2003, 2015 3.21 2.11 - - 
Panama 1989-2017 (24) 5.68 2.26 3.31 2.20 
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Paraguay 1990-2017 (21) 0.82 0.71     1.14** - 
Peru 1997, 2017 2.90 2.47 - - 
Philippines 2000, 2015 1.04 2.40 - - 
Poland 1985-2015 (15) 3.00 1.90 1.76 1.83 
Portugal 2003, 2015 0.13 2.88 - - 
Romania 1989, 2015 -1.03 -0.16 - - 
Serbia 2012, 2015 -0.61 1.21 - - 
Slovak Republic 1996, 2015 2.52 2.00 - - 
Slovenia 1993-2015 (13) 2.83 2.22 2.09 2.15 
Spain 2003, 2015 0.90 1.37 - - 
Sweden 2003, 2015 3.18 1.77 - - 
Switzerland 2006, 2015 0.85 2.19 - - 
United Kingdom 2004, 2015 0.34 2.55 - - 
United States 1986-2016 (10) 1.07 1.52 0.86 1.62 
Uruguay 1981-2017 (14) 1.17 2.19 0.95 - 
Uruguay--Urban 1992, 2005 -1.71 -0.28 - - 
Venezuela, Republica 
Bolivariana de 
1981-2006 (13) -1.31 1.34 -2.94 - 
Notes: Estimates of the annual rate of long-run growth in 2011 PPP($) adjusted household per-capita 
income. All OLS estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better using 
Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. c 
Statistical significance of OLS-based ’s is the minimum of the significance of median and inequality-
driven growth estimates 
Source: Author calculations based on data from the World Bank (2019). 
 
TABLE 31—LONG-RUN IMPLIED-  ESTIMATES, WORLD BANK CONSUMPTION DATA 
 Period a Two-point 
 
OLS 
   ?̅? c  ?̅? c  
Albania 2002, 2012 1.73 2.31 - - 
Algeria 1988, 2011 1.03 2.56 - - 
Armenia 1999, 2017 4.02 2.08 - - 
Azerbaijan 1995, 2005 8.37 2.05 - - 
Bangladesh 1983-2016 (9) 1.37 1.40 1.17 1.48** 
Belarus 1998, 2017 17.04 2.10 - - 
Benin 2003, 2015 0.42 -0.16 - - 
Bhutan 2003, 2017 5.70 2.20 - - 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001, 2011 5.70 1.92 - - 
Botswana 1985-2015 (5) 3.00 1.92  2.46* - 
Bulgaria 1989, 2007 -2.62 -0.03 - - 
Burkina Faso 1994, 2014 5.27 2.40 - - 
Burundi 1992, 2013 1.29 1.24 - - 
Cameroon 1996, 2014 4.11 2.15 - - 
Central African Republic 1992, 2008 6.69 2.31 - - 
China--Rural 1990-2015 (13) 14.72 1.97 6.09 - 
China--Urban 1990-2015 (13) 16.98 1.80 6.74 1.90 
Côte d'Ivoire 1985-2015 (10) -1.87 0.07 -2.36  - 
Croatia 1998, 2010 -2.66 0.06 - - 
Djibouti 2002, 2017 1.01 2.00 - - 
Egypt, Arab Republic of 1990-2015 (8) 1.23 1.93 0.92 - 
Estonia 1995, 2004 4.06 1.63 - - 
Eswatini 1994, 2009 10.10 2.26 - - 
Ethiopia 1995, 2015 2.68 2.48 - - 
Fiji 2002, 2013 0.82 1.95 - - 
Gambia, The 1998, 2015 9.66 2.31 - - 
Georgia 1996-2017 (22) -0.03 -0.86     1.67** - 
Ghana 1987-2016 (7) 5.19 1.76 3.46 1.87 
Guinea 1991, 2012 12.67 2.19 - - 
Guinea-Bissau 1993, 2010 0.62 -0.38 - - 
Hungary 1998, 2007 4.88 1.70 - - 
India--Rural 1983-2011 (6) 2.11 1.84 1.33 1.88 
India--Urban 1983-2011 (6) 2.46 1.66 1.69 1.73 
Indonesia--Rural 1984-2017 (25) 7.58 1.94 4.00 1.90 
Indonesia--Urban 1984-2017 (25) 6.06 1.75 3.73 1.81 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1986-2016 (11) 2.28 2.28 2.35 2.15 
Jamaica 1988, 2004 2.96 1.51 - - 
Jordan 1986, 2010 -0.04 2.40 - - 
Kazakhstan 1996-2017 (18) 3.87 2.17 4.39 2.12 
Kenya 1992, 2015 -1.73 1.16 - - 
Kosovo 2003, 2017 3.71 1.98 - - 
Kyrgyz Republic 1998, 2017 1.33 2.60 - - 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 1992, 2012 0.95 1.92 - - 
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Latvia 1997, 2009 6.63 1.96 - - 
Lesotho 1986, 2010 -1.18 0.20 - - 
Liberia 2007, 2016 5.85 1.94 - - 
Lithuania 1996, 2008 6.79 1.75 - - 
Madagascar 1993, 2012 -1.11 0.14 - - 
Malawi 1997, 2016 -2.41 1.57 - - 
Mali 1994, 2009 6.27 2.51 - - 
Mauritania 1987-2014 (7) 3.07 2.27 2.24 - 
Mexico 1984-2016 (15) 0.13 2.76 - 2.53 
Moldova 1997, 2017 5.41 2.21 - - 
Mongolia 1995-2016 (9) 3.94 1.99 5.00 - 
Montenegro 2005, 2014 1.90 1.71 - - 
Morocco 1984-2013 (6) 2.85 1.87     1.61**   1.85* 
Mozambique 1996, 2014 5.15 2.01 - - 
Namibia 2003, 2015 5.18 2.43 - - 
Nepal 1995, 2010 5.83 2.10 - - 
Nicaragua 1993, 2005 -1.13 2.04 - - 
Niger 1992-2014 (6) 3.02 2.03     2.51** - 
Nigeria 1985, 2009 0.32 -0.07 - - 
North Macedonia 1998, 2008 11.42 0.97 - - 
Pakistan 1987-2015 (12) 5.06 1.95 2.90 - 
Philippines 1985-2015 (11) 1.78 2.01 1.40 - 
Poland 1993-2016 (21) 4.69 1.83 3.13 - 
Romania 1998, 2016 2.28 2.16 - - 
Russian Federation 1993-2015 (21) 2.73 2.32 4.59 - 
Rwanda 1984-2016 (6) 1.01 0.34     1.07** - 
Samoa 2002, 2013 0.07 2.89 - - 
Senegal 1991, 2011 2.42 2.56 - - 
Serbia 2002, 2015 -0.14 2.52 - - 
Slovak Republic 2004, 2009 4.23 2.18 - - 
Slovenia 1998, 2003 0.70 1.57 - - 
South Africa 1993-2014 (7) 2.81 1.38 3.34     1.59** 
Sri Lanka 1985-2016 (8) 3.62 1.64 2.45 1.75 
Tajikistan 1999, 2015 12.89 1.90 - - 
Tanzania 1991, 2011 2.73 1.70 - - 
Thailand 1981-2017 (23) 5.20 2.23 3.28 2.19 
Timor-Leste 2001, 2014 0.59 2.63 - - 
Togo 2006, 2015 0.92 2.32 - - 
Tonga 2001, 2015 -0.09 -0.84 - - 
Tunisia 1985-2015 (7) 3.11 2.32 2.23 2.21 
Turkey 1987-2016 (17) 3.49 2.09 2.95 - 
Uganda 1989-2016 (9) 1.42 1.87 1.84 - 
Ukraine 1992-2016 (19) 2.72 2.05 3.03 2.13 
Uzbekistan 1998, 2003 -6.91 0.20 - - 
Vietnam 1992-2016 (10) 12.16 2.11 6.30 2.07 
West Bank and Gaza 2004, 2016 0.63 2.37 - - 
Yemen, Republic of 1998, 2014 -1.77 -0.13 - - 
Zambia 1991, 2015 -0.11 -0.50 - - 
Notes: Estimates of the annual rate of long-run growth in 2011 PPP($) adjusted household per-capita 
consumption expenditures. All OLS estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or 
better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. c Statistical 
significance of OLS-based ’s is the minimum of the significance of median and inequality-driven growth 
estimates 




A5.1 Data Tables Supporting Figure 31 and Figure 32 
This section reports the data underlying Figure 31 and Figure 32 (Table 32 and Table 33, 
respectively). 
 
TABLE 32— DECOMPOSITION OF GROWTH INTO DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS, LIS AND OECD 




LIS data     
Australia 1981-2010 (8)     1.38**     1.17**  0.21 
Canada 1981-2010 (10) 0.90 0.67  0.23 
Denmark 1987-2010 (7) 1.15 1.03      0.12** 
Finland 1987-2010 (7) 1.75 1.45  0.30 
France 1978-2010 (7)     0.79** 0.87   -0.08* 
Germany 1984-2010 (7)     0.56**   0.43*      0.13** 
Ireland 1987-2010 (8) 3.45 3.76     -0.31** 
Israel 1986-2010 (7) 1.67 1.44  0.23 
Luxembourg 1985-2010 (8) 2.63     2.47**      0.16** 
Sweden 1981-2005 (6) 2.04 1.81      0.23** 
United Kingdom 1979-2010 (9) 2.41 2.08  0.33 
United States 1979-2013 (10) 0.77 0.49  0.28 
OECD data     
Canada 1976-2017 (42) 0.85 0.73 0.12 
Denmark 1985-2016 (16) 0.99 0.80 0.18 
Finland 1986-2017 (32) 1.63 1.41 0.21 
Germany 1985-2016 (14) 0.60 0.52 0.08 
Hungary 1991-2016 (15)     1.02**    1.16**    -0.14** 
Luxembourg 1986-2016 (15) 1.46 1.35 0.11 
Netherlands 1977-2016 (17) 0.92 1.01 -0.08 
New Zealand 1985-2014 (10) 1.45 1.23     0.21** 
Sweden 1975-2017 (15) 1.86 1.76 0.11 
United Kingdom 1975-2017 (23) 1.23 1.05 0.18 
Notes: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) estimates in PPP-adjusted equivalised disposable 
household income, and OECD estimates in CPI-adjusted household income, of the annual rate of 
long-run growth. Statistically significant at the 1-per cent level or better using Huber–White 
standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data from OECD (2019), and Thewissen, Nolan, and Roser 




TABLE 33— DECOMPOSITION OF GROWTH INTO DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS, WORLD BANK 




Income     
Argentina--Urban 1987-2017 (27)   0.88*     1.41** -0.53 
Australia 1981-2014 (10) 1.65 1.49 0.16 
Brazil 1981-2017 (33) 2.72 3.37 -0.65 
Chile 1987-2017 (14) 2.20 3.15 -0.94 
Colombia 1992-2017 (19) 2.69 3.11   -0.42* 
Costa Rica 1981-2017 (31) 4.20 3.56 0.64 
Croatia 1988-2015 (8)    -0.32** -0.55 0.23 
Czech Republic 1993-2015 (14) 2.19 2.35 -0.16 
Ecuador 1987-2017 (20) 3.09 3.77   -0.68* 
El Salvador 1991-2017 (23) 0.96 1.83 -0.87 
Estonia 1993-2015 (14) 4.45 4.75   -0.30* 
Germany 1991-2015 (18) 0.72 0.58 0.14 
Guatemala 1986-2014 (5) -   3.94* -0.76 
Honduras 1989-2017 (28) 2.27 2.67 -0.40 
Latvia 1993-2015 (15) 4.53 4.25      0.28** 
Malaysia 1984-2015 (12) 2.65 3.01 -0.36 
Mexico 1989-2016 (15)   1.05*     1.57** -0.51 
Nicaragua 1993-2014 (6) 3.49 4.67 -1.18 
Panama 1989-2017 (24) 3.31 3.93 -0.62 
Poland 1985-2015 (15) 1.76 1.55 0.21 
Slovenia 1993-2015 (13) 2.09 2.38    -0.29** 
United States 1986-2016 (10) 0.86 0.66 0.20 
Consumption         
Bangladesh 1983-2016 (9) 1.17     0.82**     0.35** 
China--Urban 1990-2015 (13) 6.74 6.27 0.47 
Ghana 1987-2016 (7) 3.46 3.13     0.33** 
India--Rural 1983-2011 (6) 1.33 1.22     0.12** 
India--Urban 1983-2011 (6) 1.69 1.39 0.30 
Indonesia--Rural 1984-2017 (25) 4.00 3.71 0.29 
Indonesia--Urban 1984-2017 (25) 3.73 3.23 0.50 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic of 
1986-2016 (11) 2.35 2.66 -0.31 
Kazakhstan 1996-2017 (18) 4.39 4.86 -0.47 
Mexico 1984-2016 (15) -     0.63** -0.28 
Morocco 1984-2013 (6)     1.61**   1.44*    0.17* 
South Africa 1993-2014 (7) 3.34     2.50**     0.84** 
Sri Lanka 1985-2016 (8) 2.45 2.04 0.41 
Thailand 1981-2017 (23) 3.28 3.84 -0.56 
Tunisia 1985-2015 (7) 2.23 2.68 -0.45 
Ukraine 1992-2016 (19) 3.03 3.38     -0.34** 
Vietnam 1992-2016 (10) 6.30 6.65     -0.34** 
Notes: Estimates of the annual rate of long-run growth in 2011 PPP($) adjusted household per-capita 
income and consumption expenditures. All OLS estimates reported are statistically significant at the 1-
per cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 
10 per cent level). 
a Number of observations in the period in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent.  





A5.2 Implications of Some Alternative Model Assumptions 
In this appendix, four adjustments to the modelling assumptions are explored – changing 
to a constant savings function, the impact of a relative versus absolute satiation point in the 
original savings function, changes to the point in the distribution where satiation is reached, 
and changes to the planning horizon in the economy. 
The savings functional form employed – a judgement call with surprisingly limited 
implications – has received enough attention in seminars to warrant an appendix. Our 
colleague Dr Roger Fouquet observes that our differential savings rate model is akin to 
supposing a uniform savings rate but that higher-income members of society earn a higher 
return on savings in the aggregate production process. We might suppose these higher 
returns result from a more scrutinous selection of investments (the use of investment 
services) and might decline as we move down the income scale. Satiation point b then 
would denote the point where abnormally high returns begin to occur on average. 
Other colleagues suggest using a constant savings rate akin to setting 𝑏 = 0 and 
specifying total savings as 𝑠(𝑐𝑖(𝑡)) = ?̅? ∑ 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)
𝑁
𝑖=1  for 𝑖 = 1:𝑁 (all) of the population, and 
a distributional and time constant savings rate ?̅? which we can also interpret as the average 
national savings rate. We compare this to the current, differential savings function which 
is approximately stepped with both constant lower (below b), and upper (above b) savings 
rates of 0 and ?̂?. Suppose total consumption below b is 𝐶𝐿, above is 𝐶𝑈, and 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 1 is 
the population share below b and is relative (constant). Then the differential case savings 
total is (1 − 𝑏)?̂?𝐶𝑈 = 𝐼𝑈 and uniform case savings are ?̅?(𝑏𝐶𝐿 + (1 − 𝑏)𝐶𝑈) = 𝐼𝐿+𝑈. 
Setting 𝐼𝑈 = 𝐼𝐿+𝑈 and writing as ?̅? identifies the rate equivalent to ?̂?: 









Suppose we set ?̅? according to its parameters in the initial period and then compare the 
implications for total, savings-driven growth. From the previous paper, we observe for =
2 growth paths, 
𝐶𝐿
𝐶𝑈
, is constant, for > 2 is increasing, and for < 2 is decreasing. Further, 
the change in this ratio occurs slowest for  values closest to two and increases slowly as 
we follow  further away. For pathways around = 2 we can specify a value of 𝑠̅ leading 
to similar results, with higher  the ?̅?-based model would suggest higher growth and for 
lower  less growth. Since most long-run national estimates are around = [1.5, 2], our 
savings specification is perhaps more superficial novelty than departure.   
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Another matter is the implication of setting the satiation point as a relative versus absolute 
bound. That is, we might choose between modelling households as saving once they have 
surpassed some percentile in the distribution, e.g., 80th, versus some level, e.g., $100,000 
in real take-home income or consumption. One may be predisposed to assume an absolute 
satiation point is more appropriate as it is not uncommon to say “if I can just make six-
figures, I would save for retirement.” However, recent evidence on savings (Saez and 
Zucman, 2016) suggest the relative based distribution may be more appropriate. Also note 
that if the absolute condition were true, and always so, then in say the year 1900 it would 
have also been true. Undoubtedly, most households have become financially better off in 
the interim 120 or so years, yet most of the population continues to save as though they 
reside below the satiation point. The results of this paper have assumed a relative satiation 
point, but we present a comparison in Figure 47 in the form of a 100-year simulation 
repeated for preferences denoted by = 1, and only differing by whether 𝑏 is relative or 
absolute and set at the same initially equivalent values. In the short term – within 30-years 
or so – little difference emerges. However, over the extended period, differences in 
consumption and distribution become substantial. Under a relative assumption, greater 
inequality must be emphasised to accommodate growth, while under an absolute 
assumption, the capital saturation point maximising mean income is reached earlier. The 
form of satiation point may be a minor point, however, as one cannot generally expect a 




FIGURE 47. MEAN AND MEDIAN TRAJECTORIES OVER 100 YEARS 
Notes: Differences in growth of mean and median consumption levels (η=1 assumed) by 
whether the consumption satiation point (point of positive savings) is relative or absolute. The 
impact of absolute versus relative is small in foreseeable years (the next three or so decades) 
but has a substantial impact further out. Under a relative satiation assumption, higher inequality 
is necessary to drive growth resulting in a more extensive spread. Under an absolute 
assumption, an economy reaches steady-state capital and consumption levels over a shorter 
time. As a practical matter, it is likely inaccurate to have confidence in economic projections 
one-hundred years out given the unpredictability of advancements and limitations. 
 
Figure 48 reports the results of changing the relative satiation point with = {1, 2, 3} 
preferences simulated in each case. The 80th percentile satiation point is the default value 
based on interpretations of Saez and Zucman (2016) and Jebb, Tay, Diener, and Oishi 
(2018). Alternatives of 60th and 70th percentile relative satiation points are then compared. 
We observe that as the satiation point is reduced, growth paths pivot toward comparatively 
more equal growth. One interpretation is that there is less need to rely on the savings of the 




FIGURE 48. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF GROWTH PATHS TO INCOME SATIATION PERCENTILE 
Notes: Growth paths for = {1, 2, 3} preferences are compared under 80th, 70th, and 60th percentile 
income satiation points in the savings function. Compared to the default 80 th percentile assumption, 
as the satiation point is reduced, there is less need to rely on the savings of the wealthy to drive 
economic growth. 
 
Finally, I explore whether the planning horizon matters under the model assumptions. 
Figure 49 reports the results from repeating the simulation with different planning horizons. 
For each planning horizon, = {1, 2, 3} are simulated and subsequently the resulting 
growth paths are ordered from right to left. Naturally, with a longer planning horizon there 
is more time for growth to occur. However, the growth paths themselves differ. With a 
shorter planning period, there is less growth in later years to balance out an emphasis on 
investment in earlier years. So, with a shorter planning period, the growth shifts toward 
reducing inequality, or at least not growing inequality as quickly. One interpretation is that 
with a longer planning period, the population basically grows its way out of comparative 




FIGURE 49. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF GROWTH PATHS TO THE PLANNING HORIZON 
Notes: Alternative planning periods in the simulation of 20, 30, and 40 years with = {1, 2, 3} in each 
planning horizon resulting in growth paths ordered from right to left. In the shorter planning period, 
where later year growth cannot be relied on, the economic plan must emphasis growth in the lower 
percentiles of the income distribution to maximize summed welfare. With the longer planning period, 
the economy can grow its way out of poverty in line with what some macroeconomists advocate for. 
But with longer planning periods, much of the population spend their working lives comparatively 
poor in order to contribute directly or indirectly to a wealthier society later. 
 
A5.3 The Gamma Distribution Alternative 
Because we derive 𝜇 and 𝜎2 values from fitting a lognormal distribution directly on WID 
percentile values, we use this opportunity to present decomposition under a competing 
distributional assumption. The gamma distribution, 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)~Γ(𝑘(𝑡), (𝑡)), provides one such 
alternative. It follows from a similar decomposition process to the lognormal: from the 
gamma mean, 𝑘 , growth decomposes as ?̅? = 𝑔𝑘 + 𝑔 . For context, a decrease in shape 
parameter (k) increases the skewness of the gamma distribution, 2 √𝑘⁄ . Table 34 provides 




TABLE 34— DECOMPOSITION OF GROWTH INTO LN AND Г PARAMETERS, WID DATA 
 Period a Lognormal distribution Gamma distribution 








Brazil c 2001-2015 (15)     1.24** 1.54 -  1.25     0.86**  0.39 
China d 1978-2015 (38) 5.63 4.34 1.29  5.36 8.02 -2.66 
     Transition 1978-1999 (22) 4.65 3.54 1.10  4.45 7.45 -3.00 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 9.29 7.89 1.40  8.69 10.20 -1.51 
Côte d'Ivoire e 1988-2014 (6)   -1.48** -2.09 0.61 -1.84 - - 
Egypt f 1999-2015 (6) 1.45 1.67 -0.22  1.30 0.38 0.92 
France g 1900-2014 
(83/102) 
2.21 2.81 -0.60  2.43 1.87 0.56 
     Pre-WWII 1900-1939 (20/27) - 0.91 -0.70  0.68 -     0.92** 
     Post-war 1946-1969 (22/24) 4.52 4.39 -  4.58 4.56 - 
     Transition 1970-1999 (25/30) - 1.67 -1.36  1.40 - - 
     Present 2000-2014 (11/15) 2.47 -0.26 2.73  0.18 - - 
India h 1951-2013 (54/63) 1.84 1.82 -  2.05 2.59     -0.55** 
     Postcolonial 1951-1964 (12/14) 2.06 2.84 -0.78  2.31 - - 
     Transition 1965-1999 (32/35) 1.86 1.75 0.11  1.86 1.71 - 
     Present 2000-2013 (10/14) 3.74 2.98 0.76  4.42 12.69 -8.27 
Palestine f 1996-2011 (10) -1.33* -1.71 0.38   -1.27* - -0.77 
Russia i 1961-2015 (25/36) - - -  0.60 2.42 -1.85 
     USSR 1961-1989 (3/10) - - -  2.38 1.62  0.76 
     Transition 1990-1999 (6/10) - - - -5.38 - -9.59 
     Present 2000-2015 (16) 2.89 5.17 -2.29  4.09 2.37  1.72 
Turkey f 1994-2016 (16) 2.19 3.03 -  2.06 -      1.51** 
United States j 1962-2014 (51) 1.47 1.03 0.43  1.42 2.28 -0.86 
     Transition 1962-1980 (17) 1.62 1.53 -  1.50 1.43  0.07 
     Reaganomics 1981-1992 (12) 2.53 0.86 1.68  1.77 3.84 -2.07 
     Present 1993-2014 (22) 0.81 1.13 -  1.28 1.55 -0.28 
Notes: Growth and distribution of pre-tax income among individuals age 20 and over. Lognormal and gamma distributions 
fit to annual percentile income thresholds by maximum likelihood estimation. Under the lognormal distributional assumption, 
analytical values of 𝑐̅ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇 +
1
2
𝜎2) and 𝑐̃ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜇) enable decomposition of growth. Decomposition under a gamma 
distributional assumption follows from the mean, 𝑘 , when 𝑐𝑖(𝑡)~Γ(𝑘(𝑡), (𝑡)) and thus ?̅? = 𝑔𝑘 + 𝑔 . A decrease in shape 
parameter (k) suggests an increase in the skewness of the gamma distribution as 2 √𝑘⁄ . Statistically significant at the 1-per 
cent level or better using Huber–White standard errors unless otherwise noted (** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level). 
a Number of years within the period where the lognormal/gamma distribution fits well (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test) in parentheses. b Average annual growth rate, in per cent. 
Sources: Author calculations based on data discussed in c Morgan (2017); d Piketty, Yang, and Zucman (2017); e Czajka 
(2017); f Alvaredo, Assouad, and Piketty (2018); g Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret, and Piketty (2018); h Chancel and Piketty 
(2017); i Novokmet, Piketty, and Zucman (2018); j Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016), and available from World Inequality 
Database (WID), WID.world. 
 
